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The sun shone and gusts of hot air hit my face while I motorcycled down 
the road, alternately passing through patches of rice paddies and forests. I 
was somewhere I had been before, but something was different. It took a 
minute to put my finger on it: the previously ever- present dust floating in 
the air of eastern Goa’s hilly mining areas was gone. In India’s largest iron ore 
exporting state, mining had abruptly ceased. This seemed incongruous to 
the normal course of extractive ventures as there was still plenty of ore in the 
ground, and global iron ore prices and demand were at record highs. I had 
traveled to Goa to understand how and why the mining had been stopped. 
I was on this long ride with scholar Sebastian Rodrigues, an advocate of 
socio- environmental justice, and we traveled these winding roads to meet 
another key activist, Ramesh Gauns, in the town of Bicholim. The residents 
of this town, as in many other towns and villages around the world, had seen 
their lives deeply disrupted by a sudden and aggressive increase in mining 
activities in the 2000s. Mines, both legal and illegal, had surrounded their 
neighborhoods with little warning and certainly no free, prior, or informed 
consent— churning away forests, hills, and rice paddies, and turning their 
rivers into muddy flows of silt. At the height of the mining crisis it seemed 
like these communities would end up ground away, cast aside in favor of 
the ore buried in their very foundations. Yet the mining had been stopped.
From the tranquil rice fields in Bicholim we could see the hilltops of 
the Western Ghats mountains, stripped of their forests. The scars of mining 
operations were visible, brown open- pit mining areas, a visceral reminder 
of the scale of the destruction and turmoil. Now the hilltops were still; a 
few short months ago there was simply the traffic of trucks and the noise 
of mining excavators, but today birdsongs could be heard once again. This 
seemed to be something of a miracle, but I quickly figured out that this was 
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not a stand- alone case. In my travels across the iron ore mining areas and 
steel towns of India in 2013, I came across other places where birdsongs, the 
chatter of monkeys, and the conversations of citizens gathered at food stands 
were louder than extraction machines. In addition to the closures there was 
an even more unexpected finding, that new and purported to be impor-
tant planned mining projects, which would have removed mountains in the 
Tamil Nadu, Odisha, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand states of India, had also 
been discontinued. Even more shocking, this was not a phenomenon lim-
ited to the hills of India, as I also encountered shuttered and discontinued 
mining and extraction projects in Brazil. The common factor between these 
geographically distant examples was that these outcomes were mostly the 
result of different types of resistance led by communities or local NGOs, 
or both. This book will tell the story of how varying sets of local resistance 
groups succeeded— despite seemingly insurmountable odds.
Between 2005 and 2015, a time period that came to be known as the 
commodities “supercycle,” there was an unprecedented global boom in com-
modity prices. In many places the will to get rich through natural resource 
extraction did not meet the kind of fierce resistance that I witnessed in Brazil 
and India. This unprecedented will, coupled with a new level of industrial 
capacity to extract iron ore and other natural resources faster and in larger 
quantities than ever before, was happening simultaneously all around the 
world. The turn toward mining in Goa was part of a larger trend. When 
people affected by these mining operations tried to take a stand against the 
mines, they seldom managed to turn the boom to a bust. A more likely out-
come was greater monetary compensation by sharing the spoils of extractiv-
ism. However, for the people who were affected on the ground level, even 
this compensation was typically just a fraction of the riches carried away 
by those in power who pocketed the mining profits from the sapped lands 
of local communities. The lived environments of these communities were 
turned into natural resources, trucked out, and shipped away, while their 
possibilities of returning to prior land uses and livelihoods were rendered 
virtually impossible. However, Goa was different. A strong willingness 
joined with a capacity and innovative strategies to resist this “extractivism” 
was forged and spread. Willing to stop the extraction at almost any cost, 
activists threw themselves into a fight against a powerful force.
The activists in Goa approached their resistance from multiple angles and 
expressed openly in writing, speeches, and through other tangible actions 
what they thought and felt about this irreversible transformation of their 
home regions. These concrete actions forged an iron will for resistance. The 
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citizen- activists of Goa and several other parts of India formed mass social 
movements, campaigned, protested vehemently, networked with supporters 
around the world, and targeted state institutions to change the way those 
institutions treated mining. The results of this resistance were profound. 
Mining regulations were changed all around India, and the resistance led to 
massive discontinuations of mining operations and cancellation of irregular 
licenses in about half of the iron ore areas in the country. This iron will of 
resistance led to the discontinuation of practically all iron ore mining opera-
tions in Goa.
As fast, concrete, and actionable solutions to the worldwide life- 
threatening climate, biodiversity, and other socio- environmental crises are 
urgently needed, I went to India to document how this kind of change had 
been possible in practice. My first trip was in 2010 and introduced me to the 
efforts being made on the ground to resist the mining. I went to southern 
Goa, visiting the tribal villages there, walking for several hours across the 
Western Ghats’ rainforest- covered hills to the state of Karnataka with the 
locals, sleeping on the hard clay floor of huts in a remote village, deep in 
the forest and very seldom visited by outsiders. I covered this ground with 
the locals to understand what was being churned away and endangered by 
the spread of open- pit mines that I saw being gouged ever deeper into the 
hills. I returned in 2012– 13 to speak with those activists who had put their 
lives on the line to stop the mining destruction. In addition, I used this trip 
to visit the devastated and targeted areas to get an intimate knowledge of 
the lived environments after the mining ceased. I was guided by seasoned 
activists, such as Rodrigues and Gauns, who were among those spearheading 
the resistance in Goa. These men had personally felt the collateral damages 
of mining such as air pollution and its negative health impacts. They were 
active in writing poetry about their love for nature that was being destroyed 
and for the villages the mining was turning to dust. This poetry deeply reso-
nated with and inspired the citizenry, both in the affected areas and beyond. 
Rodrigues, who personally wrote over 1,000 blog posts between 2007 and 
2010 that collectively got over 100,000 views, considered the following as 
important qualities for developing a successful activism:
Write with evidence, make no compromises, refuse [private] talks 
[with companies]. The most critical thing was to talk out first, before 
trying to organize people. I played very risky, put myself in front, had 
a confidence that I can defend myself, while some other person might 
not. I knew I had lot of support, and miners underestimated us.
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This quote encapsulates a key feature behind success of the resistance in Goa, 
which was the willingness to resist and act, choosing the right choice of strat-
egies, and the avoidance of seeming potential allies who really did not work 
for the benefit of the locals in the long run. By “willingness,” I mean that 
initial active agency is crucial to launch into any broader resistance effort.
Standing on a hilltop temple in Bicholim with Rodrigues, I could see 
how the adjacent hills’ forests had been turned into mining areas. However, 
there was something visible beyond the expected green and brown contrast 
between the forest and the open mines. The hillsides were dotted with huge 
blue tarps: Why were these here? Rodrigues explained that the resistance 
had started to use satellite maps to detect the spread of mines and compare 
these with the official mining lease areas, which allowed them to accurately 
denounce irregularities. This “orbital” resistance had proved effective, and 
the miners were attempting to hide their actions from satellite observation 
by camouflaging the mines. The blue of the tarps blended with the green of 
the forest in the satellite images. This novel and evidence- based form of resis-
tance using satellite maps was just one of many that were explained to me 
throughout the years that I spent in areas targeted by large- scale investment 
projects aimed at creating and extracting “natural resources.”
My research has been mostly based around studying and understand-
ing natural resource politics and large- scale resource extraction investment 
projects. This work is timely and important, as on a truly global scale, the 
investment in the extraction of natural resources has been significantly accel-
erating and expanding. This unprecedented expanse is driven by increasing 
global demand and the allure of higher profits during a period of buoyant 
prices for a range of industrial raw materials. Numerous governments around 
the world, both in the Global North and Global South, have pursued the 
expansion of natural resource extraction projects. These projects have been 
explicitly justified and rationalized as a vehicle for economic growth and 
development. Mining has been at the center of this global expansion of 
extractivism. I have been doing fieldwork to support my research in Brazil 
since 2004 and India since 2010, as both of these countries were key play-
ers as extraction sites in this resource boom. My aim was to gather material 
for a book that would compare these two globally crucial sources of raw 
materials, which were also among the world’s largest democracies and rising 
powers during the 2000s. I have a long- standing interest in the phenomena 
of resistance and the conditions under which it forms, and what causes it 
to succeed or fail. This book reveals whether and how resistance influences 
local, national, and global extractive projects. This exploration of resistance 
in the face of extraction also engages with many other important political 
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processes, such as democratic decision- making within these two rising pow-
ers of Brazil and India.
During my journeys through India and Brazil, I visited iron ore mining 
and steel towns, forests, and mountain ranges during both the boom and 
bust periods of the global commodity supercycle. This book is about what I 
learned and observed in these different places. I heard many stories of extrac-
tion and resistance, and in several key moments I was there to personally 
observe the events as they unfolded on the ground. I traveled with the key 
players and observed their meetings where important decisions were dis-
cussed and adopted by the resistance. I got to see processes in their entirety 
from the seed of the idea to the execution of organized efforts, protests, and 
networking events. I also observed how the industry and selected state insti-
tutions made decisions, and visited many mining areas to understand how 
extraction takes place. For example, I was welcomed to the Vale headquar-
ters where the company directors gave me rare interviews, and was granted 
a coveted visit as an outsider to the world’s largest iron ore mine in Carajás, 
seeing in practice how the mine was cutting away the Amazon rainforest 
deep inside the mining area. It is these practical encounters and living with 
extraction and resistance that compelled me and piqued my interest. What 
I saw and heard led me to understand that there were many layers, under-
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This book explores how resistance to destructive extractive projects can suc-
ceed in keeping minerals in the ground even in very difficult circumstances. 
It demonstrates the importance of tackling the pressing global sustainability 
crises at the points of production, through a curbing of resource flow, which 
serves to affect the whole commodity chain. I explain how the use of five 
key strategies by local and larger- scale resistance is essential in addressing 
the global crises, mine by mine, based on a systematic comparison of these 
investment politics in Brazil and India as they took place during the recent 
commodity boom.
What I share herein is the result of many years of research on how resis-
tance can successfully discontinue extractive operations. My formative visits 
to Goa, introduced in the preface, play a central role in this narrative because 
they offer important lessons on what strategies and tactics local communi-
ties and people may consider when facing the thrust of extractivism.1 I will 
compare the strategies and outcomes in Goa to other, less successful and far 
more complicated attempts at resistance, to understand how best to forge 
the will to resist. Radical actions and concrete solutions are needed if we are 
to alter the currently rapid pace of resource depletion and the related severe 
problems that are being created around the world. I attempt to offer some 
examples of lived experiences of these actions and potential solutions and 
strategies for future resistance efforts.
The aim of this book is to study what is effective in keeping minerals in 
the ground, and more broadly, giving effective governance power for locals 
to impede the transformation of their lived environments into simply a plat-
form for destructive natural resource extraction, and which strategies do not 
support this.2 The first part of the book provides a general theory on how to 
study the resistance to extractivism. This provides tools for detailed analy-
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sis of investment politics and extractivism, including their resistance, across 
varying contexts. I will introduce five key strategies that are being used in 
differing combinations by a variety of types of resistance groups, which have 
targeted extractive operations. I compare these five strategies, which are 
intended to promote and support peaceful resistance to extractivism, with 
other, less successful or peaceful strategy choices. The second part of the 
book looks at how different contexts and contingencies influence the effec-
tiveness of the strategies, and which of them are more likely to be used in 
different contexts. The third part of the book provides more detailed politi-
cal ethnographic accounts that examine how these strategies functioned in 
different combinations within the specific contexts of resistance.
Extractivism
Generally, this book explains how the so- called commodity paradigm 
unfolded after its start around the mid- 2000s and how the will to extract at 
an accelerating pace and the opposing will to resist reshaped entire nations 
and regions. By “commodity paradigm,” investors and scholars looking at 
the unprecedented and widespread rise in a range of commodity prices dur-
ing the latter half of 2000s were referring to the possibility that the world 
might be experiencing a paradigm shift in relation to the valuation of global 
trade. The paradigm of the twentieth century, where commodity prices 
were falling while the value of industrial goods and services was increasing, 
could possibly be changing back to the situation at the turn of the twenti-
eth century, when resource exporting yielded comparatively more than after 
that.3 However, in comparison to the prior period of high commodity prices 
(approximately 1900), the commodity paradigm that started in mid- 2000s 
had novel features; raw material production costs were increasing globally 
while prices were not coming down substantially, even after a global eco-
nomic slowdown in 2008 (Kröger 2015a). I came to learn that these market 
tendencies were not directed by an invisible and impersonal hand, but rather 
caused to a large degree by politics, by personal and group efforts on the 
ground, which influenced extraction prices and impeded wanton expansion 
all around (Kröger 2019).
Extractivism has both political causes and effects, this being the politics 
that enfolds through environmental changes. The rapid shifts from accelera-
tion of and a resistance to extractivism have resulted in the imprisonment 
of key politicians at one end and the creation of new global activists at the 
other. During the late 2000s, extractivism became the dominant political- 
Introduction  3
Revised Pages
economic model of many governments around the globe. This extractivist 
turn created grave sustainability challenges with global impacts. Mining at 
the breakneck pace that extractivism demands induces socio- environmental 
havoc, including increased air pollution, soil and water pollution, and severe 
social and health problems that all increase steadily as unchecked mining 
activity increases.
I adopt the term “extractivism” to describe this accelerated natural 
resource extraction. This term has been quite important in the social sci-
ences and has been a key term in recent years to explain how Latin American 
countries molded their whole economies as export- oriented (neo- )extractiv-
ist economies (Burchardt and Dietz 2014; Gudynas 2015; McKay 2017). 
The term thus serves a broader political/economic analysis of important and 
contemporary social change processes (Ye et al. 2020). In Latin American 
(neo- )extractivism, financial remuneration for the megacorporations pre-
vails over the strengthening of the rights of citizens or environmental pro-
tection. While this is true of any sector that is engaged in extractivist prac-
tices, it is particularly true for the massively important export mining sector 
(Chomsky 2016; Gudynas 2012, 2016; Petras and Veltmeyer 2014; Valdivia 
2015). Mining expansion and conflicts illustrate the tension between belief 
in growth based on resource exploitation and demands that this extraction 
be curbed because it is either socio- environmentally unethical and unsus-
tainable (see Zhouri and Valencio 2014) or developmentally misguided (see 
Evans 2010; Marques 2007, 2012), or both (see Bunker 1985, 2003). In 
this book I lift the concept of extractivism out of its Latin American con-
text and use it as a lens through which to analyze the mining supercycle 
in India. Additionally, I will broaden the analytical power of extractivism 
by exploring in detail the social, physical, and symbolic dimensions and 
dynamics of the term. Research on extractivism as a concept that opens up 
in more detail and accuracy current key global transformations than prior 
concepts is growing. Jingzhong Ye, Jan Douwe van der Ploeg, Sergio Schnei-
der, and Teodor Shanin (2020: 158) provide several hypotheses on how to 
think of the world through extractivism, arguing that extractivism is a pat-
terning and structuring process that “explores the world for already existing, 
but still hidden wealth and then exploits it till it is exhausted,” without 
producing wealth. They argue that extractivism has been turning from iso-
lated local practices to macro- policies of entire nations (something that the 
debate on neo- extractivism started to point toward, see Svampa 2019), and 
has become evermore a hallmark of contemporary global capitalist develop-
ment. They also suggest that many scholars of resistance are myopic to the 
currently existing forms of resistance to global capitalism, as this phenom-
4  Iron Will
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enon has changed into a much more unproductive one, and has other novel-
ties that affect the forms of resistance. Exploring contemporary resistance in 
the global political economy through focus on resistance to extractivism, as 
in this book, can thus shed light on the real- world politics of today.
It is important to note that when using the term “extractivism,” I refer 
not only to the mining sector but also to other forms of natural resource 
exploitation, for example, agroextractivism and forestry extractivism. 
Extractivism, which derives from the Latin extrahere, and refers to the action 
of “pulling or drawing out,” has a negative connotation and is typically used 
to refer to large- scale or destructive forms of extraction. Extractivism would 
not be used to describe sustainable or balanced forms of making use of natu-
ral resources (Jalbert et al. 2017; Lang and Mokrani 2013; Willow 2018; Ye 
et al. 2020). There are many economic theories that study natural resources 
as “endowments,” which can have both positive and negative developmental 
outcomes depending on the kind of politics through which these resources 
are extracted, instead of tying a country to a fate due to its having these 
endowments (Nugent and Robinson 2010; Watts 2004). Extractive behav-
ior can take many forms, and, by extension, extractivism as a broader term 
is not one- dimensional. Rather, extractivism serves as a manifestation of 
the global market forces that seek ever- more profitable venues in which to 
invest. There is a long history to this process, with the past 5,000 years hav-
ing seen several phases of capital imperialist expansions, wherein extracting 
resources by power elites in ever- more distant places has been a key feature 
of an expanding world system (Frank and Gills 1993). The past five centu-
ries have greatly accelerated this process through the simultaneous conquest 
of the Americas and the linking of these new lands and other regions into a 
global system dominated and steered primarily by a capitalist world- ecology 
(Moore 2015). This world- ecology is inherently extractivist, as it relies on 
creating “cheap natures” and appropriating nature as a frontier- expanding 
process. Global extractivisms (of different types and sectors) are manifesta-
tions of this broader world- systemic process. As such, the extractivist boom, 
whose key years for iron ore were between 2007 and 2014, also called the 
“commodity supercycle” and “commodity paradigm,” was affected by the 
key changes in the capitalist world- system (a world- ecology), such as the 
2008 financial crisis, which led to abnormally high land and commodity 
prices, and thus also to land and resource grabbing (Bebbington and Bury 
2013; Edelman, Oya, and Borras 2013; Moore 2015).
In comparison to the analyses focusing on the economic or material 
aspects, a key analytical distinction I want to make is that extractivism is 
not only a physical process but it also takes place, in a parallel way, in social 
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and symbolic spaces. Extractivism entails a type of mind- set, ideology, and 
practice that seeks to primarily take from nature without giving back. In 
this extractivist thrust, the world is seen primarily as a series of objects and 
resources to be exploited, instead of a web of life composed of human and 
nonhuman living beings. The reciprocal and balanced, nonanthropocentric 
“lived environments” (see Taylor 2015) typical of many indigenous people 
and traditional populations (where one sees that one has to also give back 
to the nature if one takes something) are hidden by the ideological work, 
justifying framings, symbolic violence, and (de)legitimizing practices that 
are inherent to and produce extractivisms. As I will discuss, the locals facing 
these extractivist processes can and have used resistance actions in all the 
spheres on which global extractivism relies, including physical blocking of 
extraction, symbolic acts to revalue lives that are undervalued, the broaden-
ing of modern and Western understandings of what exists, and social actions 
to create networks and groups of resistance to counter the power of extrac-
tive capital.
To analyze the resistance to extractivism, I combine the more general 
theories of political economy and world- ecology with movement literature, 
as this unification can deliver particularly fruitful and powerful explanations 
of causalities. The goal is a nuanced theoretical framework that can cap-
ture detailed particularities, but present and analyze them in a general form. 
Resistance to expansion pressure is defined as those responses where people 
do not select a strategy of (loose or tight) incorporation into the business 
(e.g., by working at the mine, transporting ore, selling goods, or services 
locally) or conflict avoidance (e.g., by silently fleeing from the site of con-
vulsion), but where they fight (violently or nonviolently, visibly or silently) 
to defend their autonomy, to retain or increase their control over physical, 
social, and symbolic space. This conceptualization of resistance and power 
relations draws on Scott (2009) and Bourdieu (1991). I focus on public and 
visible politics, on collective action in investment politics, and thus do not 
discuss at length “weapons of the weak” (see Scott 2009) inside family or 
organization hierarchies.
The dynamics of contention approach (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 
2001, 2008) and the study of investment politics (McAdam and Boudet 
2012) make it clear that movements should not be studied alone, but as 
parts of larger political economic dynamics, where attention is also paid 
to the actions of targets and third parties (Luders 2010). In the study of 
movement outcomes, the analysis has usually focused on political outcomes 
(Amenta et al. 2010). There is, however, a budding scholarship studying the 
influence of movements on investment and economic outcomes (e.g., Bor-
6  Iron Will
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ras and Franco 2013; Bosi, Giugni, and Uba 2016; King 2008; King and 
Soule 2007; McAdam and Boudet 2012; Sherman 2011; Soule 2009; Vasi 
2009), demanding further analysis of the causalities between protest and 
business within the dynamics of contention (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 
2001, 2008). The two key gaps that Giugni and Grasso (2015) identify in 
the study of (environmental) social movements are the interplay between the 
local and global and the movements’ impacts. The detailed study of all the 
major iron ore mining regions of Brazil and India is an excellent platform to 
fill in the above theoretical and empirical gaps in knowledge.
Brazil and India
I chose Brazil and India for exploring the phenomenon of and resistance to 
extractivism because they are both globally prominent but underresearched 
centers of new investment and conflict that illustrate unexplored dimen-
sions and new actors in the global political economy and world- ecology. 
In this book, I explain how the Indian resistance succeeded, against all 
odds, to discontinue half of the iron ore production in India. Through the 
detailed analysis of a large database of ethnographic and other data that I 
have collected over the course of my fieldwork, this book sheds new light 
to crucial questions whose ramifications and importance are much broader 
than simply mining. One key question that underpins the book is, how do 
social movements influence the economy? Which strategies work to resist 
undesired extraction projects, and which do not? This book analyzes how 
communities resist extractivism as an ideology and policy used by corpora-
tions and governments to turn environments into sites of natural resource 
extraction, for the purposes of contributing to global production, the ever- 
expanding national production, and commodity markets.
I demonstrate how extractivism lies at the heart of the means by which 
political and corporate elites stay in power. During 2007– 14, iron ore min-
ing became a fast road to political power in both India and Brazil. Yet the 
people living at or near the extraction zones have revolted against these 
extractivist state policies, with varying degrees of success. In India, these 
resistance efforts were so successful that “resource nationalism” became the 
top risk in 2013 for mining companies (Ernst and Young 2013) and forced 
the country to curb exports. A political cascade effect of resistance at the 
point of production has the potential to disrupt commodity markets across 
the globe.
Extraction zones, such as mines, are often focal points for social resistance 
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to extractivist imperatives. This book is the first to trace successful local resis-
tance and evaluate the unsuccessful local resistance to extractivism in India 
and Brazil, looking specifically at an understudied locus of economic and 
environmental exploitation in the Global South— iron ore mines. I analyze 
all the major iron ore mines and expansion projects in these two globally 
crucial exporting countries through a multisited political ethnography to 
uncover how global mining processes operate in practice. I detail instances 
of resistance to extractivism itself, and analyze the outcomes of varying strat-
egies of resistance in different geopolitical contexts. The book thus answers 
two central questions: how to solve pressing global overproduction and sus-
tainability dilemmas, and what successful local resistance looks like.
The global commodity boom has meant not only a fiercely increasing 
resource exploitation but also a regulatory mobilization across the Global 
South. These mobilizations have led to the emergence of new subjectivities, 
including different types of social movements that include nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and armed revolutionary groups. Although territorial 
changes and modifications in investment pace and style have also occurred, I 
show how, from a movement perspective, a political identity change toward 
a willingness to resist extractivism has fostered deeper democracy, which has 
been an important outcome of conflicts.
Although there is a growing literature on global environmental gover-
nance, including works that compare particular resource sectors in India and 
Brazil,4 the cases and analysis provided in this book make an original contri-
bution to scholarship.5 Truly comparative studies that are well grounded in 
theory and build on a broad literature have been a rarity in the study of envi-
ronmental politics (Steinberg and VanDeveer 2012). To address this issue, 
I detail various local conflicts and cover new cases from varied analytical 
perspectives. In order to understand global political economy and ecology, 
it is important to look at domestic- and local- level policy- making (Schreurs 
2003). The regulation of extractive investments arises not only from gov-
ernment strategies but also from the comparative strength and strategies of 
resistance groups and their relations to the state and corporations. Yet in 
the existing literature the role of these other factors remains relatively unex-
plored (as noted, e.g., by Dalton, Recchia, and Rohrschneider 2003; Dryzek 
et al. 2003; McAdam and Boudet 2012). I aim to unveil these dynamics.
I will introduce and systematically apply a new theory of investment pol-
itics that explains when, how, and why investment politics arrive at certain 
outcomes.6 This framework is particularly useful for analyzing environmen-
tal politics, but can also be applied in other fields. Besides providing a way 
to systematically analyze several political games, which might or might not 
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be used by different actors, the theory presents tools for the study of deeply 
material and symbolic processes, such as extractivism and its resistance. I 
also present a theory of physical, social, and symbolic spaces as interrelated 
and internally distinguished loci for changing power relations. These two 
theories can be applied individually or in concert. They provide complemen-
tary and thus supportive takes on complex social processes. The explanatory 
power of these theories is demonstrated throughout the book.
Iron ore is a globally crucial, yet understudied, bulk commodity, which 
has become central to not just natural resource politics but politics in gen-
eral in India and Brazil. The steel– iron ore complex is also one of the most 
polluting and impactful sectors in terms of global warming, climate change, 
and socio- environmental disasters. Yet it has remained in the shadows while 
most media and policy attention has been placed on hydrocarbons and other 
minerals. Iron ore is Brazil’s most important export commodity and hugely 
important for India as well, supporting the decision to focus exclusively 
on this mineral in this analysis.7 Focus on iron ore, which generates the 
bulk of mining politics and economy, also rules out the problem of mineral 
specificity in the analysis. Typical analyses lump different types of minerals 
and metals together, which creates analytical problems, since for example 
gold, uranium, coal, iron ore, sand, and bauxite mining have very different 
conflict and political economic dynamics, due to their differing extraction 
styles, volumes, and production processes. As an example of how mineral 
specificity affects conflict dynamics, gold tends to create more conflicts due 
to its high pollution through mercury and cyanide use than other minerals 
(Özkaynak et al. 2015). Furthermore, focusing on one mineral made it feasi-
ble to cover all the major extraction and project sites, which is important for 
the analysis to be comprehensive, instead of relying on a sampling method 
that has to be well justified and still results in the problematic presence of 
what are called logical remainders, that is, unobserved cases. All the iron 
ore mining project areas in India and the main iron ore extraction and new 
project areas of Brazil through 2015 are included in my analysis and their 
locations are presented on the maps below.
India and Brazil provide a mix of similarity and disparity in contexts, 
state and government structures and actions, extraction models, local politi-
cal dynamics, and resistance strategies through which these gaps in the lit-
erature can be addressed. Both India and Brazil are large countries that were 
experiencing transitional or consolidating democracies during the 2005– 15 
period.8 The countries share institutional qualities, for example, they rank 
comparably in the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators in the cat-
egories that interest global extractive capital. These categories were cited in a 
report by the International Council on Mining and Metals (2013), a prom-
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ining lobby and interest group, illustrating that these factors are not random 
or theoretical, but significant in the real world for extractive business.9 This 
research setting of close affinity and slight differences allows for consideration 
of how their respective political systems do or do not influence extractive 
politics. The analysis focuses on the period between 2005 and 2015, when 
Brazil generally outperformed other BRICs countries (Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China) in the World Governance Indicators categories. Brazil’s higher 
ranking could be argued to offer better political opportunity structures for 
mobilization and would thus be a more permissive context for movements 
to achieve their goals. However, from the resistance viewpoint, the mining 
politics in Brazil have led to comparatively less favorable outcomes than in 
India. This suggests that state or other contextual factors related to gover-
nance cannot solely explain how and why resistance can impact extraction.
Brazil’s production of iron ore is booming, but Indian production has 
Map 1. India’s iron mining areas and projects. The size of the circles on the map 
represents the approximate extensions of the mining case areas.
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wound down dramatically since 2012. Both tendencies are hard to reverse, 
and this book explains why.10 This difference can be understood only by 
examining the role of new activist groups and progressive state actors in 
steering production, in India even more so than in Brazil. This is a story 
that has not been told explicitly although it has major theoretical and practi-
cal implications. In order to understand these new political dynamics, it is 
crucial to see how the new commodity paradigm is increasingly coproduced 
by grassroots groups, which can steer political economy at the point of com-
modity production. Between 2003 and 2010 global mining costs rose by 32 
percent and may rise by a further 40 percent between 2014 and 2024; the 
conventionally listed causes are the increasing costs of energy and produc-
tion (due to dwindling of world- class deposits), and tightening royalties and 
regulations (Carvalho et al. 2014, 225). I will show with my analysis how 
Map 2. Major iron mining conflicts in Brazil that are part of the data used in this 




resistance can also affect these costs. The struggles studied in this book are 
essentially connected with capitalism’s major reliance on producing what 
Moore (2014) calls “cheap natures.” The conventionally listed causes for the 
end of “cheap natures” do not take into consideration that, for example, it 
is estimated that half of the world’s population will have very limited access 
to water by 2030, while practically all mines already have severe water- use- 
related problems or conflicts (see Carvalho et al. 2014). Grassroots actions, 
what could be termed “politics from below,” will be an increasingly salient 
causal factor for explaining the investment politics of the future (see Borras 
and Franco 2013).
A particularly important parcel of the politics from below is the activism 
that surges from the actual physical locations of (would- be) resource extrac-
tion and tries to influence the outbound flow of resources by cutting off or 
regulating this process. Understanding the impact of these “upstream” strate-
gies to choke off and regulate access to resources at the point of extraction is 
critical for the global governance of climate change and other urgent socio- 
environmental challenges. Leaving such bulky and deeply emission- related 
minerals as iron ore in the ground is essential to effectively curb “carbon 
mobilization,” the key proximate cause of climate change (Bridge 2010, 830). 
Thus far, however, most policy and scholarly focus has been on downstream 
strategies to impact consumption and adaptation, which have resulted only 
in modest reductions in emissions and other damages (Bridge 2010). There-
fore, I focus on upstream strategies that carry untapped potential for address-
ing current global crises, mine by mine, conflict by conflict. Rising global 
powers, including, but not limited to, Brazil, India, China, Russia, South 
Africa, and Indonesia, are where the most research and attention should be 
placed, as they are the key to understanding the extractivist boom.
Mining Booms and Busts
The mining literature, specifically, needs further studies on conflicts, resis-
tance, and their relation to investment outcomes. Rather than studies that 
specifically address resistance to mining projects, there has been a focus on 
social and economic issues, including the financial compensation for popu-
lations displaced by mining operations, the working conditions in mines, 
and the relation of mining investment to development (Banerjee 2000; Beb-
bington et al. 2008; Evans, Goodman, and Lansbury 2002; Poteete 2009). 
A burgeoning literature studies mining conflicts and their management, 
and I will be contributing most directly to this literature, challenging some 
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findings and providing a framework to analyze how different investment 
outcomes are reached (a topic that has received very little attention). There 
are a few recent and impressive contributions that utilize large data sets to 
look for correlations. For example, Haslam and Tanimoune (2016) offer a 
large quantitative analysis of mining conflict determinants in Latin America, 
based on 640 cases, including many from Brazil (although not discussing 
these in detail or qualitatively). In these studies, the central focus has been 
on correlations between the causes, consequences, and character of mining 
conflicts (e.g., Özkaynak et al. 2012, 2015); more studies are needed on 
the causalities. The current theoretical frameworks have found it challeng-
ing to explain causalities in investment politics. For example, Özkaynak et 
al. (2015, 49) utilized statistical analyses to explore possible correlations 
between almost 350 mining cases around the world, and yet they could not 
discover “when a disruptive project will be stopped.” Most of the political 
science studies of mining protests have focused on the use of political pro-
cess theory to explain how liberal mining expansion has changed the inten-
sity and style of extraction- based mobilizations, while making some notes 
on broad- level consequences (e.g., Arce 2014); specific linking of particu-
lar struggles with their respective outcomes is still needed. Grievances and 
mobilization have received substantial attention, for example, Conde (2017) 
reviews over 200 publications on how and why communities resist mining 
globally, but this does not include the first- person ethnographic observation 
on which I built my data set. These prior studies identify several gaps, which 
this book will address. Haslam and Tanimoune (2016) suggest that case 
studies and qualitative approaches need to adopt hypothesis testing, better 
case selection, comparative approaches, and variance across dependent vari-
ables. This book does just that and will also address the key gaps that Conde 
(2017) identified in the mining literature. These include the state’s role in 
shaping resistance, the study of violence in conflicts, and cross- continental 
analyses of resistance upsurge causalities.
Brazilian mining has thus far received far less coverage than the rest of 
Latin America. For example, Brazil is not included in Bebbington and Bury 
(2013), which highlights resistance to mining in the Andes, and is also not 
discussed in detail in Deonandan and Dougherty (2017), which focuses on 
the push side of mineral extraction. The most up- to- date analysis on iron ore 
mining in Brazil is in Portuguese. Beatriz Saes (2018) uses the case of Brazil’s 
iron ore exports to discuss ecologically unequal trade, from the perspective 
of ecological economics. Saes provides compelling evidence on the socio- 
ecologically negative consequences of mining, and how the current form of 
Brazilian iron exporting leads to maldevelopment; with the analytical focus 
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on economics, not on politics, conflicts, or resistance. Two of the rare books 
in English that discuss mining and development in Brazil are Mining and 
the State in Brazilian Development by Gail Triner (2011) and Globalization 
and the Race for Natural Resources by Stephen Bunker and Paul Ciccantell 
(2005). However, neither discusses resistance or social movements. Triner 
offers a national historical explanation of why the iron ore sector has been 
focused on export, and the consequences of this for state formation. Both 
Triner and Bunker and Ciccantell provide important details on the relation 
between technologies of extraction, capital markets, and the state— thus 
providing the basis for a global geopolitical view and a world- ecology of iron 
ore (which should still be written). Bunker and Ciccantell focus on explain-
ing how the building of the Carajás iron ore mine in the Eastern Amazon 
reflects the general working dynamics of the capitalist world- system. The 
book’s main aim is to build neo- Marxist theorizing, a “new historical mate-
rialism,” and thus less value is given to political dynamics than to the role 
of materiality and economic scale in explaining why the race for resources 
has intensified in recent globalization. Although I use somewhat similar 
theorizing, I reach opposite conclusions: namely, in terms of political eco-
nomic dynamics and political relations, resistance movements have a larger 
role in defining investment outcomes than has been acknowledged in prior 
theorizing.
While Brazil remains underresearched from the perspective of iron ore 
mining, there is even less research done into the Indian mining sector in 
general, with the iron ore sector scarcely discussed. The most comprehen-
sive literature review on mining conflicts in India is provided by Bisht and 
Gerber (2017). They provide a preliminary overview of 100 conflict cases 
that shows how mining expansion has led to a growing number of ecological 
distribution conflicts, but do not study the politics or causalities in detail. 
They call for more fieldwork on various forms of mobilization and protests 
to generate deeper understanding on what constitutes successful resistance. 
Also a few other mining studies mention iron tangentially, these all tell-
ing a bleak story of correlations between mineral- rich locations and severe 
land conflicts and impoverishment, making the study of resistance potential 
essential to developmental agendas.11
Yet iron deserves more attention as it stands as a key ingredient in the 
process of nation building. In fact, access to abundant iron ore has been a 
necessary condition for a nation to become a global power (Bunker and Cic-
cantell 2005). Yet, the 2007– 14 global boom- bust cycle of iron ore has not 
been studied before this book. I shall show how both Brazilian and Indian 
miners have been able to produce cheap iron ore, costing much less than the 
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officially assumed costs of mining. Iron’s importance in industrialization has 
necessitated low prices and abundant quantities, while rising demand and 
a major global shift in the iron pricing system have introduced greater flex-
ibility to the trade, contributing to a conflictive iron ore boom- bust cycle 
between 2007 and 2014.12
The phenomenal rise of steel (an alloy composed of iron and carbon) 
demand in China since approximately 2005 placed considerable pressure on 
potential extraction sites around the globe, particularly in new resource fron-
tiers like India and Brazil. The global boom led miners to push for a major 
relaxation of the already- lax regulations, while the resistance demanded 
greater regulation. The extraction pace has been unrelenting, and left very 
little for the locals, the state, or future resource- users. For example, during 
the iron ore boom Goa captured, via royalties, only 0.3 percent of the value 
of depleted ore (Basu 2014). Eastern India’s national state- owned steel pro-
ducers are also running out of existing local supplies of iron ore and have 
thus engaged in what critics call a violent forest land grab at the expense of 
mostly indigenous peoples (Chhattisgarh Bachao Andolan 2014).13 Mean-
while, less violent, but just as destructive from an environmental perspec-
tive, expansion occurred in Western India, particularly in Goa and Karna-
taka’s Bellary region.
In India, a civil society countermovement against land grabbers won a 
moratorium on illegal mining in 2010 and, as a result of subsequent mea-
sures by the Indian government to retain output for domestic steel mills, 
exports were slashed in half by 2012.14 Illegal gains from resource theft have 
been under government investigation since mining- critical civil society 
organizations started pressuring the state to intervene in 2009– 10. In Goa, 
in September 2012, the Justice MB Shah Commission report on illegal iron 
ore mining quantified the total extraction value of ore from illegal encroach-
ments outside of leases between 2006 and 2010 at Rs 35,000 crore (about 
6.32 billion US dollars), with the commission demanding that mine owners 
pay that sum to the state.15 The commission concluded that if Goa continues 
such large- scale export of iron ore, representing over 60 percent (45 million 
tons) of India’s annual export, the resource will be depleted in nine years. 
In 2007, India’s production of iron ore as a percentage of the reserve base 
(over 5 percent) was the highest in the world, while Brazil’s was the second 
highest (over 3 percent) (Mishra 2010). Meanwhile, activists in Goa and 
elsewhere explained to federal- level politicians that while India was focused 
on exporting its ore, China and the United States have a policy of building 
an iron reserve. With this information the activists highlighted to decision- 
makers that iron is a crucial strategic mineral whose control will be essential 
Introduction  15
Revised Pages
for building global power and, particularly as domestic and global reserves 
dwindle, it can be used for world political control.
The iron ore boom became a fast road to power; especially for those who 
were on the leading edge of accessing the mineral deposits (e.g., by being a 
leading corporation or politician). Essentially, participating in extractivist 
mining was the way to accumulate economic and political power. Mining 
mafias formed in Goa, Karnataka, and elsewhere, and were linked to the 
national politics of India. Mining mafia refers to groups of individuals in 
positions of power, where the mixing and abuse of political and economic 
power and elite networks for gaining illegal access to mineral resources, and 
maximizing profits in the shortest amount of time by underpayment of roy-
alties, briberies of officials, threats, and violence against resistance to them, 
and other criminal acts. High- level informants knowledgeable about the 
mining mafia told me that the “BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] was funded in 
India largely by the Bellary Mafia,” which consisted of several state ministers 
of the BJP.16 This suggests that illegal mining yields have been a key source of 
political- party funding, illuminating many of the claims I heard. A Supreme 
Court insider asserted in an interview that “mining has turned into the most 
important part of politics in India today.”17
In August 2015, following the 2015 amendments to the Mines and 
Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act of 1957 that dropped export 
duties from 30 percent to 10 percent for iron ore below 58.0 percent grade, 
a Vedanta mine reopened in Goa.18 It was remarkable that only one mine 
in Goa reopened, of all the numerous mines that had been operating there, 
which suggests that the resistance has had long- lasting impacts. In 2018, fol-
lowing a petition by the Goa Foundation, an environmental NGO, India’s 
Supreme Court cancelled all eighty- eight iron ore mining leases in Goa, 
which meant the closure of all the mines.19 Once the resistance managed to 
stop extraction during the boom, time and world politics became its allies. 
As the boom waned, prices dropped significantly, and the Chinese buyers 
that had previously purchased the low- grade Goan ore had, during the three 
years the mines were closed, modified their steel mills to use average- grade 
iron ore from Australia. For these two reasons and the greater regulatory 
demands now imposed by the resistance, the 2015 Indian amendments to 
the Mines and Minerals Act do not have such dramatic impacts as it would 
have had if the resistance (and subsequent progressive government and judi-
cial orders) had not kept the mines closed since 2011. This upstream stop-
page has meant that downstream buyers have already incurred significant 
sunk costs in steering away from Indian ore, considered too risky a sup-
ply, thereby demonstrating how upstream resistance can outweigh even the 
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impact of future government policies, as global buyers refashion their supply 
chains and technologies based on current political conditions.
Resistance was very effective in India, leading to authorities restricting 
illegal mining, as well as impacting legal mining.20 The fall of exports con-
tinued, showing that the closure of mines has been hard to reverse. Between 
April 2014 and March 2015 India exported only 16.5 million tons of iron 
ore,21 thereby demonstrating the dramatic global impacts of local upstream 
struggles targeted at points of production. Importantly, these outcomes 
were reached during the mining boom, not after mineral prices slumped in 
2014. By 2016, mining companies were stuck with huge debts due to boom 
period overinvestment and low prices, forcing production in large quantities 
or shutting down or selling mines— so, in retrospect, the resistance efforts 
against extractivism appear to have been a benediction for a sounder gov-
ernance of the sector, including the management of investments. Based on 
the Brazilian and Indian iron ore booms, local resistance can cause a bust, 
or at least strongly influence not only ongoing extractivism but also the 
possibilities for future booms. However, at the local level, this “busting of 
booms” has not taken place in all parts of India or Brazil, for which reason 
much more detailed analysis is needed. It is therefore crucial to look at the 
political dynamics at the point of production, in operating and projected 
extraction zones.
Hypothesis: Five Key Resistance Strategies
The hypothesis explored in this book revolves around five key strategies that 
I think can generally explain when and how extractivist booms are busted 
by resistance. I will introduce the strategies here and then discuss each in 
further detail. These strategies will be identified and highlighted within the 
examples of resistance presented in this book:
 (a) organizing and politicizing a mass social movement;
 (b) campaigning by nonmodernist framing;
 (c)  protesting peacefully and physically so that this is noted, for ex-
ample by blocking important resource export routes;
 (d) networking; and
 (e)  (co)producing the state while retaining autonomy, by changing 
the rules or power relations through embedding in electoral, in-
stitutional, or judicial politics, or combinations of these.
Introduction  17
Revised Pages
I will use the following shorthand when referring to these strategies: (a) 
movement- building; (b) campaigning; (c) protesting; (d) networking; and 
(e) state embedding.
The findings suggest that these are generalizable strategies that activists 
from impacted populations can implement to slow down and even dis-
continue extractivist ventures and investments they consider harmful. The 
strategies apply both across industry- specific lines and in different political 
systems. I have come to identify these strategies through the work I did in 
India and Brazil. These are all peaceful strategies, not based on using arms 
to get what the resistance wants or being prepared to inflict violence on the 
targets or third parties. I also studied the role of armed resistance, to see 
what difference the use of violence made. Additionally, in my prior research, 
I found a highly similar strategy set was used simultaneously by movements 
from different parts of the world in tree- plantation- caused conflicts. When 
food sovereignty movements implemented a set of strategies very similar to 
the above, they managed to considerably slow down industrial plantation 
expansion, and even block greenfield projects and contract the size of exist-
ing plantations (Kröger 2013a, 2014). Having seen and identified similar 
strategies in action in two distinct, but still extractive, sectors led me to 
expand on these findings in this book. I was able to explore the generaliz-
ability of the findings by studying them within a different commodity and 
economic sector (iron ore), and two large countries, which had both similar 
and diverging contexts and political systems (Brazil and India). In addition, 
I study how these five key peaceful strategies function differently in nonar-
med and armed conflict contexts. I draw substantiated, well- grounded, and 
comprehensive conclusions based on the successes and failures in extractivist 
resistance over a several year period, which I have studied and personally 
observed in India and Brazil.
There are good reasons for separating different resistance strategies. Strat-
egy (a), organizing and politicizing, refers particularly to grassroots mass 
social movement organizations, not resistance by NGOs. I can thus study 
the impact of both and see whether it is necessary to have the kind of mass 
social movement organization as the 1.5 million- member Brazilian Landless 
Workers’ Movement (MST) to make a difference. This allows one to study 
whether and in which ways political and economic outcomes are linked to 
organizational structures.
I detail strategy (b) as campaigning using nonmodernist antimining fram-
ing. One could argue that all campaigns against investments are disruptive 
challenges. However, there are crucial differences in the degree and depth of 
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how frames challenge the established order. The campaigns most radically 
critical of extractivism fundamentally challenge the modernist and anthro-
pocentric notions of life, nature, and ethics. This nonmodernist framing also 
explains why most of the struggles I witnessed were about avoiding, stopping, 
and reversing mining. The locals saw that their ways of life would change 
drastically with mining. Mining and the ways in which it is enacted would 
serve as a proxy for establishing Western and modern ways of life. Mining was 
seen as having irreversible effects through its westernizing or modernizing 
of lived experiences, places, worlds, and even the way politics is done. The 
disaggregation of strategy (b) allows us to systematically study when and how 
resistance has made a difference by using or not using a nonmodernist fram-
ing of extractivism, which I will discuss in more detail in chapter 1.
It is sometimes assumed that social movements would always by defini-
tion include protesting (c) and networking (d), but this is not necessarily 
so and subsequently these two are disaggregated as specific strategies. Resis-
tance groups, or social movements, do not, in fact, always protest across 
the board in all the different cases where they are involved, or even against 
the same company or investment model (Kröger 2013a). Some movements, 
even massive, named, formal organizations, are limited to a locale or against 
one specific investment, and only later start to network (d) with groups in 
other locations or with national or global networks. Some local resistance 
groups are not networked at all.
In Latin America, civil society has largely shied away from interact-
ing with the state due to the perception that this would harm movement 
autonomy and integrity, and corrupt civil society. This attitude only began 
to change in the 1990s (Hellman 1992; Kröger 2011). There are still move-
ments that avoid almost all politics, which would mean interacting with 
state institutions, and many do this out of the justified fear of (their leaders 
especially) becoming co- opted into “clientelistic” or proextractivist, reform-
ist politics and abandon the more radical means and goals. Therefore, it is 
essential to analyze whether resistance actors can and have retained auton-
omy, even when they have interacted with the state.
State- society relations and synergies have been studied extensively under 
the rubric of embeddedness, and these studies emphasize that there is a deli-
cate balance between embedding and autonomy (Evans 1995; Evans and 
Heller 2015). While these studies focus on how the state should embed 
the civil society to foster development, I focus on how the resistance has 
embedded, coproduced, or even produced the state, and thus influenced 
the outcomes. I show how resistance can be constitutive in establishing new 
political opportunities, while retaining autonomy. Embedding includes 
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establishing deeper interpersonal ties between state and civil society actors. 
It can be assumed based on prior experiences that the resistance will not 
be effective even if it manages to establish deep interpersonal ties with the 
upper echelons of the state, or coproduces new rules and power relations 
within the state, if it loses its autonomy in this process, becoming a pawn 
in a game where it no longer sets the key goals. Retaining autonomy can 
thus be considered essential for the resistance to succeed in not only mildly 
steering extractivism but in actually discontinuing extractive operations. For 
this reason, both the maintenance of autonomy and state interactions can 
be hypothesized as being important. I thus study their mutual presence, 
and whether this has affected the outcomes. Furthermore, engaging with 
the state can be superficial or deep, ranging from pleas to powerholders to 
intervene to actually becoming a part of the processes whereby the resis-
tance constitutes new state structures, rules, capacities, or institutions, and I 
thus specify different degrees of state embedding. For example, coproducing 
new state institutions is a higher- level result than the establishment of inter-
personal ties. Through the state embedding strategy (e) the resistance can 
become involved in crafting new rules or power relations within electoral, 
institutional and structural, and judicial politics, through which important 
policy decisions are reached.
If all or some of the above five key strategies (a– e) are lumped together 
under “social movement action,” important differences cannot be analyzed, 
which becomes crucial particularly when studying the reasons for the out-
comes of investment politics at the project level. After disaggregating strate-
gies in enough detail (while maintaining comparability), it becomes possible 
to pinpoint when resistance has an impact, when it has none, and, perhaps 
most importantly, why. However, while resistance may be using one or sev-
eral of the above stances, which are clearly challenging extractivism, it may 
also be using strategies that are less clearly confrontational. I also study the 
role of these less confrontational strategies, by analyzing which kind of out-
comes are related to the participation in private politics initiatives of compa-
nies (e.g., corporate social responsibility), where an agreement is reached. In 
addition, I will analyze how armed revolutionary resistance and the threat of 
using arms influences investment outcomes; these were two distinct strate-
gies related to contexts of armed conflicts, and one or the other was used in 
quite a few of the Indian cases. This will be an important contribution, as 
the relative weight and relations between peaceful and armed resistance are 
rarely studied.
I am especially interested in the outcomes of resistance in place- based 
investment politics. I compare four political outcomes across the cases:
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• The transnational spread of resistance.
• The national spread of political and economic outcomes from this 
locality.
• The locally enduring and strong resistance capacities and willing-
ness created.
• Armed revolutionary agency created and spread across states by the 
conflict experience of the resistance.
The three economic outcomes compared are the following:
• All mines (or all projects, or both) are discontinued.
• Some mines are closed or expansion extension and volume are sig-
nificantly curtailed or there is a very major impact on extraction 
style (e.g., a nonmechanized, worker- controlled mine), or combi-
nations of these.
• Expansion is slowed down.
The findings illustrate that the five key strategies do play an important 
role, but the context, policy, and sector in question affect the outcomes 
that these strategies produce. This book is part of a broader comparison. 
My prior research dealt with forestry extractivism, looking at the politics 
around industrial tree plantations such as eucalyptus pulpwood monocul-
tures (Kröger 2013a). There was large- scale resistance against the expansion 
of these plantations, which managed in achieving its goals most success-
fully when using a strategy set similar to the five key strategies identified 
above. The findings of Iron Will show how the causal relation of the five key 
strategies with iron ore mining politics is even more drastic than with pulp 
investment expansion in Brazil, as it was the sufficient and ultimate cause for 
discontinuations of extractive operations in India. In Brazil, the results were 
mixed, suggesting a harder polity context for resistance than in India. Inter-
estingly, even a subset of these key strategies did lead to several projects being 
blocked even in Brazil, illustrating that not all of them are necessary for 
resistance to have major economic outcomes. I explore the reasons for these 
anomalies by a systematic comparison across all cases. This reveals that par-
ticipation in the private political initiatives of companies (i.e., “stakeholder 
dialogues” and similar schemes), where an agreement is reached, seem to 
have cut down or even defaulted the impact of using the five key strategies. 
Overall, my research suggests that simply engaging in private politics can 
seriously hinder the effects of other resistance strategies.22
Importantly, the sufficient (but not necessary) condition for reaching 
Introduction  21
Revised Pages
iron ore mine closures or blocking projects in India has been the use of all 
the five key strategies in concert. This means that not all of these have been 
necessary in India, but when all of them have been used, this has been suf-
ficient. I identify several cases where just some of these strategies were used, 
with quite surprising effects, such as project blockings.
Chapter Guide: Complementary Analyses of Causalities
To explain how and when resistance influences extractive investment, this 
book is divided into three parts. Part I builds the conceptual frameworks 
that are required for the kind of detailed analysis of investment politics that 
will follow. The major theories developed stem from the literature on agrar-
ian political economy and political ecology, world- ecology, and contentious 
politics. In chapter 1, I situate Iron Will in the literature, and explain the 
theoretical roots of the concepts that I develop and utilize. Chapter 2 pro-
vides two conceptual frameworks to analyze investment politics and spatial 
causalities, which are helpful not only for comparative politics, but can be 
applied more generally. Part I and the methodological appendix provide a 
detailed discussion of what needs to be considered when assessing complex 
causalities that explain political and economic outcomes in investment poli-
tics and environmental conflicts. Table 1 in the methodological appendix 
summarizes the basic data on the iron mining cases in Brazil and India. I 
compared twenty- three cases of mining politics. Seven were in Brazil and 
sixteen were in India. Sixteen cases were in existing mine areas (eleven in 
India, five in Brazil); seven were greenfield project areas (five in India, two 
in Brazil).
Part II examines the hypothesis by looking at the contextual and political 
system differences, and how these have shaped extractive politics, includ-
ing resistance styles and their impacts. This contextual approach is help-
ful in highlighting how resistance is formed in and forms different political 
settings. Chapter 3 compares several nonarmed conflict settings, starting 
with an analysis of the setting in Western India (Karnataka and Goa) of 
consolidating democracy. I then study the state of Minas Gerais in Brazil, 
which provides fruitful examples of how urban, middle- class, and NGO- 
based resistance to the expansion of extractivism in old, established, and 
traditionally promining regions are currently rising and how they function 
in such settings. The last section of chapter 3 studies the setting of the East-
ern Amazon in Brazil, where a globally significant commodity frontier is 
expanded forcefully. In the Eastern Amazon, the resistance did not resort 
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to taking up arms, contrary to what a significant part of the resistance to 
iron ore mining has done in India’s Chattisgarh and Jharkhand states, which 
are studied in chapter 4. This discrepancy provides a fruitful comparison, 
since both locales are cast as the key national resource frontiers, and are thus 
forcefully opened by the governments. Building on the work of chapter 3, 
chapter 4 argues that neither mobilization style nor the outcomes of resis-
tance can be explained without considering the role of armed conflict. The 
chapter includes an analysis of subregional variations in armed resistance 
agency targeting extractivism.
In part III, I explore in detail different peaceful resistance strategies, by 
regional political ethnographies focusing on nonarmed- conflict contexts. 
Part III is a detailed comparison of how different peaceful resistance strate-
gies function, and what have been the outcomes of their use, separately or 
in groups of two or more strategies used in the same case. I also delineate 
subcategories (tactics) for some of these strategies, which advocacy practitio-
ners might find useful. The effects and particularities of different combina-
tions of strategies are explored in differing contexts, through ethnographies 
of resistance cases. Chapter 5 analyzes the impact of mass social movements 
and collective protest on extractivist imperatives. For example, I explain how 
the Salem activists in Tamil Nadu were able to resist mining successfully, by 
deploying a narrow strategy that focused primarily on mass protest. This 
chapter highlights the importance of collective protest in extractivist resis-
tance. Chapter 6 uses the cases in Odisha and Goa to explore in detail the 
resistance benefits when using all the five key strategies in concert. Chap-
ter 7 analyzes the role of national and global coalition- building. I explain 
how global resistance to extractivism is not spearheaded by actors from the 
Global North, but rather it is based on mobilization surging at the points 
of production in the Global South, on which new transnational resistance 
coalitions can be built.
The conclusion addresses the ways to best tackle and start to solve the 
dire sustainability problems caused by global extractivism as informed by 
the rich assortment of cases discussed in the book. The contributions of Iron 
Will to a series of themes, disciplines, and research agendas are discussed. I 
then turn to avenues for future research.
I have discussed in this introduction the need to study extractivism and 
its resistance and explained how the study of iron ore mining politics in 
Brazil and India can deliver on several fronts. I explained how I came to 
write this book and introduced the key contemporary debates. There are 
many extremely interesting theoretical developments ongoing in the field 
of social movement studies, world- ecology, political ecology, and compara-
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tive politics that this book will unite. I welcome the reader to join for the 
rest of the book on a journey that explores how some of the most pressing 
sustainability issues that our planet faces have started to be tackled by largely 
unknown local movements. I suggest several ways for studying this ground-
swell in more detail and show how this can be done. Quotes from extremely 
inspiring, yet seldom heard- of social and environmental thinkers and eth-
nographic accounts reveal the real- world politics on which the building of 
steel- based societies relies.
In Brazil and India local resistance efforts were able to shut down destruc-
tive mining operations and projects even in very difficult circumstances. I 
observed and assert that these efforts consistently had more success in shut-
ting down mining projects if the resistance adopted the five key strategies, 
which I explore in detail in this book. These findings applied across the 
many different contexts and political systems that I encountered in my 
field research. However, there were contexts where resource conflicts were 
increasingly violent and armed, and in these conflicts special strategies were 
required. I hope that the worlds that are brought into focus and a height-





Theorizing the Impacts of  
Resistance to Extractivism
Part I is divided into two chapters that in tandem provide a robust explora-
tion of the theoretical backgrounds and aspects of the topics of extractivism 
and its resistance covered in this book. In addition, these chapters offer a 
set of theoretical tools for broader social scientific inquiry. The first chapter 
canvasses the key theories for the study of environmental politics and posi-
tions Iron Will in the academic literatures to which it contributes. Chapter 
1 also explains how to mobilize for sustainable and post- Cartesian worlds, 
and why the relations of state, government, and civil society actors should 
be studied in detail to understand when and where this can happen. The 
second chapter presents two novel theories premised on the concepts and 
ideas introduced in the first chapter. These two chapters create theoretical 
frameworks on investment politics and spatial causalities (between social, 
symbolic, and physical spaces) that will be used in analyzing the role of 





Resistance and Investment Outcomes
When I first arrived in Goa in 2010, traveling from the state of Maha-
rashtra also in India, where I had come to spend time in the vipassana 
meditation centers in Igatpuri and Mumbai before getting to know the 
mining conflicts, it was like arriving to another country. Everything 
around was a deep verdant green and there was an air of affluence. It 
was the monsoon season and the beach towns were empty of tourists. The 
insistent rains kept pouring over roofs, while I had long and lingering 
discussions with activists, such as Sebastian Rodrigues. Sebastian had 
traveled to Finland a few months earlier to share the mining problems 
of Goa with a European audience. When speaking with him, I learned 
that we both had an interest in the study of resistance movements and in 
the meditation technique taught by S. N. Goenka in India. These two 
connections inspired me to travel to India to learn more. In India, my 
learning curve was steep— especially regarding how to think about and 
conceptualize resistance efforts. I spent time reading in the moments I was 
alone, from Mahatma Gandhi to B. R. Ambedkar, which gave me new 
ideas to complement what I had learned in the academic arena, during 
my time at the University of California, Berkeley and the University of 
Helsinki. While Goa had several resemblances to Brazil, this was different 
from what I had learned in my years living there and other places around 
South America. This experience in India deepened my other knowledges, 
which were gleaned from the countryside and passing time among people 
living in rural areas, such as members of organized peasant movements, 
observing their lives. I will be starting each chapter with a narrative 
glimpse into my personal experiences and the process of doing the field 
research. These ethnographic vignettes serve as a second narrative that 
floats on top of the book. These brief stories will describe the sights, sounds, 
smells, colors, mood, and sensations of being in place on the ground as a 
witness to the events at the core of this book.
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Positioning Iron Will
Prior research on social movements has focused on studies where cases are 
selected based on the dependent variable and subsequently tend to focus on 
success rather than failure (McAdam and Boudet 2012). However, while 
this strategy lends itself to exploration of some movements, this positioning 
does not provide a full picture of responses to and actors in broader poli-
tics (Giugni, Bosi, and Uba 2013). Unlike typical social movement studies, 
this book is primarily concerned with understanding investment politics. It 
draws its primary material from a study that includes all the major iron ore 
projects in Brazil and India, not only the cases of resistance to those projects. 
This fuller spectrum of cases, some more and some less contentious, gives 
a better grounding to answer questions about both causes and outcomes. 
Using this data, I will be able to address the trajectory and outcome of spe-
cific forms of activism, as my database includes a larger set of different types 
of activism than is typically used in most comparative studies. Another fac-
tor that sets this book apart from the existing research is that I broaden and 
unite the study of armed resistance and peaceful movements— an approach 
called for by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001). Armed resistance is not 
homogenous, and it comes in many forms, as does its subcategory, armed 
revolutionary agency. To highlight these potential differences, I will briefly 
explain the different motivations and ends in two instances of armed resis-
tance. Take for the first example the Zapatistas, in Chiapas, Mexico, an 
armed group that was quite vocal about the presence of their arms. How-
ever, they did not use these arms primarily for violent ends; rather, they used 
them as an overt signal that made explicit there was a real possibility for 
armed resistance. For the second example, in Indian armed resistance the 
resistance actions rely on the actual use of arms to incite a Maoist revolu-
tion (Banerjee 2013; Choudhary 2012), or to secede from the state to form 
an ethnically separated region (Karlsson 2011). I will further distinguish 
such nuances in the types of actions used as different resistance strategies 
to address extractivism. To understand these nuances is a necessary step in 
examining these strategies because the type of action, in the specific context, 
might result in different political and economic outcomes.
The theory building of this book is a continuation of recent work in agrar-
ian political economy and critical agrarian studies that combines Polany-
ian and Marxist theories, which address the role of land in value creation 
with a detailed analysis of the roles played by resistance and other political 
dynamics (e.g., Kröger 2013a; Levien 2015). In line with what Marx called 
“primitive accumulation,” which is a situation where capital accumulates via 
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a process of predatory capitalism, dispossession and resistance may follow. 
Polanyi (2001), in turn, saw the rise of the “organic society,” which consists 
of progressive, regulation- creating state and civil society actors. For Polanyi, 
these entities work in conjunction as an almost automatic defense mecha-
nism of the society, which serves as a protective barrier against destruction by 
the overcommodification of nature, human life, and money. In this theory, 
Polanyi focused on the macro level and successful cases of civil movements. 
In this book my Polanyian observation serves primarily as a macro- level con-
cept to illustrate how Brazilian and Indian resistance, or at least a significant 
portion of these resistance efforts, has yielded a remarkable process, which 
unified many actors across the civil society and the progressive parts of the 
state in their attempt to respond to the problem of free- market mining. In 
addition to this macro lens, I will also contribute to Polanyian theorizing 
by explaining in detail how and when resistance happens within a specific 
context, and what forms this resistance takes.
There are spatial dimensions that distinguish the dynamics of resistance 
to global extractivism from social movements that are not so place based or 
directed at resource extraction. These spatial interactions between capital 
and resistance need to be considered when theorizing the resistance and 
alternatives to extractivism. An emblematic case is the MST, which uses the 
direct action of land occupation to boost settlement creation. These efforts, 
which are very strong at the main iron extraction site in Carajás, Brazil, are 
in direct conflict with the growth of iron ore exports. Some of these new 
land reform settlements, and the contentious actors inhabiting them, are in 
strategic locations from the perspective of the iron ore export industry. For 
instance, one key point of resistance action is the railroad, owned by the 
Vale Corporation, which runs from the Carajás mine through the Palmares 
II settlement of the MST in the Parauebebas municipality in Pará. The MST 
settlers and indigenous groups operating in their own traditional and func-
tional territories have blocked the railroad several times, reportedly causing 
millions of dollars’ worth of losses to the company through delays in iron 
exports. In these spaces, placed literally in the way of capital movement, the 
potential for mobilization has been successfully tapped by activists and used 
as a platform for globalizing the struggle through deliberate networking 
with other place- based groups. Iron ore extraction, in this sense, has served 
as the very fuel used to forge transnational coalitions that extend far beyond 
the starting point at the extraction site where the initial resistance ignited.
There have been many recent calls for a united resistance front against 
the dominant global system, and especially central in these calls has been the 
goal of uniting environmental and labor rights concerns. My analysis and 
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data address a dire need in the study of the potential of such counterhege-
monic globalization (Evans 2014) through the inclusion of cases that allow 
the assessment of how new networks of trade unions and environmental 
movements break old boundaries in extractivism. These data can provide 
new insights on the shift toward a Polanyian countermovement by way of 
an alliance between progressive trade unions and environmentalists against 
global capitalism. One of the clearest examples, but by no means the only 
one, is the case of the anti- Vale transnational resistance movement. Within 
the case examples herein there are multiple instances when workers’ move-
ments embraced environmentalism, but there are also cases in which trade 
unions were hostile toward environmentalist stances or citizen concerns, or 
both. This latter stance reflects the more typical framing of resource conflicts 
as representations of economic growth against the environment. The role 
of both stances to environmentalism by trade unions will be explored in 
the case material. These cases show that labor unions have been key play-
ers in many ways. Often the role of labor unions is simplified, in that they 
are characterized as only useful for generating strikes for better salaries or 
change in the style of investment. However, in my cases labor unions were 
also active in blocking the expansion of established brownfield mines (in 
Congonhas and Mariana in Minas Gerais in Brazil), or markedly slowing 
down the expansion of these mines (in Carajás and Maranhão in Brazil, and 
Dalli Rajhara in Chhattisgarh, India).
A large part of conflict resolution and management literatures miss the 
opportunity to reflect upon the question of which actors are actually served 
by the resolution of a conflict, and which are not. I investigate mining 
politics through an analytical lens where contention and conflict are not 
automatically assumed as a negative externality. Rather, they are respected 
as an instrumental part of political dynamics, and moreover as potentially 
able to have a positive impact on future democracy and development. This 
approach differs from the several studies on “resource curses,” which see 
conflicts in a negative light, and developmental failures as somehow flowing 
naturally from a country having ample natural resources. Instead, in the line 
of Watts (2004), which criticizes such approaches for their simplistic under-
standing of the many politics involved in defining the developmental and 
political outcomes in resource- rich contexts, I aim to provide a much more 
detailed explanation on the politics behind extractivist investments and their 
outcomes. Conflicts are instrumental in addressing unequal power relations 
and forwarding change in unethical circumstances. This is a normal process 
in politics and not a pathology to be cured. Whereas the study of power 
inequalities has been adapted in prior studies on political ecology, Iron Will 
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further widens the parameters of inquiry in political ecology and addresses 
key gaps in this field. Political ecology has historically had a marked pref-
erence for studying informal and unorganized politics from the viewpoint 
of the underdog. This is perhaps because the field “grew out of a desire to 
understand marginalization and contestations” (Wolford and Keene 2015, 
573). In addition, political ecologists typically focus on the level of individu-
als, households, communities, groups broadly defined, or organizations, yet 
they do not regularly study social movements. A reason for this could be 
the very limited interaction between sociology and political ecology (Wol-
ford and Keene 2015). This book departs from these two biases of prior 
political ecologies, instead looking in detail at organized politics and social 
movements. Thus, I can contribute new answers to the core aim of political 
ecology, which is to understand how the mechanisms of accumulation and 
extraction “shape, and are themselves shaped by, unequal locations within, 
access to and control over the environment” (Wolford and Keene 2015, 573, 
italics in the original). Questions like these serve to open up the power rela-
tions in environmental politics.
A substantial body of literature can be found on the mobilizations in 
India of lower castes and other marginal populations, such as the Adivasis, 
which is a collective term for indigenous peoples of the Indian subcontinent 
(e.g., Ganguly 2015; Guha 1989; Guha and Martinez- Alier 1997; Nilsen 
2012; Omvedt 1993; Shah 2010).1 There is a growing number of studies on 
environmentalism as it is enacted by these groups, and these studies provide 
important insights for use in global comparison. In line with the “environ-
mentalism of the poor,” which is characteristic of the Global South, Guha 
and Martinez- Alier (1997) offer evidence that Indian protest politics have 
been particularly marked by the enmeshed position of those defending both 
social and environmental justice. Mining struggles in both Brazil and India 
underline the point made by the aforementioned authors. Engaged activist- 
scholarship, such as ecofeminism (Mies and Shiva 2014), has been strongly 
present in India, of which Shiva (1991) is an important early exemplar. The 
key argument is that, due to India’s specific setting, environmental struggles 
are often struggles for survival. The comparisons I make with Brazil provide 
new insights for both the study of Brazil and India. The particularities of the 
Indian struggles (i.e., there is nowhere else for the displaced to go, after so 
many displacements by land grabs) might explain a part of the differences in 
mobilization in comparison to Brazil, where resource frontier expansion is 
still an option— not only for the capitalists, rich, and middle- class peasants, 
but even for many of the poor (Kröger 2015b). Putting the Latin American 
and South Asian literatures in discussion with each other, especially in light 
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of the concrete cases I observed, is thus fruitful, and an exercise that needs 
to be done.
In overall explanations of Indian politics, social movements have not 
been in the limelight, something that the recent rise in movement schol-
arship is trying to rectify.2 What are especially needed are detailed stud-
ies on the relation between different strategies and their political economic 
outcomes. As Baviskar (2014, 51) notes, “Only the rare study attributes 
agency and dynamism to villagers. And if it does so, collective action is 
shown as a mysterious, spontaneous phenomenon, with little attention to 
the mobilization of resources and the transformation of consciousness.” This 
is a shortcoming, which is directly addressed through my study of and on 
the key mobilizing strategies. I will contribute to the growing literature on 
environmental/land- based movements in India, which includes for example 
the work of Temper (2014) and Levien (2015, 2018). The cases presented in 
this book serve to expand the scale and scope of this scholarship, and thus 
also challenge and corroborate some of the existing claims, based on other 
cases, such as the resistance against free- trade zones and bauxite mines.
Globally, new conceptual frameworks are needed to accommodate com-
plex realities and social actors, which vary from case to case. Recent ethno-
graphic inquiries into mining conflicts, inspired by Bruno Latour, have been 
adamant to highlight that the classic actor categories and analytical concepts 
are too rigid and thus do not represent the reality of cleavage lines in places 
such as Papua New Guinea (e.g., Golub 2014) or Peru (Li 2015). In my 
study, I understand social actors as being formed by conjoined strategies, 
mechanisms, and processes, instead of as ontologically “existing” actors. This 
holds especially true when applied to social constructions, which include 
particular social movements.
This book adds to the existing scholarship on world- ecology. World- 
ecology scholarship suggests that any study of environmental politics should 
begin with an explicit discussion of what the authors and the people in the 
studied area understand by the key concepts of “nature” and the “environ-
ment.” There is a helpful recent scholarship that looks for conceptualizations 
of these concepts that transcend nature- society dualism, and I will build on 
these, as they are in line with the local conceptualizations of the indigenous 
and other populations that I encountered in the fieldwork for this study. In 
line with this intention, I suggest that the concepts of lived environments (see 
Taylor 2015) and historic natures (see Moore 2015) are helpful for provid-
ing a post- Cartesian analysis.3 These concepts also help to avoid the trap of 
flat ontological thinking where sentient beings are equalized with all sorts 
of “things”; I find it is essential to distinguish the existence of different types 
Resistance and Investment Outcomes  33
Revised Pages
of beings. This includes sentient beings and human beings among the other 
types of beings that exist in the world. While the production of “nature” is 
not the key focus of this book, I will refer to political ontology (Blaser 2009; 
de la Cadena 2015) and world- ecology and their importance as complemen-
tary post- Cartesian approaches when suggesting avenues for future research 
on the politics of extractivism.
Another key factor to be opened and explored is the definition and 
understanding of indigeneity, which is one of the central themes in the 
study of extractivism. In this book, I follow the understanding of Ingold 
(2000) on indigeneity, according to which, lived practices, skills, and daily 
tasks, as well as dwelling in particular natures, constitute specific lived envi-
ronments. The primordial or green primitivist view of indigeneity, which 
assumes all tribal people are “noble savages,” is dated, as demonstrated for 
example by Karlsson’s (2011) study of the heavy extraction of minerals and 
timber by Northeast India’s indigenous inhabitants. There are many varieties 
of lived environments in India, especially in terms of the form of dwelling. 
The sustainable dwellers are typically Adivasi people, but not exclusively— 
ancestry or genes do not automatically make one an environmentalist, as the 
political ecological critique of the romanticizing of “local communities” has 
aptly noted. However, it is still the case that those who are irreversibly trans-
forming forest areas by ordering the digging of open- pit mines are typically 
upper- caste people, or from the upper classes— although many prominent 
environmentalists also come from these castes and classes. The latter groups’ 
dwellings are not place based— as capitalist mine owners, they often live in 
the cities— and their connection with the mining areas (previous Adivasi 
dwelling areas) usually lasts only as long as the ore does.4
The politics surrounding indigeneity is, in many cases, a key dynamic 
in explaining the outcomes of extractivism. Watts’s (2004) study on Nige-
rian oil politics exhibits how the politics of indigeneity do not necessar-
ily rely on any preexisting historical continuity of ethnicity, and can lead 
to very violent, unequal, and racist dynamics. This can occur both within 
the created ethnic group and in its relations to other groups. Li (2015) has 
made a similar claim in the case of Peru’s mining conflicts, pointing out that 
indigenous- led protests have also been held in favor of mining companies. 
For this reason, Li (2015) argues that the classic cleavage lines (e.g., the 
corporate- community clash) and sociological categories (e.g., indigenous) 
might not describe the conflict dynamics of extractivism very well.
The theory presented herein offers a response to classic theories of human 
emancipation and the class theories of Marx (1887), both of which have had 
trouble in encompassing the complexities presented by societies, especially in 
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the Global South. The understanding of resistance in this book ties together 
many threads, including the emancipatory theories of the Frankfurt school, 
which looked at, among other theories, emancipation as a cultural phenom-
enon (Gunderson 2015); the Freirean view of freedom as a pedagogical pro-
cess (Freire 2000); and autonomist tendencies, which see emancipation as 
the rejection of work and control. The classic Marxist theories, in contrast, 
are based on the empirics of an industrial working class and emancipation 
arising from exploited labor. Although post- Marxist and feminist literature 
have fruitfully criticized the classic theories (e.g., Mies and Shiva 2014), a 
look at the resistance to extractivism embraces socio- ecological conflicts on 
a much wider, more likely, and currently unfolding scope, which problema-
tizes paid labor, male- dominated working classes, and other Western- based 
emancipation views. Although there are classic dimensions included in the 
theory proposed here, the conceptual toolbox also allows the explanation 
of how, for example, not only the mine worker but also a social movement 
with ecological dimensions can usher in emancipation, thus broadening the 
circle of agency in classic theories. Resistance to extractivism challenges prior 
classic theories of emancipation, offering both a challenge and a possibility 
for theoretical renewal. This broadening takes place by including advances 
in contentious politics theorizing; Indian and Brazilian movement scholar-
ship; the study of mining; general natural resources and environmental con-
flicts; world- ecology and land- grabbing resistance literature; and allowing 
the empirical reality of the studied cases to inform advances in the phenom-
ena and unite them. The multifaceted resistance to extractivism, as concep-
tualized in this book, offers a nuanced explanatory tool for politics across 
contexts.
In my study of strategies for resistance, I work particularly with the strand 
of research that explores contentious politics. This type of politics could be 
called relational and seeks for organizing concepts beyond the structure- 
agency debate. Relational scholarship, exemplified by Doug McAdam, Sid-
ney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly’s Dynamics of Contention (2001), demands a 
more dynamic framework. This has led scholars to study political opportu-
nity structures more relationally, which explains how movements can create 
structures, opportunities, and political game rules for themselves, instead of 
waiting for them to “open up” from above. Bunce and Wolchik (2011, 16) 
observe how electoral politics “can be ideal sites for expanding opportuni-
ties for mobilization while lessening the familiar constraints on collective 
action.” Agency is to be considered in conjunction with political process 
analysis because, as noted by Hadden (2015, 87), “political structures do 
influence the forms of action that groups use when they contest climate 
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change. But the effect of this structure is not uniform, and some organiza-
tions systematically seem to ignore political opportunities. In other words, 
the results suggest that structure is important, but agency is real.” This is a 
helpful notion, serving to suggest, for example, that armed resource conflict 
is not only a result of political structures but also of revolutionary agency— 
potentially ignoring political opportunities. Building on the relational 
approach, I introduce different arenas of politics as key sites to be studied, 
such as “electoral politics,” which includes actors beyond just political par-
ties (both of the government and the opposition) and elected politicians, 
but also extractivist corporate and resistance actors that engage in electoral 
politics. This relational and dynamic approach to studying investment poli-
tics will also be helpful in explaining their contours and trajectories better 
than structural arguments. In fact, explanatory frameworks relying overtly 
on contextual analysis have been unable to capture the unfolding conflict 
dynamics around iron ore mining in Brazil.5
Mobilizing for Sustainable Worlds
Extractivist projects that churn up the lived environments of local popula-
tions create grievances. There is potential for mobilization in all the iron ore 
project areas in Brazil and India, as there are people whose lived environ-
ments are being targeted. The mining areas in both India and Brazil are not 
empty voids; there are people that live within them, and thus there is the 
potential for mobilization against disruption of these environments. These 
areas contain social groups that often have very different developmental and 
political goals than the extractive industry. Polanyi emphasized that there are 
certain areas of life, and thresholds of society, that when broken lead to the 
rise of an “organic society” as a countermovement regulating capital. How-
ever, detailed research has shown that not all types of grievances are the same 
or have the same tendency to support mobilization efforts (Kröger 2013b). 
There is a particular need to identify the type of grievances and the kind of 
strategic actions that seem to work together to support resistance mobiliza-
tion, which is not an automatic process. When examining and attempting 
to understand the micro level or when comparing multiple cases, automatic 
social self- defense cannot be assumed, and self- destruction remains a plau-
sible alternative in the absence of resistance. The cognitive promotion of 
action by pinpointing a relative worsening of conditions, or lack thereof, 
explains the degree variance between cases where resistance does and does 
not take place.
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Local grievances can only be used as a starting point for developing a 
broader understanding of the myriad political dynamics at play in conflicts. 
After these grievances have been turned into budding activism, the resistance 
groups typically use one or more of what I have identified as the five key strat-
egies to pursue peaceful resistance in a more concerted way. The strategies 
are (a) movement- building; (b) campaigning; (c) protesting; (d) networking; 
and (e) state embedding. These strategies of resistance support not only each 
other but also a peaceful mobilization process. The work of organizing and 
politicizing within a resistance group creates a social movement and is essen-
tial in fostering, for example, interpersonal trust between members. Trust is 
a key element in the acts of protest by these movements: the more militant 
and dangerous the act, the deeper the required trust between and among the 
members of the movement (Benson and Rochon 2004). Importantly, this 
applies across contexts and in both democratic and nondemocratic states, 
with higher trust levels correlating with more protests (Benson and Rochon 
2004). Trust allows a rise in the intensity of participation, which means that 
a wider array of strategies become available. Notably, the act of staging and 
executing a protest often creates a positive feedback loop for trust levels. 
Protests can bind participants together through the shared experience; for 
example, within the Brazilian Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) their 
land occupations have served as the most important sites of movement cre-
ation (Kröger 2011). In another example, while studying the presence of 
cognitive activation to recognize injustice in India’s Dalit population, Dav-
enport and Trivedi (2013) found that training in nonviolent resistance (for 
example, in the Ambedkarian Buddhist tradition, or the Gandhian Hinduist 
tradition known as satyagraha) was important in making people who rarely 
participated in activism much more aware of injustices, and thus more likely 
to protest. Likewise, exposure to other activists, or to oppression/oppressors, 
led to cognitive activation.
Campaigning through specific framing actions is closely related to boost-
ing the will to resist. Reviewing the studies using the framing perspective— 
which has mostly focused on explaining political or economic outcomes, 
as I also do— Snow et al. (2014, 35) argue that for activists the framing of 
their core claims has “a decisive impact on building movements, winning 
positive outcomes, and shaping the overall trajectories of movement efforts.” 
Normative struggles are key, that is, struggles whereby well- chosen words, 
phrases, images, banners, and other aids are used to communicate with their 
target audience to challenge the established order and depict mining, for 
example, as “socio- environmental havoc” or “criminal activity,” or both, 
rather than “development.”
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Besides the above framings, campaigning by nonmodernist framing has 
been an essential element in many mining struggles. The usage of nonmod-
ernist concepts, for example, in Ausangate in Peru or Niamgiri in India, 
challenges the whole apparatus of modern politics by invoking the agency 
of nature, usually through a cosmology wherein nature is made holy, and 
the ontological invoking of extrahuman or non- Western beings, which 
are difficult to comprehend or even to describe by Western notions. Such 
framings stretch and redefine moral action and ethics. These nonmodernist 
framings, which do not put a monetary value on nature, are currently on 
the rise— or at least gaining more attention— in many parts of the world. 
In India, the Niamgiri mining project has been studied in these respects, 
but there are also many other cases, such as the National Mineral Devel-
opment Corporation mines in southern Chhattisgarh, which the local 
Adivasis hold as holy, and several hills in Tamil Nadu. I study these cases 
here in the global context of such rising ontological conflicts across extrac-
tive settings. It is worth mentioning that my understanding of resistance 
“strategy” as a mechanism, which can have crucial impacts in shaping the 
political arena and thus influencing the investment outcomes, draws from 
broader global literatures and comparisons. I also visited Peru while writ-
ing this book, to witness the myriad mining conflicts there, where non-
modernist understandings and ontologies of mountains as something more 
than mere mountains, and something entirely different, are ubiquitous. In 
Cusco, Peru, local resistance has claimed that the mountain, identified as 
an earth- being (or earth- being that is also a mountain, Ausangate), is upset 
and angry about a proposed mining project (de la Cadena 2015), a framing 
that challenges the language and thus politics and ethics of “modernics,” as 
Eduardo Gudynas has pointed out.6 Most framing in extractive conflicts is 
still anthropocentric, even when offered by resistance groups. This results in 
politics as usual, which can be effective, but also sometimes is not enough. 
Gudynas (2015) argues that politics that frame nature by its monetary 
value do not instigate the revision of the anthropocentric ethic. However, 
the surge of new, nonanthropocentric framing does, and will, change the 
way that political dynamics work. Gudynas (2015, 434, translation from 
Spanish by the author) writes:
The recuperation of other values in Nature, and particularly when its 
own rights are recognized, is not only an antidote to extractivisms, 
but an alternative to anthropocentric ethics. . . . any change in this 
spinal cord of values generates a cascade of modifications at many 
other levels.
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These notions are important, as during the course of field research I ran 
into such framings and understandings of the world and lived environments, 
which challenged mining in a way that goes far beyond the option of seeking 
compensation (which should not be seen as an option if we are looking for 
the kind of solutions that a real solving of the current crises would require).
Framing as a tool for boosting mobilization for sustainable worlds is then 
most efficient when it deals with morality and ethics, as this changes the whole 
political economy and ecology and the way political dynamics operate. I would 
thus refer to the nonanthropocentric symbolizations of mining as a “post- 
Cartesian mining politics.” Post- Cartesian refers to understandings of nature 
that are not based on the nature/society dualism that is indicative of the think-
ing of the seventeenth- century French philosopher René Descartes. Descartes 
has been criticized, for example, by ecofeminism as establishing a frame of mind 
through which the rest of the world could be divided into nature and society, 
and thus it can be used as a source of wealth to be exploited and appropriated 
to advance the key goal of “enlightening” the mind of the white European elite 
men (the “society”), which was seen as the pinnacle of Enlightenment (Mies, 
Bennholdt- Thomsen, and von Werlhof 1988). Building on this criticism, world- 
ecology has analyzed how capitalism is an ideological process that relies on the 
Cartesian dualism of separating nature from society. What is explicitly included 
in the conceptualization of “nature” has differed— especially in prior centuries. A 
prominent example of this was the framing and treating of most non- European 
peoples as part of “nature,” who could be utilized as slaves or servants, whose life 
and labor could be extracted for free or at extremely low cost for the service of 
the “society” (Moore 2014). Post- or pre- Cartesian refers to such understand-
ings that do not have this anthropocentrism, such as the biocentric views of 
Henry Thoreau, and the many indigenous cosmologies of Latin America, some 
of which have been enshrined in new constitutions that grant rights to nature, 
at least on paper (Gudynas 2009). Gudynas (2015, 434, author’s translation 
from Spanish) finds that extractivists typically want to push moral and ethical 
discussions of this sort aside as weird and irrelevant, while for him this is “the 
fundamental question”:
Many of the current problems originate in how values are under-
stood, and any alternative would require changes in them. A suspen-
sion of ethics is what makes . . . [possible the] extractivist imposition. 
For this reason, conceptions such as Vivir Bien or the rights of Nature 
are without a doubt alternatives, but become substantial in promul-
gating ethical changes that open the door to other valuations, thus 
generating consequences on many levels.7
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Framing that recognizes the rights of “extrahuman” nature seems to be 
an efficient way to change natural resource politics into post- Cartesian envi-
ronmental politics. I share the view of Gudynas (2015, 434, translation by 
the author from Spanish) that such a broadening of terms “opens alterna-
tive paths between us,” paths that should result in making a break with “the 
bonds of anthropocentrisms and utilitarianisms.” Political ontology (Blaser 
2009; de la Cadena 2015; Escobar 2011) has also made these kinds of obser-
vations. In addition, environmental historians, such as Joan Martinez- Alier, 
aware of the novelty and deep impacts of pricing nature, have warned that 
the last thing resistance should do is put a monetary value on the environ-
ment.8 This is because then they are in great danger of losing their lived envi-
ronments, the physical places that form the very basis of their existence and 
lifestyles and cosmologies, when these places are being mined or otherwise 
destroyed, as they are turned into money.
Resistance and the State
Besides organizing, campaigning, protesting, and networking, I argue that 
resistance is most likely to attain its goal when participating in and trying 
to change the rules of state- mediated political games, through which official 
policies are made, while also retaining its autonomy. There are three such key 
political games to challenge extractivism through legal and routine politics. 
The first is electoral politics, for example through targeted voting for politi-
cians opposing mining or allying with politicians seeking mine closure. For 
example, the mayors of two important cities (Congonhas and Mariana in 
Brazil) were convinced to join the resistance. The second is institutional and 
structural politics, such as acquiring progressive state- actor led investigations 
via advocacy, successfully demanding that regulatory institutions intervene 
to uphold the rule of law, occupying key institutions, or crafting new insti-
tutions. For example, in India, resistance actions enabled the establishment 
of a new national commission to investigate mining irregularities and regu-
late them. The third is judicial politics, which could strengthen litigation in 
court against the project among other possible outcomes. As an example of 
coproducing new power relations within judicial politics, professional legal 
NGOs from Goa and Karnataka created new capacities for courts to uphold 
India’s mining laws and ensured that this took place through their high- 
quality litigation.
The above separation of key political games is a contribution to existing 
theorizing on state- society relations. In the study of environmental politics, 
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the state has been conceived either as an actor or as an arena for governance 
(Duit 2014). This dual role of the state is incorporated into the theoreti-
cal framework that guides my analysis. This is especially pertinent as recent 
comparative scholarship on environmental governance has found ample evi-
dence that the role of the state has not withered away (Duit 2014). As a 
matter of fact, a reasonable initial hypothesis in explaining the outcomes of 
investments would merely be a state- centric explanatory framework, wherein 
the analysis of the state as the most powerful actor in society would be suf-
ficient. Yet, out in the field, I quickly came to notice that state- centered 
explanations cannot in practice explain when and how extractive operations 
expand or contract. To understand the nuance of these fluctuations in the 
size and scale of extractive practice a much more dynamic view of the state 
is required. This differs from a simple statement that the state does or does 
not matter. States do matter, this is not contested, but how they matter in 
today’s world has changed.
To incorporate the analysis of the state as a dynamic arena as well as an 
actor, I unite two approaches. The first is the relational approach of state 
actor- ship (Evans 1995), which regards state and society as actors that can 
embed each other. The second is the dynamics of contention approach of 
state- mediated contentious politics by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001), 
where the state is seen an arena. With this incorporated approach, I look at 
how the dialectics of supporting resistance to extractivism have or have not 
played out in different state- mediated political games in which the resis-
tance has been a key player. It has been through the state that the resis-
tance has managed to create greater political opportunities and thus to foster 
greater resistance elsewhere. In the tradition of the comparative institutional 
approach of Evans (1995), the goal is to explain the diverse outcomes with 
a focus on concrete variations across historical cases, whereby diverse states 
and state- society relations are created in different yet connected historical 
processes.
In the context of states such as Brazil and India the government is unlikely 
to act alone, and any political opportunities existing or latently available 
within federal or lower- level state structures are to be used and made func-
tional by the resistance (Carter 2015; Hochstetler and Keck 2007; Kröger 
2013a; Wolford 2010). The extractivist push and lobby are very strong in 
both Brazil and India, which renders their mining policies in dire need of 
a balancing or “checking” by civil society to secure the rule of law and to 
lower negative impacts. A geologist with decades of experience in direct-
ing mines around India told me in December 2012 that in India there are 
about 10,000 legal and 80,000 illegal mines. He believes there is a great need 
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for a regulatory body, particularly now as the mining regulators often also 
work as mining consultants.9 The words of a coordinator of Mines, Minerals 
and Peoples (MMP, an important national umbrella NGO in India) sum-
marize the message of a multitude of interviews that I conducted in India 
with the blunt statement that there is “no long- term government strategy 
on resources.” Currently, the legal setting of mining is more than confusing 
with numerous contradictory rules, not all of which must be followed. It is 
very unclear what the de jure rights and responsibilities are in practice, as 
executive orders seem to supersede legislative and court power, varying case 
by case.
Individual state governments have not usually been on the forefront 
of resistance to extractivism. For example, prior research on Brazil’s envi-
ronmental governance has emphasized that the establishment of stricter 
environmental norms has almost always required a very active role by civil 
society. These societal actors must apply pressure to the state and actively 
support progressive state actors in establishing new rules (Hochstetler and 
Keck 2007; Kröger 2013a; Wolford 2010). A similar tendency can be seen 
in India (see, e.g., Shah 2010; Sisodia and Dalapati 2015; Tiwari 2016). It 
was the civil society, particularly the forest- dwelling communities’ move-
ments, that pushed for the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest 
Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006 (FRA) (see, e.g.. Nayak 
2015; Tiwari 2016). In some cases, my informants argued that the FRA 
only later, after its inception, became a key political opportunity structure 
for mobilization and for winning better outcomes for resistance. To study 
the FRA as a state- established opening of political opportunity would be a 
misinterpretation of the dynamics, which are more complex and dialectical 
in reality. New concepts are needed to explain these complex realities that a 
dichotomy would oversimplify.
In relation to the concept of state embedding by civil society, I first adhere 
to the notion that states and state actors can and should be approached 
and attempts should be made to steer and change the political trajectory 
by active citizens and social groups. Embedding the state means that first 
these groups will have created long- term and consistent ties with state actors, 
which will be helpful in negotiating policies and institutional designs. A fur-
ther step up the ladder of state embedding is to start (co)producing the state, 
either by activating or redirecting latent state institutions, or by creating new 
institutions. When the actions initiated by civil society have led to continual 
negotiation of policies between state and civil society actors, creating consis-
tency and new political opportunities in the political games through which 
policies are made, then state embedding by civil society has occurred. Both 
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the creation of new and consistent connections to state actors and the (co)
production of state institutions have been important tactics of resistance, 
having notable influence on the discontinuation of mining. By state (co- )
production, I refer to the implanting of a desired policy, institution, politi-
cal game rule, judicial decision, or other feature that can open up a politi-
cal opportunity for the societal entity doing the embedding.10 In order to 
analyze the role of such actions across the varying cases, I will conceptualize 
state embedding by civil society actors as a specific strategy, with different 
substrategies (tactics), and observe what outcomes their usages have had.11
Most of the studies on state embedding in environmental governance 
argue that state embedding by civil society occurs when state agencies make 
space for civil society to act autonomously and guide policy (see, e.g., Sowers 
2013; Teets 2014). Although this might be true in many cases, particularly 
in the authoritarian regimes on which Sowers and Teets base their theoretical 
claims and the well- studied advanced industrial democracies of the Global 
North (Schreurs 2003), the cases from Brazil and India do not fit into this 
explanation. Within these cases, more often than not, civil society groups 
have been the instigators of change. Khagram (2004), who has studied both 
authoritarian regimes and rising democracies, found that democratic insti-
tutions and the strength of social mobilization were equally important in 
defining investment project outcomes. O’Neill (2012), in her comparison of 
the role of political opportunities and environmental movements on policy- 
making across different regimes, found that there is typically a much greater 
leeway for mobilization to influence policies in the Global South.
This discussion offers one solution to the theoretical debate in movement 
scholarship on whether activists should avoid the state and try to retain 
autonomy at all costs (see Kröger 2013a). Given proper strategies to main-
tain the autonomy of the civil society group, isolation is not necessary, so 
state embeddedness can be pursued. Moreover, this state embeddedness can 
even be very helpful in ensuring movement autonomy in the face of capture 
attempts by other civil society actors, such as powerful corporations.12
As a result of the interaction during the embedding process, it is likely 
there will be a new state- society boundary- breaking set of social ties, where 
activists can help state actors do their jobs better, and also help protect 
the autonomy of the state from being taken captive by extractive interests. 
Reciprocally, the state actors will be helping the resistance— it might even 
be that they become pivotal in resistance after the initial civil society steps. 
Thus, in the process of resistance, both the state and civil societies can be 
transformed.
State embedding can take place in parallel and simultaneous political 
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games: for example, depending on the local case, in electoral, institutional, 
or judicial politics; in just some of these; or in none. State embedding while 
retaining autonomy refers to a situation where social actors are not or do 
not become entrenched in the upper stratums of the state. Such entrench-
ment would make the use of contentious actions, such as disruptive pro-
tests, incongruous. Several cases in this study illustrate how embedding that 
retains autonomy can have as huge an impact: resistance actors are simulta-
neously entrenched while still retaining the ability to engage in contentious 
politics and avoid the movement’s capture by the state.
Evans (1995) regarded the state of India as hugely inefficient in the steel 
and iron ore sector. Additionally, Brazil is also purported to have major prob-
lems in this sector. It was surprising to see for myself how little had changed 
since 1995 in India and Brazil in this sector— with the inefficiencies being 
exemplified by the Indian mining scams and the Brazilian tailings pond 
disasters. In general, Evans (1995) saw India as being somewhere between 
what he conceptualized as developmental and predatory states, while Bra-
zil was decidedly closer to a “developmental” state. In an updated account 
Evans and Heller (2015) criticize the state of India strongly for its inability 
to deliver even basic services to its population, for example, healthcare or 
adequate food. The key reasons for this are regarded as stemming from the 
power of elites and the narrow linkages of the state- society, which are also 
too party based. They suggest that broad political mobilizations that chal-
lenge the power of the elites would be required for the otherwise promising 
federal state structures to be used successfully and more generally than in 
only a few states, such as Kerala and Tamil Nadu. The vast iron ore scams in 
India since the mid- 2000s support this finding of inefficiency in handling 
state- owned resources. Yet the fact that a powerful, loose, and broad civil 
society- state actor— which I loosely characterize here as a sort of Polany-
ian “organic society”— has managed to prevent the slide toward becoming a 
predatory state, and made such powerful interventions, suggests that there is 
a huge potential for expanding the rule of law in India. In general, the recent 
mobilization wave has been impactful in attempting to influence large- scale 
investments in many cases in India (Levien 2018). Interestingly, in contrast 
Brazil seems to have experienced less desirable economic outcomes from the 
perspective of the resistance.
The cases mentioned here show how political opportunities (as consis-
tent dimensions of politics) were not present for the use of the resistance, 
mostly because the governments of Brazil and India have been strongly pro-
extractivist. Brazil especially has been, for five centuries, guided by it elites 
to a path that is dependent on the primary sector where “landed” elites 
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still prominently prevail. Likewise, in India large areas are still treated, even 
today, as resource peripheries in a colonial- type fashion (globally and inter-
nally), at the cost of higher value- adding and possibly less socio- ecologically 
damaging industries and social structures. This particular quality of the states 
of India and Brazil partly explains why civil society has had to play a much 
more crucial role in these countries’ environmental politics in comparison 
to many other countries, where the role of the state has been more marked 
and clearer in promoting greater regulatory standards.13
It is helpful to define the “government” as an important part of the 
“state,” but not as its synonym. While I studied the extractivism of Brazil 
and India, there were new progressive state actors and institutions in both. 
These state institutions included a substantial part of the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office (Ministério Público) and the Ministry of Agrarian Development in 
Brazil, and the Supreme Federal Court and its judges and lawyers in India. 
Thus, it would be misleading to say that a “state,” with those institutions 
involved, would be driving extractivism and clamping down on resistance. 
Rather, it is much more precise to describe extractivism as being promoted 
by these countries’ governments, not by the states themselves. Prior research 
on environmental movements has found that not even authoritarian states 
are monolithic central bureaucracies that would only follow government 
orders (Sowers 2013; Steinberg and VanDeveer 2012). The “state as an 
arena” approach is thus suited to explain the spectrum of politics more fully. 
I will discuss many cases in which, besides the government, civil society 
actors have successfully steered the state arena. For example, the work-
ing dynamics of electoral politics, as a specific game within the state, were 
transformed at the municipal level in Odisha’s Keonjhar district in India. In 
Keonjhar, the tribes that resisted mining decided to demand that all politi-
cal candidates (at the municipal, state, and federal levels) who came to hold 
rallies in their territory would sign a formal pledge to oppose mining. Such a 
memorandum of understanding has dramatically changed the informal rules 
of electoral politics, and consequently the outcomes of elections. I consider 
this type of action as a state embedding and coproduction by civil society 
(via electoral politics), whereby the state apparatus is changed by a resistance 
strategy. Once elected and chosen to be part of a government, the antimin-
ing politicians who signed the memorandum of understanding have found 
their range of actions regarding extractivist policies tightened within the 
limits preferred by the resistance. Although they have become new state and 
governmental actors, they have also created novel ties to civil society, and are 
bound by the new rules of the political games that have been formulated by 
the resistance.
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The state, from this viewpoint, is in constant flux and redetermination, 
which is an arena of struggle. In that struggle, as many scholars of global 
environmental governance have pointed out (e.g., Fuentes- George 2016; 
Khagram 2004; Kröger 2013a; Pellow 2007; Rodrigues 2003; Sawyer 2004; 
Sowers 2013; Teets 2014), some state agencies might be more receptive to 
civil society engagement than others and can be played against more hos-
tile agencies. The same can be expected for engagement with federal ver-
sus state- level, municipal, and interstate agencies. Thus, within the cases I 
discuss, I will analyze the role of different scales of the state (international, 
federal, state, municipal, and local) in detail where relevant in explaining 
the outcomes. There are cases in which informants mentioned they had 
“played” some state levels or agencies against others. In other cases, I have 
other concrete evidence that this had happened even if it was not specifically 
articulated by the informants. I will explain how the resistance sees conten-
tious, electoral, institutional, and judicial politics as alternative paths of state 
embedding, and discuss how the resistance sees, for example, the judicial 
game as an alternative to other opportunities, to be used only in particular 
circumstances.
A similar set of resistance strategies is unlikely to lead to similar out-
comes across the widely varying polities of the world. Western, established 
industrial democracies and authoritarian regimes might have very different 
dynamics. It remains to be studied whether, how, and to which extent the 
strategies studied herein would be as important elsewhere. In consolidating 
democracies such as Brazil and India, during the period I observed them 
(2000– 2015) the very processes of consolidating democracy or transitioning 
toward it, via grassroot mobilizations, created new state- society structures 
and relations. In contrast, Teets’s (2014) character analysis of the budding 
Chinese civil society liberties illustrates how a single party- state still strongly 
defined what kind of civil society agency is allowed and in which arenas. 
Teets argues that the Chinese state directs this action in such a way that the 
supposed increased democracy might serve to consolidate authoritarianism, 
which is why she calls China’s model of state– civil society relations “consul-
tative authoritarianism.” In comparison, as I demonstrate, Brazil and India 
(particularly in some of their regions) were transitioning toward democracy 
until 2015, particularly through the use of the five key resistance strategies.14
Lastly, in positioning this book among the literature to which it contrib-
utes, I would also like to relate the resistance to extractivism studied here to 
two classic and helpful notions about the state, by Max Weber and James 
Scott. Their work informs figure 1 in the following chapter, particularly in 
differentiating state- mediated and nonstate- mediated political games. I will 
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detail, for example, cases in which large chunks of the territories disputed are 
not under state control, referring to Weber’s (1968) classic definition of the 
state, which includes the monopoly of legitimate violence. Up to one- eighth 
of India’s territory is under the control, or partial control, of Maoist guer-
rilla groups, which often also enjoy at least partial local legitimacy (Banerjee 
2013). This suggests that the Indian state does not have dominance or hege-
mony in these areas.15 I will discuss cases where the Indian state is present in 
armed resource conflicts, trying to secure new natural resources for its state- 
owned enterprises, for which reason they first must try to win the monopoly 
or hegemony of violence, or both, in those would- be mining areas. The 
Indian state has found this very hard to do. Likewise, in Brazil there are large 
forest areas, on top of mineral resources or rich soils, where the state does 
not have de facto control over the use of the territory. In these spaces, where 
the state has not been able to secure the monopoly of legitimate violence, the 
use of land is controlled by elites, illegal land grabbers, or indigenous and 
other rural populations in lieu of the absent state. In this sense, the expan-
sion of extractivism also includes cases in which the state— in Scott’s (1998) 
conceptualization of state- building as a high- modernist project— simplifies 
territories and tries to extinguish nonstate space by and for the purposes of 
extractivism. Moreover, the largely tribal- populated forested hill areas in 
India that host a variety of resistance to extractivism are also considered as 
part of Scott’s (2009) South Asian cases, where the resistance is attempting 
to avoid being incorporated under the state of India, and specifically looks 
for ways not to be governed by outsiders.16
In this chapter I have scrutinized the key concepts that lay the ground-
work for my analysis, including the role and form of the “state” and the 
key strategies through which I analyze how peaceful resistance is formed. In 
addition, I discussed the causalities and noncausalities between extractive 
investments, grievances, and mobilization. Building on this foundation, the 





Theory of Investment Politics and  
Spatial Changes
In the midst of writing up my initial field research on mining conflicts in 
Brazil and India, Finland was caught in a major mining boom. A well- 
known politician compared the illegalities in this Arctic mining thrust to 
the rampant expansion in the Congo. I packed my bags and traveled to 
Lapland to understand what was going on. To my deep surprise, I learned 
that the extractivism I had witnessed in the Global South was also here 
in the North, in the Arctic, and the similarities ran deep. Not only were 
the physical and social spaces transformed, but also the symbolic valua-
tions were being changed by the irreversible transformation of forests and 
pristine lakes into toxic lagoons and open pits. State officers responsible 
for regulating mining were becoming mining lobbyists, and directors of 
environmental NGOs were recruited to establish promining stakeholder 
mechanisms. Most worryingly, in my many discussions with regulators, 
they saw no problem in themselves going over to the other side through 
what seemed to be a revolving door. A view of social power relations and 
how politics are shaped by such personal decisions was missing. Find-
ing this extractivist expansion in the mind- sets and landscape- changing 
actions even in the Global North was helpful in developing a conceptual 
framework regarding the spatial dynamics in extractive politics and the 
political games that are used in investment politics. Finding extractivisms 
where one would least expect was formative for understanding the global-
ity of the key transformations changing lives on this planet.
Political Games and Agencies
Investment and mining politics typically consist of clashes between corpora-
tions and resistance in largely state- mediated political moves to influence 
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investment decisions. Figure 1 illustrates a general theoretical framework 
for the analysis of investment politics across differing contexts, agencies, 
and political games. This section discusses the framework I employed across 
all the local cases and used to explain the national and regional dynamics. 
While I employ this framework in relation to mining politics, it can also be 
used more generally. The figure builds loosely on Bourdieu’s (1991) theory 
of fields, which examines the construction of social fields and an individual’s 
reaction and response to interaction with those fields, and my prior theoriz-
ing on natural resource politics (Kröger 2013a).
Fig. 1. Different political actors and games through whose interactions the 
outcomes of investment politics are determined. Corporate, state, government, 
and resistance agencies of different types can try to influence economic and 
political outcomes either directly via specific strategies, or indirectly through state- 
mediated or private politics, or, in some cases, through armed conflicts.
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This figure shows the players that have agency (corporate entities, the 
state, and civil society) and the type of political interaction these players can 
engage in given their respective position. The central boxes and arrows in 
figure 1 illustrate the centrality of relationships within this framework. This 
figure is a summary of the potential interactions that can be accessed or uti-
lized by different players within investment projects. In the central column 
the first four boxes— contentious politics, electoral politics, institutional 
and structural politics, and judicial politics— are descriptive of the types of 
games that strongly and mostly occur under the state, and thus the (re)
mediation of state and governmental actors. The bottom two boxes capture 
the situations where corporate or resistance actors, or both, choose not to 
engage with the state and its institutionalized channels to pursue their goals. 
Rather, these types of political games rely on direct interaction between 
companies and their challengers. Peaceful resistance as a strategy can move 
between the state- mediated strategies or direct interaction through private 
or other nonstate politics, but it would not engage with armed revolution/
secessionary politics. Conversely, armed revolutionary/secession resistance, 
due to its nature, is not aiming to achieve its strategic goals through the 
largely state- controlled channels of interaction. Armed resistance of this type 
tries to either overthrow the existing state or create a new state, so these 
guerrilla groups do not typically see a point in trying to peacefully reform 
the existing state structures. Instead, they rely on armed actions of resis-
tance, and direct interactions with corporations, such as asking for levies. 
The following paragraphs will provide more specific and detailed examples 
of scenarios that clarify the flow of information and action in different types 
of resistance situations.
The first more fleshed out example concerns the role of contentious poli-
tics, as this is an extremely important facet and field of investment politics 
that came up many times during my field research. What is “contentious” 
is defined by those who are in power and is always in reference to the “nor-
mal” and accepted opinions and political methods in the context in ques-
tion. Thus, something considered contentious in an Indian context at a 
given point in time might be normalized in the Brazilian context and vice 
versa. Environmental politics and land conflicts where local people, compa-
nies, and state authorities clash in physical mobilizations, such as peaceful 
protests and land occupations, are situated within the field of contentious 
politics. Contentious politics may be a more or less institutionalized and 
normalized part of the political system. For example, the many land occu-
pations in Brazil have become a normalized political act in the past three 
decades (Carter 2015; Wolford 2010). Nevertheless, the way incumbents, 
such as conservative politicians, elites, and companies, talk about the politi-
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cal tactics used by contesters in contentious politics often frames these acts 
as contentious or illegal, immoral, undevelopmental, backward, unaccept-
able, destructive, violent, chaotic, abusive, and so on. These social actors 
may demand, for example, “strong” action to punish perpetrators and stop 
such actions via police or paramilitary violence. Government actions also 
influence the political game of contentious politics, the dynamics of which 
are strongly steered by the state (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Progres-
sive governments, especially those embedded by contentious movements, to 
a considerable degree may remediate resource conflicts to the benefit of local 
underdog groups. For example, in the 2000s, the federal government of Luiz 
Inácio “Lula” da Silva (Workers’ Party) in Brazil (2003– 10) ordered the fed-
eral police and army to support communities against land grabbers in several 
resistance cases in the Amazon, and clamped down on illegal deforestation 
by the elites (Kröger 2013a, 2015b; Kröger and Lalander 2016), while the 
government of Jair Bolsonaro (2019– ) in Brazil has quite the opposite stance 
and rhetoric in these respects. In this sense, the rules and actions within dif-
ferent political games are defined by the actions of state, civil society, and 
corporate actors.
Besides contentious politics, there may be, and typically are, other politi-
cal games in which the outcomes are determined by the clash of incumbents 
and challengers. These are the less contentious and much more routinized 
games, represented by the next three boxes in figure 1: electoral, institu-
tional and structural, and judicial politics. The political games that belong 
to this subset are the primary suggested means of political participation, 
usually by the conservative elites, in democratic political systems such as 
Brazil and India (at least during the period they are studied in detail in this 
book, until 2015). Yet there may be actors with antidemocratic tendencies 
seeking to curb even these routinized games. In conflict situations, electoral, 
institutional and structural, or judicial politics may also be framed as con-
tentious and unacceptable by different reasonings. One example is when a 
general opinion or circumstance is curbed in deference to the interests of 
“the majority.”
All the above- mentioned political games are remediated by the state.1 
Private politics are not; these are represented by the fifth central box in figure 
1. Private political tools and tactics consist of direct interactions between 
companies and their challengers, including corporate social responsibility, 
outreach, dialogue, stakeholder relations, and so on (Soule 2009). How-
ever, state- remediated strategies, whether considered contentious or not, and 
strategies used by actors within these political games can foster both extrac-
tivism and resistance to extractivism. These strategies support the trans-
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formation of passive people into activists. By activist I mean citizens who 
participate in and create politics in the above- mentioned political games, 
forcefully drawing attention to problems. The myriad and complementary, 
yet also generalizable, ways in which this may or may not happen are the 
object of scrutiny in this study.
The different political games illustrated in figure 1 are alternative and 
possibly complementary ways to address an issue. The simultaneous use of 
all these strategies or types of political posturing might, however, also be 
detrimental to resistance goals. For example, if judicial politics result in the 
victory of the targets and not the contenders, the contenders’ other politi-
cal activities could lose legitimacy. In figure 1, the boxes of these politi-
cal games overlap with resistance and corporate agency as political actors, 
suggesting that nonstate actors may become embedded in the state and 
with direct intention form state structures and political opportunities. As 
discussed, opportunities in both India and Brazil are often a product of 
embedded autonomy by resistance vis- à- vis the state (despite corporate 
agency’s similar embedding attempts) and not benevolent, top- down gov-
ernment or state actions.2
The findings of my research suggest that where mining has been stopped 
or slowed down, the outcome is strongly activism dependent, relying less on 
proactive governmental action and more on nonstate actors. What resistance 
does— in other words, what strategies are used— is important. An activist, 
working in a professional NGO with a very long track record of successfully 
instigating governance processes that have led to the curbing of destructive 
resource extraction projects in India (interviews, December 2012),3 com-
mented on the importance of the strategy of state embedding, for example 
when engaging with institutional politics by making a solid dossier to hand 
over to investigators:
So actually this is very important. This thing which both SPS [Kar-
nataka, Bellary mining- critical group] and Goa people have done: 
collecting all the information, studying the laws, the rules, the regula-
tions. And seeing what is [a] violation of what. This exercise unfortu-
nately very few of our activists, very few of our movement people, are 
able to do or somehow do. This exercise is very important.
Governments were not proactive without prompting in any of the cases 
studied. Typically, states and their governments are promining actors due 
to their positioning as parcels of the capitalist world- system. Surveying the 
strategy possibilities of antimining movements, Korten (2002, 11) notes 
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that “states are embedded in an inter- state balance of power and are often 
constrained in their ability to regulate.” For this reason, Korten sees the 
regulation of corporations primarily via governmental action as “a weak 
and temporary solution.” Studying Brazilian environmental politics, Hoch-
stetler and Keck (2007) emphasize that contentious action is required in 
addition to routine strategies of mobilization. Similarly, I argue that both 
state- challenging and state- producing strategies are to be used, and this 
book demonstrates how state embedding has been central in many struggles 
to overcome the burden of global capitalism. Furthermore, my database 
of cases suggests that state- society relations, which were characterized by 
coproduction of the state, managed to avoid civil wars and other armed 
conflicts from becoming rooted in the political dynamics.
The Political Game of Armed Conflicts: An Exemplary Case
The final central box in figure 1 represents armed revolution/secessionary 
politics. I will discuss the theoretical framework of this political game as 
illustrated by an example from my research. Since its independence in 1947, 
armed conflict has been a routinized political game in India (Banerjee 2013). 
The most widespread expression of armed resistance, territorially and demo-
graphically, has been that of Communist radical movements (Choudhary 
2012). There have also been other severe armed conflicts, but these have 
been based on ethnic or religious reasons, often taking the form of terror-
ism, and do not have an ideological agenda of social justice and land reform, 
unlike the Maoist guerrillas of Central India (Banerjee 2013; Choudhary 
2012).4 The “core issue of the Maoist insurgency” is the “exploitation of 
forest produce and mining of minerals” (Chenoy and Chenoy 2010, 119), 
which makes a study of their revolutionary agency a necessity for this book. 
This armed response to resource- frontier expansion also provides a fruitful 
comparison to the nonarmed response in Brazil by a large leftist social move-
ment organization (in this case the Landless Workers’ Movement) that easily 
could take up arms but has not done so.
Armed resistance cannot be explained by revolutionary agency or repres-
sion alone. As mentioned by Bosi and Giugni (2012, 93), “Political violence 
is less a strategic choice than one possible evolution of contention.” In India, 
acts of armed protest have been triggered and strengthened when the rule 
of law has failed. The state has offered bullets in response to nonviolent 
direct action, and there is a model and ideology of pursuing change via 
the use of arms. Banerjee (2013, 382) argues that “the poor peasantry and 
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landless opt for violence as the last resort in their attempt to improve their 
lot when all other means (such as Gandhian satyagraha [nonviolent direct 
action] or parliamentary reforms) have failed.” This suggests that there is 
willingness for nonviolent direct action, and violent means are used some-
times because they have been normalized within the political arena. In other 
words, in many Indian contexts, when all else fails taking up arms is a viable 
or expected option due to the cultural normalization of armed resistance.
In India, the existence of the civil war context makes the whole spec-
trum of mobilization different than in Brazil, even for nonviolent resistance 
groups. This context keeps open an added political field of “armed revolu-
tion/secession” that is routinized as a key political game within which the 
outcomes of extractive investments are also partly determined. It is not only 
revolutionary agency that seeks to influence investment outcomes using 
secessionary politics. This game and its rules are mutually created by revo-
lutionaries and an armed corporate agency backed by the state. In Chhat-
tisgarh, India, the game has created a paramilitary organization that expands 
the extractive operations of public and private powerhouses (Sundar 2006).
Contentious politics and armed revolutionary politics are not just alter-
native ways of addressing problems but also processes that feed each other. 
Banerjee (2013, 388) gives the example of how the Naxalite armed revo-
lutionary movement of the 1960s “set forth the demands of the poor and 
landless peasantry in a way that shook the atrophied Indian political scene.” 
The 1960s armed upsurge also fostered peaceful activism in the larger soci-
ety, although with a lapse:
The violent outbreak sensitized the rest of society to the problems 
of the hitherto downtrodden sections of the population. This was to 
lead to the development of a robust social activism among the Indian 
middle classes . . . working for the empowerment of the . . . dispos-
sessed groups; intervention of the media in exposing atrocities on the 
depressed castes and tribal peoples by upper- caste landlords . . . [and] 
human rights activists [taking actions] to protect citizens against 
police repression and illegal acts of the state. (Banerjee 2013, 388)
According to Banerjee, the second outcome of the 1960s armed revolu-
tion attempt by the Communist Party of India (Marxist- Leninist) was that
by openly asserting the right of armed resistance against the Indian 
state, the CPI (M- L) squarely placed violence as a persistent method 
of action in Indian politics. It became a precedent for armed offen-
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sives by other groups, albeit ideologically different, such as mili-
tants from religious and ethnic minority communities. . . . the main 
achievement of this first phase of the CPI (M- L) movement was not 
its physical occupation and administrative control of territory, but 
its success in spreading its ideological message of people’s power and 
the right of self- defense among the rural poor. (Banerjee 2013, 388)
These legacies are very visibly present in current extractive conflicts. 
Since Brazil lacks the experience of long- term armed revolution gaining sig-
nificant land and national attention, it can be argued that the political game 
of armed revolution is not even available to mining- affected populations, as 
there is no existing organized movement or ideology that would build up 
such revolutionary agency.
The decisive line between peaceful resistance and armed action lies in the 
use of arms and an unwillingness to try to continue to embed the state, but 
to instead exercise revolutionary or secessionist practices, or both, by force. 
Secessionary action tries to create a new state, while revolutionary actions try 
to overthrow the existing state instead of reforming it. Both forms of resis-
tance are used by groups that are armed in India. Importantly, these armed 
revolutionary and secessionary conflicts are intimately tied with the broader 
dynamics of extractivism, its impacts, grievances, and thus the mobilization 
potential among the affected populations. In this case these populations are 
most often the forest dwellers. Armed secessionist agency is also present in 
India’s Northeast, where it has fewer or no real Maoist, communist, equal-
itarian, or environmental ideologies, does not resist mining, and coexists 
with an extractive boom that deepens capitalist hierarchies within the tribal 
communities (see Karlsson 2011 and Lahiri- Dutt 2014). Armed revolution-
ary agency by Indian Maoists is openly antimining, although they have also 
allegedly taxed mining companies and allowed promining politicians to visit 
their constituencies in mining areas against a levy (see Chenoy and Chenoy 
2010; Sundar 2006). The Maoists use armed revolutionary politics (and de 
facto physical area control by expanding and seceding “liberated zones” out-
side the reach of the Indian state’s assumed monopoly on violence) to influ-
ence other political games as well (see Chandhoke 2015). Their agency is not 
limited to the use of arms, and Maoist insurgents do not just consist of guer-
rilla squads. Sanghams, that is, unofficial Maoist bodies in the villages, are 
unarmed councils established to oversee village events and usually undertake 
nonviolent activities that are in many ways similar to an NGO (Chenoy and 
Chenoy 2010; Choudhary 2012). Thus, it makes sense to study sanghams 
as a part of resistance in the same area, to see what impact a composition 
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of different and multiple agencies and strategies has in comparative terms 
to economic outcomes. How does a mix of armed and peaceful resistances 
influence the dynamics and their outcomes?
Armed revolutionary tactics often compete with peaceful strategies for 
peoples’ attention when individuals make their choice of which action to 
pursue. This is particularly true in India. In Brazil the MST and other very 
large and well- organized movements curb the possibilities of militant armed 
resistance and perpetuate the practices of peaceful contention by day- to- 
day strategic choices and the formation of cadres. In Indian mining poli-
tics, the key constituents are Adivasis, whose actions are targets for change 
by both movements fostering nonviolent direct action and those aimed at 
armed revolution. For example, the All- India Adivasi Mahasabha is a move-
ment and political party trying to unite the Adivasis in the use of embed-
ded autonomy instead of armed resistance. In this effort, the movement 
criticizes both the government and the Naxalites. Mr. Moosahary, from the 
movement, argued that “poor administration and corruption in parts of the 
country had created Maoism.”5 In his view the Maoists should turn to par-
liamentary politics: “You may be fighting for a good cause but you cannot 
get anywhere by killing innocents. In a democracy, the solution must come 
from the peaceful exercise of people’s power. . . . The Indian Constitution is a 
flexible document— short of Independence, you can get virtually anything.” 
In contrast to this view, Padel and Das (2010a, 2010b) argue that the ongo-
ing liberalization of the Indian mining sector makes it increasingly easier for 
mining companies to extract resources, and more difficult for communities 
to resist peacefully. Studies on the injustices that lead people to take up arms 
abound.6 Many scholars who study these conflicts, and base their claims 
on field research, argue that armed resistance is the only option left for the 
populations who turn to this strategy. I will assess these claims in part II.
Armed revolution/secession politics and civil war conflict have been con-
solidated as a political opportunity and a threat for potential resistance in 
India; however, they will only continue to exist if there is agency in using 
arms. Given that this is a political opportunity, the locals assume that a 
possibility exists for them to use arms to resist. A local intellectual argued 
that if the Maoists did not resist the mines in Chhattisgarh, they would lose 
support, as the locals do not want the mines and barring the mines depends 
mostly on Maoist armed resistance. Mining politics is thus not only about 
mining, it is also about different types of resistance agencies. In early 2013, 
the same intellectual thought that there was no way to counter the min-
ing expansion by peaceful politics in the Bastar region, for which reason he 
expected massive bloodshed to take place in the future— something that was 
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unfolding in 2015 under the new Modi government, according local Adivasi 
leaders with whom I talked in May 2015. I will discuss these dynamics more 
in the second half of part II.
Intertwining and Autonomy of Political Games in India and Brazil
This section will explain how the above political games function and are 
related to each other in Brazil and India, as this is essential information for 
understanding how these political systems function as contexts for extractiv-
ism and its resistance. I will compare Brazil and India for their similarities 
and differences, which is helpful in pinpointing the reasons why different 
strategies of resistance function differently depending on the political sys-
tem. This section also explains how the above political games are related to 
each other.
The political games mentioned above are intertwined, resulting in fewer 
possibilities for the civil society to embed the state in such settings as India, 
where, according to my research informants, there is no effective three- power 
division, that is, the separation of three powers— a legislature, an executive, 
and a judiciary branch— for the governance of a state. An analyst at the 
Centre for Science and Environment, an expert research organization that is 
an NGO— but also so deeply embedded as a policy- support providing insti-
tution that it can be seen as a semistate actor (for certain governments)— 
argued that in India bureaucrats do not have much autonomy, but depend 
on the minister in a federal cabinet. This mixing of executive and legisla-
tive power means that in India electoral and institutional politics are quite 
tightly intertwined and even inseparable. This suggests that institutional 
embedding is less important than electoral embedding in India.
In Brazil, the outgoing president normally names the Supreme Court 
leader for the next president’s term (historically a very conservative figure 
in practice, preventing major changes being introduced to extractivism via 
litigation at the highest level), while in India the court system elects its own 
members and leaders autonomously (a system that the current Modi gov-
ernment is trying to disrupt by giving the executive the power to name 
judges). For activists, courts are typically overburdened and of little use in 
Brazil, and it is beyond their ability to postpone projects. Additionally, the 
government has not historically listened to court orders, even regarding its 
own initiatives. For example, the construction of the Belo Monte dam in the 
Amazon was a notorious example of this inability to enforce orders (Kröger 
and Lalander 2016). In India, when the Supreme Court ordered all mines to 
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be closed in Goa in 2012, the executive complied, which would not happen 
as easily in Brazil (as this requires major political support).
According to an analyst from the Centre for Science and the Environ-
ment, the “judiciary is more powerful than the executive,” which explains 
why a “court order stands above ministries.” Furthermore, in India, judicial 
politics is a field where civil society has a firm place, “local communities ini-
tiate cases,” and there are “lots of progressive lawyers who take on cases for 
merit”, pro bono, although this judicial- actor activism is a “new phenom-
enon” in India. In Brazil, a similar and, theoretically, largely autonomous 
element of the judicial system, the Ministério Público, hosts public prosecu-
tors and an ombudsman that, as a watchdog, can also take on powerholders 
and companies via class- action lawsuits. This system has bred a new and 
substantial group of activist prosecutors (McAllister 2008), as well as pros-
ecutors who focus on attacking social movement activists, or on coaxing 
them to participate in time- consuming and largely meaningless (powerless) 
negotiations and dialogues with companies (Zhouri and Valencio 2014). 
However, autonomy does not mean that the technically autonomous state 
actors would make independent decisions without political biases, unaf-
fected by partisan or ideological motives. For example, according to many 
scholars and journalists, the greater autonomy and power afforded by Presi-
dent Dilma Roussef to the prosecutors and judges, following the unprec-
edented street protests in 2013, has led into the misuse of that new judicial 
power in the form of partisan and nonindependent judicial decisions. In the 
current situation (beyond the scope of my discussion here), the law is not 
applied correctly, and for some no law is applied at all. Nevertheless, in both 
Brazil and India, the creation of a Weberian bureaucratic autonomy (which 
ensures that state institutions are not captured by market actors or ideologi-
cal groups) has fostered the building of some noncorrupt supporters of the 
rule of law seeking the best for society on the basis of more elevated ethics 
than their typically clientelist peers.
However, as I shall show, there are important subnational and context- 
specific divergences in access to these opportunities for activists in both 
countries. Roughly speaking, access to the Indian judicial system typically 
requires such high- level professional judicial NGO or expert activist capaci-
ties and experience that its usage has been out of the reach of ethnically 
marginalized groups (who are also poorly educated and connected). It is 
pertinent to note that there are important exceptions, and the situation is 
starting to change. For example, the use of institutional and structural poli-
tics, via the social- cultural capital of ethnic affinities, is often off limits to 
Adivasis. Therefore, Adivasis have tried to push the state into new institu-
58  Iron Will
Revised Pages
tional avenues, and via new legislation strengthen the existing ones to which 
Adivasis have a privileged access. I will discuss these forest and communal 
rights (such as the Forest Rights Act) later in part II, when discussing how 
the context influences extractivist politics.
In sum, this discussion highlights how interpolitical game dynamics are 
place and context based, defined by those involved and the strategies used by 
other resistance groups and their targets in the area, thus requiring a detailed 
and comparative analysis at several scales of power. Figure 1 provides guide-
lines for including a large group of explanatory factors in the analysis in 
order to build a fuller picture of the situational politics.
Steps of State Embedding by Resistance
States are specific products of given societies, rather than fixed entities. Some 
actors in a society can better produce and embed this created entity (which 
is part of society) than others. I am interested in how these differences in 
participating in state production or in creating deep ties with powerholders 
might affect mobilization outcomes in varied local contexts. The discrep-
ancy between Brazilian and Indian political opportunity configurations has 
meant that in Brazil activists have attained better results when embedding 
and using institutional and structural politics. In contrast, in India the out-
comes have been more favorable to the resistance when it has focused more 
on judicial politics. In India, activists have also had good results with the use 
of institutional politics, but due to the mixing of executive and legislative 
powers this typically happens when the setting of electoral politics is favor-
able. However, I learned that this is a situation or issue that is very difficult 
for activists to know about. Indeed, even the most seasoned activists were 
surprised to receive the support of a number of the executive institutional 
branches of the Centre (the federal state)7 via, for example, the establish-
ment of the Shah Commission to investigate mining illegalities.8 As a gen-
eral rule, there is no easy way for activists to predict what will happen, as 
they are seldom cognizant of the backdrop of interpolitical game dynamics 
against which their actions take place.
Political opportunity structures are also often at least partially a result 
of accumulated actions by corporate, contentious, and government actors. 
Sometimes they are almost exclusively a result of prior civil society mobiliza-
tions and state production.9 The political games presented above illustrate 
the avenues through which different actors can try to use and change the 
political opportunities offered by the state. The separation of the four state- 
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mediated political games, wherein nonstate actors can coproduce new rules 
and power relations, serves the purpose of pinpointing in detail how politi-
cal opportunities are used or created. What is notable in my database is that, 
in the vast majority of cases, many political opportunity structures were 
actually created by the resistance. The bulk of prior theorizing on political 
opportunities has stemmed from Western experiences, and particularly from 
the 1960s civil rights movement (see McAdam 1999; McAdam and Bou-
det 2012). This was a very different situation. For example, opportunities 
were opened from above, which allowed the movements to prosper. How-
ever, in the history of Brazilian and Indian democratization there has been a 
marked bottom- up trajectory. A large social movement, led by Gandhi and 
Ambedkar, created the Indian state and democracy. They created the state, 
together with other activists against British rule, which could be considered 
a maximum form of embedding the state— the creation of a new state. In 
Brazil, a large movement for democratization spearheaded by civil society 
organizations and social movements, which started in the late 1970s, led to 
the writing of the 1988 Constitution. This document continues to offer the 
major political opportunities of today (Kröger 2013a).10 Showing that there 
is a particular civil society embedding of the state is very helpful in explain-
ing outcomes in a dynamic and historicized way.
State embedding can occur by three avenues; (1) changing the rules of 
the different political games; (2) changing the power relations within the 
games by new interpersonal connections; and (3) aligning the mind- set of exist-
ing state actors and thus forging encompassing embeddedness around a project 
in a way in which progressive state actors start supporting the agenda of a 
civil society actor vis- à- vis a project. I will now give a few examples of what 
I mean by state embedding in different contexts. As mentioned, in Odi-
sha’s Keonjhar district in India, the resistance produced new informal yet 
applied rules for electoral politics. There, the movement invented a novel 
way of ensuring that elected politicians follow the movement agenda. People 
would only vote for candidates who signed a preelection memorandum of 
understanding that committed them to oppose new mines. This is not the 
same thing as relying on the possibility of using electoral, parliamentary 
politics (which might not exist in some political systems). Here, the resis-
tance has changed the rules of the electoral game, by creating its own rules 
for the preelection of candidates. The strength of local movements and their 
close ties to the elected politicians ensured that the promises were kept.11 
Only those candidates who signed the memorandum of understanding were 
elected. Furthermore, some of the new MPs were local movement leaders. 
This is another form by which resistance can embed the state. The resistance 
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thus occupies state positions with people embodying two roles in key posi-
tions of the game in question. The act of joining as a common project, via 
encompassing embeddedness, is a third form of electoral politics embed-
ding. For example, in Brazil’s Minas Gerais, in two cases leading local politi-
cians (mayors) were lured into joining the resistance front. Similar and other 
tactics within electoral politics have been found to be useful in the United 
States, for example for the resistance to nuclear power plants in the 1980s, 
where ballot- measures were used for mobilization and to pass laws that lim-
ited the industry options, as David Schmidt (1991) explains in Citizen Law-
makers: The Ballot Initiative Revolution. I will illustrate how such and other 
similar tactics are available also consolidating democracies such as Brazil and 
India; the use of such electoral embedding actually being a process that co- 
produces a more democratic state.
Figure 2 illustrates how the strategy of state embedding functions in 
general, once the resistance has secured a set of state institutions driving its 
agenda. This shows that civil society resistance has had an important role in 
investment outcomes, even where state institutions have made the final deci-
sions. As the resistance continues to utilize and develop embedding strategies, 
it can advance up the steps of embedded autonomy as the figure implies. 
Figure 2 demonstrates how the rise through the steps of embedded autonomy 
brings benefits in the process of struggling for state apparatus support.
This process of embedding is not a one- way street. State actors also have 
a say, and their embedding by the civil society is not synonymous with cap-
ture. There is a distinct conceptual difference. State agencies as well retain 
autonomy, but they are in a specific kind of interaction or relation with 
specific civil society agendas. They coproduce the state with civil society.
In figure 2, the second step, “Deeper interpersonal ties with state actors, 
coproduction of the state,” refers to situations where, for example, power-
holders join the resistance front or start to coproduce new rules together 
with the resistance. The third step, “Changing rules, creating new capaci-
ties and policies,” refers to the moment in time when the resistance can be 
considered to have been key in producing the part of the state that governs 
the targeted policy arena. To argue that state embedding has occurred, it 
is not enough that the state alone supports resistance agendas. There must 
be a provable causal link that the initiative (ultimate cause) has come from 
civil society; whereas “official resource- use decisions” (the fourth step) 
have come from the state (proximate cause of economic outcomes). If the 
three steps on the bottom are absent, while the top step is present, one 
cannot say that the outcome was influenced by state embedding by the 
resistance. In that case top- down state/government action would explain 
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the outcomes. In my database, there are both types of local cases, which 
allows for the study of both resistance- initiated and top- down directed 
curbing of extractivism.
The Joda block (a block is a subdivision of a district) in Odisha, India, 
was a case without notable resistance to extractivism, and surely no state 
embedding strategies were used. In fact, the local Adivasis demanded the 
reopening of the legal mines, after the Odisha state government had closed 
down practically all iron ore mines in the state. This looks like a top- down 
process of curbing extractivism, as none of the three lower steps depicted in 
the figure 2 were active. However, the case gets more complicated when we 
look at the larger context. As I also study the other scales, not just the local, 
through incorporated comparison, I can link prior actions elsewhere to local 
events, for example in Joda. The closure of the mines in Joda took place 
within a series of nationwide extractivist politics.
I traced the causalities whereby the Odisha chief minister decided to issue 
an iron mining ban in the state after the devastating blows to mining mafias 
and chief ministers in Karnataka and Goa, knowing that the Shah Com-
mission was heading toward Odisha. The creation of the Shah Commission 
was largely a result of the Goa, Karnataka, and national mining- critical civil 
society embedding the federal state. It offered new and very useful political 
opportunities for the resistance throughout the country. Such state constitu-
tive actions carry great potential, since the federal state will spread the new 
Fig. 2. There are different levels of embeddedness a resistance can achieve 
with governmental or institutional actors. A resistance effort can build its 
embeddedness in steps to achieve the ultimate goal of influencing outcomes 
through the production or coproduction of the state.
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opportunities more widely, with state resources, and without experiencing 
such friction on its way as civil society networking would.
In terms of research applications, figure 2 and the approach to state 
coproduction developed above can be fruitfully united with studies that 
focus on explaining development, state capacities, and industrial transfor-
mation along the lines envisaged by Evans (1995, 2010). Evans and Heller 
(2015) further enrich this literature by providing a detailed look at the 
political economic process from the civil society point of view. The steps of 
state coproduction in figure 2 can also be scaled up for the study of trans-
national embedding of international institutions by corporations and civil 
society actors. A good example is how the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO) opened institutionalized access for the civil society to several 
FAO formal committees and other decision- making bodies. For example, 
after La Via Campesina started to try to embed the FAO to produce new 
rules, power relations, and structures within it, an International Planning 
Committee for Food Sovereignty was established.12
Having introduced a framework for analyzing the political dynamics of 
economic decision- making, investment projects, and extractivism across 
varying and complex settings, I will next provide a complementary theoreti-
cal framework to assess spatial changes. This framework is helpful in ana-
lyzing the likewise crucial material, social, and symbolic processes through 
which extractivism and resistance to it take place. I will use these theories 
right after their presentation, when I seek for explanations for how the resis-
tance in Goa, but not in some other contexts, managed to discontinue all 
mining operations.
Causality of Changes in Physical, Social, and Symbolic Spaces
Figure 1 is built loosely on Bourdieu’s (1991) theory of fields and more 
closely on the scholarship in contentious politics and institutional analysis 
(particularly Evans 1995; Hall and Taylor 1996; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 
2001; Zysman 1994). As extractivism is a deeply material and symbolic pro-
cess, not just a sociopolitical change, other theoretical tools are also required, 
which can be used to analyze the complex spatial dimensions involved. This 
section presents a theory of physical, social, and symbolic spaces as inter-
related and internally distinguished loci for changing power relations and 
differentiating and positioning social actors. I build on a relational thinking 
combining political ecology, world- ecology, and some classic sociological 
concepts. Political ecology sees environmental conflicts happening simulta-
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neously on symbolic and material fronts (see Peluso and Watts 2001). Figure 
3 operationalizes and develops that understanding for analytical purposes, 
to provide heuristic tools for analyzing causalities in such spatial dynamics. 
This figure outlines the theory of spatial analysis, which I have used pre-
viously for assessing mining booms (Kröger 2015a). This theory presents 
the social, symbolic, and physical spaces as internally differing topologies 
of power relations that are simultaneously interrelated and interchangeable.
In social space, power relations and topology are defined by the distribu-
tion of economic (in most cases money), social, and cultural capital, and the 
social acts that change the distribution of these between actors.13
Physical space includes the body, land, and objects, as well as visible artifacts 
like text and pictures in existing virtual worlds such as the internet. Besides the 
distribution of access to and control over these forms of physical capital, the 
power relations of physical space are defined through physical acts.
The power relations of symbolic space are likewise defined by both differ-
ences in symbolic capital distribution and symbolic acts. Symbolic capital 
can legitimize differences in economic capital and ensure complicity despite 
inequalities. Symbolic space is the arena of legitimization battles.
Fig. 3. A theory of physical, social, and symbolic spaces as interrelated and 
internally distinguished loci for changing power relations and differentiating and 
positioning of social actors. Resisting extractivism in all these spaces and through 
all these mechanisms is likely to lead to better outcomes for the resistance.
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“Symbolic acts of merit” is my own concept, not one presented by Bour-
dieu, who did not consider morality or ethics as significant strategies of dis-
tinction. This conception differs from “symbolic capital” in that the power 
in these acts of merit does not come from misrecognized capital in other 
spaces. Rather their power arises from real competence, skills, or acts of 
truth where an agent displays morality, courage, strong will, or humility for 
the sake of the inherent value of such symbolic acts, not to gain physical 
or social power (for which the accrued symbolic power can nevertheless be 
used). Such symbolic acts of merit are available for these agents despite their 
low position in the other spaces, and can result in changing their positioning 
in symbolic space. Symbolic acts of merit work as the mechanism instigat-
ing internal change in positioning or relations in symbolic space. Honor, 
trustworthiness, respect, and charisma can derive their power both from 
symbolic capital and from “symbolic acts of merit.” As I will show, symbolic 
acts of merit have been an extremely important avenue to continue in peace-
ful yet impactful resistance, especially for those who are underprivileged in 
multiple ways. For example, their underprivilege can manifest in relation to 
their ethnic, class, gender, national, and other minority positions. These are 
acts of key prominence given the current global crises and the thrust and 
power of extractivism. I will discuss cases where activists have engaged in 
these endeavors.
An actor can gain power in all three spaces by either internal, space- 
specific acts or by using interspace mechanisms. A mechanism that can be 
used to link physical and symbolic space is the creation of objectified symbolic 
power, which links physical space changes to their symbolic dimensions, 
while social and symbolic spaces can be linked by creating institutionalized 
symbolic power. Both of these tools can be used to generate transformation in 
either direction, from physical to symbolic, social to symbolic, or vice versa, 
and also to forge links between all spaces.
When social and symbolic spaces are simultaneously changed, physical 
space can be transformed more rapidly and thoroughly. Mining expansion 
and contraction can be explained through such multispatial power changes 
(Kröger 2015a). The position of a social actor in social space can be made 
homologous with physical space by what I call the objectification of social 
position (see figure 3, top arrow). Examples of this are using capital to trans-
form one’s body via plastic surgery, moving to a new neighborhood, creating 
a website, or buying a mineral deposit and opening up a mine. Institution-
alization of physical position can be used to link one’s position in physical 
space to social space. An example of this is the formation of a company or 
association named after a location where one has lived, which allows the 
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form of physical location that has been thus institutionalized to be legalized 
and made changeable (by sale). The institutionalization of physical position 
can be the resistance strategy of attempting to gain official recognition of 
ethnic- territorial rights. Indigenous and other rural populations affected by 
mining may also try to create and change the objectified symbolic capital on 
which mining relies, such as the framing of destroyed or affected beings 
and entities as living, instead of as mere objects that are devoid of life (e.g., 
“natural resources” versus animals, trees, and other entities in the web of 
life). They can argue that their land is holy, that a mountain is a god, and not 
(primarily) a mineral base, and that mining machinery are not emblems of 
progress and development, but of destruction— land and machinery being 
key objectified symbolic capital on which and through which extractivist 
expansion and its resistance often meet. Both these interspace mechanisms 
can counter mining capitalists’ use of (1) the objectification of social position, 
whereby miners use their economic, social, and cultural capital to occupy 
physical space by opening mines, and (2) institutionalized symbolic power, 
wherein these people and companies are considered rightful developers and 
their projects positive to the nation- state.
The symbolic capital changes related to “nature,” “natural resource”- based 
“development,” and “indigeneity” surfaced as particularly important during 
my field research, and a brief discussion of these terms helps to relate the 
conceptual framework above to extractivism and its discontents. Culturally 
marginalized groups, subalterns of the subalterns, cannot easily use symbolic 
capital or ethnic cleavages for their own benefit in structural politics (Spivak 
2004). Many Adivasis try to portray themselves as the “preservers of nature,” 
but such linking of indigeneity and environmentalism is often fiercely resisted 
by the Indian state and a large part of the population in India (Nilsen and 
Roy 2015). Meanwhile, the efficacy of the other political games Adivasis use 
can also be diminished when Adivasis are linked to groups engaged in armed 
secession or revolutionary politics, or both, outside of the state in the form of 
Maoist insurgency (Chandhoke 2015; Shah 2010).
I suggest a three- space causal analysis theory to assess how these transfor-
mations take place. Of key importance are the mechanisms connecting the 
symbolic space to the social and physical space, and the use of symbolic acts 
that challenge the modern ontologies by nonmodernist framings. To travel 
down one of these new paths, in India, the Supreme Court’s verdict against 
Vedanta’s project to mine bauxite in the Niamgiri hills of Odisha was cen-
trally based on the tribal peoples’ framing of the mountain as an agent and 
a god. Studies by activist scholars cataloguing these worldviews have been 
central for the courts to be able to understand the dynamics more fully. The 
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book by Padel and Das (2010a) was important in the Niamgiri struggle. In 
the foreword, Arundhati Roy, an Indian activist- writer- intellectual, discusses 
the framing of the bauxite hill by the tribal Kond people, a narrative that 
reflects resymbolizing framing in operation:14
The hills watched over the Kond. The Kond watched over the hills 
and worshipped them as living deities. Now these hills have been sold 
for the bauxite they contain. For the Kond it’s as though god has been 
sold. They ask how much god would go for if the god were Ram or 
Allah or Jesus Christ? (Roy 2010, xi)
The above is a good example of the serious challenge that indigenous 
groups often pose to modern mining, an act that churns away entire moun-
tains. Spatial changes take place through the politics of changing symbolic 
capital, revealing the violence and power inherent in framings such as “natu-
ral resource,” and scaling up these changes to national levels. This change 
in symbolic capital can result in decision- makers, like judges, recognizing 
the world more in the way indigenous peoples such as the Kond see the 
world— or at least protecting and giving space for lived environments that 
challenge the values of modernity. I will provide more examples, particu-
larly through analyzing nonmodernist framings, in action in mining con-
flicts. Through exposing cases with nonmodernist framings, argumenta-
tion, and lived worlds, I want to suggest that analysis should go beyond 
making the naïve point that “primordial, untouched nature” no longer 
exists in the world, and seek analytically deeper, workable (generalizable 
and contextually specific) human ecology relations and typologies. Figure 
3 advances current theorizing by (1) distinguishing different ways through 
which capitalism commodifies nature (demanded by, e.g., Castree 2003); 
(2) developing a political ecology that draws from the conceptualization of 
socio- environmental movements in places of very varied human ecologies 
and resistances, such as Latin America (demanded by, e.g., Escobar 2008; 
Gudynas 2011; Hecht 2011); and (3) applying world- ecology’s understand-
ing of capitalism in the web of life (demanded by, e.g., Moore 2014, 2015).
Part I has offered several new concepts and two theoretical frameworks 
that can be used in complement when studying investment politics and their 
socio- environmental dynamics, and more generally political and spatial 
transformations. Part II explores the outcomes of resistance through a focus 
on political systems and contextual variance in Brazil and India.
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Part I I
Political Dynamics and Contexts
I have divided the analysis of the cases into two major parts that have par-
tially differing goals. Part II canvasses the contexts in which these struggles 
take place and how they are created. The step of canvassing the context 
avoids the problem of jumping directly to a merely strategy- based explana-
tion of investment politics. Part II contextualizes the use of peaceful and 
armed resistance strategies, while part III isolates these strategies to explore 
their possibly generalizable role in affecting investment outcomes. First, part 
II contributes to the relational study of social movements by explaining how 
resistance coproduces contexts and political dynamics through the imple-
mentation of specific strategies. Simultaneously, it explores how the choice 
of these strategies is influenced by the present day and historically created 
contexts in place. Thus, I study the resistance in Goa through a focus of 
how it took place and its key part in the consolidation of a more demo-
cratic political system in India. I will also explore how the peaceful choices 
by the resistance in Brazil were essential to not escalate these conflicts into 
two- sided armed conflicts. I will partially return to these cases in part III, 
where I focus on how the specific sets of peaceful strategies used in India and 
Brazil impacted investment outcomes. Part III focuses on exploring how the 
five key strategies, or a subset of them, influenced economic outcomes and 
tested the hypothesis. Part III provides more details on how exactly resis-
tance movements attain success, especially in the context of building a more 
democratic society, which is a process that will be opened up in chapter 3.
In chapter 3, I dedicate specific sections to studying differing nonar-
med contexts in extractive investment politics. This detailed examination 
sheds light on the role of consolidating democratic polities, for example, in 
old- mining regions (where mining is expanding into new urban contexts) 
and key resource peripheries, which can affect the outcomes of similar resis-
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tance strategy uses. Chapter 4 turns to how conflict outcomes vary when the 
resistance is accompanied by armed resistance groups, such as the guerrilla 
groups in Eastern India. With the separation of the cases into armed and 
nonarmed resistance settings, I suggest that the key cleavage in the overall 
configuration of political opportunities is created by whether there is nonar-
med or armed conflict (from both sides).
The next two chapters focus on examining to what extent and how differ-
ent political systems and contextual factors influence resistance outcomes and 
styles. By analyzing contexts and polities, this part tests the hypothesis— that 
resistance strategies explain investment politics. This contextual approach 
here serves to open up a series of important causalities at play in extractivist 
expansion and contraction in differing political dynamics, and how they 
might influence the outcomes. I will thus explore the role of all the explana-
tory factors identified in figures 1– 3 in chapter 2. I will use an empirical 
analysis comparing a set of highly interesting cases from Brazil and India 
to provide theoretical insights to the structure- agency debate. This debate 
revolves around questions of how people can change the world, though typi-
cally not in the conditions of their own choosing, but sometimes in condi-






During my fieldwork I traveled far off the beaten path to meet people 
in places in the remote regions affected by the long arm of extractivism. 
In Goa, with Sebastian Rodrigues as my guide, we traveled across the 
hinterlands. Together with Adivasis, we drove up into the Western Ghats 
hills several hours on roads that were in such bad shape that they required 
a military- grade four- wheel vehicle to cross. After hours of bumping on 
these roads, we set off on foot several more hours to cross the hills from Goa 
to the side of Karnataka. The footpaths in the jungle were muddy, so we 
took off our shoes. Rain was pouring down as we crossed rivers, and our 
feet were soon covered with a local variety of jumping leeches that I had 
not seen before. Soiled and bloody we arrived in a humid Adivasi village 
in the middle of the rainforest, surrounded by a few terraces of rice fields. 
The locals greeted me curiously, saying I was only the third foreigner to 
visit their village. This was a place where only a few people had seen the 
outside world. Rice and dal were offered to us on bamboo leaves spread on 
the ground, and we slept on the bare clay ground that had been battered 
hard under the huts. When returning, we saw in the foothills on the Goan 
side open pits from the mining boom that was quickly advancing toward 
the heart of the Ghats. The local villagers remained there to keep a watch 
on the mining trucks, occasionally setting road blockages when they knew 
that the ore was coming from outside lease boundaries. This reminded me 
of some of my earlier experiences in Pará, Brazil, where I witnessed how 
huge Amazon trees were eaten by the expanding open pit mines. It took 
a full day of driving to reach the other side of the national forest where 
the mine was expanding. When we returned down the backside in the 
blistering heat that is typical of Amazon regions stripped of their forests, 
we observed the worker barracks, hours and hours away from the nearest 
towns, yet right in the middle of what had been, before the 1980s, pris-
tine rainforest and the homeland of indigenous peoples. While thousands 
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of miles apart, the experiences in these key iron ore exporting regions of 
Goa and Pará created a sensation about the shared experience of what the 
advance of global extractivism was like for the local communities during 
its heyday in the early 2010s.
Resistance agency is not forged in a void, rather it develops in specific con-
texts in actual places. In terms of nonarmed resistance contexts, three politi-
cal and political economic dynamics surfaced as important variations that 
influenced the trajectory of the resistance. I have thus divided this chapter 
into three sections, to study from a contextual perspective how mobiliza-
tions take place within (1) a consolidating democracy; (2) a region with an 
“industrial vocation” for mining; and (3) a peripheral territory framed by 
government as the key national “resource frontier,” where forests are pro-
posed to be replaced by open- pit mining. Let us first examine how a context 
of what I call a “consolidating democracy” helps build resistance to mining, 
which boosts the outcomes of resistance strategies.
Resisting Extractivism in and for a Consolidating Democracy:  
Western India
Running along India’s western edge are the high- biodiversity and forested 
Western Ghats mountain range. Nestled in this range are the mining areas 
in eastern Goa and the Kudremukh iron ore mines in Karnataka, a bit south 
of Goa. Goa and the Kudremukh operation were both high- profile export 
mines. These were not only important mining regions, but both Goa and 
Karnataka had already been engaged in a deep process of democratization. In 
both these places movement after movement managed to achieve the closure 
or cancellation of important extractivist and other large- scale investment 
projects, which would had taken land control out of the hands of the locals 
and irreversibly transformed the landscapes. The Kudremukh mines were 
shut down by a very broad civil society movement, where all kinds of actors 
ranging from indigenous populations, to specialist NGOs, to large- scale 
farmers came together in the early 2000s to demand the closure. This was 
the first in the series of impressive resistance efforts that spurred the closure 
of several mining projects. I will discuss some of these efforts in more detail 
later in chapter 5. This section highlights the crucial contextual factors that 
need to be understood first to effectively explain why and how the resistance 
efforts in the Goan and the Bellary mines in Karnataka were so successful. I 
will build this explanation primarily by considering this movement as a type 
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of Polanyian countermovement against unchecked capitalism. I contribute 
to the Polanyian theory by showing how an “organic society” does not build 
itself automatically, but through specific strategies in relation to the state and 
the attendant spaces in which these struggles take place. I will analyze the 
dynamics in these mining areas and resistance movements using the frame-
work of investment politics, presented in figures 1 and 2. After that, I will 
briefly complement this by a spatial analysis, which illustrates how figure 3 
can be helpful in opening up the crucial physical and symbolic dimensions 
in studying extractivist politics. Let us start by setting the scene by examin-
ing the types of resistance capabilities that already existed in Goa prior to 
the mining scams, on which the specific mining resistance could build on.
Goa has an impressive track record of recent environmental activism, 
backed by different strata of society, and can build on the existing trajectory 
of heightened land use scrutiny. For example, in 2007– 8, activists managed 
to block eighteen special economic zones planned for the state (Bedi 2013b; 
Sampat 2015). In these and other recent Goan land struggles, all five of 
the key strategies were utilized. Protest was used particularly fearlessly and 
constantly featured direct confrontations with the authorities. This mobili-
zation built a space and the expectation of the right of civil society to share 
authority with the state to maintain the rule of law using (nonlethal, non-
massive) violence. The social movements were also heavily supported by a 
nonmodernist, spiritual conceptualization of land, whereby nature is a god 
and on the side of protesters (Rodrigues 2014; Sampat 2015). The same 
contextual setting holds in Karnataka, where several nationally important 
nodes of environmental activism are located, such as the Environment Sup-
port Group, which portrays itself as defending “local project affected com-
munities and voiceless ecosystems” by helping locals to network and access 
the state.1
Another important organization in mining, pulp, and other environ-
mental and social struggles in India, particularly in Karnataka, is an NGO 
called Samaj Parivartan Samudaya (SPS), which has a several- decade- long 
history. According to many newspapers and investor group analyses (e.g., 
EMIS 2014b), SPS was central in starting the 2011– 14 mine closure wave, 
by filing legal cases against illegal miners in the Bellary district. This wave of 
closures extended beyond Western India, resulting in closures all around the 
country. SPS’s work elucidates how “organic society” builders can operate in 
mining conflicts, regulating mining in their broader pursuit of democracy 
and justice. Their teams visited field sites to document the effects of min-
ing, which led to questioning the sustainability and acceptability of national 
mining policies. SPS also conducted scientific studies, filed public interest 
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litigation, trained people on how to use nonviolent direct action, and cam-
paigned in the media. All these efforts were undertaken in order to pro-
tect “the livelihood of local people and the ecology and environment of the 
region” and to promote democracy.2
A Polanyian approach is helpful to open up the specificities of how these 
actions helped to mold the context, and vice versa. Karl Polanyi (2001) called 
the nineteenth- century countermovement to curb the destructive effects of 
the ideology of free- market liberalism the “organic society,” which defends 
life and its reproduction and expands when capital advances too destruc-
tively. It is important to note that such an organic society consists both of 
progressive state actors and civil society. The regulatory moves made by SPS 
were some of the first attempts to consolidate democracy in the realm of 
extractivism, through the introduction of measures to ensure that liberal-
ism would be checked through the inclusion of social and environmental 
safeguards. This Polanyian approach is useful since it opens up contexts in 
a dynamic constructivist way. The building of such an “organic society” in 
Western India was continued by the resistance to mining mafias, which in 
turn supported the regional and Indian democracy.
The establishment that the resistance had to face in Western India was 
very challenging, as decision- makers were corrupt and keen on continu-
ing the unrule of law. A Goan activist explained (December 14, 2012) that 
the “industry corrupted everybody”; according to his experience, only a 
few actors controlled the corruption, sharing dividends among themselves. 
There was no monitoring, and five to six big families were responsible for 
the maneuvering of mining leases against the existing rules. Even the chief 
minister was involved, owning a part of Fomento Company, which is one of 
the oldest iron ore mining companies in India. The political apparatus pro-
tected companies while putting agitators in jail for short periods of time and 
using the legal system as a weapon. For example, 1,600 legal cases were filed 
against the inhabitants of just one village. In Karnataka there was a simi-
lar scheme, through which the mining mafia, including the chief minister, 
attained an estimated 15,000– 60,000 crore (meaning ten million) rupees 
(about 2.7 billion USD to 10.8 billion USD in September 2012 ) from ille-
gal extraction.3 In a conversation in December 2012 with a Supreme Court 
insider, he argued that
mining has become the most important issue in the country today. . . . 
what has liberalization done? Allowed virtually uncontrolled exploi-
tation, displacement, water pollution, rapid depletion of iron ore 
reserves, [an] industry where the margin of profit is 70– 90 percent, 
this figure involving bribes and transport costs to ports.
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This neoliberal and corruption- enabling setting created a mining mafia, 
which is the biggest problem. There were a few studies warning of prob-
lems, such as one in 2008 by the Centre for Science and Environment. Yet 
in general the problem was ignored before NGOs, such as SPS, started to 
discuss the issue.
This setting of widespread illegality and corruption prevented the build-
ing of a sound mineral policy. For example, “nothing was done in relation 
to recycling minerals,” as the mining mafia became “institutionalized in 
society.” In Bellary, the illegality “maintained an atmosphere of fear, where 
nobody could talk,” a local activist told me. An SPS member recounted that 
the “fear was simply unbelievable.” He continued by emphasizing that “fear 
and democracy cannot go together.” Public resistance and shows of courage 
via activism were necessary to change this setting. It was the broader setting 
of a consolidating democracy, which included key NGOs and activists with 
prior experience of victory in resistance, that was central in starting to mobi-
lize larger parts of the society to tackle the problems of mining.
Within the state, no one looked at or scrutinized the obvious discrepan-
cies. Claude Alvares from the important Goa Foundation NGO, which filed 
the Supreme Court petitions leading to mine closures in Goa, gave a vivid 
description of the situation (interviews, December 2012). By 2005 corrup-
tion had rooted the idea among central Goan powerholders that “anyone 
can do whatever,” while simultaneously voicing “glorious phrases” and insti-
gating a “government policy not to recruit regulators.” In this setting, the 
resistance contacted the Indian Bureau of Mining, and using this collabo-
ration they were able to calculate verifications of illegality— although the 
Goan activists remarked to me that this bureau is also involved in mining 
illegally. This embedding of the state’s institutional politics by autonomous 
social movements was instrumental in changing a setting where the local 
states had been captured by corporate agency.
The Western Indian activists as a whole saw the iron boom episode as 
a demonstration of the ills of corporate agency: “over the past five to seven 
years we have seen what private sector involvement does” (interviews, 2012– 
13). Activists demanded state- owned mining as a first step toward remediat-
ing the situation. A seasoned activist explained that activists had garnered 
support for this claim, and that “in Goa even unions now say that pub-
lic mining should be restored; people are fed up with [the] private sector.” 
Elites have now been framed as “thieves and criminals” who have legal cases 
mounting up against them.
One Goan activist felt that the worst consequence of the mining boom 
was corruption: “The damage they have done to the political system is tre-
mendous; the entire instability in Goan politics in the past decade has been 
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due to mining. Now there is stability, due to our petition.” The activist argued 
that “it’s only by corrupt action that you will get something done on mines,” 
and gave the following account of events. In the 2000s, three brothers from 
Bellary, Janardhana Reddy, G. Karunakara Reddy, and G. Somashekara 
Reddy, became influential state- level politicians. They used their political 
power to win illegal mining leases in the Bellary region to make themselves 
richer. The Reddy brothers were members of the Bharatiya Janata Party who 
had gained the favor of Karnataka BJP party leaders by backing BJP can-
didates against Sonia Gandhi in elections. All the brothers became cabinet 
ministers in the BJP’s Karnataka state government in 2008 and remained 
in their posts until autumn 2011. They were removed following a mining 
scandal in which they, together with the BJP Karnataka chief minister at the 
time, B. S. Yeddyurappa, were arrested and taken into judicial custody as 
core members of the mining mafia. By the time they were taken down, they 
were in control of at least three state ministries and, through their control 
of the largest political bloc, were in a parliamentary position to expel other 
ministers. They also had substantial influence in Andhra Pradesh, the neigh-
boring state, with patrons belonging to the same family.
In Bellary, the Reddy brothers illicitly built roads and opened mines by 
moving lease boundaries. The brothers also forced other miners to pay them 
a tax and maintained close ties with the police through their father, who 
was an officer. They built clientelist relations with the local municipalities, 
essentially converting their physical capital of iron ore into money that they 
used to turn a traditional Congress Party voter base into a BJP constituency. 
This move won them political support from high levels. However, they also 
had good relations with the Congress Party in Karnataka, in the early 2000s 
at least, and under whose rule in 2004 they were given the first iron ore 
license in Bellary.
What followed was an era of “selfish mining,” wherein farmers sold their 
lands and mining decimated the agrarian base and agricultural possibilities. 
The definitions of constituted forest land were eased, which resulted in the 
destruction of water provisioning by mining. The removal of 45 percent of 
the green cover threatened the irrigation of two million hectares of land. In 
the face of this, SPS members shared with me that seven regulatory agencies 
failed in their duty to regulate. There were no environmental impact assess-
ments, and the activists’ demand for closure and regulation of destructive 
mines was not heard by local officials. There were no public hearings, and 
the regulators turned a blind eye to pollution. The price of iron ore that 
companies paid to iron collectors was set low and never increased, which 
effectively resulted in “looting by the rich.”
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Help from the state was not forthcoming, which meant the activists had 
to fight on two fronts: to produce new state institutions capable of effectively 
regulating the industry, while simultaneously boosting resistance agency so 
that there would be pressure for the state to actively regulate. Activist agency 
was crucial for success on both fronts. I will next explain how the profes-
sional NGOs of Western India managed to remold the state and make it 
promote the rule of law in the areas captured by mining mafias. As this story 
illustrates, it is hard to distinguish “context” from activism in this and other 
cases. The analysis below opens up how the state embedding strategy oper-
ates in and ensures consolidating democracies.
The story of the Bellary resistance, which was the first in the series of 
nationwide mine closures, serves to illustrate what generated this wave and 
why it was so strong. A central task was the systematic collection of evidence 
that could be handed over in a single file to state investigators. These claims 
by the resistance prompted officials to initiate their own investigations, 
which served as the basis for later court judgments and government decrees. 
It is important to note that the sense of urgency fostered by protesting and 
campaigning was what first attracted the bureaucratic attention. In the Bel-
lary example, the role played by SPS was central.4
In Bellary, resistance actors explained that the local “anticorruption 
ombudsman,” the Lokayuktas, were mostly handpicked by the Reddy fam-
ily. However, there remained three progressive Lokayuktas in power whom 
the movement could rely on in state- embedding efforts. The resistance rec-
ommended strong action to redress the problems through the official body 
of Lokayuktas, but the government did little.5 After this initial effort failed, 
SPS changed its strategy. This is when they began to build local resistance 
groups, visit the affected areas and local people more, and even filed a 
Supreme Court complaint. The illegalities of this case were blatant enough 
for them to rely on litigation. In other cases around India, activists told me 
that they avoid the courts if possible, as going to court often serves to affect 
the legitimacy of most of the other options. While these other options are 
still technically usable, their potential outcomes are more likely to be (or 
at least at a greater risk of being) interpreted as illegitimate in the eyes of 
powerholders and even the general public. Mass protests, for example, can 
no longer ensure that a developer will back down, and building a movement 
can become harder or the whole mobilization process can be interrupted 
when the “last word” of the courts is voiced. This does not empower people, 
but rather makes them consider their own efforts and local democracy as less 
meaningful than expert or top- down governance.
In Bellary, SPS used “powerful grassroots agitation for protection of for-
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ests,” and locals themselves succeeded “very well in building people’s power,” 
according to an SPS coordinator. The first substantial protests took place 
on November 14 and 15, 2009, followed by the organization of a very large 
gathering by the participants in the SPS- led mobilization on January 25, 
2010. On February 10, 2010, following national- scale civil society embed-
ding of the state (see chapter 7), the court ordered the creation of the Shah 
Commission to investigate the issue, which delivered a tough report, as did 
the Lokayukta, which noted that 16,000 crore (2.9 billion USD) had been 
lost to illegal mining.6 Simultaneously, in February 2010, SPS was mobi-
lizing approximately 600 people to protest in Bellary against the mining 
mafia. The Lokayukta report, which detailed the mining situation, including 
reserves in Bellary, was, according to one of its key organizers, “extremely 
helpful in court” for SPS. These efforts resulted in a complete ban on min-
ing, as well as other unexpected outcomes, which were not so beneficial from 
the resistance viewpoint.7
SPS rejoiced that, in mapping the mining mafia’s territorial reach, “we 
proved they have gone beyond lease area, blasted centenary tombs.” The 
media called the scheme the “Republic of Bellary” in which no external 
control or governance mechanism had any effect, as the Reddy brothers 
seamlessly provided protection to unauthorized and unaccounted mining, 
with active connivance with government officials at all levels.8 The report 
argued that the mining ban left 15,000 people without jobs in Bellary, most 
of whom were migrants who quickly left the area. Yet many locals were also 
unhappy about the ban; truck drivers’ incomes were cut to a third of prior 
earnings and they were not able to pay back their loans; and the hotel busi-
ness dropped by 70 percent. One of the hardest hit populations was the ex- 
farmers who could no longer get payments from miners, yet they also could 
not return to farming. Their very soils, which were considered as “overbur-
den” by the mining industry, had been removed irreversibly, and it was only 
possible to ask for royalties and rents on the former agricultural lands that 
had been turned into open- pit mines. It comes as no surprise that a mining 
baron won the post- 2011 local elections, as quite a few unemployed locals 
wanted mining jobs back.
SPS did not expect the Supreme Court decision to be in their favor, sug-
gesting that this was not an attribution of a political opportunity. Opportu-
nities appeared, but they were so camouflaged both from contentious and 
corporate agency that not even the mining mafia, with intimate knowledge 
of politics, could foresee the resistance efforts having any impact. Rather, 
these opportunities were underestimated by all parties involved. SPS had a 
slight hunch of how matters would proceed only with regard to the Loka-
Nonarmed Resistance  77
Revised Pages
yuktas, knowing that a prior Lokayukta was not going to investigate, and 
waiting for the Lokayukta to change. This wait turned out to be “lucky,” 
as the new Lokayukta was “good.” The Lokayuktas change at times, and it 
depends a lot on the personality and social ties and affinities of the ombuds-
man on whether they might be more or less likely to investigate certain 
issues and be more open to attempts by civil society groups to persuade them 
to act in favor of the public good.
SPS saw that their “engine is the political organizing of people,” which 
alone is not enough, and for which reason they always use a string of other 
strategies. For example, they use litigation, “very well- planned strategic cam-
paigning,” and embedding institutionally and structurally. This institutional 
embedding was described in their own words as being “fully well connected 
in the official part” and having friends in the bureaucracy. Together these 
embedding strategies ensure that they are “a well- treated group, and enjoy 
protection,” according to an SPS outsider.
SPS members reflected that a movement success “would not have gone 
very far” without their engagement with judicial politics: “without Supreme 
Court intervention the mafia would not have been stopped.” For litigation 
to succeed— that is, for courts to become a true political opportunity and 
not merely an observed one— several factors have to be taken into account. 
An NGO should have quite a deep history and embedded relations with the 
state, and it should have already been part of the judicial politics in which 
their formal and informal rules and power relations have been constituted 
(such as India’s Green Tribunal, a national court established in 2010 that spe-
cializes in expedited decisions in environmental cases). That is, they should 
have already advanced on the steps of the state constitution (see figure 2), 
by creating new interpersonal relations with powerholders and by participat-
ing in the crafting of new state structures (such as the Green Tribunal), or 
changing the rules of existing political games. This is particularly important 
in the Global South where courts are typically biased. In the 1980s, one of 
the early struggles of SPS, which heightened their reputation, resulted in the 
stoppage of one of India’s first large- scale pulp investments with industrial 
tree plantations in Karnataka. They also used the courts in this case, but 
“did not do very well due to partial court judges,” which “taught us a les-
son.” They told me that in the pulp case, they quickly moved from the use 
of institutional politics to using electoral politics, by campaigning, mobiliz-
ing students, and attracting seventy- seven legislators from all parties who 
decided to close the pulp investment. This was not only an economic but 
also a political victory; through this electoral- politics embedding, they had 
gained strong allies in the legislature, which ultimately also helped to gain a 
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“de facto judicial victory.” The SPS was poised and ready to move to the use 
of electoral politics in Bellary if the judicial path had not worked.
SPS saw Bellary only as a “one- third victory.” The real challenges lay in 
changing government strategizing, changing executive policy- making, win-
ning elections, and removing the deep corruption the mafia caused in public 
life. This observation supports the views of activists in Goa on the use of the 
courts; as a Goa Foundation activist told me, “The first duty is to build mass 
awareness through agitation as otherwise we will be weak in [the] courts.” In 
Goa organic society was not limited to state boundaries, and the large Goan 
expatriate population also got involved. I observed and was told many times 
that “the international and popular pressure was huge.” An NGO activist 
argued that the “movement and court can and should run in parallel,” with 
activists providing a research team to meticulously collect information that 
authorities could use as the basis for their investigations.
There are several features in this case that are helpful in explaining the 
importance and effectiveness of state embedding, including how, why, and 
when it can work. The network of Western Indian resistance movements 
has expert lawyers, legal NGOs, and professionals who are activists or are 
helping the activists. In addition, they have established links to important 
legal offices in New Delhi. Generally, in mining conflicts around the world, 
resistance has not had legal organizations in their networks, but when their 
networks include these players resistance has been more successful.9 In Goa 
a key activist NGO had twenty- five years of experience in court work and 
in certain cases knew the law better than some of the judges. According to 
an informant, this activist could thus “tell . . . backward judges what to do.” 
This resistance group had a longer experience built on mining legislation 
than many courts, which typically lacked expertise. This creates a setting 
that could be considered a deliberative rule of law, where the civil society fills 
in for the default state. This judicial politics embedding resulted in a new 
set of social ties that broke the state- society boundary, as the activists helped 
state actors to do their jobs better, while increasing the autonomy of the state 
from capture by extractivist interests.
State embedding is a two- way road between the state and civil society. As 
this section has illustrated, embedding judicial politics means going deeper 
than just filing court petitions. Engaging deliberately with the court system 
can end up actually changing social ties and the roles between the judiciary 
and civil society. However, as noted above, this level of embedding relies on 
prior in- depth expertise on the subject matter at hand (such as environmen-
tal legislation of a given sector and context) and expertise in judicial politics.
A successful utilization of the courts by activists is more likely in a set-
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ting of consolidating democracy, where movements have built their access 
to the judicial system through prior judicial actions. In a federal state system 
this typically means that there should be at least some institutional open-
ings both at the federal and state levels, as both need to be addressed to 
arrive at a policy change on an issue of such national importance as mineral 
policy. In India, there is federal- level support, in the form of the Supreme 
Court, which has, according to an activist, “honest judges— more than in 
the United States.” The power of judicial review of policies is also “really 
strong— any decision of the government can be checked.” In the 1980s, fol-
lowing a decision by a progressive judge, access to the Supreme Court was 
also liberalized. However, my research suggests that in order to access this 
court from the local level, the state where the area is located should have an 
“organic society,” which forges and provides activists or local powerholders 
who know how to use this opportunity— not an easy task for the illiterate 
part of the Indian population.
To conclude this section on how a context of consolidating democracy 
enabled resistance to extractivism, I will assess the case of Western India via 
the three- space theory of spatial causalities presented in figure 3 in chapter 
2. I discuss how power relations in the social, symbolic, and physical spaces 
influence the outcomes and longevity of investment politics. This analysis 
helps in understanding how the “double movement” is built, and under 
which conditions and to which extent “organic society” and democracy can 
function, concretizing Polanyi’s theory. I will illustrate the usability of the 
spatial theory in explaining how physical changes such as extractivist expan-
sions and discontinuations can take place.
A seasoned activist from Goa told me how “people were afraid to talk 
about mining in 2001, but I went on talking about it. Then others got the 
courage also.” This show of courage led to a “different attitude in Goa,” 
according to my informant. I consider this act of courage to also constitute a 
symbolic act of merit; the accumulation of these acts is a vital step in shifting 
the symbolic space. Furthermore, these local changes have led to a “general 
change in India in fear,” a claim that I found palpable when tracking the 
path of resistance outcomes from Western India to Eastern India in the form 
of proactive government measures to curb illegalities for fear of local protests 
tarnishing the government’s reputation. This suggests that symbolic acts of 
merit can be used to transform power relations. Such actions seem to be 
especially impactful for resisting extractivist expansion when coupled with 
the embedding and coproduction of the state, as discussed above. However, 
the outcomes of these moves can be hard to retain in the sphere of mining 
politics if the mining has already managed to remold the physical landscapes 
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into open- pit mines. Although state embedding can result in mining discon-
tinuations, sometimes mining elites manage to create so much economic, 
social, and symbolic capital during the extractivist phase that it is difficult 
to keep the mines closed. This is especially true if the countermovement is 
weak, for which reason I have hypothesized that the most efficient resistance 
tries to use the five key strategies simultaneously.
The absence of a mass antimining movement can easily prove to be a hur-
dle for the maintenance of a mining ban or regulations, while in several parts 
of India (and most visibly in Bellary) the mining mafia has left a legacy that 
is more lasting than changes in the rules of electoral or institutional politics. 
Through the mining activities these mafias permanently altered the physical 
space, which has eased maintaining a promining homology in the symbolic 
and social spaces. As the accumulation of social, cultural, and economic cap-
ital was tied to mining, the mining barons were able to sustain their image 
with their constituencies, and thus their symbolic power remained intact.
First, the mafia gained mining leases with their social and economic 
capital, thus objectifying their social position in physical space. This, in and 
of itself, was nothing new, but the depth and scale at which it was done 
was unprecedented in independent India. These large- scale objectifications 
of social positions in physical space by politicians who became entrepre-
neurs afterward (or land grabbers, if you prefer) have been made possible by 
recent procorporate and economic- growth policies (see Kohli 2012). Next, 
by redistributing and changing the type of access to, and control of, nature 
via mines extending over forests and fields, they changed power relations. 
Finally, after this power haul, they institutionalized their new physical posi-
tion by becoming ministers and restructuring the regulatory system. This 
way their ability to pursue power in the symbolic space was ensured, as they 
attacked the space both by endowing mining with objectified symbolic power 
via physical space changes and by creating institutionalized symbolic power 
for themselves. They gathered this symbolic power by portraying themselves 
as benevolent political patrons who were increasing the wealth of locals with 
iron ore money. Such a three- pronged effort to shape power relations is hard 
to combat, and essentially requires the use of national or even international 
political support. The locally built power of mining barons will indeed be 
hard to reverse, as it stands steadily on three legs, one of which cannot easily 
be altered. The physical space, now turned into open- pit- ravaged landscapes, 
remains accessible to mining (and undesirable for almost any other purpose), 
even though lease areas can be given to other miners.
Yet it is noteworthy that even in a deeply promining setting, with a sys-
tematic failure of regulation, state capture, and nonattribution of political 
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opportunities, a “handful of dedicated activists can overcome” the barriers 
to sound mining regulation, as an SPS member described when recounting 
their strategies. No mass social movement was created, although organizing 
and politicizing did take place. Activists went through a long training pro-
gram, with twenty- day courses and “regular one- day sit- downs for contin-
ued learning” where they learn the “important factor” of considering “pow-
erholders as equal, not superior.”
This mobilizing is based on nonethnic lines, “following Ambedkar- type 
grassroots work” by movements.10 This included systematic training in non-
violent action for youths and protests that the police had been informed 
about in advance. Subsequently, activists were not attacked, which differed 
from Goa, where they were beaten and jailed in considerable numbers, 
and activists also attacked the police. SPS’s typical repertoire of contention 
includes protests, but these have a particular quality, also followed in Bel-
lary, of a “very deep faith in satyagraha, showing strength, willingness to go 
to jail, chaining oneself for five days [to other protestors to block the access 
to mining sites, for example].”11
Such symbolic acts of merit, coupled with simultaneous physical space 
acts, such as street demonstrations, were used to counter mining capitalists 
in the social space. However, the absence of a mass social movement meant 
that the social space itself was not strongly transformed, nor, therefore, was 
the symbolic space, so the holders of the most capital, miner- politicians, 
retained their position as rightful developers of the region in the public eye. 
Yet the use of two- space and interspatial strategies in Bellary resulted not 
only in a quick and complete mining ban but also in breaking the corrupt 
state trajectory “at least for a while,” and instigating a deep psychological 
transformation whereby the “whole fear has changed, gone.” Such a pause 
created opportunities to start building a larger movement, but as we shall 
see, this has taken place mostly outside Bellary. Other movements were now 
able to identify opportunities and populations that were not as afraid of 
their own mining mafias as they had been previously, as it had been shown 
that they could be defeated. In Bellary, the physical context had become so 
ravaged that it made local politics less usable. The solution to combat state 
capture came from the broader “organic society” of Western India, and the 
political outcomes were even greater in places that were more open to min-
ing criticism than Bellary.
I have used the three- space causal analysis theory to identify how power 
relations in the physical, social, and symbolic spaces affect movement out-
comes and their perpetuation. Building an “organic society” is an effective 
way to resist extractivism, and as my discussion of Western India has shown, 
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this is done more easily in a context of consolidating democracy. However, 
if a strong enough “organic society” is not created locally, but resistance 
relies more on professional “NGO- style” activism instead of very large- scale 
mass mobilizations, the weight of the power vested in the social, symbolic, 
and physical spaces is typically dramatically reshaped by extractivism and 
is likely to produce short- lived resistance outcomes. It is hard to persuade 
locals to turn to postextractivism when there is no going back, as mining 
has ravaged most agricultural lands, which happened in Bellary. In such 
cases extractivism has managed to reshape the physical space so that it offers 
perpetual power, a lock- in, for miners, as others cannot use the area easily 
for other purposes. Yet even in such situations the resistance can overturn 
the power of the physical space by recasting mining’s acceptability in the 
symbolic space, and by cutting the possibilities for gaining capital by mining 
(thus severing the mechanisms linking social and physical spaces). An effec-
tive countermovement against extractivism— whose goal is to reshape what 
our landscapes look like, and who has access to which lived environments— 
should thus pursue not just court victories, but major equalizing of power 
relations in both symbolic and social spaces.
In the next section, I continue to explore the overarching political con-
texts, but I will focus on how promining attitudes influence extractivism 
and its resistance. I will provide an analysis on how mining politics, placed 
in urban and peripheral settings, are influenced due to this contextual dif-
ference. This helps in identifying how the presence of urban middle classes, 
critical mining professionals, and trade unions can help the resistance.
Resistance in Old, Promining Settings: Minas Gerais in Brazil
Mining in Minas Gerais dates back to the colonial era, and local public opin-
ion toward mining was mostly positive in the 2000s when the new mining 
boom started.12 Mining is indeed one of the state’s key sources of income. In 
fact, the people of this state, whose very name means “General Mines,” call 
themselves mineiros, which translates directly to miners. Minas Gerais also 
presents the only mining project outcomes that can be considered unequivo-
cal discontinuations in Brazil.13 This begs the question: Were the outcomes 
related specifically to these struggles occurring in this particular state, or 
were they due to the specificities of each case of investment politics with 
their assortment of resistance and corporate agency? The answers to these 
questions are— both. As I show here, there were variations within Minas 
Gerais depending on the case, but as a whole this was an “easier” context for 
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resistance than the global resource frontiers of the Eastern Amazon in Pará. 
I will discuss several contextual factors that supported the resistance actions 
in Minas Gerais in comparison to Pará. I study here four expansion cases: 
the first three (Apolo, Casa de Pedra, and Mina Del Rey) are located in the 
Quadrilátero Ferrífero (Iron Quadrangle), which is Brazil’s most important 
mining region (covering the central Minas Gerais southeast from Belo Hori-
zonte), and all of them were successfully resisted, though the outcomes were 
different. In the end of this section, I compare these three largely “urban 
mining” cases with the rural Minas- Rio project located north of Belo Hori-
zonte, which was a violent and peripheral context where resistance did not 
succeed nearly as well as it did in the other Minas Gerais cases.
Apolo
The first case is Vale’s Apolo greenfield project close to Belo Horizonte, in the 
ominously named Vale do Aço (Valley of Steel). The Apolo project proposal 
was massive,14 but was put on hold.15 The choice of the Apolo project as one 
of the projects to be scrapped was based on resistance by a well- networked 
and embedded professional NGO, which had no massive movement behind 
it, but possessed technical knowledge. This resistance case offers an excellent 
opportunity to study whether a mass social movement needs to be created, 
or whether a professional NGO is enough to discontinue mining projects.16
The Apolo resistance was built using several strategies. The group started 
the struggle by framing it as being against a company that had no respect 
for the last water reservoir and forest area close to the state capital. In other 
words, it was framed as a Vale versus Belo Horizonte fight for resource access. 
Later, the resistance also included nonmodernist, utopian framing, which 
Coelho- De- Souza (2015) argues went beyond the use of disruptive words 
and phrases in typical mining struggles. The frames affected city dwellers 
and had a large territorial span. This excerpt from a post on the movement’s 
website exemplifies the group’s territorial framing:17
The Gandarela aquifer has been estimated as having around 1.6 
trillion litres of potable water, and its recharge by rainfall is done 
through the “canga” (a shield of ironstone pebble conglomerates) that 
covers its highest peaks. Its protection is strategic to the future of the 
metropolitan region of Belo Horizonte . . . [supplying] 60% of Belo 
Horizonte’s water demand.  .  .  . the preservation of the Gandarela 
region is . . . a matter of survival: it is the last great untouched natural 
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reserve in the Quadrilátero Aquífero and its exploitation by the min-
ing companies would destroy the very last of the “canga” formations.
This framing worked as a scale expansion that brought the battle from 
the hills to the city, thereby drawing on the city’s sizeable intellectual, criti-
cal, and bureaucratic populations to help curb the unchecked expansion.18 
Importantly, the post, titled “GANDARELA: The Avatar Is Right Here,” 
was written by Paulo Baptista, who was both a professor at the Federal Uni-
versity of Minas Gerais and a member of the resistance group. This frame 
was produced through an interlinking of different socialized subjectivities 
(in this case, academic and activist), with the resulting framing drawing both 
on modern science and alternative knowledge that challenges the project 
of modernity (referring to the Avatar film that is highly critical to mining 
expansion destroying indigenous lived environments, and presents a resis-
tance struggle [the director James Cameron has visited similar conflicts in 
Brazil to offer his solidarity to resistance], here). This demonstrates how 
nonmodernist framing does not signify that biocentric knowledge could not 
be used and produced simultaneously. Scientific facts on water impacts can 
be linked with a higher valuation of what exists than is explicitly present in 
the modern vision (which sees that places are flat and replaceable, and there 
is no end to resources, which can be exploited endlessly).
Vale initially filed for a mining permit in 2009. In 2010, the opponents, 
which consisted of the group described above together with other civil 
society members who were also working by embedding the Chico Mendes 
Institute for Biodiversity Conservation,19 officially proposed the creation of 
a new national park at Serra do Gandarela, posing considerable obstacles 
to the opening of Vale’s planned Apolo, Apolo Sul, Baú, and Capanema 
mine projects in the Gandarela hills, which overlapped the proposed park. 
The new national park idea was considered an efficient tool to prevent the 
forestland from turning into mining pits. However, it should be noted that 
to propose such a park in the first place required a deep knowledge of leg-
islative possibilities and political connections. When civil society resistance 
mounted and the Minas Gerais state could not find a solution that would 
please all stakeholders, it transferred its power to grant mining rights over 
to the federal government.20 Subsequently, on October 14, 2014, President 
Dilma Roussef, who had the power to decide whether the park would be 
created or Apolo would be given the license— chose both. She allocated 
over 31,000 hectares of Serra do Gandarela to create the national park, 
while retaining between 900– 2,000 hectares for the Apolo project, pending 
proper licenses.21 While the ICMBio and Vale welcomed the decision, the 
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resistance did not. The resistance argues that the national park will not save 
the water system or the cangas, as their recommendations for the borders of 
the national park were not accepted, and crucial water systems were left out-
side the park and inside the would- be mining areas of Vale and other mining 
companies, contrary to what was proposed.22
While there was not an outright victory for the resistance, the outcomes of 
this struggle can be considered both economically and politically significant, 
as the mobilization significantly changed the old, promining attitudes and 
possibilities in Minas Gerais, particularly in the capital. Carolina Coelho- 
De- Souza (2015) wrote her doctoral dissertation on the resistance coalition 
against Apolo, based on insider participant observation. For Coelho- De- 
Souza, the resistance was not only successful in blocking mining and defend-
ing water, these being the economic outcomes to date, but also in creating 
what I call “important political outcomes” in the form of forging a lasting 
willingness and ability within civil society to actively participate in decision- 
making (which is harder to reverse than economic outcomes). The contents 
of this resistance agency, according to Coelho- De- Souza (2015, 6), include 
“deconstructing the economic discourse of the mining company,” “propos-
ing an economic alternative” (e.g., tourism), and framing “‘other worlds,’ 
other human- nature relations.” Thus, the anti- Apolo movement seems to 
be a strong case of creating and campaigning by an antimodernist framing, 
including references to buen vivir (good living), which fundamentally chal-
lenges capitalism. This is a major political outcome in a state called Minas 
Gerais. The resistance group created to challenge Apolo can offer grounds 
for expanding a different type of resistance in comparison to traditional left-
ist mass movements such as those created by Justice on the Rails, the MST, 
and La Via Campesina (which are discussed in the next section).
As a result of many mining- caused conflicts and disasters, the state of 
Minas Gerais is currently witnessing a historic surge in antimining attitudes. 
Minas thus offers a context to study a setting where significant segments of 
the existing promining citizens are beginning to look for postextractivist 
solutions. The cases detailed herein explain how the contextual change has 
taken place. Striving for a postextractivist life means that the legitimacy and, 
thus, the symbolic capital of mining is diminishing, which might also render 
mining less powerful in the physical and social space. To counter such pos-
sibilities, not only in Minas Gerais but also elsewhere, Vale has used sophis-
ticated means to try to win over the hearts of locals around the world. They 
have done this, according to my informants, particularly in Minas Gerais 
and the Gandarela region, by corporate social responsibility and outreach 
campaigns such as massive arts and culture programs.
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Vale’s campaigns suggest that the struggle is increasingly turning into 
a dialectic between Vale and an NGO that crafts nonmodernist spaces 
through a focus on framing, visualizing, or “glimpsing” other worlds, as 
described by Coelho- De- Souza (2015). To oppose these changes in sym-
bolic space, Vale and other mining companies are trying to support con-
temporary culture (e.g., via patronizing the arts and theater), a culture that 
includes megamining, which is appropriating what is left of the forests and 
hills. They aim to show that the world is good and worth living in as it 
is, that there is no need to resist extractivist practices. Therefore, in Minas 
Gerais, as in Western India, it was incredibly important that the people 
learned not to fear, to understand that resistance is possible and can result 
in the stoppage of extractive operations. Before the Apolo resistance case, 
no one in Minas Gerais had dared to imagine that resisting mining in a 
state that had been promining since colonialism, let alone against Vale, 
would be possible, as noted by a movement informant (Coelho- de- Souza 
2015, 279).23 The coordinator of Movimento dos Atingidos pelo Minera-
ção (Movement for Popular Sovereignty in Mining, or MAM) also shared 
this view, regarding attitude as a key problem for mobilization. Thus, the 
approach of the Gandarela movement to seek a deeper change in symbolic 
space, by showing that it is possible to at least slow down and win a partial 
victory, is fruitful in starting to sow the seeds of a larger mobilization in 
a very old, promining context whose people cannot imagine life without 
the mining industry.
This subsection on the Apolo case has discussed the specific qualities 
of the resistance strategies that can turn a promining context into one that 
is actively seeking postextractivist solutions. The case shows that carefully 
manufactured resistance strategies, such as nonmodernist campaigning, 
can lead to powerful economic outcomes even in the absence of a mass 
social movement. This holds particularly true if urban middle classes are 
well connected, know how to embed the state- remediated political games 
support, and join the resistance. Such a resistance can win even in a very 
deeply promining social, symbolic, and physical space, and start to change 
the power of mining in these spaces.24 Three other important Minas Gerais 
cases, analyzed below, help to explain in more detail how resistance can suc-
ceed in challenging the objectified and institutionalized symbolic capital of 
mining in a promining society. In particular, the peripheral case of Minas- 
Rio will illustrate the conditions wherein this shift is a less likely outcome, 
including a strong discrimination against ethnic and rural minorities, who 
have far less capital than the urban middle classes.
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Casa de Pedra
An important case that helps to further analyze resistance in the setting 
of old promining attitudes and established extractivism is the case of Bra-
zil’s largest integrated steel producer, the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional 
(CSN), which had an expansion project of the existing Casa de Pedra min-
ing complex in Congonhas. This large project had an intended extraction of 
eighty- nine million tons per year. The resistance movement in this case was 
ample and consisted of diverse social actors, including Grupo Rede Con-
gonhas (the mine trade union), environmentalist politicians, and affected 
locals (Ramalho, Santos, and Lima 2013).25 The outcome to this resistance 
effort was an almost full cancellation of the project, leading to an official 
nature reservation being established on 85 percent of the would- be mined 
area, with only 15 percent of the area left for possible exploration (these 
areas mostly contained already- existing mines), and the capping of mine 
production at thirty million tons per year (Ramalho, Santos, and Lima 
2013). Thus, the resistance gained a considerable victory, especially since 
they did not want to close the mine. Their proposal was endorsed by the 
mayor who wanted to preserve tourism, and the city itself was treated as a 
cultural patrimony in both the resistance and official framing. Most state 
and municipal politicians in executive and legislative positions were allied 
with the company (Ramalho, Santos, and Lima 2013), though there was a 
small opening in the political opportunity structure, as the local political 
elite was divided (although the division was lopsided in favor of mining). 
The resistance managed to embed electoral politics by convincing the mayor 
to endorse their cause.
In terms of spatial analysis, there is an important causality stemming 
from a change (or foreseen change) in the physical space, which went beyond 
the established norms of what is allowed for mining, even in a promining 
society. In the Casa de Pedra as well as the Apolo case, we see that although 
mining is old and established, the recent mining boom’s expansion into 
previously untapped areas started to provoke a deep transformation in the 
objectified symbolic capital of mining. Changes in the physical spaces, or 
attempts to change these spaces, were central for the resistance to be able 
to show and question the continuing and deepening power of the industry, 
backed by its symbolic capital of being the vanguard of local development. 
As in Apolo, the type of territory targeted also mattered, especially in cases 
where mining was threatening to move into the most important water reser-
voir and greenery in Congonhas, along with historic locations linked to Bra-
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zil’s independence struggles. In a detailed analysis of the case, Santos (2015) 
emphasizes that the symbolic aspect of resistance, focusing on the immoral-
ity of grabbing water by mining expansion, was instrumental in achieving 
the considerable outcomes of curbing expansion and changing corporate 
habits. As I see it, both CSN and Apolo were not just trying to alter physical 
space, but physical space that was deeply objectified symbolic capital— and 
thus more ready to be resymbolized along antimining and ethical lines if 
targeted by mining.
By objectifying symbolic capital, the resistance was able to shape physi-
cal space in Congonhas, whereas CSN had its hands tied as this was its 
only expansion possibility, and they did not have Vale’s privilege to choose 
between physical spaces (linked to different social and symbolic spaces). This 
made the project more vulnerable, according to Santos, who told me in an 
interview that it is easier to resist mines than, for example, industrial corpo-
rations, as the latter more often use the tactical argument that they will move 
their investment to a new location if their project is not approved.26
Yet the vulnerability of Congonhas arose not from its position as the com-
pany’s sole source of ore, but more precisely from the fact that the resistance 
knew this to be the case.27 They were able to talk the company talk, which 
allowed the company to understand both the damage their resistance could 
do and that they could not be fooled into accepting company advancement 
disguised as false resistance victories.
The Minas Gerais resistance cases are emblematic of the broader process 
of busting the boom of iron ore mines. The resistance managed to slow down 
and curb the size of the expansion plan when the urge for this was greatest, 
at the global price peak of iron ore, thereby discontinuing the expansion. 
Here, as elsewhere, time was on the side of resistance. In April 2015, as 
iron ore prices continued to decline, all the major iron mining companies 
in Brazil, including CSN, with its Casa de Pedra project, put their projects 
on hold. In addition, the efforts of the resistance to curb building the infra-
structure essential for new mines, such as ports and railroads, also put many 
projects on hold.28
Mina Del Rey
A third example that helps us to explore resistance dynamics in old promin-
ing contexts is Vale’s Mina Del Rey reactivation project, also in the Quadri-
látero Ferrífero, which was discontinued. The project was based in Mari-
ana, a historic city about fifty kilometers east of Congonhas and next to the 
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historic and tourist city of Ouro Preto. This was quite a specific context, 
an urban mining conflict like the two prior ones, which helped create an 
encompassive embeddedness, called for by Evans (1995, 2010), between 
the civil society and progressive state actors to resist mining. According to 
the website of a resistance group called Mariana Viva,29 this was an “urban 
mining” project, located just four kilometers from the historic tourist town 
of Mariana. The population considered themselves dependent on mining, at 
least according to a documentary series made on Vale- Mariana community 
relations called Sou Mineiro e sou de ferro (I am from Minas Gerais [or I am 
a miner] and made of iron),30 or on Maher’s (2014) depiction of the move-
ment as limited and most of the population being “unopposed” to the proj-
ect. Maher (2014, 195) briefly discusses Vale’s Mina Del Rey reactivation 
attempts and the thus far successful resistance by what he calls an “‘acade-
micians’ social movement.” In contrast to this view, at a co- organized pub-
lic hearing in June 2011, municipal authorities, civil society, Minas Gerais 
state’s legislative assembly’s Council on Mines and Energy, a wide range of 
civil society actors (such as the Catholic Church, trade unions, and mining 
resistance movements), together with the city’s elected mayor and legislative 
assembly members, wholeheartedly rejected the reactivation of the mine.31 
In this case, a resistance front with strongly encompassive embeddedness 
stood against rising extractivism and demonstrated that such a resistance 
front enjoys several strategic advantages. Importantly and interestingly, the 
encompassive embedding of progressive state actors and civil society resis-
tance in institutional and electoral politics made the use of contentious poli-
tics and judicial politics unnecessary.
This was a mass movement that previously had no need to protest, 
although they were willing and capable of doing so. In the words of the 
Mariana mayor, Geraldo Sales de Souza of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos 
Trabalhadores), “The people of Mariana do not want to accept the reactiva-
tion of Mina Del Rey. If necessary, we will go to the streets to put up bar-
ricades and protest.”32 The resistance used electoral politics, as well as insti-
tutional politics, specifically using the public hearing as a tool. There was 
no need to use judicial politics. The economic outcome was impressive, as 
were the political outcomes; Mariana Viva and the other anti– Mina Del Rey 
groups formed a strong link to transnational anti- Vale movements, showing 
how state embedding does not mean lesser radicalism or the impossibility 
of scaling up.
Both the Mariana and Congonhas cases suggest that the old, promining 
attitudes in Minas Gerais have been considerably transformed due to the 
emergence of a new wave of resistance that is cross- class based and includes 
90  Iron Will
Revised Pages
a large array of members from different groups who were typically promin-
ing. Although these people were accustomed to state- company mining, they 
now see it as rampant and greedy expansion by increasingly multinational or 
irresponsible mining capital. In both cases, mining trade unions backed the 
resistance, either in curbing the expansion of mines (Congonhas) or keeping 
the mines closed (Mariana). These cases demonstrate that old, promining 
settings might be better equipped, and at least as willing, to curb extractiv-
ist expansion as greenfield sites, if they have technically experienced and 
politically capable mining workers and state officials who understand what 
constitutes rampant mining expansion, know what it would entail, and can 
thus help build resistance fronts.
Furthermore, a contextual look reveals that these projects are cases of 
urban mining resistance, which may have made the creation of resistance 
easier. It is easier to mobilize impacted city dwellers than it is to mobilize 
rural dwellers, since the political connections of city dwellers are typically 
denser. The expansion of mining to large towns is in itself an interesting 
topic to be studied in greater detail. The last Minas Gerais expansion case I 
will discuss is a greenfield project in a peripheral region of the state. This case 
lacks some of the contextual factors that ease resistance, including support-
ive middle classes, labor unions, politicians, or large towns, and it was still 
under the spell of a general promining zeitgeist of the state (before the Bento 
Rodrigues tailings pond disaster in 2015, when a dam collapsed, killing 
nineteen people downstream and polluting over 400 miles of waterways).
Minas- Rio
The fourth Minas Gerais case, the Minas-Rio Mineduct Project, is helpful 
for observing the dynamics where investment projects are not discontinued. 
There was a budding resistance movement in this case until the key activist 
was murdered in 2010, after which mobilization waned. Very sophisticated 
corporate counter-tactics were used to make the possibilities for affecting 
the licensing of the mine unusable. Only after 2015 the resistance started to 
protest more concertedly, via roadblock and similar acts. A part of the state 
prosecutors’ office tried to mobilize the affected civil society and help them. 
During 2005–2015 the resistance was weak. This project has not been as 
strongly affected by resistance as those mentioned above. In fact, the person 
documenting the case in 2014 for the mapping project EJAtlas considered 
the resistance to be a failure.33 To explain this, we must turn to contextual 
factors and to broader investment politics. As mentioned above, this case 
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had none of the above cases’ contextual factors easing resistance formation 
or even constituting important chunks of the resistance (in the form of criti-
cal middle classes, miners’ unions, or state actors), a diverging causal condi-
tion complex that helps to explain the different outcome. In fact, there were 
specific contextual factors that made these investment politics and conflict 
dynamics harder for the resistance. For one, the corporate agency was very 
strong, using both violent and sophisticated countermobilization tactics, 
and there were ethnic minorities among the locals, a contextual factor that 
is generally related to greater violence and worse outcomes from the point 
of view of resistance. Owned by the mining company Anglo American, the 
Minas- Rio Mineduct Project is one of the world’s largest mining projects, 
with a feeder mine in the Conceição de Mato Dentro region and an export 
port in Campos in Rio de Janeiro. Minas- Rio has been studied by Ped-
lowski (2013), Maher (2014), and in several of the studies by Zhouri and 
Valencio (2014). All of these studies portray a very bleak picture of a poor 
rural population consisting of Afro- Brazilian quilombolas (descendants of 
enslaved people brought to Brazil from Africa who managed to escape and 
form quilombo communities, which continue to this date as specific tradi-
tional forms of rural dwelling in Brazil) and other traditional populations 
and peasants being displaced, their resistance facing exceedingly strong cor-
porate violence.34 In June 2010, Delfino de Souza, known as Delzinho, who 
systematically denounced illegalities such as illegal logging by MMX- Anglo 
Ferrous, was assassinated in the community of Mumbuca.35 In a post writ-
ten by another member of the resistance movement, Delzinho was remem-
bered as “one of the most loved community members” who had spearheaded 
the local resistance from early on, warning others about the dire negative 
consequences of the mining project and how the company was causing 
damage.36 However, Delzinho’s murder has gone largely unnoticed outside 
of his immediate community. This is because such assassinations of socio- 
environmental activists, especially in distant rural communities, are highly 
common in Brazil, which is a global leader in the dire statistics of this type 
of murder. The rural peripheries of Brazil targeted by extractive investments 
are a powerfully violent context, which require extremely sophisticated resis-
tance strategies, and the use of mass social movements, to be able to exert 
at least some sort of precautions, control, and denouncing capacities against 
the violence and its constant threat.
In many of the communities affected by the Minas- Rio project, commu-
nity leaders have tried since 2008 to garner support for mobilization against 
forced evictions and gain support from politicians and lawyers. After 2010, 
the resistance in the Minas- Rio case got prosecutors to tackle this problem-
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atic project. However, corporate agency and promining state machineries 
soon started to erode the power and critical stance of these public prosecu-
tors, steering their role from defenders of citizen rights to conflict manag-
ers in stakeholder discussions (Zhouri and Valencio 2014). Sophisticated 
corporate countermobilization tactics successfully steered prosecutors away 
from the institutional game and into private politics, largely turning the 
public prosecutor’s office into a conflict manager instead of investigator and 
prosecutor (see Zhouri, Bolados, and Castro 2016; Zhouri and Laschefski 
2017). This boosted ongoing land grabbing for the project both in Minas 
Gerais and in Rio de Janeiro (Pedlowski 2013). The land grab here has been 
very violent, and corporate agency has included the use of armed conflict 
as a political game (one- sidedly). This change in who is resisting illustrates 
that there is a weakness within the change from a primarily grassroots- based 
resistance agency into continuing mobilization dependent on state- actor 
agency. The power of state actors can be affected by steering their spheres 
of action away from the political games that corporate agency considers a 
danger to extractivism, such as contentious and institutional politics, and 
instead tying the state actors into mediating private politics.
In 2012, mine construction was discontinued for four months by pros-
ecutors on the basis of the discovery of prehistoric caves in the area (Maher 
2014). Although the iron- ore deposit turned out to be of lower quality than 
its sellers marketed, the mine opened, mainly because of the sunk cost spent 
in building the 525 km long pipeline (Pedlowski 2013). Map 3 below (based 
on Santos and Milanez 2015) illustrates that there are three long minerodutos 
(mining slurry lines) running from Minas Gerais to the coastal ports, as well 
as three railroad lines.
In the Minas- Rio case, the economic outcome of resistance was slow-
ing down and changing the style of mining. Rodrigo Santos told me that 
the project was restructured after the mobilization. This outcome is caus-
ally related to two main violence- based dynamics. The first is a very strong, 
violent, and sophisticated corporate agency, boosted by the huge sunk costs 
Anglo American made in the 5.5 billion (USD) acquisition of the project 
licenses from the Brazilian MMX Mineração company, which needed to be 
balanced by opening the project by whatever means. Anglo American man-
aged to embed the state more effectively than the resistance, also interfering 
in the working prosecutor- resistance linkage by moving this from the sphere 
of state- mediated institutional politics (of defending rights) to the sphere of 
private politics (prosecutors as conflict mediators). Second, the context was 
a violent rural setting with ethnic injustice and the absence of contextual 
factors that were present in the other Minas Gerais cases that supported 
building resistance.
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Although there have been increases in corporate agency and delimita-
tions of political opportunities across Minas Gerais state in past years, there 
have nevertheless been cases where projects were discontinued (two Vale 
projects, Apolo and Mina Del Rey) or dramatically downsized (Congonhas) 
by resistance. This indicates that old or promining settings are not immune 
to the general phenomenon of resistance to extractivism. This section shows 
how challenging established objectified capital linked to a time- honored 
activity such as mining can lead to major investment discontinuations. This 
objectified symbolic capital acts as a tie between the physical and symbolic 
spaces, and the loss of symbolic capital ends up destroying old promining 
attitudes and social capital.
As the comparison to the discrepancy case of Minas- Rio shows, the 
topology of the local social space— the economic, social, and cultural capi-
tal enjoyed by the resistance vis- à- vis corporate agency— is causally related 
Map 3. Iron ore export logistics from Minas Gerais state to the ports in 
southeastern Brazil.
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to changes in physical and symbolic space. A weak resistance position in 
the social space makes resistance more difficult and positive outcomes less 
likely. Conversely, having economic, social, or cultural capital, or a combi-
nation of these, does make it easier to resist insofar as one’s capital is under 
threat by extraction expansion, not supported by it. The successful resistance 
both in Minas Gerais and in Western India, as discussed in the previous 
section, had significant capital in the Bourdieusian sense, which could be 
used in activism (see chapter 2 for the discussion of economic, social, cul-
tural, and symbolic capital as theorized by Pierre Bourdieu). These move-
ments have also included nontraditional actors resisting mining, who, most 
importantly, knew how to challenge the established symbolic power of min-
ing by resymbolizing acts and framings.37 Differing compositions of social, 
economic, and cultural capital (forming differing class and ethnic relations 
locally) separated the successful resistance cases (Apolo, Mina Del Rey, and 
Casa de Pedra) in Minas Gerais from the not so successful (Minas- Rio). The 
resistance actors differed significantly: the former had an urban and largely 
white middle- class resistance group, while the latter had a rural, poor, and 
ethnic- minority composition. The resistance in the latter case had signifi-
cantly less economic, social, and cultural capital on which to build a move-
ment, and had to face national and global discrimination and violence that 
easily escaped the eye of the majority. Yet there are also cases where resistance 
from such backgrounds has managed to win considerable victories— such as 
the Keonjhar Adivasi resistance in Odisha in India, discussed in part III— so 
this is not a determining factor or an overwhelming impediment.
This section has illustrated several ways in which contextual factors are 
embedded in the construction of resistance and extractive dynamics, and 
how resistance strategies operate in conjunction with specific contextual set-
tings to produce outcomes. Continuing the theme of drawing lessons from 
contextual comparisons, I will next see how the setting of a key national 
“resource frontier” influences extractivist and resistance dynamics.
Challenging the Expansion of Resource Frontiers:  
Eastern Amazon, Carajás
The third example of conflict settings marked by nonarmed resistance is 
the struggle in the Eastern Amazon, which illustrates the particular con-
flict dynamics in a national and global resource frontier, where corporate- 
government agency seeks to vehemently frame and thus turn the existing 
lived environments, in this case the Amazon rainforests, into sources of “nat-
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ural resources” that can be appropriated for low cost. The contexts discussed 
above, Western India and Minas Gerais, differ from the Eastern Amazon 
(and the resource frontier of Eastern India, where the conflict has escalated 
into an armed one, discussed in the next chapter) in that these kinds of areas 
are strategically crucial for their governments. Whether the resistance is tar-
geting an almost exclusively raw- material- export frontier (Eastern Amazon), 
or a mixed national industrialization- export frontier (Eastern India), it faces 
states and companies that heavily depend on these crucial commoditizing 
resource frontiers. This signifies that the target of resistance, and its political 
role, is very different than in other contexts. For example, Moore (2014) 
goes so far as to argue that the core of capitalism is appropriation of new 
natural resources via frontier expansion. The availability of these frontiers is 
considered to be the basis on which the whole capitalist system relies. Let 
us examine what the politics of investment and resistance look like in these 
settings, through a close look at the world’s largest iron deposit and biggest 
iron ore mine, Carajás, in Brazil.
In the primary resource frontiers— the Eastern Amazon in Brazil and 
Chhattisgarh- Odisha- Jharkhand states in India— central- government- led 
expansion is more significant than in the Western Indian and Minas Gerais 
mining conflicts where the ventures were predominantly led by private 
corporations. Expansion of capitalism to the Eastern Amazon was the key 
government policy of the neodevelopmentalist Dilma Roussef presidency 
(2011– 16) in Brazil (Kröger 2015b). Vale played the key role as one of the 
“National Champion” companies with its global sectoral rise and dominance 
in the Workers’ Party government, which sought to support the crafting of 
industrial policies for these corporations (Kröger 2012). The construction 
of dams, mills, mines, biomass plantations, refineries, slaughterhouses, new 
urban and rural settlements, and other operations, all of which seek eco-
nomic growth primarily via appropriating “natural resources,” are rapidly 
changing the Eastern Amazon’s lived environments and landscapes (Kröger 
2015b, 2016). Correspondingly, and not by chance, these primary national 
resource frontiers are also the homes of large ethnic minority groups, affected 
by deep ethnic injustices. The conflicts in these areas are therefore much 
tenser than in the ones discussed above, and this needs to be considered 
when analyzing the politics of extractivism.
The state of Pará is filled with contention and grievances. Historically, 
Vale’s Carajás mines were just one element in a far more encompassing 
developmental project— the Great Carajás Project— instituted during the 
dictatorship years from 1964 to 1984 that included the highly controver-
sial conversion of rainforests to cattle pastures (Alvares da Silva, Costa, and 
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Veiga 2011; Asselin 2009). The people affected by mining have created new 
movements that specifically target mineral extraction by the largely priva-
tized and foreign- owned Vale, with the aim of creating nationwide resistance 
networks. One example is MAM, discussed in more detail in chapter 7. 
MAM, which Carajás’s peasants first considered to be composed solely of 
urbanites and intellectuals (Gerbode 2011), is attempting, together with the 
MST, to inform smallholders of their legal rights regarding mining expan-
sion before Vale manages to extend mining activities into their lands and 
those of agrarian reform settlements. The vision of the MST is to foster 
democratic decision- making with regard to the uses of nature. As one of 
its coordinators argued, “The people should decide, although they are very 
alienated. We need many things from nature, but how can we extract them 
without harming nature? The logic is that these resources should benefit the 
people, via healthcare, education.”
The MST has been spearheading anti- Vale mobilization in Pará for 
decades. These anti- Vale actions have revolved around the Carajás mine, 
the export railroad, and the supporting operations such as pig iron smelt-
ers, charcoal furnaces, and eucalyptus plantations along the railroad. In this 
section, I focus on the conflicts in the Parauebebas municipality, where the 
Carajás mine is located. Their first disputes with Vale date from 1992– 93, 
when the MST, among other protest acts, occupied a piece of woodland in 
the Carajás National Forest for two days. The land protestors occupied was 
part of a 411,000- hectare mining and forest protection complex given over 
to Vale’s control by the state (interview with Tito, MST leader, March 5, 
2011). The occupation involved 2,000 to 3,000 persons, and was regarded 
as “very important,” leading to the first substantial and important Palmares 
settlement. The MST leaders argued that the action had weight “primarily 
due to its large size,” though mass protesting was already crucial for the safety 
of the protesters.38 These struggles in the 1990s had significant outcomes, 
as a large chunk of the lands adjacent to the Carajás complex were even set 
aside for nonmining purposes. Alternative social and symbolic spaces were 
created on these physical areas by the MST, which led to the sustained forg-
ing of resistance agency during this time and for years to come.
The MST, artisanal miners, and indigenous groups continued to engage 
in direct conflicts with Vale with the goal of affecting mining and logis-
tical operations. A major rupture in company- community relations came 
on October 7, 2007, when the MST staged a 5,000- person, twenty- six- 
day occupation of the export rail link in Parauebebas. According to Ulisses 
Manacas (Pará MST leader, interviews, 2011), the media claimed there were 
only 300 protesters, but “community radios and movement journals spread 
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the truth.” Simultaneously, a movement of artisanal miners also mobilized 
against Vale in Serra Pelada, the famous labor- intensive artisanal mine where 
over 170,000 gold miners were toiling in the 1980s. Vale’s trade union 
joined the protest, demanding renationalization of the company (a demand 
for which there is continuing national support). Indigenous tribes were also 
present in railroad blockades. In total, Vale calculated that the occupation 
cost it twenty million US dollars and demanded that movement leaders be 
imprisoned and reimburse the company for its losses (Diário de Pará, April 
19, 2008).
Since 2007, there have been several anti- Vale protests and campaigns, 
with direct positive outcomes from the MST viewpoint, although still far 
from reaching the principal goal. In 2008, Vale was pressured to finance the 
paving of a road in an MST settlement. On March 8, 2009, various sectors 
of the society networked with the movement, occupying several Vale areas. 
These acts have been carried out in several Brazilian states, including Pará, 
Maranhão, Minas Gerais, Espírito Santo, and Rio de Janeiro, where the 
company has its headquarters. In Imperatriz in Maranhão, a “radical act 
destroyed the charcoal deposits of Vale” (see Kröger 2013b for an account 
of this).39
When studying these conflicts, it became clear that there are many types 
of resistance movements and subgroups, which all have differing relations 
with Vale. In fact, such a splintering of resistance into the use of more radical 
and more conciliatory tactics may have contributed to a weaker overall resis-
tance front. These complex dynamics, wherein Vale has managed to break the 
unity of resistance by building hegemony that infiltrates even within sectors 
of the MST, merits attention; the resistance in Pará is not unified in what 
it seeks, unlike in the Minas Gerais cases discussed above. The relationship 
between Vale and the MST has changed, given the MST’s continuing mobili-
zations and its decision to not respond with violence to violent resource fron-
tier expansion. Vale no longer wants “to have friction with movements” given 
their wish to expand, and they do not want the MST to occupy the railroad 
again (interview with Tito, March 5, 2011). The company has joint projects 
with the local MST, building roads in the settlements, for example, but “we 
know how it is with Vale: only by fighting can we achieve results.” Tito said 
that while it was not easy to gain financing from Vale for movement projects, 
the company had a lot of power when exerting pressure on the government to 
do so. Batista from Brazil’s Pastoral Land Commission in Marabá (interview, 
March 31, 2011) observed that when a mobilization causes direct losses and 
harm to a company that it cannot resolve via the mechanism of a court order 
coupled with police expulsion, it must negotiate the withdrawal of the pro-
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testers from the area;40 if an occupation involves thousands of people, it is not 
easy to achieve this by force. Negotiation offers movements the opportunity 
to make demands of companies, though the latter are readier to respond to 
such demands when they involve using the leverage power of the company 
vis- à- vis the state rather than shouldering financial responsibility themselves. 
In this dynamic, the movements differentiate between powerful private com-
panies and the state to make one a target and the other a third party used to 
gain leverage over that target.
Vale never negotiated directly with the MST until 2011 when it entered 
the settlement of Palmares in an attempt to make deals with the movement 
members and negotiate with settlers over iron deposits beneath the settle-
ment, “Vale wants to eat it all,” according to Ulisses Manacas from the MST. 
The leaders of the MST hold varying opinions of Vale. For Tito, the main 
problem is not Vale’s magnitude, but rather the outsourcing of its business 
operations and its privatization. Costs have been reduced by the use of radi-
cal means at the same time as the company has been making record profits 
and developing into an international player. Ednalva Moreira Gomes (MST 
leader, interview April 23, 2013, author’s translation from Portuguese) 
described the goal and the dilemmas of the MST in both the anti- Carajás 
protests and in mobilizations directed against corporate resource exploita-
tion more generally:
As a movement, our objective is to close the [Carajás] mines. We have 
not worked a lot on the question of extraction, how this should be 
done, because we need to shut down the mine. But we have also tried 
to find out how to act [to this end] and have an [positive, direct] out-
come for [mine]workers as well. We dream about closing [the mine], 
it needs to be closed, but we do not now have the political force to 
close it down, as the workers who now live in Eldorado dos Carajás 
want to maintain their jobs and do not want the mine to close. So, 
an objective is to work [trabalhar] on [raising] the consciousness of 
these workers. So, in these protests, besides having the role of inform-
ing [the public about the problems], and causing losses to financial 
capital, we also have the objective of gaining something for the popu-
lations. This [dilemma of needing to protect the current interests of 
workers in problematic resource exploitation businesses while also 
trying to close them down] is a great contradiction today in Brazil.
There is a possible discrepancy between local and national MST actions 
and attitudes toward Vale in Carajás. The local MST would like governance to 
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be turned over to a multistakeholder committee; it also demands renationaliza-
tion and greater protection, salaries, and rights for company workers (Alvares 
da Silva, Costa, and Veiga 2011). The national MST seeks the full closure of 
the Carajás mine due to its environmental destruction (interview with Ednalva 
Moreira Gomes, March 22, 2013).41 Evidence of a splintered resistance also 
emerged in further interviews that I conducted at the Vale headquarters in Rio 
de Janeiro, in July 2014, with three key directors of corporate social responsi-
bility, sustainability, and community relations, as well as directors of the Vale 
Foundation. According to the Vale directors, in 2014 people from some MST 
settlements used protesting to demand work from Vale, while other settlements 
have demanded mining curbs, not mining jobs. I asked the directors of this mul-
tinational company to reflect on how the situation in Brazil differs from conflicts 
elsewhere in the world (author’s translation from Portuguese):
The resistance in Carajás is isolated, for example taking place through 
Justice on the Rails, unlike other Latin American countries where 
large- scale mining is generally not well regarded. This is because in 
Brazil we have a history of state- run mining— we had privatization, 
yes, but the country had been prepared for this. Mining generates 
revenues for the country. Vale is also typically the only mining opera-
tor, and its presence is seen [by the locals, generally] as an opportu-
nity; there’s a positive view of mining. In other countries the compa-
nies are multinationals.
The promining view, based on Vale’s centrality to the local economy and 
still- strong state control, partly explains why there has not been cross- class 
resistance— including the middle classes in Carajás. Regionally situated class 
dynamics seem to be central in explaining investment outcomes, both eco-
nomically and politically. On key resource frontiers, located in peripheries, 
there are seldom middle- class people who would have significant capital in 
the social space and would be prone to resist mining, a contextual factor 
explaining the weaker resistance results in economic terms in Pará. The bulk 
of middle- class jobs in key frontier areas are tied to managing the resource 
extraction, while in the Minas Gerais and Western Indian cases (which were 
relatively far less “peripheral” or “rural”) the middle- class income sources 
were much more varied. However, this contextual feature has prompted 
the Carajás region’s would- be resistance actors to self- identify as “organized 
working classes” (e.g., Vale trade unionists, MST members), to network 
horizontally, and also to seek international allies interested in steering Vale’s 
global operations.
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There were unsatisfied mining workers, who were allied with the MST, as 
demonstrated in the MST- organized occupation of the railroads, where they 
were joined by labor movements and indigenous tribes. While conducting 
participant observation in the area, I witnessed very close ties between MST 
and the Vale workers who jointly organized my visit to the mining complex. 
One reason Vale workers were motivated to join the resistance was due to 
their profound grievances about unpaid salaries and privatization. Vale exec-
utives have not typically replied to these worker demands, but have avoided 
dialogue and demanded that the police and the state quell protests (Alvares 
da Silva, Costa, and Veiga 2011), which is why it has been natural for the 
workers to unite with specialists in contentious politics like the MST. The 
resistance surging from Carajás has been built horizontally across different 
working- class peoples affected globally by Vale; instead of a deep cross- class 
resistance on the local level, it has been a globally extensive horizontal mobi-
lization within the working class.
Due to its class position in Brazil, the MST, in comparison to a profes-
sional NGO, does not typically have access in the judicial field as a special-
ist NGO would have. This is illustrated by a comparison of the resistance 
efforts in Carajás to Vale’s Apolo project in Minas Gerais. The resistance 
to Apolo forged deep and positive links with the public prosecutor, while 
otherwise radical public prosecutors operating in Pará have started criminal 
processes against MST leaders for the Vale railroad occupations. Brazilian 
prosecutors, who privilege formal and legal means of criticism, are typically 
less sympathetic to radical mass protesters than to official institutions such as 
NGOs, churches, or trade unions. This might explain why the movements 
with NGOs had more success in Brazil, for example in the Apolo case, and 
why the MST has not managed to achieve such victories.
Thus, local resistance can do better when including NGOs that do not 
protest in their networks, argued Santos, who generally agreed with the 
hypothesis that peaceful resistance using combined and flexible strategies 
is most successful. Furthermore, to explore the Pará– Minas Gerais differ-
ences, the MST did not have such clear electoral embedding in Pará as the 
resistance had in Mariana and Congonhas. In Congonhas, two municipal 
council members were antimining, “and it makes a huge difference whether 
you have two or zero politicians on your side,” as Santos put it.42 Further-
more, although the indigenous people and their allies have regularly blocked 
other Vale operations in Carajás and demanded, for example, direct pay-
ments from companies to let them enter their areas,43 the MST did not 
manage to get the indigenous people to network with them, which did not 
help the resistance.
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MST’s Vale campaign is continuing, according to Manacas, as “there is 
a demand to create debate on problems, denunciate, publicize, and through 
this mobilization various movements, networks, and articulations are being 
created.” This viewpoint illustrates how for the MST the most important 
goal was to pursue good political rather than economic outcomes. Mobili-
zation has indeed spread. At the physical level, the protests also influenced 
Vale to stop charcoal production and Vale’s main expansion plan was slowed 
down by movement litigation. In terms of economic outcomes, the Pará 
state government has raised the royalties Vale is obliged to pay, to be used 
to help suffering populations. Additionally, the courts have demanded that 
Vale pay massive amounts of back taxes. Rodrigo Santos told me in 2014 
that MST’s actions against Vale in the 2000s had managed to “substan-
tially impact the profits and reputation of the company,” although without 
slowing expansion much. The most important outcome, in his opinion, was 
that a “critical consciousness was created” along with new mining- specific 
resistance agency, which was also institutionalized, for example through 
the founding of MAM. In this sense, the MST has focused on providing 
political opportunities for mining resistance and particularly Vale- resisting 
actors around the world. The MST— a crucial movement in understanding 
Latin American and global peasant mobilizations of the past decades (Carter 
2015)— has increasingly adopted large corporations as its primary target, 
wishing to fundamentally shape developmental policies by creating a coun-
terforce to increasing transnational resource extraction.
The contextual dynamics in Pará differ radically from central Minas 
Gerais around the state capital, as this is a very violent, key global resource 
frontier— that the mining resistance in Carajás has avoided taking up arms 
and thus propelling the opponents toward civil war is an impressive out-
come. This difference will be put into perspective in the next chapter, where 
I explain how a similarly crucial and violent resource frontier was turned 
into an armed conflict in India. In Pará, the mining conflict has been much 
more violent than in the rest of Brazil (or in Southern or Western India); 
routinized murders and other attacks on lower- class activists are endemic in 
all of Brazil, but particularly in this region. In this context, the ability of the 
MST, and other social actors opposed to Vale’s activities, to steer away from 
the trap of reacting with violence to violent frontier expansion is particularly 
striking.44 Rather, they have endured state violence, and invented ways to 
limit its reach.
This is a political outcome that is important when compared with sev-
eral parts of Eastern India, where the path chosen was armed revolutionary 
agency, instead of peaceful resistance. Large parts of India, particularly the 
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Northeast and Eastern highlands, are mired in violent interlinked resource 
extraction expansion and civil war. Although the Indian Maoist insurgency 
has de facto placed large chunks of land outside mining and state control, 
this has not meant peace for the local inhabitants, nor has it allowed for the 
globalization of the struggle. In Brazil, in comparison, movements have also 
managed to set aside land from mining ventures and stopped them, without 
violence, although the Amazonians have had to face a similar crude drive of 
accumulation by dispossession as have the people in Eastern India. Yet the 
dynamics of contention in Brazil have not turned into a violent civil war, 
although the MST, for example, would have the means to turn to armed 
resistance and the incentive to do so after continuous massacres or murders 
of its members and the continued nonresolution of agrarian reform (based 
on the author’s interviews with hundreds of MST members and other infor-
mants in Brazil since 2004). The similarity in these peaceful resistance strate-
gies (the five key strategies) used in Brazil and parts of India partly explains 
the less violent context of resource extraction. However, contexts are not 
static or given; rather, they are constantly being created.
The anti- Vale mobilizations targeting the Carajás mines have also cre-
ated large coalitions and wide networks, much more than those created by 
the resistance groups in Minas Gerais or India. A reason for this difference 
might be that the Amazon is currently one of the most crucial expansion 
points of the capitalist world- ecology and of Brazilian capitalism, both seek-
ing to augment their transnational raw material flows. By contrast, Eastern 
Indian iron ore extraction was mostly tied to feeding local steel plants, and 
there were also important local steel plants in the Minas Gerais region, as 
mentioned. The fact that the Eastern Amazon was reserved for global tap-
ping meant that the resistance there could use the global commodity flows 
as a pathway to forge resistance networks globally. Meanwhile, in Eastern 
India, the iron ore stayed much more tightly within local production net-
works, offering fewer targets for resistance. The new globalizing resistance 
surging from the Carajás region has followed the money and is meticulously 
and consciously building on the five key strategies. The MST and Justice on 
the Rails (which targets Vale in particular, transnationally along the export 
routes) movements are cases in point, illustrating how resistance against the 
expansion of the primary national and globally crucial capitalist commodity 
frontier does not have to use violence, and how mobilization can be trans-
national rather than local in scale. The last chapter in the book will discuss 
these dynamics.
This section has analyzed how key resource frontiers typically offer the 
would- be resistance lesser access to political games, such as institutional, 
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electoral, and judicial politics, in comparison to regions that are less periph-
eral, where the resistance has more capital and connections to embed the 
state. These connections also ensure a safer resistance environment, when 
using contentious politics, and make it less likely for locals to be lured into 
private negotiations with corporations. These differences can be explained 
by different social spaces at resource frontiers, with the middle classes typi-
cally sparse and often involved in the management of resource extraction. In 
addition, social, economic, and cultural capital are not as equally distributed 
to would- be resistance actors across different classes and professions in these 
areas as in areas closer to cities. Resource frontiers are also areas where the 
most powerful state and corporate actors seek to dominate in the physical 
space, capturing it for their own extractive projects, and any resistance to 
this capture must face intense corporate strategies, with the goal of framing 
the resistance as backward, violent, nondevelopmental, barbarous, or dan-
gerous. Sophisticated corporate tactics of corporate social responsibility and 
advertising often manage to divide the resistance in these poorer regions, 
which perpetuates an image of the key companies as the main benefactors of 
society, thus creating successfully symbolic capital for extractivists. This pos-
itive symbolic capital, and the negative symbolizations of resistance, func-
tions also as symbolic violence to chastise the locals who resist. This suggests 
that the divisions within social space, the topology of capital distribution 
between those who do and do not resist extractivism, is an important start-
ing point for analyzing investment politics, as figure 3 in chapter 2 and its 
application in this chapter have illustrated.
This chapter has analyzed resistance to extractivism in the nonviolent 
contexts of a consolidating democracy (Western India), an old promining 
setting (Minas Gerais), and a key global commodity frontier (Eastern Ama-
zon). I used a Polanyian analysis to show how the resistance to extractivism 
has been part of a broader process of building an “organic society.” Through 
the conceptual framework for the analysis of investment politics and spa-
tial causalities in extractivism, I opened up how an “organic society” does 
not surge automatically against destructive projects, but is built by concrete 
resistance actions and strategies. I explained the way state coproducing 
actions by movements helped in the consolidation of democracy in Goa and 
Karnataka, and how an encompassive embeddedness by the local state and 
civil society actors was forged and important in central Minas Gerais. Based 
on these cases, I argue that the presence of a consolidating democracy, with 
research and legal organizations willing to join the “organic society,” is a far 
easier context to attain movement success than other contexts. The Goa and 
Bellary cases illustrate particularly well how and when state coproduction by 
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civil society organizations can take place through coproducing judicial poli-
tics, and how this embedding can have major consequences. Civil society 
can demonstrate, by its higher technical expertise and local know- how, that 
the state (in this case, the courts, or the state actors within judicial politics) 
needs not only to listen to but also share state production with civil society 
(while retaining autonomy) to be able to better perform its state functions. 
A state- constitutive civil society in the judicial game will help the resistance 
elsewhere in the country as well.
The comparison of the different contexts in this chapter also reveals that 
different contexts seem to influence the styles of resistance agencies. When 
extractivism has targeted areas close to cities and threatened their middle 
classes, more vertical, cross- class local resistance was forged, and the primary 
goal was to discontinue the investment or otherwise markedly influence the 
economic outcomes. When extractivist expansion took place in key resource 
frontiers in peripheries, where supportive middle classes were not to be 
found, class cleavages were further deepened by the resource frontier. When 
the primary resistance promotor was a rural landless workers’ movement, 
horizontal yet globally extensive mobilization was forged.
To conclude, in contexts without armed conflict, or with the presence 
of only one- sided armed conflict (from the corporate agency side), the resis-
tance can still make use of peaceful state- mediated political games (conten-
tious, electoral, institutional, and judicial politics), via embedded autonomy 
in relation to them. However, if we are talking about a peripheral rural con-
text, which is cast as a key resource frontier, and thus often has high vio-
lence and ethnic/class cleavages, the composition of resistance is less vertical 
socially, and the possibilities of using peaceful political games and embed-
ding the state are lesser and harder than in regions that are not as peripheral. 
In armed conflict contexts, as will be discussed next, that specific political 
game seems to overtake much of the power of the other political games (see 
figure 1), such as peaceful, contentious, electoral, institutional, and judicial 
politics, which means that these state- mediated political games become less 





Chhattisgarh was mired in an armed conflict when I arrived there. The 
civil war made it necessary to take extra precautions and ask for people to 
come to meet me in the state capital, Raipur. Many came, and I learned a 
lot from them about the dynamics in extremely violent contexts of resource 
extraction. I visited some rural areas, for example, an Adivasi village on 
top of a plateau, where mining operations, which had been placed on top 
of the indigenous people’s ancestral lands, had been discontinued as the 
company had not paid the required state royalties. The local community 
and Adivasi leaders had invited a group from Finland to join them for a 
meeting with the community, which is how I ended up there. We observed 
how Adivasi leaders gave rallying speeches, and people threw their fists 
into the air. The mood turned tense as a convoy of black cars with men 
in black sunglasses arrived and demanded to see our documents and 
remained afterward to observe what was going on. They were apparently 
members of the intelligence police, and arrived at the village in the cars 
of the mining company, although the company did not have permission to 
conduct operations in the area at that moment. It was clear that the locals 
were not allowed to exercise free speech or actions, because the state was 
constantly observing them. We saw the open pits excavated right next to 
this local village, where people had lived and survived for generations, the 
red ground now exposed and growing nothing. When driving down from 
this plateau, we also visited a village whose Adivasi inhabitants told us 
that it had just been burned out by some local powerholders in an attempt 
to move them out of the forest. Yet even amid all the tension the Adivasis 
greeted us with joyful traditional dances, which the police also observed. 
The presence of potential violence was clearly in the air and taught me 
a lot about how the context of resistance does matter immensely when 
attempting to explain how and when people resist, and with what means 
and strategies. We also learned that we were not immune to the ills that 
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fall upon people who must live in areas with armed conflicts. Our group 
of Finns was placed on the blacklist by the local powerholders, and was 
not allowed to reenter India, although we had the permissions needed to 
visit the Adivasi hill, which had been turned by the state into a mining 
site embroiled in a contentious episode. Even government ministers from 
Finland tried to get us off the list, but to no avail. We received no official 
explanation, but unofficially were led to understand that this had to do 
with mining and Adivasis, and that there were powerful local interests 
that did not want anyone to see what was going on in Chhattisgarh.
In India, mining expansion, particularly that of iron ore, provides the raw 
materials for steel plants. Iron mining is framed as the essential component 
in securing cheap steel and multiple downstream jobs. Steel is used in spe-
cialized metal and other industries, such as car manufacturing, making rail-
road tracks, and in producing all sorts of machinery and parts for industry, 
including equipment for constructing and building other machines. The 
modern economy, as we know it, simply would not and could not exist with-
out steel. Therefore, in states such as Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and Jharkhand, 
it is seen as essential to keep steel mills open, avoid any stoppages, and even 
increase production capacity.1 Mining resistance in Western India has deep 
federal- level linkages due to the presence of an established “organic society,” 
and these movements were generally able to seize more national political 
opportunities. This is in contrast to Eastern India where conflicts were often 
either local or at the state level, which left these resistance actors less able 
to capitalize on the same national political opportunities. Eastern India’s 
mineral areas are also sites of armed secession, a context with important 
ramifications on the federal level. While the Eastern Amazon is similarly cast 
as a resource frontier (Kröger 2015b), it lacks such two- sided armed con-
flict. In Eastern India mining resistance is undertaken mostly by indigenous 
people, which is another factor that sets it apart from the Eastern Amazon. 
Therefore, these two contexts make for a useful comparison of how dif-
ferent dynamics of contention (armed/nonarmed resistance) across primary 
resource frontiers can influence outcomes.
The focus in this chapter is on exploring how resistance has influenced 
economic and political outcomes, broadly termed as investment politics, in 
armed conflict contexts. Similar to the previous chapter, I will analyze how 
contexts and established political systems shape both the type of actions 
that are taken against extractivism and how the particular resistance agen-
cies forged end up partially creating the contexts and shaping the political 
economies.
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Chhattisgarh
This discussion of armed resistance mostly focuses on Eastern India’s Maoist 
revolutionaries, particularly those in the southern part of Chhattisgarh state, 
which is among the key areas in India where large open- pit iron mine and 
steel plant expansion projects clash with a mixture of peaceful contentious 
and armed revolutionary agency.2 According to my informants, after the 
year 2000, Naxals (Naxalites) became very prominent in this Bastar Division 
(or region— not to be confused with the much smaller Bastar district) when 
the state of Chhattisgarh was formed by a separation from Madhya Pradesh. 
This division created the most densely populated Adivasi state in India.
The Naxals have been very active since 2005, following the very ram-
pant expansion of so- called developmental projects during the preceding 
five years (Chandhoke 2015). The Maoists, who initially entered the polit-
ical milieu in the 1980s, had become locally popular as they ejected the 
local landlords who had oppressed and terrorized the people— for example, 
by selling Adivasi women into brothels (Banerjee 2013). The Maoists also 
stripped the landlords of their exploitative control of the remunerative tendu 
leaf trade (used as tobacco wrapping) and were instrumental in instigat-
ing land reform. As the Maoists forced the contractors to stop exploitation, 
they swiftly became very popular, although according to a local lawyer there 
was also local resistance to their consolidating power. The Bastar region has 
been disrupted since 2005 when a civil war began, set into motion by the 
establishment of state- led paramilitaries (whose members were also mostly 
Adivasis). This conflict has led to the displacement of more than half a mil-
lion people living in the region.
Subash Mohapatra (2007), who conducted evidence- based independent 
research used in court proceedings, explains how the violence is directly 
related to the spread of revolutionary agency in the area. It is important to 
note that his research indicates that violent responses to this growing agency 
were fueled almost exclusively by iron ore conflicts. “Naxalism” gained its 
name after a 1967 peasant uprising in Naxalbari village in West Bengal, after 
which it has spread “through the rural, marginalized and tribal populations 
of east and central India.” Mohapatra (2007, 5– 6) argued that the key dif-
ference between Naxalites and the over seventy other Communist parties 
in India is “their uncompromising desire for revolution rather than govern-
ment reform and their allegiance to violence and armed struggle as the sole 
means to achieve their ends.”
The debate about armed resistance in Eastern India is very complex and 
no single party can be claimed to be the sole agent. Adivasis’ participation 
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in and support of the Maoist insurgency are typically seen by the Indian 
intelligentsia as either a casualty of being caught between state and Maoist 
violence or as an authentic expression of Adivasi political subjectivity. How-
ever, Nilsen (2012) notes that Adivasi mobilizations are in no way exhausted 
by Maoism but take a much larger array of forms.
There was a major increase in violence beginning in 2005, which is 
directly and clearly linked to the iron supercycle and the decision by cor-
porate agency in Chhattisgarh to embark on a massive mining expansion. 
However, to effectively expand the mining the corporations had to get rid 
of the Adivasis and revolutionaries sitting on top of the resources. Salwa 
Judum,3 an armed private vigilante force, began its operation the day fol-
lowing the signing of memorandums of understanding (MOUs) between 
the government and corporations, which were worth 130 billion rupees 
(about 3 billion USD) and focused on steel and iron ore (Mohapatra 2007). 
This entrance of paramilitaries changed the corporate- state agency’s choice 
of political game into armed conflict. A May 16, 2015, editorial in the Eco-
nomic & Political Weekly, a renowned academic journal from India, reflected 
on the past and future dynamics and impacts of Chhattisgarh’s iron- ore- 
fueled armed conflict:
In an operation backed by the security forces, the Salwa Judum evacu-
ated hundreds of villages, hounded the inhabitants into police camps, 
and forced many more to just run. .  .  . In Dantewada and Bijapur 
Districts, between June 2005 and 2009, 644 villages were razed to 
the ground, displacing some 3.5 lakh [350,000] Adivasi peasants, 
according to one estimate; of these 47,000 to roadside camps, 40,000 
fleeing across the border into the then Andhra Pradesh or Odisha, 
and 263,000 seeking shelter in the forests. The process in southern 
Chhattisgarh might very well have been one of the largest and most 
brutal development- induced displacements of people so far in inde-
pendent India.4
In comparison to Carajás’s export orientation, the iron ore from Chhat-
tisgarh was used for the national state (e.g., the Steel Authority of India Lim-
ited [SAIL] Company) and cosmopolitan Indian private- capital run steel 
mills (e.g., the Mittal family). The primary battle is between a land- grabbing 
upper- caste elite including both the Left and Right, targeting the forestland 
under which a crucial ore is found, and on top of which an ethnic group 
considered to be an “other” (the Adivasi people) is residing.
The Indian setting of armed violence linked to extractivism is not unique 
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and has many parallels around the capitalist world- ecology. Armed violence 
by corporate agency, according to Downey, Bonds, and Clark (2010), plays 
a critical role in facilitating natural resource extraction from the peripheries 
by those in the cores by (1) offering powerful actors the means to prevail 
over others in environmental conflicts, and by (2) ensuring “that natural 
resources critical to industrial production and state power continue to be 
extracted and sold in sufficient quantities to promote capital accumulation, 
state power, and ecological unequal exchange” (Downey, Bonds, and Clark 
2010, 417). In Eastern India and the Eastern Amazon, the other politi-
cal means of securing resource access have not functioned due to strong 
popular mobilizations, indigenous worldviews of lived environments that 
are critical of modernity, and at times armed resistance (in India). It could 
be argued that armed violence by corporate- state agency has partly surged 
as a method to prevail over the use of peaceful resistance strategies in other 
political games.
The political opportunities for peaceful mobilization between armed and 
nonarmed conflict contexts differs greatly. A Goan activist explained to me 
that in Chhattisgarh the opportunity to use the courts is not so easily avail-
able, as there is a “corrupt judiciary” and a “rogue state” that has “gone 
beyond the constitution, building a country of its own” with a publicly 
funded “vigilante army,” the Salwa Judum. For Padel and Das (2007, 30), 
the creation of the Salwa Judum in 2005 meant that the context in Chhat-
tisgarh shifted from an armed conflict to “a manufactured civil war” whose 
“aim . . . is not just to exterminate Maoists, but also to implement indus-
trialisation plans that have faced sustained opposition from tribal society.”
By 2007 the presence of armed agencies in this setting had already resulted 
“in the forced displacement of at least 80,000 Adivasis in Dantewada dis-
trict, with human rights abuses and conditions of horror and squalor that 
beggar the imagination” (Padel and Das 2007, 30). In 2013, a local journal-
ist told me that the situation in Bastar is “horrific . . . like in Vietnam.” Salwa 
Judum was headed by a Congress MLA (Member of the Legislative Assem-
bly), Mahendra Karma, “whose support for Tata and Essar [two important 
companies in the mining sector in India] is well known” (Putul 2007, 62). 
These companies’ illegal appropriation of large swathes of Adivasi land for 
iron ore and steel projects in the Dantewada and Bastar districts has become 
easier since the evictions, whether caused by mercenaries or the police; Salwa 
Judum and iron extraction expansion attempts appear to go hand in hand 
(Choudhary 2012; Putul 2007).
New Delhi– based social actors that were knowledgeable about the situ-
ation intervened to quell the civil war. Nandini Sundar, an expert scholar 
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on Bastar Adivasis (e.g., see her 2006 article describing the Bastar armed 
conflict), wrote a petition to the Supreme Court to order the state of Chhat-
tisgarh to abolish Salwa Judum, which the court did in 2007. Such an inter-
vention by an academic portrays how expert power, and outside interven-
tion by civil society, is an important component in decreasing violence and 
the unrule of law. Nevertheless, violence has lingered on and even intensified 
in the 2010s, mostly as a result of the iron ore grab. Violent extractivist 
agency is a hallmark of the southern Chhattisgarh region, building a specific 
context of resistance.
In order to understand the targets of resistance in this context, the opera-
tion of corporate agency in armed conflicts must be surveyed. Corporate 
agency in armed conflicts typically includes the government, which inter-
meshes with corporate interests. This intermingling is particularly present in 
the Eastern Indian civil war, as most of the mining and steel companies and 
other companies involved in the war are state owned, and politicians are in a 
central position as middlemen dealing land to corporations. A human rights 
advocate explained to me that “the state becomes a businessman, acquires 
land though eminent domain from the people and sells it at a higher price,” 
which puts the role of the state in question. Furthermore, most of the iron 
ore mining is done by state- owned companies in Chhattisgarh.
A key observation that can be made through examination of the Chhat-
tisgarh cases is that the dynamics between different political games and resis-
tance groups work very distinctively in armed resistance contexts than they 
do in nonarmed resistance contexts. For these and other reasons, which I 
will discuss below, I have placed armed secessionary (and possibly also revo-
lutionary) politics as a political game outside state mediation. As the state, 
government, and private capital are so intermeshed, the armed secessionists/
revolutionaries do not want to use state remediation. This has major conse-
quences for the dynamics of investment politics. Peaceful contentious poli-
tics and other state- mediated political games are rendered almost obsolete, 
for several reasons. First, the role of the state changes in secessionist armed 
conflicts because the “state as an enterprise uses the military to suppress the 
people or those who have a difference of opinion, branding them as terror-
ists,” as a local informant explained. This makes the choice between violent 
and nonviolent methods of resistance less of a difference, because one will 
be treated as an armed guerrilla either way. This tends to promote armed 
reaction when peaceful resistance is rendered obsolete. In the armed- conflict 
areas of Chhattisgarh, “civil society organizations are seen as ineffective, 
and there is no other option than to join or support armed rebel groups,” 
argued an informant from the Dantewada district in early 2013. The locals 
are caught in a cross- fire:
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If Maoists come with the gun, you have to give food to them because 
they will ask for food with the gun. Then the police come and ask, 
“Why you give food to [a] Maoist? You are arrested. Let’s go to 
the police station.” (Excerpt from an Odisha- based mining activist 
interview)
Chhattisgarh has been producing approximately twenty- seven million 
tons of iron ore per year, aiming to raise this swiftly to thirty- seven million 
tons5 by opening new mines in the forests, which are now violently razed 
and violently contested. I met not only the powerholders, such as a former 
state minister, politicians, and trade union leaders, but also several victims 
of these actions who related to me their horrific personal tragedies of try-
ing to face the context of Chhattisgarh with nonviolent activism. Some of 
them had had to go underground, particularly those who had systematically 
reported human rights violations and filed cases against state officials and 
members of the corporate elite.
In Eastern India, the elites have become accustomed to using harsh vio-
lence without fear of being brought to justice; they can easily camouflage 
any atrocities as part of the attacks against guerrilla groups (Verma 2004). 
In states with large Adivasi populations, such as Chhattisgarh, the ethnic 
context makes it easier to perpetrate legitimated violence and thus maintain 
a civil war context for expanding resource extraction. A key tool is to divide 
Adivasis by pitting them against each other, hiring paramilitary troops from 
the villages, which, according to Baviskar (2001, 368), “gives the state much 
more leeway to explain violence as a ‘normal’ aspect of tribal culture and 
to disguise its culpability in violent encounters.” Such naturalization of 
violated populations’ “primitive” peasant or indigenous moral economies 
as the innate cause of their miseries has been found by political ecologists 
to be a common mechanism for justifying and opening resource access in 
Africa (Carney and Watts 1990), Southeast Asia (Fox et al. 2009), and Brazil 
(Zhouri 2010).
When the armed route to power settles in, routine political games can 
lose much of their usability. Consider electoral politics. According to an 
activist, Maoists in West Singhbhum “forbid voting” by the locals, which 
results in the election only of “corrupt, pro- mining, co- opted politicians” 
from the old mining areas of the district. Chenoy and Chenoy (2010, 131) 
found that in some cases the Maoists have used their control over voters to 
tax politicians, and that “even politicians pay them, to get access to their 
constituencies when they come to campaign.” To avoid paying such taxes, 
politicians have sought to displace populations using paramilitary forces. For 
example, in the Bastar Division in Chhattisgarh, Sundar (2006) notes how 
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visits during elections “revealed deserted villages and shut polling booths. 
Yet ‘votes’ were ‘cast’ from them.” Corrupted politicians from the BJP and 
the Congress, and violent land grabbers such as Karma, the founder of Salwa 
Judum, have gotten themselves “elected” as MPs or MLAs in this setting 
where there is only corporate agency and no counterparty using electoral 
politics to impact resource policy.
Once peaceful resistance is repressed in a political system that has armed 
conflict as one constituent field, the contentious thrust is more likely to 
turn into armed resistance, expanding the spread and strength of armed 
politics, rather than leading to passivity. Both corporate and revolutionary 
agency will want to retain armed conflict as the main means of contention, 
as it supports their very existence. Sundar (2006) notes how the attempt to 
defend their guerrilla zone by the Bastar Maoists had “overtaken people’s 
need, including the desperate desire for peace.” Some saw the Maoists’ rea-
sons for attacking mining as deriving not from antimining sentiments, but 
from strategic war- making.6 It is not just that the plight caused by mining 
and other violent dispossession leads people to join the armed resistance; 
often the Maoists actually force people to join them by violence.
Mohapatra (2007, 16) describes the terrible situation for Adivasis in 
Dantewada’s iron ore mining areas:
In most cases an Adivasi who chooses to remain in their forest vil-
lage, especially when that village is in a Naxalite stronghold area is 
considered by security forces to be a Naxalite. If an Adivasi chooses 
or is compelled to move to a displacement camp then the Naxalites 
consider them a part of Salwa Judum.
Practically all land with rich iron ore deposits in Chhattisgarh is Adivasi 
land. According to the law, they should be able to decide whether they will 
allow mining to enter, a right that would be further strengthened if two of 
the legal provisions developed to support the rights of the tribal peoples were 
implemented effectively in practice.
These two key political opportunities, which the ethnic forest- based 
minorities in India have helped to establish, are the 2006 Forest Rights 
Act (FRA) and the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act of 1996 
(PESA). The FRA created a legal framework that was pro- Adivasi and pro 
other forest dwellers (designated as Scheduled Tribes by the government) 
(Kumar and Kerr 2012). It has been effectively used in mining conflicts, 
although it “has not yet stopped mining,” according to one national activist, 
as it has not been implemented evenly. If the Adivasis’ many- generational 
Armed Conflicts  113
Revised Pages
habitation is not recognized, that is, if the FRA is not implemented, the Adi-
vasis “will not get any recompensation package” for displacement, a coordi-
nator from the Bhubaneswar- based National Center for Advocacy argued.7
The PESA enables a larger number of tribal populations to self- govern 
their areas directly via their village- level self- government organizations 
(Gram Panchayats), elected by all adult members of the village (Gram 
Sabha).8 PESA extended the rights of municipalities to the tribal areas of 
nine states, demanding that state legislation on Panchayats take care of tribal 
customs, religious practices, and traditional management practices of com-
munity resources. This legislation is part of a growing tendency to increase 
and deepen local and autonomous decision- making, which has been tak-
ing place since the 1990s (Tiwari 2016). Based on the analysis in Tiwari 
(2016), PESA can be argued to have created radical governance powers for 
tribal communities (de jure rights), but, similarly to FRA, it has not yet led 
to radical outcomes in terms of implementation (de facto rights), largely 
because implementation was left to the states.
During my interviews, National Adivasi Alliance leaders argued that 
Gram Sabhas are strong tools, as “under government rules, land can be 
acquired only after the Gram Sabha’s consent is obtained.” However, to give 
an example of how this “political opportunity” has become a reality in prac-
tice, during the conflict over the steel plant installation by the state- owned 
National Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC) in Dantewada in 
Chhattisgarh in 2000, this interpretation of the rule of law was obeyed only 
after the Adivasis organized themselves and protested. This action step was 
required to ensure that “the complaints finally reached Delhi.” These acts 
led to NMDC’s relocating its steel plant project to nearby Nagarnar (in Jag-
dalpur at the border of Odisha) (Putul 2007, 54). This showed that Gram 
Sabhas can be a potential “political opportunity.” In other words, they are 
an institutional political game that can be embedded, for some and in some 
instances— but at the cost of others if the investment is merely moved some-
where else.
The Gram Sabhas’ power, as that of almost all institutions, is under con-
stant redefinition, mostly due to differing interpretations of the contradic-
tory set of ethnic- territorial rights in the Indian constitution. In 2006, the 
Adivasis displaced by the Tata steel plant in Bastar in Chhattisgarh peti-
tioned the Chhattisgarh High Court to stop the project, referring to intimi-
dation (despite this action, consensus for the project was not acquired). The 
court ruled that the Gram Sabha or Panchayat must be consulted, but that 
obtaining consent is not necessary (Hinmon 2007, 135). Frustrated at this 
limited interpretation of PESA, which provides democratic legitimacy to 
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government strong- arm tactics in land acquisition, many locals have turned 
into Naxalite guerrillas as they have seen no other option to resist displace-
ment (Choudhary 2012). A local journalist told me that Panchayats do mat-
ter, but they exist “only on paper.” This shows how the closure of routine 
political opportunities can lead to a rise in armed revolutionary agency at the 
cost of promoting peaceful activism. The future of such a transformation is 
that movements will face settings with an open political game (opportunity/
threat) of armed conflict.9
The utilization of institutional politics is hard in this context of potential 
and existing violence. Despite this, the peaceful resistance is trying to use 
institutional politics and the political opportunities afforded by the FRA. 
The Adivasi- led Samta Manch movement is trying to foster understanding 
of nonarmed resistance opportunities at the village level and how to resist 
extractivism peacefully by focusing on the FRA. In addition, there are at 
least nine other organizations doing the same type of work in the larger 
Chhattisgarh civil society network. Currently, all potential Bastar region 
mining areas are “under scheduled area” (the rights afforded by PESA). 
However, this is another example where institutional opportunity is only 
latently present, “just on paper.” These legal provisions will not be help-
ful without resistance that activates and ensures them. In areas of armed 
conflicts and ethnic minorities, there are many people who are “not aware 
of their rights,” which is a reason why there is displacement, according to 
two Adivasi coordinating activists and members of the national network 
Mines, Minerals and People (MMP). Furthermore, they add, there has been 
a “complete disregard of FRA when distributing mining leases.” Their work 
in 2013, which I closely observed, centered on building evidence of these 
infringements to hand over to state investigators, including the Shah Com-
mission that had recently arrived in the state, so that it would not look just 
at illegal mining (narrowly defined), but at the whole leasing system as illegal 
in the context of the FRA.
On the contextual level, the expansion of institutional opportunities 
from more democratic regions of the country to the more violent ones can 
be seen as an attempt to homogenize the political opportunity structures 
across the country. These attempts have had better success in some places 
than others. Odisha is a positive example, discussed in part III, while in 
Chhattisgarh the government intervened. As part of this intervention the 
government dismantled the Shah Commission while it was in Chhattisgarh, 
stopping the process of homogenization of democratic norms.
The activists encountered severe barriers to this embedding work, as the 
area in which they should have been collecting evidence— requiring exten-
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sive field visits and effective organizing and politicizing of the Adivasis— 
has so many Naxalites. The Naxalites claimed that the activists were police 
informers, while the local police said they were Naxalites— both stances 
served to prevent state embedding. The presence of the armed conflict has 
made the crucial work of extending de jure rights into a de facto situation 
in Chhattisgarh very difficult, indeed almost impossible. In parts of Odisha 
the activists have managed to steer away from this dilemma by using a series 
of linked strategies (the five key strategies) to endure violence and convince 
the authorities that they are not Naxalites.
The armed revolutionary agency by Naxals in relation to mining includes 
more than just the use of arms. They have “issued warnings in local media” 
to villagers not to give land to miners. Such armed- resistance agency works 
more as a threat, placing full responsibility on the villagers; if the villagers do 
not obey, the Maoists may punish them. Such operational logics are typical 
in many armed revolutionary movements, but absent in peaceful resistance, 
where movements do not have such threatening physical power, and where 
the aim is increasing proactiveness and debate, not subservience.
Using threats, the Naxals are trying to increase the locals’ cost for allowing 
mining; this way they do not necessarily even need direct armed conflicts— 
they can use their clout to instill fear. Resisting mines becomes a more attrac-
tive option for locals, as refraining from resisting would incur greater costs 
than in a nonarmed revolution context. Such contexts, with their threats, 
may thus also partially increase the willingness to resist by locals, but it 
is clear that the overall negative effects for activism override these partial 
boosts. Furthermore, resisting out of fear is not really a basis for forging a 
lasting activism; resistance agency is unlikely to last, and those who have 
experienced threats by armed groups might turn into pro- mining attitudes 
after the armed groups leave. Problematically, the mining issue becomes 
politicized as a government versus Naxalite political issue, rather than focus-
ing on the actual impacts of the investment on lived environments.
Adivasi activists claimed in interviews that in early 2013 about 60 per-
cent of Kanker and 80 percent of Bastar and Dantewada districts were 
Naxal- affected. This makes “day- to- day community work very difficult” in 
these areas. Furthermore, it brings an influx of outside migrants, such as 
people of the trader caste, middlemen, and authorities, to the towns, who 
are very promining and frame Adivasis as antidevelopment and Naxalite. 
This dynamic has made it difficult to build antimining movements even in 
the relatively safe urban centers of these otherwise rural areas. Demographi-
cally, the numbers of outsiders increase with the civil war, while Adivasis are 
displaced and killed. It is in the interest of the influx population to advance 
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the resource frontier, since their class and capital formation is principally 
tied to extractivist appropriation. This is not an isolated situation, as these 
dynamics can be found in other areas of the world that are also experiencing 
outsider- based resource frontier expansion (see Tsing 2005 for an example 
in the Indonesian context).
Many civil society organizations are trying to work in the Bastar Divi-
sion/region that comprises southern Chhattisgarh,10 and have managed 
some small achievements. Yet the central Adivasi activists of the state pro-
claimed to me that no such organizations have their base there, and that 
“Naxals have raised the issue” of mining. Kanker district had the least peace-
ful peoples’ movement against mining of all the three southern iron ore 
mining districts in Chhattisgarh, according to the Adivasi leaders. The Naxal 
movement was “very hard- core” in Rowghat, the new greenfield mining area 
of Kanker.
I will next do a comparative analysis of mining politics across the key 
cases in Chhattisgarh, drawing lessons from their contextual differences, 
strategy sets, and outcomes.11 The analysis includes both old mining sites 
and greenfield expansion projects. I will first briefly describe the cases of 
Dalli Rajhara and the Manpur mines in western Chhattisgarh, after which 
I will dedicate specific subsections to the more crucial cases of Rowghat, an 
attempted greenfield project, and Dantewada, where an already established 
mining project is trying to expand. The dynamics that unfold when target-
ing a virgin forest area, which is devoid of major mining operations, may dif-
fer greatly from expanding an existing mine— although strong Maoist insur-
gencies resist both expansions. These virgin areas, both with several mining 
projects close to each other, require their own subsections. In the section on 
Rowghat, I will also briefly discuss the case of Kawardha greenfield project 
in northwestern Chhattisgarh (both of which are expansion projects of the 
Bhilai Steel Plant— Dalli Rajhara being a depleting mine of the same plant), 
where there is no Naxal (or other type of ) resistance, as the project existed 
only on paper and the locals were not aware of the project.
Dalli Rajhara and Manpur Mines
In old mining areas such as the Durg district’s Dalli Rajhara mining com-
plex, there was allegedly “no Naxal presence” and “mining goes on.” How-
ever, “Naxal presence” is a very rapidly changing concept, and if they wanted 
to, the Maoists could be in Dalli Rajhara. By this I mean that Maoists from 
other regions could come to Dalli Rajhara, as it is unlikely that the residents 
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living there now would suddenly turn into Maoists. The nearby Sarda mines 
in Manpur Panchayat, over the district line from Durg to Rajnandgaon dis-
trict’s southern part, are controlled by Godawari Power & Ispat and Sarda 
Energy & Minerals Limited. Both private companies— the latter is primarily 
a sponge iron producer in the Raipur area— were closed down or blocked by 
the Maoists in 2008, according to a lawyer I spoke with.12 The lawyer argued 
that the company did not take the Maoists seriously.13 The Maoists, who 
consider their acts in Manpur (wherein the Pallamad mining area named 
below is located) a key success,14 argued that
this Manpur area situated on the southern part of Rajanandgaon 
adjacent to Kanker and Durg districts on one side and Gadchiroli 
district of Maharashtra on other side is an important strategical area. 
This region has rich mineral wealth and for this many big Indian and 
foreign companies are eyeing. Particularly in Pallamad area, many 
big capitalist houses are playing with the livelihood of people open-
ing mines in that area. They have all set to enact the destruction of 
water, forest and land of this region. But the people organized under 
our party leadership has become a major obstacle for this path for 
exploitation.15
The Maoists explained that the closure of Sarda’s mine (called Raipur Alloys 
in the extract below, though it was bought by Sarda) took place due to a 
mixture of a mass social movement and armed resistance (not explicitly 
mentioned):
People launched militant struggle against Raipur Alloys that started 
the Pallamad mines in this area. More than a thousand people and 
workers rallied in 2008 January and closed this mine. But after some 
period, the management started work again. Once again people ral-
lied on a huge scale in December and not only closed the mine but 
had also sent back the machines and vehicles from there. People are 
building movements opposing this mine that is proving to be a disas-
ter to the agricultural fields, forests and people’s lives as a whole and 
other proposed mining projects.16
The Maoists attacked the Sarda mines and even effected the closure of 
most of them, but they have not messed with Dalli Rajhara, which is mostly 
explainable by the absence of a strong trade union movement in the private 
Sarda mine and the existence of a strong and alternative trade union in 
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Dalli Rajhara. The union, Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha (Chhattisgarh Lib-
eration Front, or CMM), is so strong that even the truck owners are linked 
to it. Typically, truck owners do not join the trade unions of miners or the 
workers in other larger operations, but rather see themselves as entrepre-
neurs employing drivers and being closely and uncritically aligned with the 
interests of large capital. The CMM is interesting from a global perspective 
because it is a radical trade union that incorporates environmentalism and 
criticism of mechanization, yet it also seems to have significant de facto 
control over local land use policy. I will discuss how this specific form of 
peaceful agency shapes extractivism below.
The heavily mining- critical and arms- using stance of Naxals against 
mining was visible also in the crucial Rowghat expansion project. In 2011, 
according to the newspaper The Hindu,
Maoist spokesperson Gudsa Usendi said the guerrillas were categori-
cally opposed to mining operations in Rowghat. . . . “They [the estab-
lishment] are trying to squeeze us. The Rowghat mountains are very 
important to the ecology of the area and the Maria tribes who live 
there,” said Mr. Usendi. “The adivasis did not benefit from the mines 
in Dalli and they will not benefit from mines in Rowghat.” On Satur-
day, the Raipur and Bilaspur editions of the Dainik Bhaskar reported 
that BSP [Bhilai Steel Plant] had offered to pay for the cost of raising, 
training and deploying an armed battalion (800 to 1,000 men) of 
policemen to secure the Rowghat mines.17
Rowghat and Kawardha Greenfield Project
The Bhilai Steel Plant is one of India’s first five initial steel plants, and was 
constructed in 1955 with the help of the Soviet Union.18 The plant own-
ers and trade union leaders want to expand the production from 4.7 to 
7.5 million tons per annum, but this expansion cannot be done without 
building a railroad from the depleting Dalli Rajhara area to the Rowghat 
area,19 and using extreme violence to kill the Adivasis living in the area, 
who are largely armed and resist the appropriation. The corporate agency in 
Chhattisgarh includes the strong Communist trade union of the Bhilai Steel 
Plant, which backs the opening of the railroad to Rowghat and starting to 
mine these forested hills of the Adivasis, which would benefit the steel plant, 
which employs 30,000– 40,000 workers. The conflicts of the “Communist” 
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state steel plant workers with Maoist guerrillas are interesting expressions 
of the actual forms that the capitalist world- ecology takes at the points of 
production.
The BSP argues that it must open up the Rowghat mine to avoid closure 
and the loss of jobs at the plant. However, the BSP is not the only proponent 
of the project; there are important private companies that could benefit even 
more from the state’s efforts to open this iron ore frontier. The initial stage 
of the project includes building a railroad north to the state- owned BSP 
of the SAIL Company, with the state assuming the risk of this very unsure 
operation. According to an interview with a tax lawyer affiliated with the 
Congress Party, there is a major intercapitalist struggle ongoing around the 
Rowghat reservation, with the procorporate BJP- led state government back-
ing the private corporations (such as Tata) more than the public companies, 
SAIL and NMDC. Prior studies have found that such schisms between elites 
create political opportunities for movements (McAdam 1999) and foster an 
environment that supports the efforts of nonelite actors in equalizing the use 
of endowments (Nugent and Robinson 2010).
There are also internal schisms inside the BSP, and not only between the 
would- be miners of the Rowghat hills. These schisms can be seen as fur-
ther political opportunities for resistance, though in a somewhat equivocal 
way as they offer possibilities that a significant part of the resistance might 
not see as worth pursuing. The BSP and its mines differ from other steel- 
iron complexes, as the legendary Dalli Rajhara mine trade union movement 
(which differs radically from the Communist Party of India [CPI] – led BSP 
Steel Plant union) extended by forming its own political party, both the 
movement and the party being called CMM.20 The CMM resists the vio-
lent resource grab. The role of CMM and the Communist parties and trade 
unions is complicated in current mining politics, considering the political 
opportunities in resisting extractivism. On the one hand, they might be seen 
as allying with corporate agency pushing for new mines (as long as these are 
not too mechanized or privatized), and partly directing a large proportion 
of potential resistance into seeking alternative models of mining, rather than 
resisting mining per se. On the other hand, without such presence, the situ-
ation could have been much worse than it is now, and certainly this would 
have been the case for (official) workers and mining town community devel-
opment.21 The CMM has demanded that the Centre (the Indian govern-
ment, which is also sometimes referred to as “New Delhi” to distinguish this 
central government power from the state powers) continue the operation of 
the Shah Commission in Chhattisgarh to investigate illegal mining.22 In this 
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sense, it has been a boon for the general tendency of trying to expand the 
context of a consolidating democracy from Western India to Eastern India, 
and thus help to dismantle the context of armed conflict.
Although the CMM is critical of mining expansion, and is particularly 
against the violent expansion of mechanized mines, the larger and more 
powerful trade unions are in line with the BSP and the government in sup-
porting corporate agency in this matter. A worker at the BSP and also the 
president of the Chhattisgarh’s iron ore miners’ union shared with me in 
2013 that the Rowghat mine must be opened, as there are only 5– 10 years 
of ore left for the plant.23 In his opinion, importing ore from Jharkhand or 
Odisha would “cost more than the ore,” as the price of transport is based on 
the market value of the ore (which is high due to the iron ore boom and the 
local scarcity of ore). The opening of the mine would thus allow the mine to 
escape the market and continue producing “cheap iron ore.” Importing from 
elsewhere would also be possible, as (according to the company website) the 
Bhilai Steel Plant is by far SAIL’s most cost- efficient and profitable plant; 
turning to imports would just mean lower profit margins and abandoning 
steel- production expansion plans.
In fact, Rowghat is not the only nearby option, as in 2012 SAIL signed 
an MOU with the government to build an iron ore mine in the Eklama area 
of Kawardha district in the northwestern part of the state.24 This greenfield 
project would require far less railroad building than Rowghat, and the area 
does not have Naxalites. When I visited the area’s Adivasi villages, however, 
the villagers and even their leaders were unaware of the whole project. By 
2015, I had not heard of the project being advanced. According to initial 
estimates, there were at least 200 million tons of high- grade iron ore in 
Eklama,25 which is far less than in Rowghat. The region has also had a very 
strong and successful local resistance trajectory against mining, and a bauxite 
miner has been driven out of one of the Adivasi hillocks; resistance is strong 
in Kawardha, and the peaceful Adivasi network is dense. The corporate- 
state nexus could not use the pretext of fighting Naxalites in combatting 
resistance— which would undoubtedly surge— if they opened the mine in 
Kawardha. This might be one reason why Rowghat is targeted instead.26 
According to a lawyer, the Kawardha area is densely forested and there is 
strict enforcement of forest protection. Rowghat is likewise richly forested. 
Yet, for the state, in the de facto application of law, a Naxal- affected forest 
apparently has less value than a nonaffected one— particularly as officially its 
forest rights have not been protected or respected strongly.27
It should be noted that resistance in Rowghat was not limited to Mao-
ists; there were fervent attempts by activists to support peaceful mobilization 
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aiming to retain the existing lived environments. In my interviews, local 
Adivasi social movement leaders from the Rowghat area argued that all the 
locals living in Rowghat are against the project, which has erected police 
stations every five kilometers around the village to prevent any outsider 
activists coming to help the villagers. In essence, the villagers are trapped 
between the expanding miners, their military and paramilitary allies, and 
the Naxalites. The local Adivasis do not want the mine, according to the 
movement leaders:
Part of their livelihood is based on [forest product] collection.  .  .  . 
That particular mountain [in Rowghat] and foothills around it [are 
very rich in forest products]. . . . they get things like jar, which is kind 
of a dry fruit and very, very expensive. And then mahua, which is also 
used for producing liquor and so many things. And tentupata, from 
which smokes are made. . . . the opinion of the community [is] that 
it [the mining project] should not be there.
Chhattisgarh Bachao Andolan (press release, February 18, 2014), a social 
movement consisting of Adivasis, farmers, environmentalists, and human 
rights activists, proclaimed:
Anyone opposing Bhilai Steel Plant (BSP)/SAIL is being arrested, 
beaten, tortured or attacked by the police. . . . None of the 35+ tribal 
villages surrounding the mine have given their consent, nor have had 
their rights settled under The Forest Rights Act— in direct violation 
of the law and the Supreme Court’s April 2013 judgment [prohibit-
ing the company from expanding in the area]. . . . no legal process 
of land acquisition has taken place, and no plan for rehabilitation, 
resettlement, or compensation of these Scheduled villages exists in 
the project documents. In April 2013 members of Chhattisgarh 
PUCL [People’s Union for Civil Liberties] found that the local police 
are threatening the people at gunpoint to “leave the village and settle 
in Narayanpur town”; the people are not even aware of the [Row-
ghat] project.  .  .  . Chattisgarh Bachao Andolan activists trying to 
hold meetings on tribal rights have been prevented and their mobile 
phones and ID cards seized.
What can be said about the role the armed and nonarmed resistance 
played in the stalling of the Rowghat project, given that they both oper-
ated at the same time? State- level Adivasi leaders, among several others who 
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do not resist mining, such as trade union leaders and CPI leaders, shared 
the argument with me in 2013 that the reason why mining work has not 
been started in Rowghat was the resistance by Naxals. The Naxal strategy in 
Rowghat has been based, according to outside Adivasi activists, on “generat-
ing fear” by using landmines, publishing media reports, and forcing work-
ers to strike and locals to block roads and not ask for road construction 
into their areas. In line with the trade unionists’ understanding of the case, 
Chattisgarh Adivasi leaders did not mention their own peaceful movement- 
building work as having played a role in stalling the Rowghat project. These 
leaders also emphasized that corporate agency weakness is unlikely to have 
been a cause for stalling, which seems accurate given, for example, the ample 
support of the state in the form of military support. Yet it cannot be ruled 
out that peaceful mobilizations have had some impact in the overall causal 
condition complex. A national activist explained how on February 10, 2013, 
there was a “huge rally against the Rowghat mine” by the local communities. 
There have also been “small- scale rallies” of about 2,000 people against the 
Rowghat project. The peaceful movement that sprung up among the locals 
has been a “spontaneous, new, and loose movement.”
In sum, the simultaneous presence of peaceful resistance strategies (the 
five key strategies), together with the “big Naxal presence,” could explain 
why expansion has not taken place in Rowghat. In fact, in all the cases 
involving armed conflict, two to five of the five peaceful resistance strategies 
were used. Based on this, the exact role that peaceful or armed resistance had 
in producing the outcomes cannot be ascertained— a finding that broadly 
parallels prior findings on the somewhat unclear role of violence in influenc-
ing movement outcomes (see Giugni 2004).
Dantewada
I will next analyze the important Dantewada iron ore mining region (which 
has high- quality ore in substantial quantities), as this case adds new detail 
about the relation of armed conflict and revolutionary armed resistance 
with mining investment outcomes. Dantewada is an old brownfield min-
ing area, where the Maoists and the state- owned mine, with its Communist 
trade union, have built a complex coexistence. The Maoists strongly steer 
the extraction policy of the region by using arms to block private corpo-
rate investments. Peaceful resistance building has been very difficult in this 
region as it has been cordoned off from the rest of India by state, para-
military, and Maoist armed forces. Despite this overwhelming presence of 
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armed resistance, it is interesting to study how the peaceful strategies of 
movement- building, campaigning, protesting (but not networking), and 
judicial embedding were used in this context. As an outcome, several private 
steel and iron ore projects were discontinued, apparently mostly due to the 
Maoist actions, while the existing Dantewada mine continued its opera-
tions. The analysis of Dantewada further illustrates how armed resistance 
can influence and even block the type of extractivist expansion it considers 
harmful.
Dantewada contains a mix of established mines and greenfield mining 
projects, but had no steel plants as of 2015, thus making the context pos-
sibly easier to resist. The main functioning mines in Bailadila (in the hills 
west from Dantewada town) have been run by the public iron ore mining 
company NMDC since they opened in 1966. In 2011 Dantewada was the 
district most severely affected by the Naxals and was also by far the highest- 
value iron ore extraction site and reserve in Chhattisgarh.28 The district has 
a 65 percent forest cover and an 80 percent proportion of Adivasis (which 
only captures those who are officially part of Scheduled Tribes) in the popu-
lation (CSE 2011).29 I will discuss how and why the resistance has been so 
strong in Dantewada, including armed revolutionary agency.
The relations between mining expansion and resistance in Dantewada 
are long and tumultuous. The resistance has lingered on since the 1960s, 
a period that, according to one lawyer, saw a massive indigenous peoples’ 
uprising against displacement (see Sundar 2008 for an account). However, 
the 1960s movement did not manage to stop the investment, which was 
heavily backed by Japan.30 The mining expansion has led to an accumulation 
of grievances around the impacts, such as considerable iron dust and waste 
pollution.
The 1980s saw the arrival of Naxalite armed organizations in the area 
(Choudhary 2012). Since then, the NMDC Dantewada mines’ “staff and 
property have been targeted in frequent Naxal offensives” (Hinmon 2007, 
125). However, a journalist argued that although the Naxalites “attack at 
times NMDC, their relations are okay.” The Maoists often derail trains to 
disrupt mine operations, which, according to the journalist, the compa-
nies and the state “cannot stop.” However, the expansion of mines has been 
markedly stalled by the resistance. The journalist thought that “no peaceful 
movement has managed to slow down” mining expansion in Dantewada. 
There is a constant attempt to cordon off the region from peaceful resistance 
strategies (such as state embedding) by both the state and the Naxalites, a 
strategy that would support such an analysis. “Maoists are the only [resis-
tance] the Adivasis have seen,” said the journalist. However, I found that 
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local resistance formation is more complex, as Adivasis have also spontane-
ously and peacefully resisted new expansion by private mining companies in 
Dantewada, much like in Rowghat. Both spontaneous and armed resistance 
are strongly linked to the fact that the government uses armed forces to 
take over Adivasi lands, and that the locals often do not have official land 
titles or are not recognized as locals, and thus cannot, for example, use state 
embedding via FRA demands. Choudhary (2012, 160– 61), who did seven 
years of participant observation among Dantewada Maoists, writes about 
the 2005- initiated government and paramilitary attacks in Bailadila:
I wondered why the state attacks were concentrated on this area. 
The answer lay in its location. These villages are only a few kilome-
tres from the Bailadila mines numbered 1 and 3, leased to Tata and 
Essar [private Indian companies] by the NMDC. A team of revenue 
officials had visited these villages with Mahendra Karma [founder of 
the Salwa Judum] to ask for land to make roads, ponds, an airport 
and railway lines which would facilitate mining, but the villagers had 
driven them away. Many of these villages are not even mentioned in 
the government revenue records and so, they are unlikely to be com-
pensated for any land they give up.
Such a setting makes it understandable that the resistance uses all means 
to resist, particularly when they are attacked by the powerful corporate- 
government nexus, which uses severe violence against the locals on top of 
the iron ore.
There is a constant push to expand mining to the whole hill range in 
Dantewada. In 2013, there were attempts to cut down forests, which the 
local Adivasis resisted, according to a lawyer, who added that the Adivasis 
in the Bailadila area no longer resisted mining per se, but its expansion. 
A Tehelka journalist informed me that there were twenty- one MOUs with 
private miners in early 2013 in Dantewada, of which the villagers were very 
angry. The lawyer also observed that Adivasis must take sides as either Nax-
alites or promining locals, as the whole area is isolated from the work of 
environmental NGOs or peaceful social movements.
I received varying accounts from my informants on the role of resistance 
in affecting Dantewada outcomes and on the motives of local resistance. In 
2013 Adivasi leaders said to me that the Naxals in Dantewada frame the new 
mining thrust as a “complete government resource grab,” which they are try-
ing to resist. They have not succeeded in closing the existing mines, although 
“at times [they] disrupt railroad traffic” by exploding dynamite on the tracks 
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or sabotaging the power supply. In reality, however, activists argue they “do 
not want to close the Bailadila mine,” as they have never destroyed the mine 
or said categorically that the mine should be closed.
In this light, the claim above that the mine could not be closed by the 
Naxals must be understood as referring not only to the strength of corporate 
agency but also to the unwillingness of resistance agency to close the mine. 
Chenoy and Chenoy (2010, 132) found that Maoists extorted about a fifth 
(400– 500 million rupees) of the total of massive illegal mining proceeds in 
the neighboring Jharkhand state, in the form of protection fees from miners. 
Similar dynamics are likely to be found or practiced in other places, such as 
Dantewada, which makes the supposed antimining stance of Maoists less 
clear. Of course, one could tax an industry while simultaneously resisting 
it, but the existence of these two tendencies might explain why some mines 
were closed in Chhattisgarh by the Maoists while others were left opera-
tional, and why they will not close all mines.
The Naxal presence has had an impact; “you can say that expansion has 
slowed down in Dantewada due to this resistance,” but in comparative terms 
the resistance in Rowghat against greenfield mines “seems stronger” to the 
Adivasi movement members I talked to in 2013. Other informants and data, 
however, suggest that Naxal- NMDC relations have been much starker than 
the above informants claimed, and that they have worsened since 2013, 
which led to major stalling of Bailadila mine expansion. In March 2014, 
Naxals burned “the downhill conveyor of 11B deposit over a length of 500 
meters”; such attacks have, according to the NMDC, “seriously hindered” 
its six- billion- rupee expansion project in Bailadila.31
That Dantewada mines remained state owned and had a strong CPI 
trade union helped in the interactions between the mine and the Naxals. I 
talked to several leading trade unionists, and they seemed to be on speaking 
terms with the Naxals, even while the sabotage described above was hap-
pening. While the CPI and CPI (Maoist) do not share the viewpoint that 
armed revolution should be the way forward, they share similar views on 
workers’ rights.32 For instance, CPI presence in NMDC Dantewada mines 
has, according to a tax lawyer, provided very good employment and health 
services to those employed, much better than the private companies that 
do not have similar trade unions.33 The CPI leader argued that the Nax-
als attacked the NMDC mine “to pressure the state government” and to 
demand a “no- export” mineral policy.
The NMDC mine seemed to have comparatively better relations with 
the Adivasis and Naxals than SAIL’s Bhilai Steel Plant and the Rowghat 
project— although none of these relations can be called peaceful or good in 
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the conventional sense. Several of my informants claimed that the iron proj-
ects benefit and employ mostly non- Adivasis, and when they are hired, they 
are typically offered positions as the lowest- ranking workers in the indus-
try.34 In any case, working in a factory is deeply at odds with the traditional 
way of life in the forests for the Adivasis, who thus become alienated from 
dwelling in their traditional lived environment.
In 2013, a long- term worker in the Bhilai Steel Plant and president of the 
iron miners’ union in Chhattisgarh told me that the unions oppose the cen-
tral and state government’s willingness to privatize the mining industry. He 
argued that “Tata and Essar want the Dantewada mines,” but these mines 
“should be of people, tribal people,” whose land right is “ancestral.” He then 
continued to raise a question that was revealing of the underlying worldview 
of these mining trade unionists: “They [the Adivasis] have saved the mineral, 
the forest, why should [the lands] go into private hands?” This kind of dis-
course illustrates the general trend of opinion held by trade unionists, steel 
and iron mine workers, and CPI members in India, which frames public 
mining as no problem to Adivasis, and private mining as the key problem. 
This view both unites and differentiates many (but not all) trade unionists 
and mining workers from the Adivasis and the Naxals.
The rising push of extractivism by private capital seems to have made the 
conflict worse and bloodier, given that the Naxals resist private capital in 
particular, which is then protected by new paramilitary forces. This entrance 
of new players (Tata, Essar, and the paramilitaries) shatters the existing 
dynamics of contention. A mining activist claimed that at least since 2005 
Tata has “taken over land without environmental clearance” and “organized 
[a] massacre of Adivasis in July 2005 in a steel plant area” that would be fed 
by the Rowghat mine. According to this person, “thousands have been killed 
for the steel and other projects” in the Bastar Division.
Steel plants are the first required step for prospective miners before open-
ing mines under the Indian government’s iron mining policy. This means 
that along with banning illegal mining, resisting steel plants is also essential 
for resistance targeting the iron industry. The Maoists have attacked many 
private steel project plans, and almost all of these have been scrapped.35
The entrance of private capital has deepened the civil war and triggered 
armed revolutionary agency. The post- 2005 increase in signing MOUs with 
private companies, such as Essar and Tata, had many impacts on the min-
ing industry. These MOUs outline deals that include taking over at least a 
part of the state mines; establishing private mines; and installing steel plants 
and building infrastructure in Dantewada. These agreements, according to 
a non- Adivasi forest rights activist, have led to stronger attacks by the Nax-
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als against the prospective privatized projects. One target of these stronger 
attacks was the Essar slurry pipeline running to the Andhra Pradesh coast, 
for the purpose of exporting iron ore.36 The escalation of violence has been 
two- sided, and this has led to a situation where the adoption and use of 
peaceful politics has been rendered almost impossible.
According to Hinmon (2007, 132), in Dhurli in Dantewada in 2006 the 
government was grabbing land for Essar, and communication with the vil-
lage was cordoned off days before the Gram Sabha meeting, that is, the offi-
cial decision- making meeting of the villagers. Thousands of police officers 
arrested protestors, canvassed households, threatened inhabitants to make 
them “behave,” and forced people who did not sign documents giving up 
their land to leave. In addition, they allowed fifty outsiders, including the 
Salwa Judum leader Karma, to be present at the meeting. Under these condi-
tions, only four of the villagers did not sign the documents— for which they 
had to pay dearly. “After the Gram Sabha, in a series of midnight arrests, 
four Dhurli villagers who refused to sign over their land were arrested under 
Indian Penal Code 151– 107 (knowingly joining or continuing in an assem-
bly of five or more persons after it has been commanded to disperse).”
When such breaches of the rule of law are systematically allowed, and 
activists are unable to use state embedding or other peaceful strategies 
despite repeated attempts, more people turn to armed struggle. The Dhurli 
and many other similar cases suggests that the extractivists choose the type 
of politics they prefer, to which the locals must respond by participating in 
those politics. The existence of budding armed revolutionary and paramili-
tary agencies furthers this spiral of violence. This is particularly the case when 
the option of becoming a guerrilla or paramilitary is omnipresent. This has 
major impacts on how economic and political outcomes are defined, what 
types of corporate and resistance agencies are formed, and which political 
games are usable for them and how. Essentially, electoral politics is rendered 
unusable for the would- be peaceful resistance in the iron mining civil war 
areas, as, according to a local journalist, “Naxals demand nonvoting from 
communities.” Institutional politics is rendered mostly unusable due to the 
simultaneous existence of active armed conflict as a political game, and as a 
key strategy. Even the Gram Sabhas lose their otherwise substantial power 
(these are institutional politics, which they could enjoy in a democratic, 
non- civil- war context) as the state- corporate nexus can use armed violence 
to enforce compliance. However, “nothing can be done without Gram Sabha 
in Adivasi areas,” as I was told by an Odishan political party leader, geologist, 
and retired high- level bureaucrat from the Indian Administrative Service 
of Andhra Pradesh. The Gram Sabhas also influence the arrangement of 
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political games in civil war contexts. The highly successful embedding of 
institutional politics by the creation and control of Gram Sabhas in many 
tribal areas of India has meant that in those places where the government- 
corporate nexus truly wants to expand, it more or less has to resort to armed 
conflict as the means to the desired end. This applies especially in the pri-
mary resource frontier of Eastern India, which has very crucial resource 
endowments. In many instances, corporate- government agency first “shuts 
down” the possibility of using peaceful political games where the resistance 
is powerful, before continuing by pushing with the full force of violence.
In comparison to other Indian iron mining struggles, Chhattisgarh offers 
the worst context for peaceful resistance. In comparison to Goa and the 
rest of Southern and Western India, which are more urbanized and con-
nected to India as a whole, Chhattisgarh is a backwater. According to a law-
yer I interviewed, in Chhattisgarh the establishment of the rule of law and 
democratic civil society has been tried and failed. In 2009, 150,000 people 
marched 130 kilometers in Chhattisgarh to protest against all of the proj-
ects described above, but according to the lawyer, no one reported on this 
peaceful march,37 which demonstrated for him that the democratic voice is 
not heard in the state.38 However, I would not affirm these claims on the 
futility of nonviolent activism even in civil war contexts, as it is obvious 
from the above analysis that peaceful resistance has also been present and 
played a role in Chhattisgarh in many ways. So much so that it is impos-
sible to say whether it could have or could not have affected the outcomes. 
Even in a civil war, the story of resistance is not exhausted by a recital of the 
acts of armed revolutionaries. The resistance has found ways to curb and 
even discontinue extractivism, even in the midst of the dire armed conflict 
contexts of Eastern India. In fact, the resistance has succeeded exceedingly 
well in all civil war– context iron ore expansion conflicts. This outcome has 
been related to a causal condition complex that involves an amalgam of both 
armed and peaceful resistance strategies.
The rest of this chapter will briefly compare the Chhattisgarh cases with 
other armed resource conflicts. First, I study the neighboring Jharkhand 
state’s important West Singhbhum area, where there is a similarly strong 
push to turn the forests inhabited by Adivasis into iron mines. I will end the 
chapter by making some comparisons to international examples. These com-
parisons will be helpful in exploring the role of civil war contexts in defining 
extractivist politics. The Jharkhand case shows how government policies, 
which supersede the possibilities of peaceful resistance and democracy in 
order to pursue resource extraction, have ended up paving the road to armed 
conflict and deepening armed revolutionary agency.
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Jharkhand
Jharkhand illustrates how a context comes into being where armed resource 
conflict clearly surpasses other political games in importance. At first in 
Jharkhand there was a strong attempt at peaceful resistance against extrac-
tivism, but government and corporate agency were either unresponsive or 
violent in their response, which turned the whole political dynamics violent. 
Until the 2000s iron ore boom, most attention was on peaceful resistance by 
the forest dwellers. However, as their attempts to embed and coproduce the 
state along nonextractivist lines were not heard, the resistance had to turn to 
the use of arms to protect the forests where they were living. This situation 
provides answers to the complex relationships between peaceful and armed 
resistance in the same locality.
Beginning in 2006, there was massive local and regional resistance in the 
form of peaceful rallies against mining MOUs, which blocked expansion. 
As an example of the networking taking place, a Traditional Leaders Forum 
was established, which united the Gram Panchayats, Adivasi groups, and 
NGOs. Networking across the state linked the struggles between captive 
mining areas and their projected steel plant areas.39 In West Singhbhum, the 
key mining expansion site in Jharkhand, the activists’ politicizing and move-
ment organizing work consisted of going around to the villages and trying to 
convince people to live in accordance with FRA stipulations regarding how 
traditional forest dwellers should live in a forest. The activists also encour-
aged villagers to demand official recognition of their area as a self- governable 
unit. However, none of the state- mediated political games were successfully 
embedded by the resistance in West Singhbhum. In the late 1990s they 
formed a political party, Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, which united Adivasis 
affected by mining in West Singhbhum. They also created a network uniting 
parties and movements whose aim was to save the forests. However, they 
did not win political power as the neighboring mining areas’ people voted 
for promining politicians, which led to people becoming disillusioned with 
electoral politics.
In parallel with this peaceful mobilization, since 2000 there has been a 
rising Maoist revolutionary agency built in the West Singhbhum area, which 
also has been resisting extractivism. Since 2010, the political dynamics have 
been increasingly turning away from peaceful and routine political games, 
which were found inaccessible, and toward armed resistance, in a dialectic 
where the state has used militarization to try to push for mining expansion.
The creation of civil war contexts has happened from both directions. As 
in Chhattisgarh, the informants in Jharkhand also mentioned a series of dif-
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ferent factors explaining why armed resistance became a key political game. 
Saranda forest dwellers have been turning to Maoism in greater numbers 
in recent years, according to an NGO informant. According to this infor-
mant, the local Adivasis, called the Hos, in comparison to many other rural 
populations, have never been fully dominated by the state or subjugated to 
capitalism— this suggests that they have had alternative and autonomous 
physical, social, and symbolic spaces. Locals in West Singhbhum saw nature 
as including approximately 200 Adivasi forest villages (and a similar num-
ber of nonforest villages), as well as their ancestors and the spirits of the 
forest. This area also included a large area of huge, ancient sal trees, which 
comprised a sacred Saranda grove. The local Ho people wanted to protect 
this sacred grove by any means necessary. Instead of embracing extractivism, 
the Hos have retained and strengthened their “strong, traditional self- rule 
system” and their willingness to defend their territory by any means. Thus, 
according to a local informant, it is not surprising that they welcomed the 
Maoists around 2000, because the Maoists “provided arms that the Hos 
were looking for.” After this, West Singhbhum “became a Maoist stronghold 
and since then the Maoists have become more and more powerful in that 
area.” A forest movement leader told me in early 2013:
No mining companies or industries can function there smoothly. 
That’s why the minister says I’ll fight the Maoists with development. 
So now they are constructing huge roads. Infrastructure is going on. 
Construction of infrastructure is going on. You won’t believe the 
kinds of roads they’re building deep inside the forest. Six lane, four 
lane . . . Yeah, nine feet thick concrete roads. . . . So you can imagine 
the reason. Obviously not for the Adivasis who usually ride bicycles 
or have bullock carts.
In 2010 the government and mining capital started placing armed forces 
in the region. A Jharkhand- based activist told me that by 2013 approx-
imately 16,000 paramilitary forces and a mass of Central Reserve Police 
(an army- equivalent force that only handles internal security) were already 
stationed around the West Singhbhum brownfield and greenfield mining 
project areas. This military apparatus had been operating actively since 2012 
as the Anaconda Operation in the Saranda Forest and as the Green Hunt 
Operation (aimed at the Maoists). This militarization suggests that the area 
was being transformed into another Bastar- like context (as discussed in 
chapter 2).
While peaceful resistance had managed to stop expansion in the past, by 
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August 2012 it was no longer possible to conduct rallies or demonstrations. 
“Those days are gone,” an activist explained. Now, “people have no alterna-
tive than to surrender or oppose mining by joining the Maoists.” This activ-
ist further explained how mining politics in 2013 took place “between the 
Maoists on the one side and paramilitary forces on the other.” He saw that 
“the future is very bleak. Lots of bloodshed is going on and it will increase 
over the years, I think . . . Ho societies are passing through a tragic time . . . 
in the near future we will have very little scope to turn the tide in the other 
direction.” In contrast, some activists who were also knowledgeable, for 
example, about the Shah Commission (unlike the above activist), saw that 
there were still possibilities for peaceful resistance, and provided a less grim 
or uniform picture of the situation and the potential future. According to a 
local forest movement coordinator (interview, March 2013):
Proposals, new mines, and new industrial proposals in Saranda are 
for the time being stopped. And the most interesting thing is that the 
minister of rural development of the central government of India, 
Mr. Jairam Ramesh, who has been frequenting this West Singhbhum 
region of Saranda forest, has requested the government of India to 
stop all mining leases for the time being in that area. So he is a power-
ful minister and we hope that his request will be heard by the high- 
level decision- making body in the government and for some time at 
least in future there’ll not be much mining activities in the area.
The activist said that Jharkhand had its “democratic moment,” with a 
democratic grassroots movement in 1975– 2000, a period he saw as “very 
important to sort out issues. That is a period when the crisis should have 
been addressed by the state. The moment the state fails to do that and takes 
a strong position to ignore it then that phase is lost. And another phase of 
struggle begins. A more militant movement.” This activist said that they 
had observed how since the 1970s the context had changed through three 
phases, “peaceful agitation, militancy, and then armed struggle.” For him, it 
was the government that had made the errors:
If you fail to address the issue in the first phase, when people are 
peacefully agitating, [then you should] still try to look at the issue 
more closely in the second phase because you’re on the road to a 
more bloody conflict. So before you enter into the bloody conflict 
you should address the issue and resolve the issue. In both phases the 
government did nothing. So now it will have to face the trouble. . . . 
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[the government in 2013 has] the least interest in the future, peace, 
and good governance in Jharkhand.
Consequently, this activist, whose movement had for years tried to intervene 
at critical moments, by visiting ministers and urging them, to no avail, to 
take the issues seriously, framed the post- 2000 mining politics in West Sing-
hbhum as follows:
When a democratic movement fails then there are two options left 
for the people. One is to accept the misery of defeat; one is to take 
up arms. I think the Hos taking up arms is very tragic but it was 
unavoidable and inevitable. Because armed [mining interests are tak-
ing over] the entire habitat of the Ho people. They’re sitting on iron 
ore.
I asked this activist whether the people could have chosen to use just peace-
ful resistance, to which he replied that mining politics is not a one- sided 
game and is not explicable by resistance strength alone:
When there is a democratic movement, peaceful agitation, and peo-
ple raising genuine concerns, then the government will have also to 
respond to it positively. . . . Unfortunately, when the region was rais-
ing its issues democratically, the government did not pay any atten-
tion to it.
The case of Jharkhand illustrates how agencies— resistance, corporate, 
and government— are in a dialectical relationship, creating a specific arrange-
ment of political games through which both extractive expansion and its 
resistance are pursued. These dynamics are interscalar, local, and substate 
events that influence national- level events. These dynamics can even influ-
ence those at the national and international level— such as resistance efforts 
elsewhere— which in turn influences the local contexts. Later, the Shah 
Commission shut down most of the existing iron ore mines in Jharkhand 
due to their irregularities (not paying royalties, mining without licenses and 
outside lease areas, and so on), but the move mostly did not affect the poli-
tics of the greenfield mining projects discussed above.40
I will conclude this chapter and part II with a short comparison of the 
different armed conflicts. This discussion will help to assess how different 
armed conflict contexts influence the possibilities of resisting extractivism.
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Comparison of the East Indian Experience with Other Armed Conflicts
Not all armed conflicts are similar. Rather, they are dictated by the types 
of revolutionary/secessionary and government- corporate agencies and strat-
egies creating the political dynamics, as figure 1 in chapter 3 suggests. I 
compared six Eastern Indian iron ore investment cases in this chapter: West 
Singhbhum, Dantewada, Rowghat, Manpur, Dalli Rajhara, and Kawardha. 
This affords a broader and systematic comparison that draws conclusions 
on the key causalities. The first four of these cases all showed a trajectory 
where a violent expansion of extractivism, by state- corporate agency, led to 
a spiraling of civil war. This created a context that Maoist guerrillas found 
easy to take advantage of after peaceful means of contention were rendered 
largely obsolete, or dangerous to use.41 However, even in these armed con-
flicts, there were peaceful resistance strategies employed alongside armed 
strategies. Movement building and protesting were used in all the five cases 
(the Kawardha project still existed only on paper, so no resistance was form-
ing against it, with locals not even being aware of it). None of these cases 
used private politics (by this I mean that they did not participate in private 
dialogues with corporations in which an agreement was reached), which 
can be explained by the presence of Maoist revolutionaries, who particularly 
resist private capital, as well as public corporations, that seek to destroy the 
forests and hill areas on which the revolutionaries depend on geographically 
to continue their guerrilla warfare. Campaigning by nonmodernist framing 
and networking were also used in three of the cases. Therefore, peaceful 
resistance agency was also surely formed and operational in all these contexts 
and cases, for which reason the investment outcomes cannot be attributed 
solely to armed resistance, but the efforts are pooled.
However, electoral politics were rendered unusable in all these armed 
conflicts, and institutional and judicial politics were hardly used. If they 
were used, as in the case of Dantewada, the judicial decisions coming from 
the federal level were not followed by the Chhattisgarh and regional authori-
ties. This suggests that even localized armed conflicts can render national- 
level state embedding by peaceful resistance ineffective, as the outcomes of 
this federal embedding are applied weakly or not at all in the armed conflict 
areas. Nevertheless, in most cases when this happened, Maoists stepped in 
and stopped the projects by force. In all, the barring of extractivist expan-
sion by this conjunction of armed and peaceful resistance was impressive in 
Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. The greenfield projects could not be opened 
despite huge army and paramilitary operations. Even some existing mines 
were closed, and their extraction styles, logistical operations, and expansion 
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plans were modified by this resistance. Yet, when comparing these economic 
outcomes with Western and Southern India, where all iron ore mines were 
closed and plans were scrapped, it becomes clear that resistance in peace-
ful, democratizing contexts, or merely peaceful resistance, if using the right 
set of strategies (which I will study in the next part), can attain even more 
impressive results. The political outcome of deepening democracy instead of 
a civil war is even more impressive in this comparison.
Besides armed revolutionary agency, which tries to capture the state 
(rather than embed it), there is also armed secessionary agency, and there 
are instances where both of these agencies have become intermeshed, in dif-
ferent ways, with mining conflicts. Armed revolutionary/secessionary resis-
tance does not typically resist mining per se, but rather uses the possibility 
of resistance instrumentally. Sometimes these goals become intermeshed, 
as in the case of Eastern India. Perhaps the best- known case of armed min-
ing resistance globally is that of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea (Evans, 
Goodman, and Lansbury 2002). This conflict dragged on for decades, and 
the resistance used all means possible, finally taking up arms against the 
neocolonial mine as resistance intermeshed with Bougainville’s secession-
ary agency, which sought self- determination from Australia and Papua New 
Guinea via a war of independence. In response, the government of Papua 
New Guinea sent in the army to try to keep the mine open, which created 
a context of lengthy civil war (Benson and Kirsch 2010). Ultimately, the 
resistance won, as the mine was not reopened (Kirsch 2013).
Not all armed resource conflicts mean that the locals resist extractivism, 
not even always those closely tied to land and resource control in the form 
of independence struggles. The Papua New Guinea case differs from North-
east India, where the armed struggle for self- determination has used most 
mining operations as a tax levy base for arming guerrilla forces, rather than 
tying mining resistance and the independence struggle together (uranium 
mining project resistance being a slight exception to this) (Karlsson 2011). 
When comparing the armed secessionary groups of “mainland India’s” min-
ing regions to those in the Northeast, several differences are apparent. In 
his discussion of the Northeast context of resource extraction (including 
mining), Karlsson (2011) notes that the indigenous hill societies are becom-
ing unequal class societies. The armed resistance in the Northeast is not 
Maoist or Adivasi- ideology based; rather, it is the result of a prolonged quest 
for autonomy or independence from India in nationalist terms. In Eastern 
India, based on the accounts of Sundar (2006, 2008) and many others (e.g., 
many writers in Paul 2013), a leftist ideology of struggle against class injus-
tices (including attempts to root out traditional tribal power hierarchies) has 
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merged with the traditional Adivasi notions of ecology, and resulted in a type 
of “green war” over the essential basis of life, such as water, cultivable land, 
and forests (Karlsson 2011). Yet news media, such as the New York Times, 
have reported that the Northeast indigenous populations, armed or not, are 
making (use of ) the resource rush to finance their struggle for autonomy, 
whether regional or family- based.42 This portrays a mining setting that is in 
extremely stark contrast to the politics of metal mining in “mainland India,” 
whose expansion is fiercely resisted in almost all cases.
Can armed resistance, revolutionary or secessionary, provide for a postex-
tractivist setting based on democratic decision- making on what constitutes 
lived environments? This is highly doubtful, given the violence inherent in 
armed resistance, which often also levies taxes on miners to buy arms; the 
key goals are also different. Currently the mining conflict in the Northeast is 
subsumed under the broad struggle for self- determination. From the view-
point of political games, almost all attention is paid to the field of armed 
secession, which subsumes all others, meaning that other strategies are 
scarcely used. Indeed, true sovereignty in these predominantly indigenous 
lands cannot be attained by this path. Karlsson (2011, 276) notes, “Wom-
en’s rights and respect for nature are thus central facets in the process of 
achieving indigenous sovereignty. This is not something that can be adopted 
at a later stage.” Once agency of a specific kind is created, it becomes hard 
to turn away from the path set into motion. As social beings, the agency and 
socialized subjectivity of humans is created in and tied to particular social 
fields (Bourdieu 1991). When the field of choice is armed conflict, this will 
also be the political outcome in terms of the political agency that is created. 
For this reason, it is important to compare not only the economic outcomes 
but also the political outcomes of investment politics.
In this part of the book, I have discussed the major cleavages in the 
political dynamics, contextual conditions, and types of resistance agencies 
available to prospective mining activists in differing regions. I have sought 
to convey how political dynamics do and do not influence the forged agency, 
available strategies, conflicts, and investment outcomes. In the absence of 
civil war, the resistance could make a very efficient use of, for example, judi-
cial and institutional politics in the context of consolidating democracy, and 
to consolidate democracy (as in Western India). The reliance on mass pro-
testing in contentious politics can be used to directly influence the flow of 
iron ore and to forge transnational working class coalitions (as in the global 
commodity frontier of Carajás). This resistance could also challenge extrac-
tivism, even in very old and promining contexts, through an encompassing 
embedding that includes the state, government, NGOs, trade unions, envi-
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ronmentalists, urban middle classes, mining professionals, and other resis-
tance groups— as in the (peri- )urban mining cases in Minas Gerais.
The analysis showed how figures 1 and 2 from chapter 2 can be utilized as 
helpful analytical tools to study the key arenas of investment politics. I also 
showed how an analysis of causalities between and within social, symbolic, 
and physical spaces, as theorized in figure 3 (also from chapter 2), can be 
used to explain how extractivism and its resistance transform power relations 
through different spaces. Finally, I analyzed the relation of several important 
contingency factors on the outcomes, such as the role of middle classes and 
the proximity of the urban centers to the proposed mines.
The comparison of armed and nonarmed investment contexts offers trou-
bling insights into why extractivism became linked with armed conflicts and 
violence as the commodity boom of 2005– 14 advanced. In several places, 
“resource- war- type” mineral extraction has proven at least instrumental, and 
possibly essential, to maintaining the flow of cheap minerals in spite of local 
land rights.43 In Chhattisgarh, according to a local activist- scholar, “It suits 
the government to militarize the area; a peaceful solution would signify giv-
ing all the lands to scheduled tribes, as these belong to them by law. Now it 
is also possible to mine there using the argument of war against terrorism.”
There are extractivist ideologies and policies that appear to perpetuate 
rather than extinguish the fires of civil war in Eastern India.44 The foreseen 
changes in the physical space are important partial explanations of the con-
tinued armed conflict. After a mining boom closes the forest frontier there 
will be far fewer geographical possibilities for waging guerrilla war, even if the 
push toward armed revolutionary agency would be much stronger and the 
absence of other political opportunities would force people to pursue it. The 
current extractivist thrust of large open- pit mining— meaning the expansion 
of infrastructure, felling of forests, and depletion of water and arable land— 
differs radically from the geography of past conflict contexts, causing a more 
desperate, back against the wall situation for the guerrillas.
This suggests that if the main goal were to end a civil war, one compo-
nent would be to put a hold on rampant and violent mining expansion, 
which both generates and boosts armed conflict. First, the areas of armed 
conflicts should be pacified and the rule of law guaranteed, so that routine 
politics and peaceful contention do not lose efficacy due to the presence of 
armed forces. Yet the reality is that extractivism is waged in and by armed 
conflicts in many parts of the globe. I hope that this chapter has opened 
up these often- forgotten or unknown dynamics behind global extractiv-
ism. I also hope that the reader has seen how, despite very violent resource 
crunches, there are always some possibilities and strategies to resist, and that 
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these can lead, more than just sometimes, to the desired outcome of retain-
ing the lived environments that are home to many.
Having surveyed a large array of contextual factors, including armed 
conflicts and other situations, and their role in investment politics within 
the resistance to extractivism, I will next move to a detailed study of how 




Part I I I
Peaceful Resistance Strategies
We have now come to understand how the broad differences in contex-
tual factors can influence the type of resistance that is formed against global 
extractivism, and how the type of resistance strategies implemented can cre-
ate contextual changes. I will now further examine the hypothesis by study-
ing the role of differing strategy sets. This will highlight the strategies that 
are the building blocks used in boosting activism and those that are not. This 
last section of the book looks at mining politics from the bottom up, the 
grassroots point of view, but with an understanding of the interplay between 
strategies and political dynamics.
When resistance groups or fronts choose or embark on a strategy path, 
the new recruits and activists tend to conduct their actions within the lines 
specified by those strategies. The group’s actions are strongly shaped by the 
avenues of activism that the chosen strategies recommend, and these actions 
are adopted by the larger social group. Thus, strategies are a key object of 
study to be able to understand the causal outcomes of resistance efforts over 
time, including how the resistance influences the political dynamics and 
opportunities of future activists and of other resistance efforts. For example, 
when a resistance group is experienced in embedding the state via judicial 
politics, then the newcomers to the group will gain expertise in this strat-
egy and are more likely to continue working within this strategic avenue. 
When the only viable option for would- be resistance is armed revolutionary 
action— whether or not this choice is a result of coercion— then this strategy 
and style of resistance agency is boosted. I believe that this dynamic view of 
strategies can open up, in great detail, the causalities at play in politics in 
general, as this view is formed through the interaction of different political 
agencies that meet in differing political games.
The sections below detail the specificities of each case to illuminate in 
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greater detail how different strategies can influence the economic outcomes 
of conflicts. Thus, this part of the book discusses the multiple pathways for 
the resistance to make an impact in mining politics, with the separate sec-
tions illustrating how specific combinations of strategies can be used to forge 
contention and thus influence investment pace and style.
The material is divided into chapters, partially to keep the cases sep-
arated, but each chapter also has a central unifying lesson, based on the 
cases discussed, for understanding how resistance can impact extractivism. 
First, chapter 5 analyzes the impacts of protesting by mass social movements 
through two important variations in the selection of key strategies by two 
large and important resistance movements (one in Kudremukh and two in 
Tamil Nadu). Next, chapter 6 focuses on the states of Odisha and Goa, 
which both saw the use of a broad set of strategies of resistance and can thus 
be used to compare the impacts of this broad quality of resistance in the dif-
ferent contexts of Western and Eastern India. Finally, chapter 7 analyzes the 
role of global and national resistance coalitions in the politics of extractivism 
in Brazil and India. After discussing all the cases, the conclusion will serve as 




Protesting by Mass Social Movements
We left the coastal city of Udub at 5 a.m. to drive through the lush hills 
of the Western Ghats rainforests, up to the former mining town of Kudre-
mukh, for a scheduled early morning meeting. It was a beautiful dawn, 
and the air was fresh with mist and gentle rays of sun. There was ample 
time for me and my partner Jenni, who joined me on several field visits, 
to wander around the town, getting to know the unique feeling of a town 
whose main purpose for being built has disappeared. I was curious to 
learn about the events that had led to this current situation. The place 
had a very special, even magical feeling to it with all the infrastructure 
and none of the hustle. After spending the day talking to former mining 
workers and activists, I mused about what the postextractivism future 
would look like. Would the rural areas of formerly extractivist states be 
dotted with these partial ghost towns as movements had success shutting 
down polluting facilities? With this thought in my mind, we left for a long 
drive along the tiny winding and bumpy roads of Karnataka’s country-
side, across the coffee growing regions to the southern and eastern parts of 
the state, and, finally, to Bangalore. On the way, we talked to the state’s 
most seasoned activists, visiting their homes. Although the trips were tire-
some, they were truly worth it, and the welcome at new places by the 
locals was overwhelmingly friendly. People gave their time to talk to me 
very late into the night, and even cooked breakfast early in the morning, 
consisting of so many different types of and flavors of rotis, chapatis, and 
naan breads that we had not even known existed. From Bangalore we 
continued to Tamil Nadu, where we traveled around the proposed min-
ing areas. While visiting peoples’ houses, we heard the constant chirping of 
textile machines and saw the steeply rising hill of Salem next to the houses 
where we talked with the locals, who had stopped the plans to mine away 
the hill next door. Several times the local villagers spontaneously expressed 
words of joy and how happy they were now that they had been able to stop 
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the projects that would have ended their current ways of life and liveli-
hoods, and would have changed the place to one without a hill, fresh air, 
and home industries such as textile- making and agriculture. This was still 
a thriving place and not a partial ghost town because they had managed 
to stop the mining before it had started. Thus, to preserve the physical, 
social, and symbolic aspects of place is not just about shutting mines but 
about stopping projects before these changes are made— as the towns are 
not the same after mining takes root.
This chapter discusses three cases where resistance strength came primar-
ily from forging a new mass social movement and organizing large- scale 
protests. These cases clearly illustrate the importance that organizing a mass 
social movement and protesting had for resisting extractivism in this con-
text. I will first look at Kudremukh in Karnataka, India, which was the first 
iron ore conflict in my database and shows how networking across tradition-
ally hostile movements can yield remarkable outcomes. I will then analyze 
the Tamil Nadu cases of Salem and Tiruvannamalai, also in India, showing 
how resistance by a mass social movement can succeed even by using a very 
limited set of peaceful strategies, by focusing on mass protesting.
Organizing and Unifying Rural and Environmental Movements: 
Kudremukh
I will start the discussion of resistance cases with the first struggle that took 
place that resulted in the closure of an existing mine. Kudremukh Iron Ore 
Company Limited, the state- company owned mine in Kudremukh, West-
ern Ghats, was the first mine to be shut down by resistance efforts in India 
or Brazil. The mine shut down in 2005, but even when I visited in early 
2013, the remnants of a public company town were still highly visible. Rows 
of neat company houses were provided for worker families, and indeed in 
2013 these looked like accommodation way above the standard for work-
ers in India. However, the mine had been closed for twelve years and there 
was none of the noise or dust that would have dominated the senses when 
the mine was still open. What was left was only a lush, pristine- looking 
rainforest, which surrounded the former mine in all directions and formed 
a national park— it was now a spectacular place. The forests that now sur-
rounded the slopes downhill from the mine had many animals, tree species, 
and a “very good ecology” (referring to the very rich biodiversity, which was 
of major importance in offering many bases of livelihood and life to a vast 
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array of peoples and life forms). This evaluation of the state of the area was 
given to me by the mine- displaced Adivasis with whom I talked. Some of 
these informants had also worked for two decades in the mine as engineers 
and were able to relate both sides of the story of the place.
When the mine and the accompanying factory were installed, according 
to my informants, a lot of pollution followed. Three rivers were poisoned by 
pollution from the factory wastewater, fish started dying, and harvest yields 
dropped from two annual crops to not even one. Similar damage to agricul-
tural fields was also present in Goa. In Kudremukh, factory pollution aggra-
vated all these problems downriver. Mobilization started in 1994 to prevent 
the renewal of a lease expiring in 1999. The affected public in the lowlands 
made a complaint first to a the Karnataka High Court, and then in 2002 to 
the Supreme Court, which decided to order a shutdown of the complex in 
2005 (Sridhar 2010). Thus, using judicial politics was a key proximate cause 
for the outcome, while electoral or institutional politics were not used. The 
deeper causes lay in building a massive social movement that bridged old 
barriers by development of exemplary networking across movements. Cur-
rently, it is legally impossible to reopen the mine, although in practice this 
could be done as all the facilities are there. Even many of the workers still 
remain in the area after about a decade of closure, and many of them would 
like to see the mine reopened because it provided a monetary livelihood. The 
specificity of this struggle was that almost all the major social movements of 
Karnataka joined the fight from 1996 onward. This has not happened in the 
state on any other occasion; rather, rivalry and hostility between movements 
has been common.
An Adivasi who worked as a mechanical engineer in the mine said he felt 
good when he heard about the Supreme Court decision, although it meant 
losing his job. He wanted to see the pollution stop, and although he was 
employed by the mine, it had not been providing work to local Adivasis or 
people from Karnataka in general. He estimated that about 90 percent of 
the workers were outsiders. Thus, he, along with the 10 percent of the work-
force who were locals, backed the activists even though they were working 
for the company. This is a telling example of how there can be resistance to 
extractivism even from those who are physically doing the extraction. The 
people involved directly in the extraction quite often also include indig-
enous people who are forced into this work by the powers of development.
Another Adivasi leader, who was also the president of one of the dis-
tricts impacted by the mine, wanted us to move away from the company 
town center to discuss the ten- year struggle. He shared that this discretion 
is needed, as unemployed ex- workers continued to live there, and it was 
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not the right place to speak critically about the company. This suggested 
that the whole town continued to be company controlled even though the 
mine itself was long closed. This control extended beyond the simple physi-
cal space and even into the symbolic space as critical discussions about the 
mining company were not be held within the boundaries of the town. We 
relocated to an area that was further afield, but still looked down over the 
shuttered mine. My informant related how the mine had eaten into the 
main living source of a large and impacted population for decades, con-
stantly expanding and in need of more land. However, it was the contami-
nation of the local water sources that was the tipping point that caused the 
Adivasis to start agitating against the mine. Their Adivasi group had been 
ordered to move away from the Western Ghats in the early 1990s when the 
hills were turned into a national park. They fought back, however, staying in 
the forests and developing deep hostilities with environmentalists over the 
creation of the national park.
The Kudremukh struggle united several groups— at least into a loose 
front and for a while. A senior NGO networker from Kushalnagar in Kar-
nataka related how, for example, the Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangha was 
already in a land fight with the Adivasis in 1987 (this organization is now 
a large farmers’ movement and member of the transnational peasant move-
ment La Via Campesina, which had in the early years been largely com-
posed of successful Karnataka farmers). He argued that the substantial and 
united protests since 1997 were crucial in influencing the court decision 
on Kudremukh, as “when protest takes place, it is easier for the court to 
make a decision,” and for the government to obey that decision. As the 
mine was state- owned, the lease was long and the price was low, which 
meant that the owner was not willing to relinquish this asset lightly. The 
mine was also the sole target of action, meaning that the state could not be 
used as a partner or third party helping the activists; electoral or institu-
tional embedding was out of the question. Considerable mobilization was 
therefore essential.
One of the key organizations in this struggle was the Environment Sup-
port Group from Bangalore. Their NGO activists had long- term experience 
in taking problematic projects to court and shutting down polluting plants. 
In 1996 they had been the intermediator in filing a suit against a steel mill 
in Mangalore, which was using Kudremukh ore. The suit was successful, 
and the Supreme Court ordered the mill to be shut down in 1997. The 
Environment Support Group had also fought against paper mills and dams 
on the west coast of India. Leo Saldanha related to me how Kudremukh was 
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a special case, to which they devoted more attention: “we brought differ-
ent people together— [we saw that] if the resistance split, this will become 
a people versus wildlife struggle.” The Environment Support Group knew 
that the thirty- year mine lease was ending soon, and that Japanese interests 
wanted to buy the public company. If there was ever an appropriate time 
to act, this was the moment.1 Although officially the mine was closed by a 
court order, and the victory came by having the capacity to target judicial 
politics, Saldanha asserted that “we came very close to stopping the mine 
politically by local mobilization.”
The outcome of the court case was preferential to the wildlife groups. 
This is because these groups had drafted the litigation slanted in their favor, 
which created a problem with the broader antimine front. They wished 
to close the mine and simultaneously create a national park in the West-
ern Ghats. However, the Adivasis wanted to continue to live in the forest 
and were not in favor of creating a park— they continue to live there even 
now. Although the conflict is not active, it has not waned. The Adivasis I 
interviewed hinted that one key reason for the resolution of the conflict 
could have been the calculation by powerholders that if the mine were not 
stopped, the locals could quite easily become Naxalites. In fact, in secret 
negotiations, they apparently had also hinted at this possibility to the pow-
erholders. Saldanha similarly argued that the area around the mine would 
have become a “hotbed of Naxalites, worker oppression and homelessness” 
had the operations continued.
The Kudremukh case shows how building a large resistance front that 
includes different types of organizations (NGOs, environmentalists of dif-
ferent sorts, Adivasis, farmers, mining workers, engineers, and others), uses 
all of the five key strategies to mobilize, and even hints that the resistance 
could turn to the use of arms if their voice is not heeded can lead to the 
complete shutdown of extraction. However, the political outcomes were not 
as impressive as in some of the other cases, as only locally enduring resis-
tance capacities were created. This was possibly because the conflict came 
to an end via judicial politics, instead of waiting for the other strategies to 
produce results. This suggests that the selection of resistance strategies influ-
ences both economic and political outcomes in particular causal ways. The 
Tamil Nadu cases, discussed next, help to study in more detail the impact of 
social movement creation and protesting as a deliberate and isolated strategy 
pair. Thus, these next cases will focus on the tandem use of those two strate-
gies. This is an example of a situation where resistance can be successful even 
if all five strategies are not used simultaneously.
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Mass Protesting without Negotiation or State Embedding: Tamil Nadu
After the 2005 Kudremukh closure, the next interruptions to iron mining 
projects in India were experienced in Tamil Nadu in the late 2000s. There 
are not many iron ore or manganese deposits in Tamil Nadu, but in the 
boom years of the late 2000s the national and state elite, consisting of lead-
ing politicians, their families, and businessmen, tried to grab two of the 
most promising iron ore deposits. These project areas were situated in Salem, 
which was the site of the first attempted mine, and Tiruvannamalai in the 
northern part of the state, where the second project attempt occurred. Both 
projects were interrupted by direct resistance action before mining was even 
started. Nonetheless, there was still a push in August 2015 to begin these 
projects by the Jindal Steel & Power company and its associates in govern-
ment. However, the prospects of realizing these projects are quite limited 
as illustrated by the following analysis of resistance strengths and strategies.
Across all the investments cases studied in this book, these were the 
clearest examples of the importance of quick organizing and politicizing a 
mass social movement, in addition to protesting against a sudden extractiv-
ist push. Mass protests early on, before the commencement of construc-
tion, were enough to warrant project closures even before there was a need 
to start embedding electoral, institutional, or judicial politics. Instead, the 
protesters could rely on a strategy of politicizing and organizing the poten-
tially impacted populations around the hills that were to be mined. These 
efforts were then followed by either arranging a large targeted protest in the 
local government offices (Salem) or campaigning on nonmodernist lines (by 
expressing that the mountain in question was among the holiest places in 
India and lay beyond any monetary valuations) and protesting (in the case of 
Tiruvannamalai). Some national networking took place in Tiruvannamalai, 
where mining targeted an important holy mountain that had many temples. 
Salem also has an important hill with ayurvedic herbal medicinal plants and 
a temple dedicated to their use. Mining this hill would affect many people 
and industries, as well as the spiritual heritage of the area.
The Tamil Nadu cases are comparatively important as they show that 
there are multiple pathways to resistance success, which do not necessarily 
have to rely on the simultaneous use of all the five key strategies; rather, 
the resistance can be selective about which ones to deploy. Protesting and 
avoiding private negotiations with companies were the necessary, but not 
always solely sufficient, strategies to create conditions that supported suc-
cess for movements across all major iron mining cases in Brazil and India. 
The Tamil Nadu examples can illustrate how these two strategic choices of 
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action/inaction around protesting and private negotiation in some contexts 
can take the protagonists a long way in the battle, and the ways in which 
they are necessary.
Tamil Nadu has a long history of mobilization, with perhaps the larg-
est current environmental conflict in India. The construction of a nuclear 
plant at the southern tip of the state was resisted by approximately 100,000 
coastal people living in fishing villages. Although the nuclear plant protests 
were not directly linked to northeastern Tamil Nadu’s iron mining conflicts, 
which were small in comparison, the latter are symptomatic of the general 
dynamics of mobilization that situate Tamil Nadu more closely with West-
ern India’s building of an “organic society,” rather than Eastern India’s civil 
war. There was a smaller proportion of Adivasis present in the Western and 
Southern Indian resistance groups (almost none in Tamil Nadu), as were the 
number of Naxalite threats. Tamil Nadu had also made some of the most 
impressive moves in the direction of abolishing caste- discrimination- based 
politics by introducing considerable allocations for non- upper- caste com-
munities, as a result of which numerous upper- caste people had left the state 
(Banerjee 2013). Thus, there were better possibilities to gain power despite 
one’s caste, as the opportunities presented were based more on competence 
than ethnic ties. As a consequence, Kohli (2012) argued that state institu-
tions are more progressive and superior in administrative quality in compari-
son to the Hindi heartland, which is still more dominated by Brahmins. This 
also meant there are better overall educational standards. In this context, 
bringing to light misuses of state institutions and the rule of law mattered 
more than in the armed- conflict context of Chhattisgarh, where state- level 
institutional politics do not carry much weight. These contextual consider-
ations help to explain why fewer strategies were needed in this context.
The project- specific contingency in these cases was that the proposed 
mines were, according to many participants that I spoke with, including 
Piyush Manush, “absolutely illegal,” which made mobilizing against them 
“easy.” Briefly explained, Manush and his companions formed a large move-
ment of thousands of local people under the banner of “Speak out, Salem,” 
joined by other movements, which marched into government offices and 
demanded to see the mining project documents based on the Right to 
Information Act. This 2006 act, according to a national activist, is a “very 
powerful tool in India to stop illegalities.” By 2008 the resistance in Tamil 
Nadu had already used this tool in other cases, for example, closing down an 
aluminum plant and several non- iron- mine projects or mines whose opera-
tion would have been illegal. That said, the act may not be as useful in cases 
where legal mines are targeted to be stopped.
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Manush recounted his view of the mobilization as follows:
In 2009, we got to know of iron ore mining applications in two 
places, in Tiruvannamalai (about 300 hectares) and another larger 
area close to Salem, in the Ganjamale hill. It was too late when I 
knew about the projects. [I got to know about the cases as] CEC 
[Central Empowered Committee, a Supreme Court– appointed body 
to handle environment- related issues especially in the mining sector] 
arrived in Salem, and a local reporter called me. Then, in early 2009, 
we had four months of action. We started mobilizing people, as the 
threat to people’s life was very clear. We had three actions. We rallied 
the Forest Department by a protest of 550– 1,000 people and filed 
there our Right to Information Act demands. Then we raided the 
mine office with 150 people, the Direction of Mines [a state office]. 
Last, we also raided the collectorate [administration] of the Salem 
district with 2,000 people [with similar demands for information]. 
These were the most important offices processing the files. We said we 
would not leave the offices without the documents.
After these raids, the activists got the data they demanded, and discovered 
several important facts, which, when made public, meant that the project in 
Salem could not proceed. For example, they found out that the state’s chief 
minister was a part owner of the proposed mine, through his VKG Steel and 
Energy company. The clearance for the mine was given on June 13, 2008, 
which was the same date the project was proposed. It was clear that it was 
illegal as it is not possible to propose and give clearance to a mine in less 
than twenty- four hours. I asked Manush to explain to me why the people’s 
knowledge of these illegalities was so important:
Nothing works like people’s power  .  .  . humor scares the state, but 
shame scares them most. Corporations are not scared of shaming, 
but violence. We never use violence against the state, but against cor-
porations [we use] limited [violence], scaring them [about possible 
economic losses].  .  .  . All that you need to do [to organize a social 
movement] is to provide information to people: they will mobilize 
themselves. The community is empowering itself, [this is] not politi-
cization. If people are limited in knowledge, mobilization is easy 
when information is spread [through] sharing by locals and village 
meetings.
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However, my field visits and further conversation with Manush also sug-
gested that mobilization might not be an automatic response to informa-
tion, as he detailed how some villages had taken more responsibility for 
“convening blocks, whose members had the role to organize people, manage 
funds, and call for meetings.”
The movement did not have media support. Manush pointed out that 
the mere possibility of the data going public was enough for the project to 
be scrapped by the chief minister and other top powerholders who would 
have lost their reputation. The movement was cross- class and cross- caste, 
and included farmers, textile mill owners, and their laborers. Many of the 
movement leaders consisted of middle- class entrepreneurs, whose high- 
quality garment industry next to the hill would be destroyed by the “red 
haze,” which was the name for the dust coming from the open- pit iron ore 
mines. This dust would also destroy the extremely productive and intensive 
agricultural and dairy industries of the area. I visited these areas— they were 
a very rich mosaic of rural- urban, high- value, small- scale, agriculture- based 
industries, which were highly valuable economically, but located right next 
to the hillside. The resistance front had the support of the middle class and 
even had middle- class professionals participating in the movement, and 
there was a strong third party that opposed mines, which took the form of 
powerful nonmining textile and agriculture industries. Only the rich did 
not get involved, for “money rules the rich, not the public good,” explained 
Manush. In general, “people shed [their] differences and came together in 
this kind of movement.” Now, as the mine has been closed, Manush told me 
how “not allowing them to take the hill gives me great satisfaction . . . we 
saved the area around a 40 km perimeter around the hill. . . . I feel the hill 
talks to me: ‘thank you, thank you.’ I am so happy, [I] have understood the 
value of what I have, this clean air.”
The mine project was pushed by a strong corporate agency, as the com-
panies involved were large, and as closely tied to the state apparatus as the 
mining mafia in Karnataka. I spoke to another activist in Salem, who was 
also an important state- level political party member, and he told me that 
“the state government forest minister had come to Salem six times to push 
the project.” Although political parties supported the project, the members 
of these parties living in Salem said that they would lose votes in the area if 
they pushed the protesters who comprised a genuine mass social movement.
The activist- politician quoted above was also from the hillside and a lead-
ing member of a party that openly supported the project. Still, he joined the 
social movement, and carried out activism on its behalf, explaining that it 
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was a “tough task going around villages and convincing people.” He orga-
nized different blocks (a subdivision of a district) that held meetings at mul-
tiple levels. The response of his political party was “first to resist and protest 
his political organizing at the local level,” as it went against the party policy, 
but later the party “gave independence to organize locally, although we were 
in government.” He was the elected counselor of the area, which consisted 
of fifteen wards and about 1,000 people. I have observed that the involve-
ment of activists who also have secondary positions in political parties or as 
state bureaucrats is in general a positive factor in the movements’ achieving 
their goals both in Brazil and India. However, this is not a necessary factor, 
as the Salem case demonstrates. The politician- activist I interviewed was the 
sole member of his party not in favor of the project, which meant that in 
this case the Gram Sabha could not be used to discontinue the project. The 
politician felt that, as the others had their “hands tied,” “people power was 
the only, best way” because after the struggle, now, people locally “feel much 
more confident about themselves.”
This type of organizing resembles the style of the MST in Brazil. The 
Salem politician- activist remarked that “this organization can be revived 
anytime. Now if there is any trouble against livelihood, people will surely 
stand about it.” It is a notion that is possibly even more important when 
applied in the context of Indian culture, where long- term personal and com-
munal relations are extremely important and durable and can be used for 
mobilization. This means that alliances that have already been created can 
easily be relied upon in the future, as these successfully draw from long- 
established cultural frames and the replication of prior models of resistance.
The cultural context of compounding mobilization resources in the long 
term is an asset in India, but it can also mean that forging new movements 
may be a tougher job than elsewhere. Forging new movements in areas that 
have not previously had the experience of failed or destructive mining proj-
ects, or both, is not easy. The Tamil Nadu politician explained how convinc-
ing people in Salem was “a little tough .  .  . as people do not know about 
mining. The notion of someone coming and uprooting forests is not there.” 
In Salem, it was very helpful that there were activists with experience in 
other parts of India who could display photos of exactly what the impacts 
would be, in visual and scientific terms, if a large open- pit mine were to be 
constructed in the region. These were visceral and relatable illustrations of 
what it would mean for the people. The pictures of industrial towns with 
heavy pollution and destroyed environments were convincing and thus 
countered the efforts of the project marketers to sell the project as “develop-
ment.” The key messages to counter the development claim were that this 
Protesting by Mass Social Movements  151
Revised Pages
would be a bad project for securing (1) livelihood; (2) health; and (3) water 
security. The overarching message was that the project would have a negative 
impact on prosperity. At first, “a few people were in favor of the project, out 
of ignorance: they were cheated.” However, after movement- building, no 
locals were in favor of the project, and “people threatened the government 
that they would return their ration cards and nationality if the project runs. 
Another threat was to go to the company gates. A person doing wrong feels 
he may be exposed [in such situations],” explained an activist.
After the attempt to mine the Salem sacred hill was swiftly rejected 
because of mass social movement protesting in 2009, the activists from 
Salem turned to Tiruvannamalai to support the mobilizations, partly gen-
erated by Dalit and feminist organizations, against a similar iron ore proj-
ect there. Directed participation in public hearings was important there, 
alongside the use of similar tactics as in Salem. In both cases organizing and 
politicizing a local (and in Tiruvannamalai, also national) social movement, 
small- scale campaigning, and protesting were enough to lead to project clo-
sures. No use of state embedding or networking with other movements was 
needed in Salem, and in Tiruvannamalai the use of networking was also 
quite limited. Yet the latter was different as they had the support of the 
recently successful activists from Salem to help in the activism activities and 
did not have to rely on solely local mobilization. Furthermore, the hill in 
Tiruvannamalai was easier to mobilize people over than the Salem hill, as it 
was among the top ten holy hills of Hinduism and other religions of India, a 
sacred site of pilgrimage with many visitors annually. As of 2015, there were 
still discussions about Jindal opening both these Tamil Nadu mines, backed 
by the authorities, but the willingness and capability to reactivate powerful 
resistance makes it very unlikely that the mines will ever be opened. In the 
words of one activist from Tiruvannamalai, S. Sankaran, a resident of the 
temple town, “lakhs [hundreds of thousands] of people are prepared to die.”2
That the mining capitalists targeted even these relatively iron- poor hills 
illustrates the race for minerals and quick wealth that was rampant in the 
late 2000s. This fervor was partially caused by the disparity of a radical 
increase in global iron prices coupled with the extremely low production 
costs for iron ore and the possibilities for corruption and land grabs in India. 
It was no coincidence that the Jindal company was the prime actor here. 
Many of my informants in Jharkhand and Odisha explained that this pri-
vate company had been behind the bulk of the illegal mining schemes there, 
yet it had managed to escape most of the public scrutiny by buying the ore 
for under the normal price from small miners, who bore the brunt of the 
blame. Meanwhile, the Tamil Nadu and other cases portray how global price 
152  Iron Will
Revised Pages
increases or corporate embedding/capturing of state- remediated political 
games— which favor mining by skewing access to state and business power 
toward promining elites— do not explain investment outcomes. Ironically, 
by liberalizing capital these moves have helped to consolidate, create, and 
make visible a similar “organic society,” as discussed in the cases of Goa 
and Karnataka in chapter 3, that defends livelihoods and sustainable lived 
environments.
The Tamil Nadu cases offer two crucial insights: first, even implementa-
tion of very few resistance strategies can yield major outcomes; and sec-
ond, this causal chain was operational in a context and contingency setting 
that was in many ways more favorable for mobilization in comparison to 
similar (iron ore) conflicts elsewhere. Both the strategies and the political 
dynamics matter, and when investment outcomes are primarily defined by 
the resistance strategies of protesting by a mass social movement, the politi-
cal dynamics molded and created during the mobilization and the conflict 
are prone to provide more longer lasting benefits for resisting extractivism. 
Next, a detailed study of the resistance strategies implemented in Odisha 
allows us to contrast the Kudremukh and Tamil Nadu cases— which were 
both in the more democratic and peaceful Western and Southern regions of 





Using a Broad Set of Strategies
Having explored India’s West and South, I left to study the rest of India’s 
iron ore mining regions. Thus, I traveled to Odisha, while my partner vis-
ited Amma’s ashram in Kerala. Besides its hundreds of ancient gray, stone 
temples, full of noises from rituals, devotees, and priests without shirts, 
the holy city of Bhubaneshwar, the capital of Odisha, had a very lively 
intellectual and activist crowd. I spent much time in their meetings and 
events where I learned about the long history and strong current presence 
of struggles. People were trying to protect their lived environments across 
the state, and were largely succeeding in this, despite the very strong and 
coercive attempts to impose steel mills and mines on top of their villages, 
forests, waterfalls, and farmlands. It was intellectually and emotionally 
rewarding to hear about all the successful stories of resistance directly from 
these people. I spent time talking with the activists in steel towns and on 
the roads while traveling toward now- saved waterfalls, on top of viewing 
platforms in the middle of saved forests, and at ancient princely palaces, 
like the palace ruins of Keonjhar where it felt like I had been transported 
back hundreds of years to the India of ancient stories. This feeling was 
augmented by the moonlight that shone brightly on the top of the old walls 
surrounding the palace garden, which was lush and full of trees. This time 
left a strong impression and feeling about the necessity to put oneself in 
the line of fire to save what good is still left. I was humbled as I learned 
the stories of how people had sacrificed themselves bodily and mentally for 
the sake of so many others. There was a lot to learn about these heroic acts 
and also the everyday resistance actions being practiced by people fighting 
for the survival of their communities and future generations.
This chapter discusses several cases in Odisha and Goa, where the resistance 
used all the five key strategies simultaneously. I will contrast the successful 
outcomes in these cases to cases where the resistance did not use all five 
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key strategies in concert. In this chapter, I will also explain how the use of 
all five strategies in Odisha and Goa was key in helping to ensure that the 
resistance was successful and did not succumb to a cycle of violence. The 
Goan resistance is also studied in more detail here, which opens up the role 
of particular key resistance actors. This Goan example provides the backdrop 
for a discussion that provides concrete viewpoints on how an impactful resis-
tance can be created in practice. This section thus tests the hypothesis on the 
importance of using all the five key strategies simultaneously.
I will start with a detailed study of the resistance movements in Odisha, 
India. In this study, I compare different districts and subdistrict areas, which 
portray both local resistance and mining support cases. Odisha hosts many 
important cases that help to generate an in- depth understanding of contem-
porary extractivism and the way it is or is not successfully resisted. The unit-
ing theme of the many successful Odishan conflict cases is activists manag-
ing to avoid the path of taking up arms, instead using a linked set of peaceful 
strategies (the five key strategies), to counter extractivism. It is interesting 
to note that this resistance is enacted in a quite similar political economic 
context as that of the neighboring Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, which did 
succumb to at least partial violence by a significant part of the resistance 
efforts. After the study of Odisha, I will examine how the use of the five key 
strategies worked in the crucial case of Goa. I will highlight the interesting 
dynamics, specifically, how innovative campaigning based on nonmodern-
ist framing, organizing, and politicizing several separate resistance movements 
based on ethnic (caste) cleavages can perhaps unexpectedly be a boon to the 
overall resistance effort. The case of Goa is also important in showing how 
consistent and forceful use of all possible peaceful resistance strategies can 
yield globally momentous outcomes.
Enduring Violence through a Series of Linked Strategies: Odisha
This chapter surveys in detail iron ore mining and related steel plant 
expansions and the types of possible resistance to them in all major areas 
of the state of Odisha. These projects include POSCO and its prospective 
mine area in Khandadhar in the Sundargarh district; the rest of Sundar-
garh, such as the heavily mined Koida block; Keonjhar district’s heavily 
mined Joda block; and the rest of Keonjhar (Banspal and other blocks 
in the south and west, where Adivasis have stopped expansions). These 
cases reveal differences in the sets of strategies and specific tactics used 
for state embedding. There are also cases in this selection with little or 
Using a Broad Set of Strategies  155
Revised Pages
no conflict and limited resistance (such as Joda and Koida), which show 
how the absence of specific resistance methods reduced the capacity of the 
resistance to stall mine expansions.
Odisha is India’s most important mining state and produces the most 
mining revenue. Thus, it is not a surprise that this state has seen a multitude 
of mining conflicts in the past decades (CSE 2008). Odisha was the playing 
field for the most globally known Indian mining conflict. This conflict, not 
specifically an iron- ore related conflict, is Vedanta’s Niamgiri bauxite project 
(Padel and Das 2010a). According to a member of the MMP network, the 
overarching protest in the state of Odisha has been “very strong” and there 
has been more opposition due to bad rehabilitation, which has left approxi-
mately 5– 6 million people without homes. Mishra (2010) reviewed the situ-
ation and the crucial impact that the protest waves of the 2000s, directed at 
“industrialization” and mining booms, have had in curbing large projects. 
His arguments also support my conclusions and help in opening up the long 
trajectory of projects and their resistance in the state.
Odisha is a key steel producing state and has massive new steel and iron 
mine complexes in the planning and implementation phase. However, the 
resistance in the state has managed to block most of these projects. Indian 
law demands that to start a new iron ore mine, a company must first have 
a steel plant. Thus, a key feature of mining politics has been conflicts that 
revolve around the construction and opening of steel mills. The key struggle 
that concerned POSCO from South Korea has dragged on for over a decade. 
This struggle is over POSCO’s steel mill project called Paradeep in coastal 
Odisha (the largest ever foreign direct investment project in India). The 
MOU that the government has given to POSCO has been criticized by a 
plethora of people because of its terms. For example, it promises thirty- year 
mining leases to supply a total of 600 million tons of iron ore at a cost of 
only Rs 400 per ton (Das 2005). The project has been blocked for years by 
a strong resistance opposing the “establishment of industry on multi- crop 
land” (see Mishra 2010, 50).
Why has the resistance in Odisha been successful? Mishra (2010) argued 
that the cornerstone of success is that the movement is more horizontal 
than elsewhere in India. By horizontal he meant that the movement had a 
broader base of militancy and less hierarchy between leaders from political 
parties or NGOs and the rest of the participants in the movement. These 
qualities have indeed been a great help to this resistance effort, which stands 
out as distinctly successful among my cases, even though the context con-
tains a very strong government attempt to frame all activists as Maoists and 
thus render the game as an armed conflict. Yet in the broader context there 
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remains a strong mass movement organizing and politicizing— but not all 
focusing on Odishan iron ore mining sites, as I will discuss.
A nationally working activist, who was not sympathetic to protesting as 
a tool, but preferred to use litigation, argued that human barricades have 
been “necessary” in the case of POSCO, “as there have been no other alter-
natives.” The Supreme Court has not listened to the activists, and they have 
not been able to get the financial resources or contacts to start sound litiga-
tion. The cost for one day of a Supreme Court lawyer’s salary is equivalent 
to approximately five years of earnings for the activists in the lowest socio-
economic status. Not that court orders would matter— the company has not 
obeyed any of the orders handed down by judicial or other state powerhold-
ers to close the project. In 2013, a human rights activist from Bhubaneshwar 
told me that “the Green Tribunal gave a POSCO closure order and did not 
give an environmental clearance. And there is not even a valid MOU any-
more for the investment. People are losing their faith in the legal system.” 
In this context, the activist, who also had his own litigation against many 
multinationals in an attempt to stop their “exploitation of Indian national 
wealth,” argued that “whatever mechanism is usable, the activists do that.” 
He insisted that “even an excess of protest can be defended as far more 
exploitation is done by the powerful.”
As a consequence of losing faith in many routine (i.e., nonconten-
tious) state- remediated politics (including the use of nonviolent conten-
tious politics), the human rights activist was certain that in the future 
there will be resistance that will be “more violent, more felt.” However, 
practically all resistance against iron and steel projects in Odisha, and 
other similar initiatives, has remarkably steered away from the use of 
violence or armed revolutionary agency. This tact is in stark contrast to 
the Maoist resistance that is spearheading activism in parts of neighbor-
ing Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, as discussed in chapter 4. While armed 
resistance seemed to be a reality in parts of West Singhbhum and Sun-
dargarh, all my numerous informants argued that there are either no or 
very few armed Maoists in Keonjhar district. In the words of one infor-
mant, their alleged presence was “invented” to “create fear by the min-
ing mafias and administrators.” Facing the violence that powerholders 
legitimize by framing communities as “Maoist,” the struggle to endure 
this stance becomes a “battle of the community’s integrity.”
The resistance of local communities to POSCO has dragged on for years 
and used all possible means; it is one of the most important reasons for the 
impediment of mining expansion in the inlands of Odisha, primarily in 
the virgin lands of Khandadhar that were promised to POSCO for min-
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ing. The movement that has developed in the POSCO area, called POSCO 
Pratirodh Sangram Samiti (the Anti- POSCO People’s Movement, or PPSS), 
was set up right after the locals heard of the steel investment plan in 2005. 
Since then, members of the resistance have endured strong violence directed 
against them, but they have remained nonviolent, using the slogan to frame 
their united struggle, “Whatever be the nature of attack on us, we will not 
raise our hand.” According to a report by the National Center for Advo-
cacy Studies (2011, 94), “this slogan announced the non- violence strategy of 
the struggle and it attracted many villagers to join the struggle. To date the 
people have not taken to violence.”
According to the National Center for Advocacy Studies (2011), the 
movement had gotten its members elected to the Panchayats, which was 
helpful, as were the political party connections. The anti- POSCO move-
ment leader is a local activist and a politician of the Communist Party of 
India (Marxist). He could also use electoral politics effectively due to being 
intimately involved with politics through his presence in a major political 
party. According to several informants, this allowed the movement impor-
tant support from a political perspective. However, some informants said 
that the leader’s party affiliation also meant that the movement would not 
be able to stand against a state- owned steel project, and that POSCO is a 
foreign company explains a part of the successful resistance, but I could not 
directly validate this claim.1
Beginning in 2013, the POSCO resistance also started to influence other 
mining struggles in Odisha. For example, PPSS has started networking with 
the new resistance movements that have grown in the proposed mining areas, 
as a post by its spokesperson Prashant Paikray on April 13, 2015, suggests:
We have also expressed our total solidarity with our brothers and sis-
ters from the Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups like Paudi Bhunya 
community and other forest dwellers of Keonjhar and Sundhargarh 
district of Odisha who have come under the banner of “Khandadhar 
Surakhya Sangram Samiti.” They have been continuing their struggle 
to protect the waterfalls and rich biodiversity as well as their liveli-
hood. The perennial spring of Khandadhar waterfall provides water 
to river Brahmani as well as irrigates agriculture down the hill. Peo-
ple have demanded to declare the hill as national natural heritage. 
At least 5,000 [members of ] Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups 
(PVTG) and 16,000 other forest dwellers will be deprived of their 
right to live and livelihood if POSCO will be allowed to mine iron 
ore from Khanadadhar [sic] Hill.
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My informants called for continued state- and federal- level networking 
by mining activists. Currently the Odishan use of networking to connect all 
the concerned movements is “still in its infant- stage,” according to a coordi-
nator from a human rights NGO. My visits across the major areas of existing 
or projected iron ore mines support this claim, as quite a few of the local 
activists I talked to did not know prominent activists even in nearby areas, 
for example, between the neighboring Sundargarh and Keonjhar districts 
(Khandadhar is located partly on both of these districts’ lands.) Currently 
the movement organizations differ substantially on the local level, as they are 
autonomous local entities.
In comparison to the Kudremukh, Tiruvannamalai, or Goan cases, 
which relied on significant state- spanning networking to create links, unite 
movements, and pool protests, conscious network creation among mining 
activists in Odisha was just starting in 2013. Yet another type of network-
ing, which I call replicative networking (Kröger 2010, 2013a), had already 
taken place in several parts of the state, for several decades. This replica-
tive networking means that a group starts to replicate the resistance model 
of a progenitor movement in its own activism strategies, replacing its own 
prior strategies and ideological stances with the progenitor’s strategy set.2 
There has been a compounding replication of resistance strategies in his-
toric Odishan struggles against extractive and other large- scale investment 
projects that would have had negative socio- environmental impacts. The 
temporal trajectory through which the Odishan resistance has been able to 
face violence peacefully is quite old. These political dynamics continue to 
be strengthened by a spreading replication of peaceful resistance strategies.
Many of my informants participated in early struggles against large- 
scale projects and carried and replicated the lessons learned through their 
central role in these mining conflicts. The years 1981– 86 saw a strong and 
peaceful resistance movement against a missile test base in a coastal area of 
Odisha. This conflict developed the understanding that it was essential to 
be constantly ready for mass protesting. The leaders of this struggle used a 
horn alarm that allowed them to summon a large mass within one hour to 
the base’s gate to forbid access. This was a successful movement that “could 
not be displaced.” Several different movements “have adopted its methods,” 
according to an informant. Using a similar strategy of mass protesting, an 
aluminum plant project on the northern coast was resisted and stopped in 
1990– 95. Activists from that case told me that this struggle was successful 
for many reasons. In particular, the role of corporate agency was weaker in 
this case. The aluminum plant was a government project, which meant that 
the “company could not bribe parties”; thus, “the movement was stronger” 
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than the target. This strength emanated from the people forming a united 
front, bolstered by their strong spiritual commitment to preserve the area 
and its many temples.
In 1995– 2002, a Tata steel plant was stopped by using similar tactics 
and a strong movement, but in this case, activists were killed. Deaths have 
been common in these direct- action struggles in Odisha, but these deaths 
have served to increase the willingness to resist peacefully. This result sug-
gests that the terrorizing attempts of corporate- state agency do not have an 
effect of demoralization or pacification in a context of sympathetic public 
opinion for contentious resistance to investment. Following the conceptual 
framework introduced in figure 3 in chapter 2, I would argue that the reason 
for this turn is that the deaths of peaceful activists ultimately create symbolic 
power for the resistance front in general; these deaths function as symbolic 
acts of merit that can counter the effects of symbolic violence.
The battle in Odisha is fought especially in the symbolic space. A key 
reason for this contextual specificity is that the most affected groups in Odi-
sha are the indigenous people and Dalits (an ethnic group in India who have 
been kept depressed or oppressed; they, or a part of them, are also referred 
sometimes as the Scheduled Castes, the “untouchable castes,” or the “back-
ward castes”). According to a state- level human rights organization activist I 
interviewed, 70– 80 percent of those whose rights are being violated are Adi-
vasis, and the peasants impacted by the POSCO and other steel projects are 
typically Dalits. While both minority groups have some support from pro-
fessional NGOs, they often must use whatever means are available to defend 
their case, without much support from the broader Indian society, and in 
an atmosphere where the powerholders respond to their protests with vio-
lence. There are very few possibilities for these lower- caste and racism- facing 
groups to gain economic, social, or cultural capital, which would allow them 
to accrue clout in the regional social space. A rise in social- space positioning 
would allow for the use of the mechanism of objectification of social posi-
tion to assure a better physical- space position, or at least the possibility to 
use mass protesting without fear of violent repression.
In the absence of possibilities for social ascendancy, and to distance activ-
ism from guerrilla militancy, particularly useful tools in Eastern India are 
what I call “symbolic acts of merit.” These are always available, even in the 
most oppressive situations. Examples of these in Eastern India, recounted to 
me by a local activist, have included Adivasi women in a remote mining area 
of the Balco aluminum company “putting their babies in front of trucks, say-
ing ‘drive over, as they will have no future.’” The POSCO movement leaders 
went to jail for a long time in defense of their fellow villagers. Several of 
160  Iron Will
Revised Pages
my informants exclaimed that such “[a] giving of leadership,” which shows 
“[a] high personal commitment,” is the most crucial of the many strategies 
needed for successful resistance. Symbolic acts of merit are not available to 
unethical persons, as they require the building of morality by moral deeds 
that can counter the power of symbolic capital/violence. Often, they require 
sacrifice and selflessness, and a will to endure violence and injustice. The 
POSCO resistance also developed mechanisms to ensure that rapid surges in 
anger, in response to counterattacks against their mobilization, do not turn 
into destructive violence. For example, “PPSS managed to channel people’s 
discontent in a positive manner by engaging them in shramdan (physical 
labor donated by people for building village assets)” and by using simulation 
exercises (National Center for Advocacy Studies 2011, 97).
A senior researcher from Odisha, a key figure in many struggles that have 
terminated large investment projects in past decades, said to me that “abso-
lute nonviolence” has been the strongest tactic leading to movement success. 
He argued that in Odisha the “opposition has always been by local people, 
not guerrillas,” and that the “Maoists have used” the locals, possibly some-
times offering “implicit support,” which has nevertheless “not influenced the 
outcome.” The nonviolent resistance in POSCO and some other cases has 
included human chains that were maintained even during the night, with 
people sleeping in rows and lines to prevent entrance to an installation. This 
resistance strategy has postponed projects around the clock, which meant 
rising costs to the company. The fact that the company has not managed to 
start the project and destroy the village suggests that the resistance is win-
ning, and that this is a successful strategy. In fact, in general, it can be con-
sidered that in extractivist conflicts, so far as there is no landscape change or 
difficult and costly- to- reverse physical space change, or both, the resistance 
is winning.
While the price paid by the resistance is high, it is a burden that is easier 
to carry when their community is so united. The anti- POSCO villages have 
been cordoned off from the nation, and random arrests and court cases await 
anyone leaving the area. The people are on permanent sit- in in their own 
homes. A June 30, 2015, email update by the PPSS stated:
More than 2,000 villagers and activists are facing over 350 false and 
fabricated charges. . . . Many villagers cannot go out even when there 
is a medical emergency for fear of getting arrested.  .  .  . The state 
administration has cut down thousands of old trees for POSCO and 
destroyed the greenery of our locality and has made us vulnerable to 
cyclones.
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Yet the resistance was holding and had spread its agency to other parts of 
Odisha and India. The strategies employed by the POSCO resistance have 
been remarkably solid and well deployed, including all the five key strate-
gies. The POSCO case illustrates how the interstrategy relations, that is, the 
conjuncture of the strategies used, their multiplicity and synergy, is impor-
tant in explaining outcomes, particularly in difficult resistance contexts. It 
also shows how symbolic acts of merit can be a key tool leading to success.
Besides the POSCO case, there are many other iron ore- related strug-
gles in Odisha, which I will now discuss.3 First, I will examine the cases in 
the Sundargarh district, after which I will turn to Keonjhar, next making 
comparisons between the two cases. This helps to explain how and why 
people (in this case, Adivasis) do resist extractivism, and how and why 
they do not resist.
In the early 2010s, forty- one of Odisha’s iron ore mines were in the 
northernmost Keonjhar district, twenty- one of them in Sundargarh and 
ten in Mayurbhanj, according to Development Initiative, an Odishan 
NGO that focuses on mining, trying to diminish its impacts (interview 
February 2013). The Mayurbhanj district had not seen important mine 
expansion since 2000 during the iron ore boom, but this is an old mining 
area with mines that are quickly depleting. It did not, therefore, present 
important conflicts or resistance movements for observation. The Sundar-
garh district is home to the large Rourkela Steel Plant, which opened in 
1959, amid waves of dispossession of Adivasis who were forced to become 
“migrants” (as the displaced are officially called in India). Sundargarh dif-
fered from Keonjhar in that there was generally a much less organized 
resistance against mining expansion in Sundargarh (interviews with several 
activists and experts from Rourkela, the rural areas in Sundargarh, and all 
around Keonjhar, February 2013).4
An activist lamented how a process of forced mass migration has increas-
ingly escalated in the past years in Sundargarh and some adjacent mining 
areas: “Many young girls started to work in the mines, as the tribes are 
matrilineal. Mafias took their lands and at the same time [as they were at the 
mines, they took their] food security. Now [the locals, including the girls, 
are] not raising a voice. Somebody should go there.” However, this activist, 
who had long- term experience resisting in Sundargarh, also observed that 
there had been some mobilization in the struggles over iron ore between 
1996 and 2002. In this struggle there were approximately ten leaders and 
800 people in the district’s sole movement in Koida (also written Koira). He 
explained how in that struggle the “farmers resisted waste dumping on their 
fields by tycoons from the mines” and “supported the Adivasis.” Together, 
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they managed to close mines including some of the mines of Essel Min-
ing, the leading Indian iron ore firm. According to him, “Whenever people 
raised [their] voice, people closed mines— small groups played big roles in 
closing the mines.”
The pre- 2005 struggles in Sundargarh used mass movement protest-
ing and networking, which resulted in some closed mines, but no veritable 
political outcomes were created, such as lasting resistance capacities. Thus, 
the post- 2005 situation has been less positive in terms of movement build-
ing or outcomes in Sundargarh (apart from Khandadhar). A displaced Adi-
vasi activist from the Sundargarh rural areas told me that the areas’ lack of 
organized resistance was due to the absence of a good leader, a movement 
organizer. The attempts to build a movement were being “suppressed” as the 
“atmosphere” was “very hot” in the area, which meant that people were “not 
raising [their] voice against industrialists,” although the Adivasis are “in a 
boiling state that can explode at any moment,” particularly in the mining- 
affected areas of northern Sundargarh. In the eastern parts, such as Koida, 
several other informants told me that part of the population had accepted 
mining as the state of affairs or business as usual in the area. An NGO work-
ing in these already greatly ravaged areas was occupied with requesting com-
pensation, jobs, and better social policy for the affected, rather than with 
safeguarding the environment or blocking and hindering mining expansion. 
Private politics with corporations were also used in this arena.
Moreover, in Sundargarh, networking efforts were seen as promulgated 
only if someone from the outside came to the affected areas. The prospect 
of state embedding was a far cry: as two activists and a journalist put it, no 
politician would be inclined to take the trouble of reaching out or listening 
to distant Adivasi from the forests. The main purpose of the 2006 protest, 
the largest protest that had been organized in the area to date, was demand-
ing work for all the displaced. In this protest 20,000 people held up a train 
for fifty- five hours, which did result in some of them getting jobs. Besides 
this incident there were no major protests organized that could have influ-
enced the mine closure ordeals in the 2010s. In sum, post- 2005 Sundargarh 
(with the exception of Khandadhar) was lacking on several fronts in terms 
of peaceful strategies of contention. For example, until 2011 there was no 
organizing and politicizing leadership, and thus no social movement organi-
zation or resistance campaign, and no networking or state embedding while 
retaining autonomy. Nevertheless, even this timid resistance in Sundargarh 
post- 2005 came to enjoy the fruits of mobilizations elsewhere, which led the 
Odisha state government to proactively shut down many of the illegal mines 
all around the state. Most of the mines in Sundargarh were also closed.
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Another Adivasi activist displaced by the Rourkela Steel Plant who had 
been living in Sundargarh’s Khandadhar forests for a decade (after retiring 
from a career as a mechanical engineer and government employee) said that 
by 2013 identity- building had become the key tool and goal of mobiliza-
tion. He argued that after a strong Adivasi identity was created, it would 
be possible to have 100 percent autonomy, and to network effectively. The 
basis for this would be that an Adivasi identity would facilitate the fight for 
the recognition of the FRA, which would render “70 percent of forest and 
80 percent of minerals” outside the bounds of exploitation (without Adivasi 
permission). FRA recognition would make the exploiters “lose [the] right 
to those areas.” Thus, ethnic- territorial rights are a key goal for these move-
ments with a current focus on identity- building, given that in places like 
Koida it has been splintered and lost due to mining.5
It can be said that networking to boost Adivasi identity, by making FRA 
claims in institutional politics and thus trying to change the institutional 
status of the lands, and private politics have been actively used in the case of 
post- 2005 Sundargarh (exluding Khandadhar). This has led to no political 
outcomes worthy of explicit mention (notably not even to building armed 
revolutionary agency), but has yielded some mining project discontinua-
tions. I will next analyze the highly illustrative and analytically rich examples 
of the Keonjhar district cases. There are globally important lessons to be 
learned by telling the Keonjhar stories about effective mobilization and resis-
tance to extractivism. These stories are so rich and necessary to tell because 
the results of this resistance were realized in an extremely tough context 
where the extractivist corporate- state agency was strongly pushing for a mili-
tarization of these struggles.
Keonjhar
Keonjhar had several iron ore mines that were closed by activist efforts, 
mostly in the Keonjhar Sadar, Banspal (also known as Bansapal and Bansa-
pani), Harichandanpur, and Telkoi blocks.6 Peaceful mass protesting has 
been a key element in Keonjhar for the local movements and has success-
fully discontinued mining expansions. This was not a process of trickling 
down of resistance efforts elsewhere, through a mediation of top- down 
executive orders. This was a very real, long- term, and concerted effort of 
building strength for peaceful grassroots movements across Keonjhar, by 
several advocacy groups and villagers’ mobilizations. Very few activists in 
Sundargarh or Bhubaneshwar, the state capital, were aware of these efforts 
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and dynamics on the ground in Keonjhar, due to very weak networking 
across the places of discontent in the state. I was able to gain insight and 
understanding into the story of the Keonjhar resistance through the coor-
dinator of an NGO and advocacy group in Keonjhar, which operates across 
the district. I traveled with him and some of his assistants for many days 
around the state, and in this time, they shared a lot of information with me. 
I cross- checked the stories they told as best I could with other people and 
scholars also knowledgeable about the case. I carved out this explanatory 
story from these many meetings and recordings, which were transcribed. 
I use this material as the basis for the narrative in this section, where the 
coordinator is the strongest voice.
The coordinator explained to me that most of the locals are now resisting 
mining expansion, since they have seen the negative impacts. They are “not 
allowing even mining surveying vehicles” to enter their spaces. Women are 
central in blocking these attempts, threatening to damage vehicles if they do 
not stop. When the miners did enter without permission, “people got angry, 
went to the hot mood, went with sticks, and said [you] have to leave,” after 
which the miners left.
In addition to such direct actions, the locals have pooled their resources 
to allow community members to travel to cities for training in activism, and 
to organize massive protests in the state capital against the many projects in 
the district. These have included “thousands and thousands” of people in 
“many many marches” in front of company headquarters and government 
offices. Targets have included Mittal, Vedanta, and Rio Tinto in particular, 
none of which has been able to acquire agricultural land since about the 
mid- 2000s, when the protests against their steel/iron ore complexes started. 
In the 2000s, the Keonjhar NGO organized the people resisting the steel 
plants and those resisting the mines into one movement, something that had 
only recently started with the POSCO- Khandadhar movements.
I will next explore the causal condition complex of resistance strategies 
in Keonjhar by examining key strategic features. I start by explaining how 
three tactics have been particularly important features for organizing and 
politicizing a robust and autonomous mass social movement, while avoiding 
the dangers of private politics and armed conflicts. These three tactics are 
first, organizing financially autonomous village resistance (this contributes 
to the building of movements with embedded autonomy); second, abstain-
ing from private politics; and third, using nonviolent resistance and limited 
violent action to avoid losing land control.
After exploring these tactics of organizing and politicizing, I explain cer-
tain tactical features in each of the other four key strategies (campaigning, 
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protesting, networking, and state embedding). The points raised about these 
tactics specify how the rest of the five key strategies can be developed and 
used, even in peripheral contexts with limited help from outside.
Perhaps the first move that supported the success of the resistance in 
Keonhjar was building a strong autonomy, via financial independence and 
control of physical space. A standout feature of the Keonjhar actions has 
been this autonomy, which extends so far that not even the local NGOs dis-
tribute financial resources to the villages to assist them to travel and mobi-
lize. Instead, if people can themselves manage to get the resources to come 
to training centers and places of power to protest, they come. The Keonjhar 
NGO coordinator, who is the dominant voice in this section describing the 
Keonjhar movement, explained their mobilization “strategy” to me, claim-
ing that it has worked well, as it is attuned to local realities. The NGO 
advises people on various issues including
how to address people and how to address the government. So they 
[the villagers] come, they stay here, learn, they go back. Also they visit 
other groups [who cannot come]. They come, stay, learn and then go 
back. So that is [our] strategy: listen, learn, get stronger and listen . . . 
leadership multiplies in this process. We are actually having this pro-
cess. Learning and doing. Reflecting a lot.
Such a tactic of indirect help, where the NGO does not directly lead 
the campaigns or fund them, is necessary in the context of violence against 
activists in Odisha. The members of this NGO had already been jailed, tor-
tured, had their offices destroyed, and some of them even killed, through 
wanton acts by the police who accused them of being Maoists. In Sun-
dargarh, the activists noted that it is forbidden to receive any money from 
abroad for political organization, or even from national entities. Besides the 
goal of averting violent attacks, the above strategy better fosters the ability 
and readiness for peaceful contention, as the people must create their own 
resources and become the messengers that the NGO activists cannot be.
Second, the resistance in Keonjhar has been very avidly against all kinds 
of attempts by companies to lure villagers into private politics, such as stake-
holder compensation(s) or being friendly and open toward the corporate 
social responsibility policies of the mine owners. Vedanta tried to send a 
sponsored vehicle of doctors to an Adivasi village that it wanted displaced, 
but the villagers attacked the vehicle and detained the Vedanta officials, 
demanding, prior to releasing the doctors, a promise from the company not 
to enter their lands again. In another case,
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Vedanta had distributed school bags for school children. So what 
they [the villagers] did, they collected all the bags from the children 
and burned them in front of the collectorate [the administration in 
charge of a district]. Around 1,000 bags [were] distributed to the 
area’s school children. So they were all collected and burned.
Third, the resistance has been peaceful, or at least tried to limit violent 
response. When the alternative of private politics was rendered unusable by 
the resistance, the companies tried to enter with the help of state violence: 
“The government has tried many times with the military to enter. Many 
times [with] many many police and military [personnel]. But they are still 
not able to [enter]. . . . So this fight between military and Adivasi is going 
on.” As a result of resistance, which was both nonviolent and occasionally 
violent, “the government became tolerant” and started to “avoid the resis-
tance, avoid the violence . . . in spite of violent resistance from the Adivasis, 
the government, the police and the military became tolerant.” I asked why 
the government became “tolerant” toward the (nonlethal or physically dam-
aging) violent resistance, to which the coordinator answered:
Because otherwise many people will die. If they fired, many Adivasi 
will die. If Adivasi die, there will be a lot of questions. The govern-
ment won’t get votes. After all, they’re Adivasis. And this news will 
circulate everywhere— although Adivasi may not support the govern-
ment. And internationally and at the national level also the govern-
ment and companies will be immediately punished.
In comparison to Sundargarh, Keonjhar, which had received the visits of 
nationally renowned environmentalists “to boost the morale of people not 
to give land to companies,” had a much more robust resistance front built 
among the villagers. The NGO coordinator noted that in Sundargarh the 
resistance was “a bit weak.” As a result, the villages had accepted the gifts 
of the companies and their promises of wealth. In the absence of peoples’ 
movements,
the corporate made people understand that it will benefit them a 
great [deal]. They [the corporate] will bring electricity, they will give 
new medical, they will give new house, they will give water, food, 
everything. Very nicely. Who? The corporation. They [the villagers] 
say, corporate says we’ll give house, we’ll give light, we’ll give water, 
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we’ll give food, we’ll give cloth. You don’t owe for it anything. We’ll 
double your earning. Don’t worry. Let us do mining. That is the way 
they [convince people].
The coordinator argued that many leaders in Sundargarh had been co- 
opted and received monetary compensation and became middlemen for the 
mining companies, instead of becoming “critical educators” exposing the 
ground- level devastation for the villagers:
They [the villagers] can’t imagine that their own people will cheat 
them. Their own people will fool them. So they blindly believe, they 
trust on the corporate agent because corporate himself is not coming. 
It is the villagers’ own man convincing them. Own agent. Because 
corporate keep their own agent in the village. [Your] brother, sis-
ter . . . they’re coming and convincing [you]. In the village. On behalf 
of corporates.
However, “when there is an exposer, then naturally people say ‘no: we 
will fight,’ [but] in many places in India there is no critical educator, move-
ment never takes place. People become tolerant. And finally, they leave their 
place and go somewhere else.” This combination of avoiding private politics 
and firmly keeping up the autonomy of physical space, through strict con-
trol over land access, seems to have been an important strategy, given the 
real danger of co- optation that has taken place in other nearby areas. This 
illustrates that it may be crucially important to organize and politicize a mass 
social movement in peripheral areas inhabited by ethnic minorities without 
outside support. Moreover, this also suggests that financial autonomy and 
de facto control over a particular place are intertwined with the success-
ful building of such a movement in areas cast as resource peripheries. It is 
important to note that all the other of the five key strategies were central in 
this case, as the last four points below open up.
Fourth, there has been a major effort of campaigning along nonmodern-
ist lines,7 which was firmly rooted in the strong grievances that the locals 
could see when visiting mined areas near their own villages. At the begin-
ning of extractivism, people did not resist mining as they did not know what 
it would do to their lived environments. Now they know, and the resulting 
massive displacement has caused deep grievances of all types, which are by 
themselves, according to the NGO coordinator, the biggest explanation of 
why people resist:
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[If you] go to Joda [the heavily mined block of Keonjhar], you won’t 
be able to see Adivasis. In many, many villages they have already 
left and gone to somewhere else. In the Tata area [in Joda] there are 
22,000 Adivasis still missing, nobody knows where they are. Popula-
tion of the Joda, even government doesn’t know where they are. They 
have been displaced and gone somewhere else.
The locals know what it means to lose land, having observed others under-
going the change. When the Adivasis are displaced,
they lose their emotional attachment to the motherland. They lose 
their deity, their village deity, they lose the right to worship. They lose 
everything. They lose water. They lose [their] environment. They lose 
their cultivable land. They lose habitats. They lose house. Everything. 
In the name of development.
With the expansion of extractivism, in Keonjhar this process is increasingly 
also caused indirectly, particularly by destroying peoples’ water sources and 
not offering “even a glass of water,” let alone access to a river or stream, 
which thereby instigates a process of self- eviction. This self- eviction occurs 
even despite the new mining jobs, which are poorly remunerated:
Government makes the environment such a dusty and such an 
unhealthy place there that self- eviction started. Government did not 
evict people. People evict themselves. Automatically because govern-
ment makes the area very poisonous, very unhealthy. People cannot 
live. So self- eviction started. The Adivasi cannot live in an environ-
ment like that.
When I questioned how people managed to resist, the coordinator 
answered that the most important reason for this was that they saw the 
impacts described above. This spurred resistance in nearby areas, not only 
directly next to their own villages. Now that the people in Keonjhar have 
seen these effects, they began to resist. To further this resistance, they have 
formed a campaign where they display slogans such as “Stop! Stop min-
ing! Stop iron ore! Stop anything which destroys our forest! The forest is 
our life— we cannot live without forest. We are like fish in the water— we 
cannot be separated from the forest.” Protests also display Adivasi culture: 
“they’re having the placard, they’re having banner, they’re having traditional 
drums, they’re having blowing instrument in the rally.” This display of Adi-
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vasi objects and their use in these place- based rallies creates objectified sym-
bolic power for the Adivasis’ way of life to continue in that place. This kind 
of objectification of symbolic power helps in marking both the symbolic and 
the physical space as belonging to the Adivasis.
Fifth, the resistance movement in Keonjhar was tightly rooted to their 
physical space, and not just campaigning and protesting. The NGO coordi-
nator argued that a rally alone does not make sense. For a rally to work, he 
saw that there was a need for “ground measures,” meaning that villagers “are 
able to protect their forest from mining, are able to stop mining survey in 
the village.” This means blocking the exploration or mining by any means, 
including using their physical bodies. One of my main takeaways from the 
strategies of resistance in Keonjhar was the crucial importance of having 
land control at the village level, not just protests. In this sense, it is essential 
to have power and good positioning in the physical space to be able to make 
the other strategies work. “If you have significant control of all the resources, 
or significant changes, significant achievements in a village, people will get 
convinced,” the NGO coordinator argued. “People have their own conver-
sation. . . . Okay, that village they are able to protect [themselves]. We can 
also protect.” He emphasized the importance of “real village action,” which 
is resistance action that physically bans the entrance of companies to their 
space as the basis of all rallies, otherwise they are useless, as there will be 
“nothing to learn, nothing to share” with other protesters.8 In an illustrative 
example, in 2006, the mining surveyors entered an area of people the NGO 
had been working with since 1996:
So the people were well organized, and when forest survey came, peo-
ple resisted. People said, “No. You cannot survey our forest. We are 
living here.” And there is iron ore of course. . . . But in spite of their 
resistance, the company came again for survey. The locals blocked 
the road. They did not allow the vehicle to go inside. So the survey 
company filed a police case against eighty tribal leaders.
After the coordinator heard this, he suggested that the leaders file similar 
cases against the company. However, the police would not accept this, say-
ing, “You know police and the government and the company and the survey, 
they are one, no? . . . So then we filed a complaint against the police by the 
district post,” which the police had to accept.
After some days, the police came again, to arrest these eighty people. Yet 
the people continued to resist and said, “If you want to take us, take all the 
people from all the villages. We are people from six villages. So you take all 
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the people of six villages. Why eighty people only? We’ll go together. We’ll 
stay there happily. Because you know we can have our life there. Like a fam-
ily.” The police left. With this example, the coordinator wanted to make the 
point that if only eighty people protest, they can be easily jailed, but if the 
protests are rooted in whole communities, they cannot be so easily ignored 
and cast away. Grounding the resistance not only to the land but also to 
the bodies of the community members is an effective way of controlling 
the physical space— which will, of course, provide immense benefits in the 
social and symbolic spaces as well, as demonstrated by the theory of spatial 
causalities outlined in figure 3 in chapter 2.
Sixth, there was a successful, although painful, experience of using net-
working to overcome the massive violence that tried to break this powerful 
movement. The coordinator explained how in 2008, the police entered the 
area again
in the name of Maoists. . . . Then around 10 o’clock they [the police] 
arrested three of my colleagues and two community leaders. Alto-
gether they [the police] arrested fifteen people. And immediately they 
[the locals arrested] are sent to unknown places. . . . [the] Police said 
that they arrested some Maoists.
The coordinator then went to file a complaint against the collector (an 
Indian Administrative Service officer in charge of revenue collection and 
administration of a district) with his colleagues, but the collector was not 
present.9 After that the coordinator fled to the state capital, as his and his 
colleagues’ names were also posted on the list of Maoists. He explained to 
me the different ways the media tried to publicly smear his reputation: “[The 
media said that] ‘I’m the leader of the Maoists; I have an AK47; I do this 
and that in the forest.’ All the dirty things they wrote.” His friends suggested 
he should not attack or criticize the press, as “otherwise how can we win?” 
A fact- finding mission was quickly assembled and dispatched immediately 
to Keonjhar. The fact- finding team included a High Court member, several 
activists, NGO employees, and senior press people. When this team tried 
to interview the superintendent of police, however, “[he] said, ‘I won’t be 
available. I cannot give my comment.’” Nor was the collector available. The 
coordinator continued to tell me of his harrowing experiences:
Then, in the meantime, all of my colleagues were sent to jail.  .  .  . 
They [my colleagues] were beaten very heavily . . . They [the police] 
had beaten and asked them [my colleagues] to say that they are Mao-
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ist. So that is the reason they have beaten. One of them said no: “I 
cannot, I cannot, we are not Maoist.” So he was beaten very heav-
ily. . . . after all they [the fact- finding mission] took the interview of 
many, many senior people like the subcollector [who gave a statement 
on the NGO people that] “They are good people. They have fought 
for the protection of the Adivasi rights. They have filed 120 cases in 
courts [on mining issues], this organization. I don’t think that they’re 
Maoist. I don’t know how police knew that they are Maoist.” And 
also they [the fact- finding mission] took the interview of [the] assis-
tant police commissioner. He’s a tribal. He also said that until now we 
don’t have any evidence of that they are Maoist.
The NGO went to the High Court for a “one- year fight,” but did not get 
bail granted for those incarcerated, and then appealed to Amnesty Interna-
tional and many other international human rights organizations. The NGO 
also “wrote to the government of India, Supreme Court, High Court, prime 
minister . . . We remain[ed] underground for six months.” Had they stayed 
in Keonjhar, the coordinator asserted, “We would have also been beaten 
up, picked up and sent to jail. So fortunately, we went to Bhubaneshwar.” 
Amnesty International’s letters after taking the case and the pleading of a 
local Adivasi directly to the chief minister were, in the coordinator’s estima-
tion, central in releasing all his colleagues from police custody in 2012.
After this incident people recommended that the coordinator no longer 
stay in the area for safety reasons, but he declined to leave:
I said, “If I go to Bhubaneshwar, then how will this problem be 
resolved?” People, government will attack me. I will go to Bhu-
baneshwar, government will attack other activist, he [the potentially 
attacked activist] will also go to Bhubaneshwar. So everybody will go 
to Bhubaneshwar. Then who will address the situation, the problem? 
So we go to Bhubaneshwar and let the government to do whatever? 
It’s life. [This] we cannot [do], we will be with the people. And we are 
still with the people.
Out of fear, some locals paused their resistance for a year or two during this 
incident, but after the coordinator’s resolution to return and continue the 
struggle, combined with “some justice from the High Court” and “conso-
lation and encouragement” from people all over India, the local activists 
continued and escalated their mobilization. This case was an exception in 
Eastern India, as in most cases when “you have been presented as Maoist, 
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anti- state and anti- government, you get a life sentence, you are not able to 
come out. You are not able to get a bail to come out. This is actually a very 
serious issue.” A turning point in this struggle was when the local NGO 
and the Adivasi activists (collectively the Keonjhar resistance organizations) 
gained the support of the local and national media after a press conference 
conducted by the fact- finding mission, which had collected convincing evi-
dence to prove the reality of what had happened in this situation. From that 
moment onward the activist’s position began to improve, and the “police 
also kept a low [profile] because all the national newspapers also wrote that 
what the police had done is not right.”
There were some Maoists in the area in the mid- 2000s, but by 2013 they 
had moved on, which allowed the NGO activists to “get democratic rights” 
for their operations. Since this series of incidents, the movement understood 
the importance of networking and creating as many links with as many 
different entities in different places as possible. For example, this incident 
started the practice of networking with Adivasis from Jharkhand and Chhat-
tisgarh. The activists felt that the most important element for positive activ-
ism outcomes in the future was to “widen the network and voice.” One 
important facet of this process was to demand and allow the processes of 
human rights law to be exercised in India.
Lastly, besides movement organizing, campaigning, protesting, and net-
working, state embedding was also a strategy used in this resistance effort. 
The way electoral politics were embedded, redesigned, and produced by the 
resistance in Keonjhar is the seventh highly interesting strategic feature to be 
drawn from this case. The resistance decided to abstain from judicial politics 
and institutional embedding, while focusing on electoral embedding in a 
very innovative way. Favoring electoral embedding over the other types of 
embedding was not a random circumstance: the Keonjhar resistance had 
good reasons for these embedding choices. I will briefly outline the reasons 
they had for not pursuing all potential forms of embedding. The Keonjhar 
resistance organizations were very skeptical about the use of courts, which 
they had not previously used in their resistance efforts. They saw consid-
erable danger in this course of action because of the Indian constitution 
and laws, such as the Land Acquisition Act, which grants the government 
the legal right to displace people for “developmental” projects. While the 
government should pay compensation for this displacement, the monetary 
compensation stands as just another way to destroy the place- based and 
place- reliant Adivasi way of life and their spaces. If this is the law, the activ-
ists choose not to use the courts as a tool of resistance.
The movement also did not try to use or embed the state institutions 
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such as the pollution control board, the collectorate (the district level poli-
tics under the authority of a collector), and so on, as “they are always in 
the pocket of the corporates.  .  .  . they close their eyes.” The movement 
had, however, made use of the Right to Information Act, by “fighting for 
information continuously and strongly,” and getting data on mining leases. 
The movement was required to complete several rounds of applications, for 
each different institution involved in licensing mining, before they got what 
these institutions were obliged by law to provide outright. For example, 
this included the information on who had reserved which areas, and for 
what purposes. This kind of information was very helpful for the movement 
because they learned things like in some villages 100 percent of the land had 
been reserved. Knowing this helped them to determine key areas to target 
with the resistance efforts. The movement used the information to inform 
the people about their rights so that when “the company comes and says 
that, ‘This [is] my mining lease area, you go!,’ the people can say, ‘No, get 
out of our area. And since our Gram Sabha has power, unless we give the 
right to you to come, you cannot come.’”
The coordinator observed that the institutions in their area are com-
pletely corrupted by mining mafia money and are therefore useless. The state 
bureaucracies were also very militarized. For example, when state officials 
went to villages to ask whether people wanted mines, they went with a heavy 
military presence. Bringing arms to an introductory discussion naturally 
inhibits an honest response in most cases as people are afraid of this show 
of power. This indicates that there was a notable difference between Eastern 
and Western India in terms of political opportunities that allowed the use of 
institutional and even judicial politics. However, these limitations did not 
apply to electoral politics, which the movement started to engage with, and 
even started to change the rules as a result of their action and intervention.
The Keonjhar movement differed from the other iron mining conflicts 
in India and Brazil because of its strong embedding of electoral politics. The 
most innovative example of this was the process introduced by the move-
ment of demanding that electoral candidates sign an MOU before they were 
even allowed to enter an area. This MOU stated explicitly that the candidate 
would not support mining operations in an electoral area. Many candidates 
and even local party leaders signed these MOUs against mining investment, 
“and got elected accordingly.” This type of vote pooling, or shaping the 
political arena, represented a new political power in the electoral field. This 
power proved quite useful, as the movement could make use of the promises 
(and the candidates’ fear of not being reelected). The coordinator told me 
that even with all this positive momentum, after the elections,
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in spite of all this [effort], mining tests started. So the people went to 
meet the chairperson. They [the people] said, “You have signed our 
agreement telling that you do not allow mining operation. But how 
come this testing is going on? You have to go. You have to go and stop 
it. There’s no other way.” Then this poor chairperson came, of course, 
along with the people, and stopped the mining operations.
After these initial efforts, this strategy was fine- tuned to spread it more 
effectively by replication. The movement called for large meetings of people, 
including candidates, in traditional vote- buying areas, saying that, “We have 
experience that [the] one who gives you feast, liquor, rice, potato, every-
thing, the dal, you vote them [the traditional clientelist politicians, who typ-
ically support the expansion of mining]. Why do this again this year?” After 
this, someone asked, “Can we use our power to stop this?,” to which another 
person suggested, “Can we have one common election meeting where we 
can put our demand that the one who says no to mining, we’ll vote for him.” 
The mining- project- affected communities in Keonjhar agreed to such an 
arrangement, as it meant that the candidates also did not have to travel from 
village to village. Official invitations were sent to people by the electoral sys-
tem to attend this meeting, and a “huge number of people” attended. Votes 
were pooled for the candidates who promised to protect the Adivasi villages, 
hills, and forests. Now many people in Keonjhar’s rural areas would not vote 
for anyone who had not signed the MOU. The coordinator argued that this 
was essential, and had been a very positive experience, as unless the powerful 
political participants of large public meetings are “linked with [the] vote,” 
the affected communities cannot “make them bend.” So, “[the] vote is the 
main power, main weapon.”
Targeted voting is a form of state coproduction, meaning that it goes 
beyond simply influencing who gets elected to decision- making power. This 
type of state constitutive action yields an extended executive arm for the 
resistance against mining. As political and policy- making outcomes, the cli-
entelist system begins to break and be replaced by one where the people can 
control their representatives. Moreover, public meetings are steered accord-
ing to the wishes of the mining resistance, and not by politicians who are not 
necessarily interested in these issues. This state coproduction has managed 
to turn elected politicians, at different levels of power, against mining in 
the richest iron ore reserve areas of Odisha and has thus helped in block-
ing greenfield mining projects. In comparison, I did not find similar tactics 
used in brownfield mining areas or non- iron- ore areas. This reshaping of 
the state has also grounded the understanding of the influence of voting, by 
Using a Broad Set of Strategies  175
Revised Pages
increasing the salience of democracy and the importance of electoral politics 
as the second- most important political game (after contentious politics) in 
Keonjhar, thus avoiding the dangers of armed conflict and private politics. 
Furthermore, almost all the elected MLAs are now Adivasis and not outsid-
ers, which has meant a structural change in the social space toward a more 
equal distribution of social, cultural, and economic capital. In addition, this 
has also led to a change in the larger symbolic space as it is a shift in the 
perceived role of local Adivasis in the political process through the power 
they now yield.
Outcomes in Odisha
Having discussed many cases and tactics of resistance in Odisha, I will link 
them more explicitly to the outcomes of extractivist investment projects. 
As a result of the multiple strategies discussed in the previous section, the 
coordinator was confident enough to claim that “without our intervention 
or any mobilization in Khandadhar [the Keonjhar parcel, located in the 
Bansapal block], there would have been a mining operation. There would 
have been eviction.” Thus, the outcomes of the efforts in Keonjhar were sig-
nificant. The coordinator also pointed out that the Shah Commission was 
interested only in illegal mining, not in the legal mining that also devastates 
the lives of Adivasis. For this and other reasons, he did not believe the Shah 
Commission was chiefly responsible for closing the mining operations. In 
fact, the kind of grassroots process described in this section on what hap-
pened in Odisha works very differently in comparison to the curbing of 
illegal mining by the powerholders and shapes a whole spectrum of political 
games wherein mining politics takes place.
When looking at the broader picture of the Odisha state, and not just 
Keonjhar, the outcomes of the Odisha iron ore mining resistance are perhaps 
most easily visible in preventing the opening of the Khandadhar mining area 
in Sundargarh. This landscape is still rich with natural features including the 
huge waterfalls that are still gushing water.10 Yet it cannot be said that the 
outcome in Khandadhar, which blocked the mine, was produced solely by 
local resistance. The outcome in this case was also a result of resistance by the 
POSCO steel- plant activists and other factors. The Supreme Court was also 
involved in the dynamics of contention in this case— a shared feature with 
many other cases in India where projects were suspended. An intercorporate 
agency struggle for the mining resources also partly explains why the mine’s 
opening had been postponed.11 These outcomes are the product of invest-
176  Iron Will
Revised Pages
ment politics where resistance strategies operate and interact with corporate 
and government strategies.
There were a myriad of different forms of resistance groups and types 
of strategies in use in Odisha, whose joint impact helped in banning the 
greenfield mining projects. Their role in the large- scale closing down of the 
existing mines was less direct. Odisha hosts about 200 mines, all of which 
are small, including seventy- seven iron ore mines. According to the coordi-
nators of the Development Initiative, an NGO and MMP member from 
Bhubaneshwar offering advocacy for locals (including workers) in mining 
areas, about sixty of Odisha’s mines were closed between June 2012 and 
January 2013. The Development Initiative argued that these outcomes were 
due to the Shah Commission report, which was the basis for the central 
government’s request that the Odisha government address illegal mining.12
When the chief minister of Odisha obeyed the initial orders of the Shah 
Commission, he secured his continuity in power. The chief ministers of Kar-
nataka and Goa were forced out of office when the mining mafias in power 
during their terms of office were revealed by the efforts of the “organic soci-
ety” that formed in Western India. In fact, the Odisha chief minister not 
only shielded himself while watching the politics of mining- caused term 
interruption unfold elsewhere in India, he also dramatically increased the 
vote count of his party in subsequent elections.
Generally, blockage of iron ore and steel megaprojects in India and Brazil 
has been a grassroots- led process. Besides POSCO, there are Mittal’s and 
Tata’s large captive steel plant projects (called captive because these plants 
have earmarked mines, whose ore can be used only by that company), which 
are being blocked in Odisha. Additionally, there are projects by several other 
companies, such as Sterlite (a part of Vedanta) and Essar, and state- owned 
companies’ expansions or greenfield plants, such as those of KIOCL (Kudre-
mukh Iron Ore Company Limited) and SAIL. For example, according to 
journalist for Tehelka, an investigative news magazine, in Odisha the “Mit-
tal project was not able to take off because of local opposition.” My field 
research in Keonjhar and Sundargarh also revealed that there are many more 
local and highly sophisticated and proficient resistance groups that have had 
a direct impact, before and independently of the Shah Commission, which 
has blocked iron extraction expansions.
However, Odisha was not a story of full- blown resistance to mining. In 
fact, many locals are in favor of mining, and these locals are typically Adiva-
sis. Nevertheless, these promining local constituencies are almost exclusively 
present only in the old mining areas with few possibilities for all those now 
employed in mining to return to livelihoods based in either the forest or agri-
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culture. Following the central government’s orders to close most iron mines 
in Odisha in 2014, as these mines were illegal, thousands of people, mostly 
Adivasis, lost their mining and mining- affiliated jobs in heavily mined areas. 
Koida in Sundargarh and Joda in neighboring Keonjhar were hit particularly 
hard by this ruling, with approximately 10,000 people losing their jobs. The 
unemployed organized huge protests in December 2014, demanding a swift 
reopening of a group of mines that they considered to be legal.13
Demands for reopening the mines resonated with the Modi govern-
ment’s hyperextractivist agenda. However, this government’s agenda was 
met by the enhanced capacities of activists and progressive state officials 
who sought to uphold the rule of law, after the Shah Commission and other 
investigations had unveiled the illegal mining schemes. For example, at the 
end of 2014, Subash Mohapatra, a human rights activist, asked the Odisha 
government to collect unpaid Net Present Value, which the Times of India 
newspaper explained as “the amount mining lease agencies need to deposit, 
according to a Supreme Court order in 2002, for diversion of forest land 
for non- forest use”. The unpaid fees amounted to Rs 715 crore (about 0.96 
billion euros) from 111 mining agencies.14 When the government did not 
obey, Mohapatra instigated a public- interest litigation to the Odisha High 
Court, which gave notice in May to the Centre and state governments that 
they have to collect the Net Present Value. Such residual outcomes are typi-
cal in mobilizations, and it is likely that many more collections of unpaid 
payments, to counter the looting of valuable minerals beyond lease areas by 
the mining mafias, companies, and politicians, will be made in the future.
Broadening the analytical scope, the situation does not look quite so 
bright just across the border in Jharkhand. The local resistance has failed in 
electoral politics and other state embedding, which caused a partial turn to 
using arms, as this felt like the only viable option left to defend their sacred 
forests. As discussed at length in chapter 4, these forests are intimately tied 
to their way of life, ethnic identity, and livelihoods. State lines, and even the 
lines of municipalities in many cases, seem to differentiate and even separate 
activist groups quite effectively in India, which is not the case in Brazil. The 
affected people, or even the local activists, were not well connected between 
Jharkhand, Odisha, and Chhattisgarh. There was no consistent communica-
tion and cooperation between the nearby mining areas on the Jharkhand- 
Odisha border. Therefore, the institution of broader and deeper networking 
in India seems to hold great promise for effective broader efforts.
I will next discuss the strategies and tactics through which the Goan 
resistance was forged. This detailed discussion complements the broader 
approach in part II, which started with an observation of the larger struc-
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tural and contextual changes in overall political dynamics. For example, 
the consolidation of democracy in Goa and Karnataka during the 2010– 15 
period was no miraculous structural change, but was created by specific and 
concrete social actions. Mining conflicts were central in these states’ devel-
opment and exercise of more democratic decision- making over the use of 
natural resources and the environment. The discussion of resistance strate-
gies to extractivism offers important insights into how democracy has been 
consolidated in Goa. The Goan case, like the one in Keonjhar, illustrates how 
the simultaneous use of all five key strategies can have massive impacts. It is 
important to study several cases and contexts where all these strategies were 
active to be able to more accurately generalize their causal consequences.
Cross- Caste and Cross- Class Resistance in Goa
This section explains how the strategies of resistance in Goa were formed. 
This more detailed scoping of the tactics and tasks involved is important in 
highlighting what the activists actually did. Another takeaway from this sec-
tion are the notes on how the overall resistance can actually benefit from the 
presence of several resistance factions. This finding directly challenges some 
prior studies on movement outcomes.
The Goan cases allows for exploration of the role that the existence of 
several cross- caste/class resistance movements can have. It should be noted 
that in this case, all these movements were fighting for the same goal of 
resisting extractivism, yet they were based on ethnically or economically dif-
fering constituencies, or both. Does this kind of splintering impede resis-
tance success? My results indicate that it does not, but this is premised on 
the condition that these groups are using similar strategy sets. In the case 
that they are employing similar strategy sets, the presence of several groups 
ensures better internal cohesion, and aids in avoiding fights within the resis-
tance based on ethnic/class cleavages. In India these cleavages do exist and 
are gaining importance as bases of mobilization. I also found that in this 
situation the multiple fronts of pressure are also a harder target for corpora-
tions to stand against. When the Chinese boom started around 2005, Goa 
felt the effects very strongly. Goa has a mining lease system dating back to 
the colonial era, which placed large parcels of land under iron ore leases. 
For example, I found one village that was dotted with twenty- three sepa-
rate leases. Mining had been accumulating pollution for decades, but this 
was not taken seriously before the Chinese export boom “made the [many] 
cumulative impacts visible [at] one time,” as an activist explained. Suddenly 
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there were many more struggles aimed at preventing mining over the water, 
agrarian land, and forest use. Yet the powerholders were mine owners and 
thus very much in favor of mining. These owners had so much accumu-
lated power that their desires to continue mining sidelined the voices of the 
“organic society.” For example, in 2005 at a public hearing in Bicholim that 
concerned Sesa Goa’s project (Sesa Goa Iron Ore is a subsidiary company of 
Vedanta, operating in Goa and Karnataka), the whole hall, more than 800 
people, was against the project, but still the project was given a lease.
In Goa, what followed was the creation of a cross- class movement. All 
my informants saw this as an inevitable consequence within this situational 
context. While movement building did not start with the more educated and 
higher- income people from the coast, it soon included these middle classes. 
A key channel of this networking was Goa- net, an email list of over 60,000 
subscribers, which was used as a platform along with blogging, speeches, 
and protests (interviews in Goa, 2010– 13).15 Goa- net attracted a middle- 
class urban professional audience; it linked the plight of impoverished rural 
dwellers— whose livelihoods were being destroyed by mining expansion— to 
the interests of progressive middle- class people seeking to build a new Goa. 
For example, when the Adivasi village of Velip “refused to compromise” 
and blocked roads in 2007, blogging about this protest on Goa- net “gave 
international attention” to mining problems. Activist and blogger Sebastian 
Rodrigues saw that Goa- net was “really central,” as “without it, it would 
not have been possible to achieve this so fast— otherwise one village cannot 
achieve results.” In 2008, Kolham village revolted, and then others, as they 
came to know about the issue through this virtual networking.
Besides uniting the lower- class villagers into one movement, the upper- 
caste people (Brahmins) formed another movement, after “part of them got 
our messages and aligned with us— we shared information, but they had 
their own movement, not dictating our agenda,” explained Rodrigues. The 
villagers also got ideas from the coastal activists. For example, the idea to 
attack mines directly and close their traffic seems to have come from the 
coastal people because, in general, the “popular movement” was not “experi-
enced in protest organizing.” After some initial protests where many activists 
were arrested and beaten, many coastal people got demoralized and left the 
movement. The “fearful people were not invited anymore to actions,” while 
the core of the more direct- action group was formed of about one hundred 
people who were “not afraid of any harassment or arrest.”
Different parts of the larger movement specialized in specific tasks 
related to the overarching goal. Each of these task force teams were led by 
a particular individual. For example, Ramesh Gauns focused on using all 
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possible institutional channels in Goa to question the authority of mining 
licenses. Additionally, he was a key local movement organizer in his village. 
Claude Alvares, with his colleagues at the Goa Foundation NGO, focused 
on instigating litigation in the Supreme Court and other courts (an impor-
tant dynamic I discussed in chapter 3). Sebastian Rodrigues was concerned 
with winning over the established media by making the story of mining 
illegalities in Goa attractive to them and creating new alternative media, 
like the aforementioned blog. Local villagers organized the protests, which 
were frequent, almost daily after 2007, although often involving very few 
people. Yet even these small- scale protests were enough to make big news 
in Goa. Others, like Samarendra Das, helped with international contacts 
and networking. Hartman de Sousa took tourists from across India into 
the mining belt on buses, to spread knowledge of the problems, and wrote 
assiduously. The looting of mineral wealth belonging to the citizens and 
its resistance were captured in the local documentary film Goa, Goa, Gone, 
whose distribution was one way to expand the movement to different audi-
ences. There were also many others who were actively involved in leading 
important teams. In total, this myriad of actions led to a full use of the five 
key strategies, which form the core of my hypothesis of what actions are 
very impactful when used in concert in extractivist conflict. Major positive 
outcomes in resistance can sometimes even be explained solely through the 
implementation of the five key strategies.
The mobilization made effective use of campaigning on nonmodern-
ist lines. This kind of campaigning emphasizes that a particular place that 
would be destroyed by mining cannot be compensated monetarily, as so 
many lives and existences are wiped away in the process. This nonmodernist 
campaigning is typically also working more on the level of emotions than 
the intellect. Strongly emotionally charged discourses about the devastation 
caused by mines (particularly in rural areas) were crafted and effectively dis-
tributed. The main frames were “Attack on Goa” and “Mining Terrorism,” 
while writing open blog posts and giving public speeches were the key com-
munication strategies. Rodrigues thought it was essential to focus on chang-
ing attitudes through massive campaigning and what I call symbolic acts of 
merit, as “Goa is a small state, a fearful state.” Movements can be invigorated 
by symbolic acts that put an issue on the agenda. A particularly useful and 
impactful facet of this strategy were poetic forms that were charged with 
emotion. A poem written by Rodrigues called “I Love Pissurlem” was posted 
on the blog on April 1, 2002, and was subsequently circulated widely in 
Goa.16 Below are a few lines from the beginning of this poem, which calls 
the people to action against mining, to express their feelings and love for 
what is being destroyed:
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Mining has played havoc
With the lives of people
With the agriculture
With the forest cover and its
microbe wealth
With workers
With the wells and water
With the tiger, fox and squirrel
With the nests of Mainah, Sparrow
and Parrot
With the habitat of snakes and
Calothes
With the fish, fishing ponds and
Frog
With the natural springs and its
Coolness
With the trees— big and small.
Mining has pumped dust





Of the democracy of my land.
. . . 
The efficacy of such poems dispersed via blogs was a surprise. It was 
regarded as a key mobilizing tool that built bridges, expressed emotions, 
and united the sentiments of people— both those previously unaware of the 
problem and those who shared the views expressed therein. The resistance 
in Goa was further assisted and supported by the campaigning in two or 
three local newspapers, which became critical of mining as mobilization 
advanced. This was further bolstered by some important national newspa-
pers that elevated mining problems to a national scale.
The organizing and politicizing of resistance also took place vertically in 
many social fields. Around 2007– 8 the resistance started to come together, 
perhaps most visibly in the formation of the Goa Federation of Mine 
Affected People, a nexus of “20– 25 working people” meeting in Panjim to 
discuss strategies. This group worked meticulously and tirelessly for the sub-
sequent three years. At this juncture, the movement was heterogeneous, had 
important connections, and knew how to exert political pressure. The Cath-
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olic Church was, for example, used as a space of mobilization— something 
also true of the resistance in the Carajás region (in Brazil’s Pará and Maran-
hão states), where liberation- theology missionaries had an ingrained habit of 
pursuing nondiscriminatory movement- building. In general, the movement 
was a “ragtag alliance, not a strong organization,” where “talking strongly 
made the organizing.” In fact, there were several separate resistance groups, 
of which the Goa Federation of Mine Affected People was just one, though 
perhaps the most centrally located node. All the groups “had the full free-
dom to attach [to the larger movement in] any way possible,” claimed an 
activist. As an example of a major resistance group, the Adivasis in Goa, who 
were concentrated in the south and marginalized, “got up very late” in their 
struggle but “made a lot of noise,” and were instrumental in using the FRA 
clearance requirement as a tool against mine expansion. Together, the effect 
of these different groups’ attacks against mining amounted to a “struggle 
against Goliath from different places,” according to a western Goan activist.
However, the context for mobilization was not completely in favor of 
resistance, since many still supported extractivism. For example, corporate 
agency was very strong, and the state government was deeply involved in 
mining extraction. Thus, as the resistance movement started gaining trac-
tion, for example through a mining moratorium in 2010, its most visible 
networking activists and ideologues, such as Sebastian Rodrigues, were 
charged by companies, alleged to be Naxalists, and briefly jailed. Yet this did 
nothing to quell the disquiet. The agitation got almost all villages protesting, 
although very few were unanimous in their resistance; about half in eastern 
Goa was in favor of mining, and the activists I accompanied on field visits 
to the area were aware that some people were not in favor of their presence 
in the area.
Village- level mobilization was challenging, and a state- level approach 
was more suitable for concerted mass direct actions. This was also because 
village- level protests, such as blocking the road to ore trucks, led to mass 
action suits by companies against anywhere from fifty to one hundred villag-
ers, and were accompanied by injunctions against the village itself. The battle 
was fierce, and the stakes were high; under these conditions it was quite easy 
for companies to break village- level organization. Furthermore, the villagers 
were mostly “interested only in daily local mine problems,” “had no time 
for activism,” and “must be able to come back by the evening.” At the same 
time, by 2012 many people in nonmining areas had turned fiercely against 
mining, “but do not want to mention their names,” as after the mining ban 
life was hard for workers in the mining area. Yet these shortcomings on the 
local scale of activism were more than compensated for by the global scale 
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of activism, as national and international pressure was considerable through 
the active networking done by the resistance. The National Human Rights 
Commission was brought in by activists to investigate the beatings of pro-
testers, and ordered compensation payments, which was “one more shock 
to companies.” By calling in the federal state institution for human rights, 
and getting its support, the resistance had thus managed to make the federal 
government “decide it is better to be more sensitive.” Gaining this kind of 
support for the right to protest was a difference in comparison to Eastern 
India and supports the suggestion of the importance of the context of a 
nonperipheral consolidating democracy.
The miners tried to use sophisticated corporate countertactics to curb 
mobilization. One visible activist said to me that the companies’ attempts at 
building a “constituency in mining towns,” and using their backing in their 
several counterstrategies that attacked the activists, was the “most disagree-
able aspect of it.” He mentioned that if the ban had occurred in Chhat-
tisgarh, the counterstrategies would certainly have included severe violence 
against activists. In Goa the countermovement included, for example, a 
statewide road blockade by 600 promining truck drivers on November 27, 
2012. Neither they, nor anyone else, expected the “heavy consequence of 
going to [the] Supreme Court,” which led to a complete ban on mining 
and trucking. This meant that a large numbers of truckers, between 15,000 
and 20,000, had their activity curtailed and actions monitored by the Shah 
Commission and other authorities.
Goa had one of the most visible state coproductions of the Indian cases. 
I will illustrate this by describing the work of Ramesh Gauns who was the 
most active producer of new rules and power relations in institutional poli-
tics. He was also a key figure in forging resistance agency through the simul-
taneous use of all the five strategies, which he considered to be the most 
essential factor for success. He has had a long history as an activist, succeed-
ing in 1997 in protecting a lake near his hometown, Bicholim, the mining 
hotbed introduced at the beginning of this book. In 2003, he managed to 
change the way the Goan cabinet of the collector conducted its environmen-
tal impact assessments, moving these from remote offices to the actual places 
of investment. He saw this as the first victory in the battle against mines, and 
he was later able to build on this success. He got “fully into the business of 
mining” in 2007, when mine expansion more severely and directly affected 
his town and the school where he was working. After this it was “an everyday 
job to find out the area where mines were expanding,” and take all the village 
elders to visit the area, call the media, tell locals to speak on the site, and help 
locals with media interaction.
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This type of local politicizing was crucial for the success of the move-
ment. Gauns considered that the first phase of such politicizing is to “boost 
the morale of common men and demoralize miners.” After such politicizing, 
the locals knew what to say, were empowered to speak, and started writing 
articles themselves. They managed to win over important public hearings 
by demonstrating that they were all against the mines. However, this did 
not prevent the authorities from granting mining licenses. This propelled 
the resistance into trying all other possible strategies of potential influence, 
including studying laws, organizing protest marches, and using the courts.
It is unlikely for state institutions to uphold the rule of law, especially 
in the Global South, without activation from a resistance movement. State 
institutions typically require this kind of external, continued coproduction 
of their right to operate in contexts of strong corporate- government pushed 
extractivism. Gauns kept the Pollution Control Board busy by filing several 
complaints. This is an important juncture in the mining process as the board 
must give its consent to mines before mining can start. Following Gauns’s 
plea, the board refused consent, which led many companies to file a com-
plaint against the board in the administrative court. Gauns stepped in at this 
point as well, to make an intervention in the same court to oppose the move 
by the companies and support the board. However, other professional NGO 
activists in Western India considered that the Pollution Control Boards are 
“by and large corrupt,” and not autonomous, even though they should be 
autonomous. Yet a Bangalore- based professional activist commented that 
though the boards are “weakly set up,” they “can be used tactically,” and 
“work sometimes,” but in general “take too much energy, so people become 
frustrated or even cynical.” Gauns seemingly was not one of those people 
with a lack of energy, and he tackled these boards many times.
In line with many activists with whom I have discussed the five key resis-
tance strategies, Gauns considered that the simultaneous use of strategies 
is indeed crucial. He affirmed that, in his experience, “it is all to be done 
simultaneously; otherwise you face losing the battle in court and so on.” 
He continually intervened in the Goa High Court, which led to an envi-
ronmental clearance order given for a mine near his school to be set aside. 
Local people like him were central in documenting illegal mining opera-
tions before the authorities knew of the infractions, producing records that 
became key evidence in courts when tracing back the events. Gauns won 
the respect of local authorities and others nationally for his work, and was 
empowered via awards to concentrate on this work for seven years, denounc-
ing problems and seeking solutions.17 He considered that the most essential 
part in activism is gaining knowledge, and with the creation of alternative 
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knowledge, “you can win over the Goliath if you have the knowledge.” This 
claim suggests that when symbolic space is transformed via concerted efforts, 
changes in social and physical space will follow.
Besides showing the importance of using the five key strategies simulta-
neously, Goa is also a unique case in demonstrating that resistance can be 
dispersed and even have internal conflict, yet still be effective in the out-
come. Goa is an interesting case consisting of different resistance movements 
divided by caste cleavages, and I will end this chapter by discussing the rela-
tion of these dynamics to outcomes. Cleavages among the resistance could 
be hypothesized as weakening its impact (based on, e.g., Watts 2004), but 
the Goan case suggests that the opposite can also happen. In essence, when 
a resistance movement is divided into many actors it can be harder to attack, 
and division and struggles between resistance groups can take place without 
harm done to the outcomes (this contrasts with Hadden 2015).
After 2010 there was an important rupture in the Goan antimining 
movement, as some important activists deliberately created an openly anti– 
upper caste movement. One might suggest that claims based on ethnic/caste 
discord could easily become combustible, but Wilkinson (2013) argues that 
the growth of caste politics has been generally helpful for communal peace 
in India, alleviating more volatile divisions, such as those between religious 
groups.18 The Goan case supports this argument, and suggests that caste- 
based campaigning might not automatically be negative for retaining peace.
In Goa, Adivasis were included both in lower- caste and upper- caste- led 
mining resistance movements. This splintering into different movements 
probably helped the resistance, as demands and pressure came from two 
autonomous directions simultaneously. This was not, therefore, a case of net-
working between all castes in a unified manner— many informants reported 
to me serious hostilities between upper- and lower- caste activists— but a 
case of vertical politicizing and campaigning, whereby both upper and lower 
social power strata are included in a loose resistance front. This feature in 
Goa is also in tune with my prior analysis of Western India as a “consolidat-
ing democracy,” as a polity where a splintered society, composed of roughly 
equally voiced but separate groups, seeks to express the views of their con-
stituents, which can be considered a step toward a deeper democracy.
Upper castes are a minority, while the lower castes or noncaste people 
are increasingly aware of their power as the majority. For example, after 
2010 a portion of mining activists in Goa “deliberately” relinquished euphe-
misms such as “mining terrorism,” a framing that did not mention caste, 
but was known to refer to upper- caste actions. The term “mining terrorism” 
allowed for the initial mobilization of a very large group of people, includ-
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ing those from the upper caste. When a significant part of the resistance 
started to instead emphasize that this terror by mining was done by par-
ticular castes and classes, the resistance started splitting into factions. The 
resistance continued to take place through the non- upper- caste movement, 
and the movement that consisted of both upper caste and other people. 
The non- upper- caste movement tried to unite Other Backward Classes (i.e., 
lower castes), Scheduled Castes (i.e., Dalits, untouchables), Muslims, and 
Adivasis. According to Rodrigues, these classes and castes comprised approx-
imately 85 percent of the Indian and Goan population (a majority group 
called Mulnivasis), which were against upper- caste- controlled mining, and 
thus created a new front of mobilization. Such use of communalism is a key 
political tool in Indian society’s cleavage making and can be very effectively 
used to mobilize an electorate. Hindu pogroms against muslims have for 
example been used to unite Hindus in urban areas to combat the tendency 
of anti- upper- caste politics to diminish the importance of religion as a com-
munal distinction maker (Wilkinson 2013). Anti- upper- caste framings are 
an especially powerful tool for creating a larger communal movement, and 
many mining activists were aware of this. “Mulvinasi- movement people are 
all over Goa and able to connect across barriers within the 85 percent and 
unite against the attackers,” Rodrigues suggested.
This turn to using the mechanism of communalism, working on the 
lines of vertical politicizing, may have been quite influential. According 
to Rodrigues, “The top level got scared of Mulnivasi strength. It became 
a central issue for Brahmins to close down mining to stop the [Mulnivasi] 
movement [from growing, based on mining/local upper- caste grievances].” 
Whether or not this caste dimension of the conflict was the key reason for 
success, I do not know. However, the appearance of an antimining move-
ment that excluded upper castes, working parallel to a more general inclu-
sive movement, increased the stakes and issues in play, mitigated the risk 
of a perceived “upper- caste takeover” of the movement and made it hard 
for mine owners to attack just one movement (or treat mining resistance as 
forming only along ethnic lines). Mining scams were a particularly volatile 
issue, and upper- caste politicians and businessmen were considered key cul-
prits. As long as these issues were not resolved, Mulnivasi and non- ethnicity- 
based mobilization grew.
Though splintered into two factions, both general processes of mobiliza-
tion in Goa shared the same metaprocess of using all the five key strategies 
simultaneously. There was no clear strategy cleavage between two groups 
of activists, unlike the global climate negotiation mobilizations in the case 
discussed by Hadden (2015). Comparing Hadden’s anatomy of the rupture 
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between professional environmental NGOs using conventional tactics and 
movements using more radical forms of protest to the case of Goan min-
ing politics suggests that the splintering of a single- issue movement into 
contentious and conventional strategies is not beneficial in terms of the 
larger movement’s goal. Rather, such a rupture opens possibilities to attack 
the movement, create confusion, and hinder the use of the five key strate-
gies. Conversely, if the different movements addressing the same issue share 
similar peaceful strategies (including protests), splintering into two or more 
factions seems to increase the likelihood of achieving the overarching goals. 
My finding that several separate resistance groups sharing similar peaceful 
strategy- sets (as in Goa) have had more success than resistance, which has 
splintered into factions using both violent and peaceful strategy- sets in the 
same region (as in Chhattisgarh) supports the analysis by Erica Chenoweth 
and Maria J. Stephan (2011) on the advantages of peaceful resistance vis- à- 
vis violence. They found that it is easier to attain more people from different 
backgrounds to join resistance when it does not include violent insurgency. 
I would add to their findings in Why Civil Resistance Works that within this 
peaceful resistance it seems to best to (1) have distinct groups for distinct 
social strata and (2) utilize the five key strategies in all of them.
The distinct groups can operate in different social strata and this verti-
cality can help bring different kinds of people into contact with an issue. 
Particularly in a deeply communalist society, with cleavages along caste and 
religious lines that impede normal interaction between certain groups, such 
a division can lead more quickly and peacefully to the desired outcome. The 
history of India is replete with failed or too- costly attempts to pursue change 
through a united front, such as Gandhi’s demand for a united greater India 
that includes Pakistan. Although networking over divisive lines might be 
possible for a short time, in the long run an artificial top- down unification 
of movement fronts, whose members have considerable animosity toward 
each other, is likely to lead to internal conflict that will ultimately weaken 
the outcome (such as the resistance capacity and willingness, or democracy 
in India, or the maintenance of good mining regulation), even if there are 
initial victories.
Thus far, this part of the book has discussed in detail resistance mobiliza-
tions in different parts of India, through a multisited political ethnography 
that looked at the strategies used and their outcomes. In the next chapter, 
I will discuss several Brazilian cases to show how resistance can forge global 
activism against extractivism, illustrating the relation between resistance 
strategies and political outcomes on the global scale. While the Indian cases 
discussed thus far in this part were clear cases of resistance with major eco-
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nomic outcomes discontinuing extractivist operations, the following Brazil-
ian cases typically had comparatively less impressive economic outcomes, 
but more impressive global political outcomes. After examining how global 
resistance agency has been forged in Brazil, the final chapter of part III stud-
ies the role of national networks in Brazil and India in curbing extractivism. 
This last chapter complements the state- level or local- level based political 
ethnographies of the resistance strategies discussed, looking at the role of 
national and global efforts and outcomes in resisting extractivism, which 




Global and National Coalitions
To get a more holistic view of the impacts of mining, I tracked the flow 
of iron ore downstream from the world’s largest mine in Carajás in the 
Eastern Amazon. I followed the railroad tracks by car and motorcycle 
from the mining site through the land reform settlements, reaching the 
pig iron plants in the state of Maranhão, where the ore was processed 
before being shipped from the ports. These regions were among the poorest 
and most violent of all the destitute regions of Brazil. I slept on floors and 
in hammocks in the back rooms of social movement offices, and visited 
the communities living next door to polluting facilities, listening to and 
experiencing their lived environments. The air was hot and full of smoke 
from the iron processing plants, and the workers’ neighborhoods nearby 
were full of dust. However, in the same visit, I also sat in the clean and 
cool air- conditioned offices of the companies and state officials. The locals 
had for a long time been looking at the iron ore wealth being carried 
away every day by trains with upward of 300 wagons. There were two 
worlds existing side by side, and those who suffered the consequences of the 
mining pollution did not reap the benefits. The locals started to organize 
themselves to remedy this unjust situation. These uprisings were organized 
and executed in places that were little known to the wider world. Not 
many outsiders had been to these places before. I could find scant prior 
public data on these places or what was going on there in the early 2010s. 
It was impressive to note how globally impactful movements were first 
crafted within these peripheral places, the upstream areas of the flow of 
iron ore. It was interesting to note the parallels between the resistance and 
the policy agenda setters, when I visited the offices of corporations and 
mining advocacy NGOs, and movements in Rio de Janeiro and New 
Delhi. There, chatting over a strong chai or coffee, the key policymakers 
shared with me the dynamics of national and global iron ore politics. 
There were many important nodal activists and other people whose scope 
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of action was not only local, but even broader. It was interesting to note 
how their work paralleled the place- based struggles I had witnessed in the 
field. Much of their work also goes unnoticed, taking place behind closed 
doors in the cabinets of power. My takeaway from these experiences is that 
actions targeting the local, national, and global- scale decision- makers are 
all essential.
This chapter demonstrates the importance of understanding how resistance 
to extractivism has differing goals, some aimed toward primarily economic 
outcomes, such as shutting down mining expansion or changing the style of 
operations, while others focus on political outcomes, such as forging more 
widespread and deeper activist agencies. The first section of this chapter 
looks at how local upstream struggles against the international flow of iron ore 
from Brazil’s Carajás region in the Eastern Amazon have been able to forge 
an important new global transnational coalition that transcends traditional 
social movement boundaries, for example, through the inclusion of mining 
trade unions and groups from both the Global North and Global South. 
This first section will focus primarily on place- based local struggles and their 
unique strategy combinations. In the second section of this chapter, I will 
discuss the strategies of the nationwide network movements of mining activ-
ists and their role in the politics of extractivism in both India and Brazil.
Forging Upstream Struggles: Justice on the Rails
Brazil offers several examples of how transnational resistance against extrac-
tivism has been created, and I turn now to one of these cases. A national 
MST director explained the reason for seeking widespread mobilization, 
which is nevertheless still place based:
[In May 2012 in Parauepebas in] a meeting with many Brazilian 
organizations working against mining companies and large- scale 
projects, we met to discuss the possibility of creating a new social 
movement, because in Pará they already even have the name and sym-
bols for such a [antimining] movement. The objective of this move-
ment would be that families who live in the mining regions, who are 
impacted by them, would organize, so this would be a movement 
with an organizational structure and objectives which would fortify 
this articulation internationally and across territories, because many 
of the people in the mining- company- controlled territories do not 
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have an association, are not organized. For example, the people in 
Serra Pelada, including the syndicate, were very enthusiastic, saying 
they would join the movement, as alone they could not manage to 
win their rights. But in other states the organizations do not need 
such a movement. . . . We do not have the position to force action; we 
have to construct [this new movement]. There is political articulation 
already, but we have noticed that large mining extraction operations 
require a strong movement as a counterplayer, not isolated groups 
that often just study the impacts. There’s already a lot of resistance in 
various states, but more is needed. Now, after the May 2012 meeting, 
there are heated ongoing debates across states concerning the creation 
of this movement. (Interview with Ednalva Moreira Gomes, MST 
leader, March 22, 2013, author’s translation from Portuguese)
The movement was created soon after, taking the name Movimento dos 
Atingidos pelo Mineração (MAM, however, the name changed in 2014 to 
Movimento Nacional pela Soberania Popular frente à Mineração; more on 
this change later in this chapter). MAM had an office in Belo Horizonte in 
2013 and opened a new one in Marabá in October 2014, which provided a 
venue for encounters between disparate mining- focused groups. As Ednalva 
Moreira Gomes noted in our 2013 interview, the movement has been tena-
cious, as the initial successes by “isolated groups” in Minas Gerais were fol-
lowed by other outcomes in favor of needy groups in 2014. Meanwhile, 
boosted by the development of a strong place- based resistance in Carajás, 
agitation had been stirring on the international anti- Vale front since the 
2000s. Resistance was globalizing from an epicenter in the Eastern Amazon’s 
upstream as struggles arose over the control of iron extraction at key points 
of production and transportation.
The first conscious attempt to create a transnational movement by those 
impacted by Vale, and targeting Vale, was at the World Social Forum in 
Belém in 2001 (the following narrative is from an interview with Father 
Antonio, founding member of Justice on the Rails (JoR) and a member 
of Combonian Missionaries, March 17, 2011, author’s translation). Justice 
on the Rails was born in Pequiá, but it is part of the larger International 
Articulation of People Affected by Vale, which includes many different social 
actors critical of Vale, both in Brazil and abroad. It is notable that JoR, or the 
International Articulation, was not created as a “not in my backyard” move-
ment. In other words, it was not interested merely in avoiding destruction 
of the local setting (which was already destroyed). Rather, these resistance 
groups were created with the intention of warning others of similar dangers 
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and seeking to transform the broader setting based on a liberation theology 
ideology rooted in the lived experience of asymmetric and physically violent 
power relations.1 Father Antonio noted that the JoR movement “was created 
out of the reality of the very strong injustice [of ] mining, the railroad, steel 
mills, eucalyptus, charcoal furnaces, of environmental injustice, and degra-
dation.” The building of the transnational movement was based on the local 
and global use of all five of the strategies for resistance.
JoR has three lines of action: (1) to build the organization of the move-
ment, politicize the people, and campaign; (2) to engage in judicial politics 
by generating a series of class action suits in the courts; and (3) to deploy 
political means in electoral politics, aiming at steering Vale via the influence 
of politicians. While I was conducting field research in the heavily polluted 
pig- iron- producing town of Pequiá where Father Antonio lived, he com-
mented on these lines of action:
First, raising the consciousness of communities, about the effects of 
the doubling of the railroad [Vale tried to double the railroad capac-
ity, which had created new grievances]. We want the company to pay 
remuneration to communities, not individuals. We have already won 
remuneration from Vale based on a decision by the judge of Açailân-
dia in favor of the relatives of someone whose death was caused by 
Vale. Now the people are more aware. Those who have direct experi-
ence have a negative view of Vale.
The image of Vale is very real for the people residing in Maranhão, which 
is the Vale railroad junction and a center of Pequiá pig- iron and charcoal pro-
duction. A 330- wagon train passes twenty- four times a day, carrying twenty 
million dollars’ worth of iron ore every day. “The money that passes and the 
ore that we see allows us to see, this is an open vein of Latin America,” said 
Father Antonio, who has been living for years within the impacted popula-
tion and developing opportunities for mobilization via strategies such as 
the creation of alternative frames to aid in understanding reality in a critical 
way, thus politicizing a movement and offering a base for campaign fram-
ing. He counters the framing of the company as a “national champion,” and 
provides a critical frame:
Vale is taking abroad the blood, presenting itself as a Brazilian com-
pany, a champion of sustainability that protects the Amazon, etc. [In 
fact, it is] a champion of labor abuse fines, killing people and animals 
on the rails, expelling families, transporting people [on the railroads] 
only because it is forced to, so as not to lose the railroad concession.
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JoR has already gained powerful allies through networking during its 
brief existence. An ex- manager of Vale and a lawyer of the Organization of 
Brazilian Lawyers— a powerful bar association— has joined the trade union 
movement that is part of JoR. Father Antonio explained:
He knows all the mechanisms of Vale. We started to work with him 
with the population in key locations of the railroad. Judges and pros-
ecutors helped us to make the work real. The greatest articulation 
started on a 100 km patch stretching from Bom Jesus da Silva to 
Buriticupu, and since 2009 we have also had meetings in São Luis.
A specialist national movement of judges, called “Judges for Democracy,” 
has also started to help the JoR movement, and there are many prosecutors 
assisting the movement behind the scenes. This suggests that the movement 
has successfully embedded the state, while still retaining autonomy. The JoR 
movement has also achieved extensive cross- national and transnational net-
working, which is the strongest asset of this small movement in comparison 
to the movements in the other cases. In Brazil, JoR headquarters are situ-
ated in the state of Minas Gerais. They network actively with Observatorio 
de Conflictos Mineros de América Latina— an observer of mining conflicts 
based in Peru— and are aligned with the United Steel Workers of Canada.
Contentious politics (via protesting) had not been used to a great extent 
by JoR until March 2011. One protest had occurred, but it involved only 
about 200 people. This was a march to the headquarters of Vale in Rio de 
Janeiro and was not acknowledged by the company. However, during our 
early 2011 interview, Father Antonio anticipated that in Pequiá they would 
block the railroad or perform some other more radical protest with greater 
numbers, “when the time is ripe and right. Protest is a powerful weapon, 
one that has to be used carefully, pacifically. We have recognized three focal 
points we can cut, which will influence the whole iron production system.” 
In consequence, on December 7, 2011, 2,000 inhabitants of Pequiá, includ-
ing workers producing pig iron and charcoal, protested Vale, via marches 
and blockages of Federal Highway BR222. The complaint that this pro-
test hinged on was the damage caused by Vale’s pig- iron complexes, which 
dominated the industrial hub.2 Vale was targeted because it was seen as the 
principal agent in installing the complexes, and because it “continues to be 
the real decision- maker,” transporting ore and seeking to double iron extrac-
tion. A few days later, the state governor visited the area and promised, as a 
matter of urgency, to commence the construction of new housing for people 
living literally next to the highly polluting pig- iron furnaces and the unsafe 
railroad and highway.
194  Iron Will
Revised Pages
JoR did not engage in private politics such as non- state- mediated direct 
negotiation and corporate social responsibility schemes. Instead, JoR has 
bought company shares, entitling its representatives to speak at annual 
meetings, “just to be able to voice views” as owners; such creation of criti-
cal shareholders can be considered a form of embedding companies by the 
resistance. In comparison, some local MST organizations have received help 
from Vale and other companies, for example, by receiving the proposed 
funds for road construction in agrarian reform settlements. JoR has the most 
radical anti- Vale attitude, according to the Vale directors I interviewed, and 
does not have any shared projects with Vale’s development fund. According 
to Father Antonio, the goal of the movement has been to start long- term, 
general public discussion about what a development fund should do in the 
contemporary world, and thus “to force Vale to work continuously in the 
municipalities.” JoR has not taken the bait to engage in private politics but 
has worked to improve the rules of the game, and the distribution of games 
in the overall political arena, by boosting resistance willingness and capaci-
ties using particular strategies.3
These remarks on the initial steps of the JoR and MST’s efforts to create 
a national and global coalition targeting Vale have been radically realized 
since 2011. In August 2015, JoR and other new members of the anti- Vale 
movement toured mining- affected areas all over Brazil, and organized meet-
ings and networking with movements all around the world, with the intent 
of creating a global coalition. These actions brought very significant politi-
cal outcomes whose true economic outcomes have yet to materialize. This 
movement is particularly important as the bulk of it is formed by critical 
workers’ movements that bridge the cleavage of environment versus jobs, 
including miners and ore transporters at vital commodity- flow points. 
Globally, Carajás has tremendous significance as the key node of iron ore 
extraction. Whatever happens with the export- oriented point of production 
in Carajás and with Vale will have direct consequences for mining workers 
and towns from Mozambique to Canada and New Caledonia. This allows 
activists to take their resistance directly to the transnational level, and to 
unite working classes across the globe into the same network that is trying to 
steer capital. Ultimately, this means that upstream struggles against iron ore 
extraction can create transnational coalitions against extractivism.
It is not by coincidence that the global Vale resistance has been built 
from the base of the struggles at the point of key extraction in Carajás, and 
that this global activism has been based and made possible— as a politi-
cal outcome— through the use and building of the five key strategies (and 
abstaining from private politics and armed resistance). This signifies that the 
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same set of strategies (the five key strategies used simultaneously) seem to be 
generally related to major economic outcomes as well as major political out-
comes. However, the creation of new and significant global activist agency 
has not been the result in all cases that utilize these five strategies. I suggest 
that one explanation for this is found in the nature of the capital targeted. 
The case of global resistance against Vale suggests that the transnationality 
of capital and its extractive impacts across the globe serve as a mobilizing 
platform uniting dispersed local people and entities into global resistance 
networks— something that might not occur against different local compa-
nies. India, whose iron ore mining projects present a much larger variety of 
different companies than Brazil (where Vale is by far the key player), has not 
produced global political outcomes for the resistance to extractivism. This 
discussion of political outcomes is important to understand the cleavage 
lines between global, national, and local environmental governance, espe-
cially as this relates to when they emerge, and to what extent they do or do 
not define politics.
National Mining Advocacy and Networking
This last section briefly compares the use of strategies by the national organi-
zations, networks, and movements that work on mining politics in India and 
Brazil. National networks and organizations can operate as opportunities for 
local activists, particularly as they have taken over several of the defaulted 
functions of the state institutions that are supposed to monitor or steer min-
ing policy and stakeholder relations. However, these are primarily civil soci-
ety organizations in the formal sense, and they have their own strategies for 
embedding the state or forging resistance networks on a nationwide scale, or 
both. Thus, it is productive to assess their role here. I assess the strategies of 
these national coalitions, and their impact in resistance to extractivism, and 
the building of different resistance strategies by local groups.
The Brazilian national movement, MAM, experienced a name change in 
2014. In a June 2014 interview, the coordinator of the movement explained 
to me that the new name, Movimento Nacional pela Soberania Popular 
frente à Mineração, adopted in 2014, emphasizes the national character of 
the network, and reflects the turn from a movement for those who have been 
impacted by mining and require compensation to a proactive movement 
that creates “popular sovereignty” in order to stop mining before it even 
begins. The national network in India, called Mines, Minerals and People 
(MMP), has a much longer history and a larger presence in mining politics. 
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According to my interviews with its coordinators, the network— involving 
about 150 communities and twelve support groups— aimed to “keep miner-
als in the ground as long as possible,” but also to follow local views (if they 
for example preferred to have mining in some form, against a compensation, 
whose terms the network helped to negotiate). Besides offering contacts, its 
activities include training people around the technicalities of environmental 
impact assessments and taking cases to court. In December 2012, the MMP 
had a “portfolio of 80– 90 cases” against companies. In brief, MAM is less 
focused on litigation than MMP, and more focused on building a radical 
mass social movement.
The MMP network has three basic strategies that are used successively. 
In other words, if the first does not work they continue to the second and 
then on to the third. The first strategy is to create awareness in project areas, 
educate people about false company information, and teach how to demand 
compensation and to register grievances. If this does not work, MMP helps 
organize protests. If protests do not work, they offer help to affected peoples 
to work with the courts. This suggests that MMP focuses on activities that 
support the locals to be able to use the five key strategies themselves if they 
want to, and MMP may become directly involved particularly in protesting 
and judicial embedding efforts if it is needed. They also support community 
meetings and exchanges to a degree, but this activity is limited due to its 
high costs. Since 2010, the MMP has held national meetings, which indi-
cates that several local movements dealing with mining problems are starting 
to converge under the MMP banner.
Given the many different and often conflicting forms of mobilization by 
mining activists in India, the MMP network is much looser than its coun-
terpart MAM in Brazil. However, it should be noted that practically all resis-
tance efforts in India are involved in some way with the MMP, whether it is 
in the form of support or receiving direct assistance. The MMP is composed 
of a mix of alliances between social movements and specialist NGOs, dif-
fering from other Indian mass social movements, like the land rights move-
ment Ekta Parishad, in that it is more closely linked to state governance 
structures. It has several committees addressing policy, and it also offers legal 
aid to activists. The coordinating staff is quite small and consists of a handful 
of traveling national secretariat members that help move cases to the capital 
in conjunction with the local organizers. Indeed, they find it “necessary” 
to maintain a presence in New Delhi. According to the MMP, in 2010– 12 
it was involved in the following five key cases: (1) Vedanta bauxite mines 
in Odisha; (2) Jindal’s Chhattisgarh coal and steel projects; (3) Goa’s iron 
projects, where they were performing “systematic work”; (4) Tata’s Kalinga 
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Nagar steel project in Odisha, where the Tata company- state apparatus 
killed twelve Adivasis on January 2, 2006; and (5) ArcelorMittal’s steel proj-
ect in Ranchi, Jharkhand. All these cases have experienced the suspension or 
closure of projects or mining/steelmaking activities.
The MMP steers away from private politics. A coordinator told me, “Our 
dialogue with companies is only in court. . . . Many companies have come 
to us, but we have had bad experiences. Companies say, ‘what is the prob-
lem, we will resolve it.’” Yet companies do nothing, and the MMP has been 
actively working to change this dynamic, and I was told, “now we are fram-
ing the companies differently.” However, the coordinator emphasized that 
they are not targeting the companies, but rather the implementation of the 
law. Initially only the state is involved in legal cases, but later in the process 
companies get drawn in. This was the case in Vedanta’s Niamgiri litigation, 
which was initially against the Ministry of the Environment, but later the 
company joined. I asked other important national and local organizations 
about their views of each other, and their views of the MMP. A member of 
the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), a national research orga-
nization, argued that the MMP is a “very powerful organization” that has 
helped to “bring change so that only tribals can own land in tribal areas,” 
which was a “big blow to the industry.”
The CSE has possibly been the second- most impactful national network 
or organization in mining activism, producing the most in- depth indepen-
dent analyses of mining impacts and problems and trying to change policies 
in India. A human rights activist in Odisha said to me that the massive CSE 
(2008) report has made it easier for the government to understand the issue 
of mining, and that the CSE has had a “role as a bridge in our state, helping 
in information collection.” The CSE, however, is “not contentious,” accord-
ing to one of its coordinators. It does not do protesting: “It is not Green-
peace. . . . Our biggest strength is data- based research to show government 
is doing something wrong.”
Brazil has a similar organization, the Brazilian Institute for Social and 
Economic Analysis (IBASE), which has published extensive alternative pro-
posals on mining policy, and is collecting data and doing deep analysis of 
mining and other important extractive sectors. However, in comparison to 
CSE, IBASE is much more rooted in mass social movement organizations, 
in addition to its role as a top- notch think tank. Yet the CSE has more 
resources and is more embedded in the state. The CSE has also been influ-
ential through the publication of a renowned national magazine and the 
delivery of extensive reports to the public. Both IBASE and CSE have taken 
over functions that the state has defaulted on. A state bureaucrat told me 
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that “even ministries do not have the information [on mining] coded and 
consolidated” to the same extent and depth as the CSE. My review of exist-
ing publications on the mining sector revealed that this was the case. The 
CSE sees that improving transparency is the key to solving these problems: 
“The CSE sheets [on mining] are the only data in the public domain. Trans-
parency is the most important thing.” This has changed since 2013 with the 
Shah Commission and Supreme Court producing detailed data, but they are 
not as easily accessible or readable as the CSE sheets.
In many ways, therefore, these civil society organizations form a part 
of the de facto state by performing functions that should be done by the 
state. Such an occupation of state capacities by critical NGOs can be seen 
as a boon to mobilization and activism in the sense that it is much easier to 
embed these semistate apparatuses than the official state institutions. This is 
particularly true in political systems where institutional politics are almost 
completely steered by the results of electoral politics, as in India. In Brazil 
this was not such a big issue (in the period before 2016), when the auton-
omy of proper state institutions such as the Ministry for Agrarian Develop-
ment allowed the landless movements to embed the ministry thoroughly 
and use it in the same way as the Rural Caucus of large landholders has 
almost completely embedded the much larger and more powerful Ministry 
of Agriculture.
Both agribusiness and the MST have largely retained their autonomy 
despite their coproduction of these Brazilian ministries and other state insti-
tutions. A CSE member argued that “we work with the government, but 
[also] against them. I need to have the dialogue with the government to get 
something done.” The CSE was the crucial bridge maker with local com-
munities in the Manmohan Singh central government’s attempt to draft 
a new mining bill. According to the CSE member, “we went to places and 
organized dialogues, educated people about the bill, giving everyone a space 
to dialogue.” Unfortunately (from the point of view of crafting a solid min-
ing law), the government changed, and these efforts were rendered almost 
fruitless. This sudden shift caused by governmental change demonstrates the 
danger in single- party- focused electoral embedding; from this point of view 
the production of new institutions or institutional rules would be safer. The 
CSE has also participated in institutional embedding activities. They were a 
key organization pressuring the central government to set up the Shah Com-
mission in 2009, through their work collecting research data on how much 
money the government was losing due to mining mafia thievery. Indeed, the 
establishment of this commission was seen by one member of the CSE as 
its first significant impact. She was possibly too modest about what the CSE 
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achieves— several independent observers agreed that the organization plays 
a salient role in government embedding, talking their language, and having 
the right connections at the top. In fact, institutional coproduction at the 
federal level can be far more powerful than electoral embedding, as it can 
change the dynamics of how candidates get elected. After the Shah Commis-
sion gave recommendations concerning moratoriums on mining, the state 
governments “had to follow these to get reelected.”4
In addition to the MMP and CSE, there is a third, more grassroot- 
politicization- based national movement network working closely on mining 
activism in India, the Campaign for Survival and Dignity (CSD). These 
three networks overlapped and included organizations and movements that 
were interconnected, but also separate groups. According to one of CSD’s 
coordinators, whom I interviewed several times in 2012 and 2013, CSD is 
a national platform of Adivasi and forest dwellers’ organizations operating 
in ten states, mostly in the civil war contexts of Eastern India. They are a 
key platform for pursuing the Forest Rights Act, and a considerable actor in 
India, much like La Via Campesina’s Brazilian organization.5 According to 
one of its national coordinators, the CSD (which consists of 150– 200 mass 
organizations that have their own state- level federations and a very large 
number of members) takes a more general view of mining, treating its prob-
lems as part of general land- rights issues. The CSD coordinator noted how 
“it does not make sense to look just at mining,” as, in general, he saw that 
it is “the same principle— capitalism— that is applied in all these struggles” 
where nature is seen as “resources.”
The CSD is radical in comparison to MMP and CSE and steers the fur-
thest away from dialogue with corporations or the state: “we don’t want to 
fall into the trap of the state; mining is not our [issue], but the state’s issue.” 
By this the coordinator of CSD meant that they do not even want to start 
talk about “mining” per se, as they are rather advocating for the talk to be 
held around the “forest rights of people,” as their goal is “a collective control 
of land and resources, also against mining of course.” The movement aims to 
support the vision and development of alternative spaces controlled by the 
peoples’ alternative culture, in the same vein as the MST in Brazil. CSD has 
gained more traction since 2002 with the explosive rise in mobilization in 
India, moving toward agitation increasingly based on mass movements (not 
NGOs). The framing of its goal very closely resembles the latest form and 
goal of Brazil’s new national antimining movement, MAM, which is never-
theless a very small actor in comparison to CSD. While the CSE, along with 
many other NGOs, held Minister of Rural Development Jairam Ramesh’s 
actions in very high esteem, a CSD member called Ramesh’s land reform 
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promises “mostly meaningless,” demonstrating the different stances among 
the Indian national networks.
In comparative terms, the three large national networks in India (MMP, 
CSE, and CSD) have had more activists, greater resources, and have been 
more successful in closing mines than the national organizations in Brazil. 
However, most of the attention of national- level networking in Brazil has 
been much more international from the beginning, aiming to create a glob-
ally new movement for targeting large mining corporations. This has taken 
form in the movement called International Articulation of Those Affected 
by Vale, in which JoR and the MST are key members. Their main goal 
has been to build a radical mass social movement that is global and has 
many constituents. The results of this difference in scope— national versus 
international— are still to be seen.
The Brazilians sought primarily political outcomes, and with this politi-
cal focus they created more coherent and encompassing national activist 
networks around mining than in India. Carlos Bittencourt from IBASE 
emphasized the importance of this national political networking; after a few 
years of such efforts, a “national public debate on mining” has started in 
Brazil. There have been important synergies in uniting the struggles of local 
communities, which have learned the logic of litigation. Companies are now 
recognizing that resistance can slow down and cancel projects. They have 
also realized the importance of mayoral support for movements: “it is pos-
sible to win small victories now.” Major victories have even been won, such 
as discontinuing Apolo in Belo Horizonte, but the clearest victory, accord-
ing to Bittencourt, was the bauxite mine project blocked by the villagers of 
Jurutí in Pará, next to the Amazon River.6 Future research should consider 
these early major resistance initiatives in the context of the historical iron ore 
boom, and see how the differences in created political agencies influenced 
future economic outcomes.
Part III has described and analyzed many important and as- - yet unheard 
of and undocumented struggles from places cast as global peripheries, where 
local people have stood up to resist the turning of their homelands into 
resource frontiers and points of extraction, appropriation, and dispossession. 
The rich, empirical depictions offer many insights into how people can resist 
the expansion of destructive projects even in very difficult situations, and 
without resorting to violence.
Part II examined the major cleavage lines that explain how resistance 
does not take place in a void, but in social settings that offer different oppor-
tunities and threats to activism. The takeaway message from this comparison 
is that we need more analyses that do not compare blindly across all dif-
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ferent types of polities and settings of broad political dynamics, under the 
assumption that social mechanisms and causalities can be generalized across 
the board, but also make contextual and contingency analyses. Having done 
this before moving into a concentrated analysis of strategies and their rela-
tion to outcomes in part III, it is possible to say that a surprisingly large 
portion of different strategy combinations’ causal relation to outcomes can 
be generalized.
In sum, the hypothesis has proved robust in explaining the Indian cases; 
the use of the five key strategies was sufficient to bust the boom of iron mines 
across all the cases. This was not, however, the case in all the Brazilian cases, 
suggesting that the contextual and contingency differences between Brazil 
and India, and among the Brazilian cases, are important to understand the 
limits of generalization. The five strategies were always important in one 
way or another, creating either crucial political or economic outcomes, but 
sometimes the local resistance faced an extractivist push and violence that 
were too much to handle, even by a potent peaceful resistance.
Parts II and III brought forth competing and complementary explana-
tions that placed maximum pressure on the initial hypothesis, so that the 
concerted examination of the strategies’ impact would not be based on a 
naïve romanticizing of activist possibilities, or on a shallow understanding 
of causal complexities. Most studies on social movements against extractiv-
ism have focused on the roots of mobilizations, trying to explain why people 
resist (Conde 2017; Haslam and Tanimoune 2016); it is an even more com-
plicated task to study how they produce or do not produce the outcomes 
that they do, and to explain the role of resistance in the overall investment 
politics, as has been done here.7 I have tested and refined these five resis-
tance strategies via the study of contexts, contingencies, and multiple cases. 
The hypothesis alone is sufficient to explain when extractivist booms can be 
busted. This book has analyzed the resistance to the global iron ore boom in 




Resisting the Global Political Economy  
of Extractivism
After finishing the field research trips for this book in Brazil and India, 
I was invited on a trip to Canada as an observer of their mining sector 
governance mechanisms. I represented civil society; I was accompanied by 
representatives of industry and of the state. We visited the mining region 
of Sudbury, whose tall forests had been cut and burned in their totality 
to fuel the nickel smelters, whose sulfur emissions had turned this once- 
verdant region into a moonscape. Now some trees were growing like in 
the Arctic, as miniatures, after enormous efforts of restoration— an arti-
ficially made Lapland fell with dwarf birch and tundra- like landscapes. 
We observed the corporate- community meetings in Canada, which offered 
glimpses into how the most critical voices were silenced and not welcome 
in the so- called stakeholder dialogues. In a meeting in Ottawa, mining 
executives pondered how their industry association should reward the best 
performing corporation. Many options were weighed, including a fist- size 
model of the Earth, made of metals, or something like a glass placard. 
The globe made of different metals won. These experiences were helpful 
when developing a conceptual framework on the political games that are 
used in investment politics, which include not only state- mediated politics 
but also private and other kinds of politics. In one visit I was invited to 
a mining company headquarters in Toronto, the mining capital of the 
world, where half of the global mining equity financing is done. Discon-
nected from the earth on the thirtieth floor, one corporation’s directors 
were proudly explaining how each floor of the building was responsible for 
managing a different mineral, and that they led all the global operations 
of making money with that mineral. While this Toronto tower gleamed, 
the sky was dark and stormy as rain poured down the glass and steel walls 
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of the tall building. Being an up- close participant observer to the sheer 
magnitude and clout of the corporate side of mining expansion, from 
Canada to Finland, Sweden, Brazil, India, Peru, and elsewhere, was 
important to understanding the true globality of extractivism, and what 
the resistance movements were actually up against.
I started this book by explaining how I went to Goa in 2010 and 2019 to 
understand how the resistance to mining extractivism in India resulted in 
a globally unprecedented wave of discontinuation of over half the iron ore 
mines and scrapping most greenfield projects. As I am writing this conclu-
sion, in September 2019, the mines in Goa remain closed. Activists keep on 
advancing their cause, even reaching further cancellations of mining leases. 
It seems that these activists have managed to forge a robust will to resist. This 
book has explained how this resistance can be forged in the myriad situa-
tions faced by those whose homelands have been cast as extractable regions. 
A broad lesson that came out of this exploration into the lived experience 
of mining resistance in India and Brazil is that the best results came when 
five key strategies were used in combination, and conciliatory strategies were 
actively avoided. I will readdress these strategies throughout the conclusion 
as I tie up some of the loose ends around this multifaceted research topic. By 
way of review, the five strategies are: (a) organizing and politicizing a mass 
social movement; (b) campaigning by nonmodernist framing; (c) protest-
ing peacefully and physically so that this is noted, for example by blocking 
important resource export routes; (d) networking; and (e) state embedding 
actions that redefine the rules or power relations of electoral, institutional, 
and structural or judicial politics, or both, while retaining autonomy. The 
long- term observation of the practical and theoretical lessons learned by the 
resistance movements around how to start and make change was the basis 
for the development of the concise articulation of these strategies. These 
strategies should be heeded and utilized by future resistance movements as 
the problems caused by global extractivism and solutions to the climate and 
socio- environmental crises described herein are likely to become ever- more 
central and pressing around the world.
This book compared several different locations in Brazil and India that 
have shown signs of a marked increase in resource extraction, but differ in 
contextual, geographical, and sociocultural settings. This is the first book 
to systematically map, document, and compare the politics of such a large 
number of iron ore mining areas and projects in the world. In addition, 
this project also took into account most of the related steel plants, as these 
sites provided an important set of unique, but related, political dynamics in 
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both Brazil and India. Maps 1 and 2 served to spatially situate the projects 
during the 2005– 15 study period. These maps were qualitatively produced 
based on my experiences in the field, as the information regarding the true 
extent of these projects is not easily gleaned from the available geographic 
data, which comes mostly from the companies or the government. The 
process of producing these maps served as a grave reminder that the true 
extent of a project area is made up of many different types of space, includ-
ing the sociocultural— these maps honored this more complex geography. 
In the process of surveying and ground truthing the extent of the project 
areas, I encountered widespread and deep conflicts, which had innumerable 
human rights and other violations in these extractivist regions. There is even 
a major civil war being consistently waged around the question of whether 
iron ore extraction should or should not expand into forests inhabited by 
indigenous populations. It is surprising how little knowledge has previously 
existed (outside the immediate battlefields) on these conflicts and projects, 
especially given their global centrality. Thus, an important mission of this 
book is to document and bring to light these cases.
Beyond the documentation of an important slice of global extractivism 
and the resistance efforts, my theoretical starting point was to seek common-
alities in how movements have influenced investment pace and style despite 
contingencies from the grassroots perspective. In this conclusion I will first 
summarize the key points and then situate these findings in the appropriate 
broader literatures, illustrating how these conceptual frameworks influence 
broader and specific theorizations. I will pay specific attention to the con-
tribution of these analyses to the study of contentious politics, investment 
politics, world- ecology, and global environmental governance. Finally, I will 
discuss the general implications for global extractivism as suggested by these 
cases, and I will point toward new directions for research.
Contentious Politics and Investment Outcomes
The findings provide new insights, which focus on the outcomes of civil 
society strategies, mobilization trajectories, and the differing dynamics of 
contention in the recent global commodity boom. Although these insights 
are not limited solely to the study of contentious politics, this analysis serves 
to extend the agenda of that field, by demonstrating that there are multiple 
possible pathways to reach the desired outcomes, particularly via the use of 
differing sets of strategies. I have tried to answer the call of McAdam, Tar-
row, and Tilly (2001, 2008) for a more dynamic and relational approach 
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to studying social movements. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) theorize 
on several generalizable mechanisms of contention, through a focus on the 
characteristics and the role played by these mechanisms in mobilizations. 
However, these authors do not make any claims about the causalities these 
mechanisms might have in relation to mobilization outcomes, which is an 
important facet of the larger discussion.
Iron Will contributes to the social movement literature by outlining in 
detail the complex causal interrelationships that exist between strategies, 
dynamics, and outcomes. My working hypothesis was that the simultaneous 
use of five specific resistance strategies could explain investment outcomes. 
In order to test this hypothesis, this book examined the relationship of these 
strategies to outcomes, through political ethnographies of place- based strug-
gles. Partly as a way of introducing the cases and the overall settings and 
polities where these take place, part II looked at how discrepancies between 
political dynamics and contextual factors might offer better or complemen-
tary explanations. By way of example, I found that the cleavage between 
an armed conflict and one without two- sided use of arms carries major 
explanatory force. Nevertheless, certain strategies do seem to carry general 
importance in resisting extractivism. The working hypothesis was that five 
key strategies could generally explain when extractivist booms are busted by 
resistance movements. This hypothesis received robust support and proved 
sufficient to explain all the cases across India, but not the cases in Brazil. The 
reasons for this discrepancy were explored by incorporating a comparative 
study of political dynamics, contexts, opportunities, and contingencies. This 
analysis shows how resistance strategies produce outcomes, but also that the 
causalities are intermediated by polities and contextual contingencies.
In order to identify these strategies of resistance, as well as many other 
important factors, I have developed a conceptual framework based on multi-
ple, contextually varying empirical cases that do not easily fall into traditional 
Marxist labor emancipation, modern social movement, or environmental- 
politics analyses. The two resulting conceptual frameworks of the political 
games of policy- making (figures 1 and 2, chapter 2) and the spatial causali-
ties of power relations (figure 3, chapter 2) are powerful and complemen-
tary explanatory tools, as they are based on detailed, yet large- scale, analysis 
of empirical realities. These figures when taken together offer a tool set to 
study the quality of state- society relations, as well as offer a comprehensive 
explanation of causalities in investment politics. The framework is helpful 
in explaining the locally specific governance settings in their multiplicity 
and complex interrelations, instead of imposing a rigid framework on top 
of complex realities. At the same time, the framework allows a comparison 
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across very different cases, as the political games and spaces identified are 
loose enough as heuristic tools. This analytical framework offers the pos-
sibility of understanding the global political economy and world- ecology 
through incorporating comparisons across differing sets of extractivist and 
investment politics.
My Indian and Brazilian field research between 2010 and 2014 disclosed 
that all iron ore mining projects in Western and Southern India (i.e., Kudre-
mukh and Bellary in Karnataka state, Salem and Tiruvannamalai in Tamil 
Nadu and Goa) had been discontinued, and quite a few in Eastern India as 
well— this was the work of ongoing, globally unprecedented, antimining 
mobilization. In Brazil, the Eastern Amazon (Pará, Maranhão) has witnessed 
some changes in investment style as a result of the mobilization of the poorer 
working classes into social movements, while the clearest project discontinu-
ations have occurred in the state of Minas Gerais. The third principal iron 
ore producing region in Brazil, around Corumbá in Mato Grosso do Sul, 
had not experienced major mining curtailment based on a resistance effort. 
However, this region produces a relatively low- production volume.
This book responds to calls by Bosi, Giugni, and Uba (2016), Amenta 
et al. (2010), and others for rigorous research on movement outcomes. By 
analyzing these important yet previously unstudied cases, I have demon-
strated empirically that movement action coproducing new electoral politics 
can be influential. This influence is shown through actions, for example, 
by signing antimining MOUs with prospective political candidates in local 
regions, and then pooling votes for these candidates, as in the Keonjhar 
case. Likewise, analysis of the Iron Quadrangle of Minas Gerais, around 
Belo Horizonte, emphasized the importance of city politics in supporting 
resistance efforts. Successful state embedding, including electoral politics, 
is a central component by which mayors and other politicians were incor-
porated into resistance movements, and is a powerful strategy that has both 
political and economic outcomes. State embedding also creates a changed 
reality for future movements, providing them opportunities to more reliably 
secure favorable outcomes. I also found that court litigation can be a very 
effective tool, but it should be used with caution. Simple litigation, without 
prior judicial embedding with resistance autonomy, typically requires build-
ing skills and capacities via organizing, campaigning, protesting, and net-
working. Direct litigation without the use of these other resistance strategies 
before or simultaneously can be perilous and have an unintended backlash.
I study which causal condition complexes of strategies of resistance were 
related to what outcomes. The findings suggest that the simultaneous use of 
many strategies more securely leads to better outcomes from the movement view-
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point, which is in line with the findings of prior movement outcome studies 
(Luders 2010; Kröger 2011, 2013a). By contrast, engaging in private poli-
tics initiated by companies (e.g., stakeholder dialogues) seemed to not have a 
positive impact on boosting resistance or influencing investment outcomes. 
This resonates with previous studies on the negative impact of dialogue with 
stakeholders for activists and civil society that is adversely affected by invest-
ments (Maher 2014; Zhouri and Valencio 2014). The cases with the stron-
gest engagement in private politics also had the least vigorous creation of 
resistance and the least impressive economic outcomes.
These findings are globally important. The Pará and Maranhão mobi-
lizations had major global political outcomes, with the result of boosting 
resistance elsewhere, and therefore are the most interesting for a study of 
how transnational coalitions against extractivism are forged. Both the MST 
(Pará) and JoR (Maranhão) mobilizations against Vale managed to influ-
ence the company’s investment pace and style, and not only in their local 
operating areas as the movement’s networking has been transnational and 
helped to politicize those impacted by Vale’s operations from Canada to 
Mozambique. Both mobilizations shared the simultaneous use of the five key 
strategies, which suggests that while the use of these strategies might not 
lead to discontinuing all mining operations in all places, their use is likely 
(and possibly even more importantly) to lead to the creation of new politi-
cal agency that can shape global environmental and investment governance.
I also found that not all the five key strategies have been necessary to 
bust mining booms— in some cases the use of a subset of these has sufficed. 
Yet, even more importantly, some of these strategies were more crucial than 
others for blocking or discontinuing projects. In India, the necessary (but 
insufficient) strategies for peaceful resistance to either halt or stall the expan-
sion of mining have been peaceful protesting and avoidance of private politics. 
In terms of movement scholarship, these findings support Walsh, Warland, 
and Smith (1997), who found that resistance was more successful when 
using political instead of legal tactics— both protesting and avoiding private 
politics are largely political strategies. However, I found that the legal path, 
specifically through the embedding of judicial politics, could bring great 
success for resistance in the right political opportunity context, such as in 
the case of India’s Supreme Court design. In India, as discussed in chapter 
3, specialist legal NGOs focusing on environmental issues, and having the 
right connections inside the Supreme Court, can make petitions directly to 
the Supreme Court’s Green Tribunal, skipping the lower level courts and 
getting specialized and good attention to their petitions relatively quickly. 
Such an opportunity is not present for similarly equipped NGOs in Brazil. 
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This supports Evans’s claims (1995) that the mobilization in Kerala that he 
studied would not have been successful without the already- existing, bureau-
cratic coherency, which assured at the federal level that the movement could 
embed the state. However, in order to use judicial politics toward the desired 
ends, movements had to have already been using political tools to create the 
willingness and capacity to contend among the civil society. It is essential 
that they had to be able to not only embed but also to coproduce new rules 
and working practices, and thus power relations, for the state- remediated 
political games— this reinforces the primacy of politics.
Forging unforeseen willingness to resist extractivism, this “iron will” 
activism, within a large group of people has lasting and important devel-
opmental and democratic ramifications. In Brazil, a horizontal expansion 
of contention was created, leading to a new movement network with the 
specific agenda of targeting a multinational company (Vale), and expand-
ing both nationally and transnationally among those directly affected. In 
India, populations in Goa became more involved and critical of the politics 
of mining across ethnic and class lines. The comparison revealed that any 
attempts to steer mining policies in a better direction were either grassroots- led 
or professional- NGO based, or both, and not proactive top- down government 
processes.1
Can These Findings Be Generalized?
In comparison to another natural resource sector, industrial forestry, which 
has been the main focus of my academic work, the causalities in iron ore 
politics have greater differences than similarities between the cases. In large- 
scale pulp investments, a set of resistance strategies similar to the five key 
strategies was necessary and sufficient to lead to either discontinuing or slow-
ing down the pace of tree plantation expansion (Kröger 2013a). In India the 
(economic) outcomes of using the five key strategies were generally more 
impressive than in Brazil, in both forestry and mining, halting to a greater 
extent both the expansion of industrial tree plantations and many mining 
projects. Since success seems to breed success, there looks to have been a 
marked difference in the variety of resistance possibilities (using the same 
strategies) available in Brazil and India. Although both Brazil and India were 
consolidating democracies during the study period, which ran until 2015, 
it has generally been easier for the resistance to reach major outcomes in 
India than in Brazil.2 On one hand, this suggests that variations, particularly 
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in political systems and the social contexts of activism, but also in the issue 
examined, render it difficult to universalize causalities between strategies and 
outcomes. Overtly universalizing claims purporting to explain how move-
ments are most influential should be avoided. On the other hand, these 
findings do exemplify that the more deeply, broadly, and simultaneously the 
five key strategies are used, the more likely it is that resistance will reach its 
goals. Context and issue function as amplifiers or mitigators of the impact, but 
so does the depth or superficiality of resistance. For example, the readiness of the 
elite to deploy violence and limit the use of democratic channels to report 
grievances can be countered by using all the five strategies. The actions in 
Odisha, for example, demonstrated that a very effective form of peaceful 
resistance was to fill the physical space targeted by companies with locals.
These findings are likely to hold in other contexts, based on the exist-
ing mining literature that I consulted for this study. Most of the research 
on extractivism and its attendant conflicts has focused on the general min-
ing projects of Spanish- speaking regions of Latin America, many of which 
have been shelved by resistance efforts. This book has expanded the study 
of mining- based extractivism through the deep ethnographic examination 
of rarely studied contexts. Based on my investigation and evaluation of the 
existing research on extractivism in Latin America, the simultaneous use of 
the five key strategies has led to a massive wave of high- profile mine block-
ings and closures throughout the region. It should be noted that the key 
strategies that are most often used in these situations are organizing and 
politicizing strong local mass social movements with a focus on concerns 
about the impact of mining on water, agriculture, and forests. Arce (2014), 
Bebbington and Bury (2013), Broad and Cavanagh (2015), Haslam and 
Tanimoune (2016), and the EJOLT project Environmental Justice Atlas3 
provide accounts of the large number of successful mining resistance cases, 
particularly in the Andean countries and Central America.4 In the Andean 
countries and Central America, mass social movements have been par-
ticularly visible, and, not surprisingly, quite impactful. This is also clearly 
seen with a recent large iron ore project in Uruguay, which was successfully 
blocked by a resistance movement. In Peru, mobilizations against resource 
extraction have led to a number of other important changes, including the 
political outcome in 2011 of electing President Ollanta Humala, who lis-
tened to the demand of movements to have prior consultation, requiring 
consensus on extraction from locals, as a law, while particular resistance 
cases, such as against the Yanacocha project in Cajamarca, led to important 
national- scale changes (Arce 2014).
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Why Was Physical Protesting a Key Factor in Resisting Extractivism?
Disruptive and innovative protests have been found in general to work well 
for movements (Tarrow 2011). They do not have to target elected state offi-
cials; disruptive mass protests aimed directly at corporations can be a direct 
and effective way to reduce their power to influence the government. In 
addition, mass protests serve as a mechanism to urge corporations to think 
twice about proceeding with their investment (Young and Schwartz 2014). 
Based mostly on U.S. cases, Young and Schwartz (2014) argue that targeting 
economic actors to change government policy is more effective than target-
ing politicians. In the natural resource sectors, mass movements can block 
the flow of commodities more easily than in service sectors such as banking 
or retailing.
The resistance efforts I observed have led to major changes in the actual 
possibilities to expand or continue the economic activities of mining, but to 
fewer changes in official mining laws. The choice of resistance movements 
to primarily target the operations of companies at the point of production 
has led to some government policy changes. In quite a few cases there have 
been greater royalties, greater respect for prior consultation, and a tendency 
for powerholders to clamp down on heavily destructive mines. However, 
the major policy outcomes, on the actual use of environments, have come 
from the de facto political blockage of projects, not from the de jure rights 
of the citizenry. This finding supports the aforementioned claim by Young 
and Schwartz (2014) that targeting economic actors to change policy is more 
effective than targeting politicians. In my data this concept applied locally, but 
was not so clear nationally.
Disruptive, pioneering, nonviolent, and massive protesting surfaced as a 
necessary condition for movements’ ability to significantly influence invest-
ment trajectories. While protesting is a necessary causal condition in slowing 
extraction projects, the use of this mechanism alone was not typically a suffi-
cient condition for change. Earlier studies of environmental activism in Bra-
zil support this finding, confirming that combining the use of both conten-
tious and conventional means of resistance is far more likely to guarantee an 
impact (Hochstetler and Keck 2007). Both Brazil and India from 2000 to 
2015 had many regions that were undergoing a consolidation into democ-
racy. This offered several innovative federal- level possibilities, which had not 
yet been tapped into, and were unlikely to be developed without their active 
coproduction by civil society. Thus, using the contentious strategies of state 
coproduction, movement autonomy, and capacity building simultaneously 
was a fruitful avenue for civil society to become a key partner in building 
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democracy. This can result in encompassing embeddedness, which Evans 
(2010) sees as a cornerstone solution for building twenty- first- century 
developmental states that also solves many of the problems related to the 
deep and seemingly unsolvable developmental dilemmas of today.
Iron Ore Cases as Challengers of Existing Knowledge on Land  
and Resource Politics?
These new mining data allow us to challenge several previous claims made in 
scholarship, for example, regarding resistance to land grabbing and environ-
mental conflicts in India. Levien (2011) argues that India’s agrarian coun-
termovements have been successful in politicizing land acquisition more 
broadly, which puts states on the defensive and disrupts their abilities to 
broker land for special economic zones and other ventures. Undoubtedly, 
iron mine closures build on land politics, but nevertheless the success of 
mining resistance is arguably greater than that seen in other sectors. This 
may be related to the resistance strategies in use. Those studying land grab-
bing, dispossession, and the general resistance to these activities in India, 
such as Levien (2011, 2012, 2013b, 2018), have argued that cross- class alli-
ances are a typical feature of local resistance in these fields and that move-
ment organizations are typically ad- hoc, autonomous, single- issue, and not 
affiliated with political parties (Levien 2013a). Apart from the autonomy 
claim, for which I did find support (autonomy failing in only two of the 
sixteen cases of Indian iron mine dynamics), the features above did not 
apply. Cross- class alliances were present in only four cases. Most movements 
were party affiliated.5 Most mining movements were not just mining focused, 
but had already mobilized to resist the unchecked expansion of forestry and 
GMOs, and around other issues. These were not just ad- hoc movements 
formed specifically for mining resistance, but rather were building on deep 
roots of activism over a long period of time. These findings illustrate a deep 
need to reassess the existing understanding(s) of India’s rural and environ-
mental social movements.
The findings also help to change the focus in the debate on endowment- 
based “resource curses” (see Watts 2004), tying geographical and political 
explanations more fully together instead of pitting one against the other. 
I found that ecological endowments are not fate, but the geographical par-
ticularity of mines is an important political component that movements can use 
strategically. Mines are easier targets for resistance to achieve their goals than 
more movable investment projects if (a) the resistance has knowledge of 
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potential immobility and manages to use this as a bargaining tool, and (b) 
the targets are not desperate enough to use any and all means to push the 
project through.
Upstream struggles to choke the flow of resources at the source (Bridge 
2010) were of great importance in busting the boom of iron mines. This 
stands as a key finding and answers Gavin Bridge’s call for more studies on 
these upstream strategies, instead of looking just at downstream strategies. 
The discrepancies between the politics (particularly resistance strategies) of 
coltan (Nest 2011), bauxite (Padel and Das 2010a), nickel (Kirsch 2013), 
and iron ore show that resistance has gathered downstream around some 
minerals, such as coltan (through actions like boycotts), and upstream in the 
case of other minerals, such as iron and other bulky minerals. Bauxite and 
nickel are somewhere in between the upstream and downstream approaches, 
with successful resistance efforts having relied on both strategic positions. 
Point- of- production politics, like those the population in Papua New 
Guinea relied on, were the basis for the social movement’s ultimately man-
aging to convince buyers not to buy nickel from the mine (Kirsch 2013). 
To achieve their goals, it was necessary to organize and politicize a resistance 
group that could make an in- depth study of the spatial distribution of nickel 
capital. These studies traced the global production network and commodity 
chain in an effort that Kirsch (2013) called a “politics of space.” In contrast 
to the three aforementioned minerals, due to the globality and generality of 
iron ore, the options of both consumer boycotting and tracking and pressur-
ing commodity chains are less usable, and most politics revolves quite limitedly 
around resistance at the points of production and the logistical network in a 
more Mitchellian way of obstructing extraction (see Mitchell 2011).
What Was the Role of Corporate- State Agency?
I also studied the role of corporate agency, third parties, and the state. 
My database included both small and large companies, and government 
and nongovernment prioritized project areas. The mining literature sug-
gests that the odds against blocking state- backed mining investment are 
overwhelming in many political systems, though the existence of coun-
termovements can slow this type of investment (Gerbode 2011). In the 
Carajás region of Brazil’s Eastern Amazon, the most important national 
“resource frontier” in the country’s growth strategy (as the region is offi-
cially called), expansion is principally driven by the federal government 
(Kröger 2015b). Goa’s mining expansion, on the other hand, was largely a 
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private- interest, substate initiative led by upper castes or classes, or both, 
rather than the federal state apparatus, which regards Eastern India, and 
not Goa, as the nation’s principal region to be turned into a “resource 
frontier.” Not coincidentally, these regions are also mostly densely forested 
homelands of indigenous populations, which are framed as in need of 
“development.” A related key factor is the presence of large steel plants in 
Eastern India, which are thought to require the opening of new iron ore 
deposits nearby. This has provided a markedly easier playing field for Goa’s 
antiexpansion activists compared to that in Carajás or Eastern India. It 
should be noted, however, that the feat of fully halting all mining activities 
in Goa and rendering them difficult to fully reinitiate was not a predict-
able outcome. Meanwhile, although the resistance did not bring mining 
to a halt as in Goa, the activists in Carajás have managed to significantly 
influence the expansion pace and style of the extractivist practices. These 
findings suggest that in the politics of extractivism, the presence of a key 
national or global resource frontier means a much harder context for resistance, 
in terms of state- corporate agency and the target. Facing a situation wherein 
your homeland is labeled by the government or would- be “developers” as 
a “resource frontier” or a “periphery” does not necessarily seal one’s fate. 
This was seen in the many cases where resistance was nevertheless able to 
block turning their lands into extraction zones whose people are treated 
like they do not matter and that they must surrender their way of life for a 
“greater good” to provide minerals for outsiders, these indigenous peoples 
barely using or needing them themselves (such as Keonjhar and Rowghat). 
In these contexts, however, the process of resistance is likely to be more 
difficult, and the extractivist violence tougher.
The underestimation of resistance potential by the targets of these efforts 
was a factor that augmented success outcomes. This suggests that an elite 
attitude can support the ability of resistance to steer investment. These find-
ings are relevant not only for the movement and corporate social responsi-
bility literatures but also for the study of site- based politics, which explores 
the implementation of large- scale projects and the presence of conflicts. This 
existing literature has found that not taking resistance potential into account, 
or adopting a solely technocratic and expert- based approach to determine 
where an investment site will be, has led to serious trouble for corporate- 
state agency to implement projects (Lesbirel and Shaw 2005). My analyses 
corroborate these findings, and in particular the case of the POSCO resis-
tance in Odisha offers a classic example of this underestimation. Investors’ 
underestimation of resistance potential is not, however, a necessary factor 
in influencing investments. Even in cases that did not have this corporate- 
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agency weakness, resistance was able to attain investment changes and boost 
mobilization not only locally but also in other places.
It is important to note that neither India or Brazil had mining- critical 
national business elites or governments— two nonmovement conditions 
that Broad and Cavanagh (2015) found crucial for explaining when mining 
bans have occurred. In fact, the elite and all the governments in the period 
studied (2000– 2015) were markedly extractivist in both countries. Consid-
ering this, the outcomes are impressive, and illustrate how “easy” contexts are 
not as essential for resistance to emerge or to have powerful impacts, contrary to 
what is assumed in the bulk of social movement theorizing. Yet, when look-
ing at the dynamics locally, in places with a significant industry sector that 
would be negatively impacted by mining, or that for some other reason 
was silent instead of defending mining, the results were more impressive for 
resistance than in the cases that lacked such economic third parties. This was 
the case with beach tourism in Goa, historic tourism in the cities of Mariana 
and Congonhas in Minas Gerais, and religious tourism in Tiruvannamalai 
in Tamil Nadu. This condition was also present in areas with nontourist 
sectors, for example, in Kudremukh with agriculture, and in Salem with 
the textile industry. These factors eased but did not cause mobilization efforts.
Does Armed Resistance Pay Off?
Often armed resource conflicts are left out of comparisons, as they have 
been suspected to have such radically differing dynamics that they require 
their own, separate studies (e.g., Haslam and Tanimoune 2016). This book 
has presented a large- scale, detailed study that includes both armed and 
nonarmed mining politics. Studies of the consequences of armed groups 
have been on the rise in security and social movement literature but are still 
limited. There is a particular need for studies on the economic outcomes 
of all kinds of protest activities (including violent and armed) that offer 
process- and mechanism- based explanations, rather than studies that just 
compare conditions (Bosi and Giugni 2012). This has been one of the main 
goals of this book. The findings suggest that violent actions by leftist groups 
in India are not simply or mostly negative for the economy, as many exist-
ing terrorism and security studies purport. This is because these projects are 
deeply destructive from the socio- environmental perspective, causing a lot 
of dispossession and serious trouble also economically, when existing jobs 
and livelihoods, and possibilities for sustainable ways of life, are destroyed 
alongside the expansion of mines over forested villages. Such dispossession 
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does mean the accumulation and economic growth in terms of GDP for 
the investors— and when following this neoclassical view on development, 
the existing literature has found the economic effects of protest acts are 
mostly negative.
However, my findings also illustrate that nonviolent direct action can 
lead to even more profound economic impacts than armed resistance, which 
challenges conventional thinking about the power of arms. Armed revolu-
tionary agency typically forges a very strong willingness to resist, especially 
in situation where the resistance has exhausted other means of impacting 
the local situation and seeks new expressions of contention. Yet the turn 
to armed resistance has mixed political outcomes; it partly supports other 
forms of contention and allows and relies on activism, but it also starts to 
eat away at the basis of critical and contentious stances when the war or the 
armed organization forces a stronger hierarchy of command. Armed revo-
lutionary resistance is a perilous and unpredictable path, with potentially 
high rewards if it is based on the threat of using arms (as in the case of the 
Zapatistas) instead of waging a bloody civil war. Tragically, in some mining 
expansion dynamics, it is the only lasting option for people who do not 
want to choose passivity, fleeing, facing ethnocide, or permanent landless-
ness. This is because in many cases, such as in parts of India, extractivist 
corporate agency has been deliberately militarizing the targeted “resource 
frontiers,” even manufacturing civil wars to ensure enclosures and resource 
access despite local resistance.
I also found that armed resistance both supported and blocked peaceful 
contention, though further studies of the specificities of armed resistance 
agencies are still needed. However, what is indisputable is that armed revo-
lutionary agency, when coupled with peaceful strategies, was effective in stalling 
mining expansion, changing mining style, and building antimining resistance 
(peaceful resistance coincided with these cases, suggesting that alone the use 
of arms might not be enough). In addition to looking at armed resistance 
strategies, I also studied armed conflicts as a contextual issue. My compari-
son suggests that there are many reasons for the emergence of armed resource 
conflict, such as differing political systems. India and Brazil, for example, dif-
fer in their organization of security and the right to use police force. In India, 
the states are responsible for security, which means that there are wildly dif-
fering stances on handling security issues (Mohapatra 2007), varying from 
extreme violence and the use of paramilitary forces to peaceful deployment. 
In Brazil, by contrast, the federal state has the most power in security mat-
ters, while the state executive, the governor, controls only the military police, 
not the several federal police forces, the armed forces stationed in the state, 
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or the civil police. Federal institutional politics has thus helped to avoid a 
long- term civil war context in Brazil, as rogue governors have been stripped 
of their overly violent responses to conflicts, deterring a spiral of deepening 
violence. Violence escalates interactively, and if the other party does not par-
ticipate, it cannot continue. Brazil, India, and Colombia are currently the 
world’s most dangerous places for environmental and land rights activists, 
who are murdered and harassed routinely and in high numbers. While Brazil 
has the world’s highest number of murders of such groups as environmental, 
rural activists, and urban, nonwhite youth, targeted by the elite and their 
hired gunmen, the major leftist groups in Brazil have not taken up arms or 
followed the type of ideology that the Maoists in India promote.
In Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, the affected populations (Adivasis) 
often lacked the means and knowledge to use the court system, electoral 
politics, or to lobby institutions and bureaucrats. They were prohib-
ited from their use, failed in their use, or the achieved results were not 
respected (e.g., Supreme Court orders). Partly for this reason, but also 
because of the secessionist tendencies of the guerrilla movements, a large 
proportion of the process of demanding rights took place in non- state- 
mediated politics. This played out as an armed revolutionary struggle that 
often aimed at Adivasi survival— survival of the cultures, populations, and 
livelihoods of forest dwellers. Activism based on revolutionary ideas is typi-
cally tricky and more prone to escalate into a cycle of violence than a strategy 
based on embedding and trying to coproduce state- remediated political 
games while retaining autonomy. In India, it is very hard for low or non-
caste people to be accepted as partners in routine politics or in coproduc-
ing new rules for them (Banerjee 2013). Thus, these deep ethnic cleavages 
have partially caused the armed conflicts.
My comparison of strategies together with contexts provides further 
information on how resistance actors select their strategies for resisting. 
Dalton, Recchia, and Rohrschneider (2003) found that both conventional 
and nonconventional strategies are used in dramatically different contexts, 
arguing that the choice of strategies relies more on activist agency than on 
contextual differences. Challenging this finding, I found that context was 
an important reason that a part of the resistance in India’s Bastar region 
and West Singhbhum had to use armed resistance. However, as I discussed, 
context is not destiny. In the Odisha case, with a very similar context, the 
resistance did not take the path of armed revolutionary agency, but rather 
forged peaceful resistance. Context and agency are not competing factors, 
but instead complementary ones.
Conclusion  217
Revised Pages
What Are the Long- Term and Short- Term Impacts of Resistance,  
and What Are the Causes?
I have focused on the more or less immediate outcomes of movements, those 
visible after a few years or at most about fifteen years of very active pro-
testing. However, movements also have long- term impacts. I have demon-
strated how mobilizations against mining built on prior outcomes achieved 
by other resistance groups, often in other places. These cases illustrate how 
important it is to track the spatial- temporal movement of capital and resistance 
in order to understand how investment outcomes vary. In cases that lack a local 
resistance, the crucial differentiator of outcomes can be, for example, the 
presence or absence of “outside help,” whether temporally or spatially, or 
both, in the form of activists who travel to help organizing resistance else-
where or the collateral impact of resistance outcomes elsewhere within the 
same jurisdiction.
Imposing a greater rule of law in mining across India has been an exten-
sion of democracy from the context of a consolidating Polanyian “organic 
society” in the West and South to the armed conflict that plagued East-
ern India. Antimining activism has been a main driving force to unifying 
the political system of India across space, demonstrated by the creation and 
work of the Shah Commission, a new state institution whose establishment 
was an important component in the process that led to the discontinuation 
of about half of existing iron ore mines in India.
It is likely that the significant outcomes achieved in Latin American and 
Indian mining protests since 2005 will produce long- term and large- scale 
policy changes. In the latter part of the 2010s, extreme- right- wing parties 
and populist authoritarian politicians have risen to power in many parts of 
the world, their rise being related to the increased financial proceeds and 
other new political dynamics ushered in by the 2005– 15 resource extraction 
boom. The interest of the current Brazilian and Indian governments seems 
poised to continue and seriously deepen the extractivism that was started 
before they rose to power. These governments are trying to turn this exist-
ing extractivist thrust to hyperextractivism, as they see this as a way to take 
away the lands that are controlled by the indigenous populations, which 
will enrich their own constituencies quickly through massive expansion of 
resource extraction in these previously protected areas. However, these poli-
cies by Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro and India’s Narendra Modi are not in line with 
the current and rapidly worsening climate and other planetary crises, which 
will affect Brazil and India especially strongly and negatively. Clamping 
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down on movements or implementing policies contrary to resistance wishes, 
such as what the Modi government is doing in India, and Bolsonaro in Bra-
zil, or what is happening under Latin American neoextractivism, reflects an 
antiquated economic model that does not consider world- ecological limits. 
The results of the willingness and capacities forged by the resistance will be even 
more visible in the future, as the world- ecological limits start to be experienced 
even more acutely than at present. After the slump of 2016, states and corpo-
rations that invested in extraction during the 2005 to 2014 boom should be 
thankful to the resistance that busted their efforts. Of course, there is lasting 
and almost irreversible ecological damage done to many areas that experi-
enced the mining boom’s open- pit expansions, which renders these areas 
usable only for mining and makes it difficult for displaced locals to return 
them to their prior uses.
Goa is now a largely postextractivist context, as the resistance has created 
a largely nonmining future. A key activist felt that the resumption of mining 
activities would be “highly unlikely,” while another thought in 2012 that 
the “moratorium will stand at least two years, and then mining will resume 
perhaps with 5– 10 mt [million tons] per year, on a small scale, or not at all.” 
The latter estimate proved to be more accurate, as one mine reopened in 
August 2015. This is a major outcome against the backdrop of Goa’s sixty- 
year history of iron ore mining for export, which peaked in the 2000s, and 
against Goa having been the most important iron exporting state of India 
(despite its minuscule size and low- grade ore).
Greediness and overexploitation, met by fierce social mobilization, led to 
a complete closure of mining operations in Goa, which is a lesson to be con-
sidered. However, the surge of a regulatory movement is not an automatic 
process of capitalism, as it does not happen everywhere, but rather a pro-
cess that is very much dependent on resistance. As Marx (1887) famously 
noted, history repeats itself. However, the history of resistance is based on 
a defined set of strategies that causes specific outcomes to repeat themselves 
more strongly than the history of capitalist expansion— although they are 
supposedly susceptible to being curbed “automatically” (as in many theories) 
and by any kind of resistance.
Mining as an Outcome of Physical, Symbolic, and Social Conflicts?
The findings confirm that it is best to resist mines before they are opened. 
However, they also provide evidence that effective resistance can close very 
large mining areas, making the shutting down of operations a reality, in spite 
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of strong corporate agency or (nonattributed) political opportunities. This is 
not a typical finding. Normally, it is assumed that investment projects with 
lower sunk costs are easier targets, but this is not necessarily true in every 
situation. In fact, cases such as Kudremukh, Goa, Congonhas, and Mariana 
highlight that built infrastructures and social capital (including jobs) for 
mines are not an impediment to forming a mining resistance movement. 
Movements can also include the mine’s trade unions, which might also be 
against mining expansion and ecologically concerned about the place. This 
is perhaps due to these mining areas having the dual role as work space and 
homelands, with the workers having an embedded history in place. Thus, 
they resisted the unchecked style of extraction and its expansion.
This study indicates that the examination of social movements, NGOs, 
and other forms of civil society organization must be integrated more fully 
into a range of social scientific and environmental disciplines when studying 
the politics of natural resources and climate change mitigation, among many 
other contentious issues. These civil society actors not only shape concrete 
places and land uses, they also shape symbolic and social spaces, and when 
they create and exercise resistance, their members benefit by exploring their 
own strengths in the face of contestation. The new mining mobilizations are 
globally significant examples of how activists can earn themselves consider-
able say in politics, and thus in the longer- term developmental and envi-
ronmental trajectories, even when working under very negative and difficult 
circumstances.
As mentioned in the introduction, besides being a book on investment 
politics, this is also a work of world- ecology scholarship, building on the 
recent attempts to go beyond Cartesian dualism in studies of the environ-
ment. In addition to intensely studying different political games and strate-
gies across many contexts (via figures 1 and 2 in chapter 2), I also present 
a theory of spatial power relations and causalities (via figure 3 also in chap-
ter 2). This theory of spatial power relations takes into consideration the 
changes present within social, symbolic, and physical spaces, and outlines 
the interspace mechanisms. This new spatial view can explain how resource 
frontiers expand or retract, which is important to consider when examining 
the implications of this research for world- ecology. When the symbolic and 
social space of the state has not been embedded by mining resistance, the 
state’s proextractivist attitude will, sooner or later, manifest itself in the phys-
ical space— such is the nature of spatial causalities. Capitalism unfolds in 
close or sequential parallel across all of these spaces, as it is a world- ecology. 
In other words, in order to exist it requires the changing of physical space 
through framing this space as consisting of “resources,” which are further-
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more framed as being the most valuable thing in that space, so valuable 
that to leave them in the ground would be madness, and that the collateral 
damages must be accepted; after these symbolic moves the resources can 
then be more easily appropriated. Put conversely, anticapitalist movements 
must be able to win over at least two spaces on a large enough scale so that they 
can ensure that the game does not revert to “capitalism- as- usual.” In the case 
of Jharkhand, by 2013 the iron- mining resistance had won control over 
the physical, social, and symbolic space in West Singhbhum, but it had not 
changed the social or symbolic space in the rest of the state, for which reason 
this was in a way a secessionary trajectory.
The particularities of Indian armed secession in the mining areas I sur-
veyed included armed control over physical space and an alternative social 
and symbolic space. There were many indigenous groups with nonmod-
ernist cosmologies resisting extractivism. They saw their lived environment 
as consisting of indigenous forest villages, as well as their ancestors, forest 
spirits, trees, tree groves, and other entities and beings that cannot be made 
commensurable through quantification or modern mapping. Most impor-
tantly, these resources cannot be ecologically compensated for if destroyed. 
Capitalists cannot win the struggle over symbolic space when physical space 
is still controlled by such a cosmology, such objectified symbolic power. An 
activist explained to me that Lakshmi Mittal, the owner of ArcelorMittal, 
had argued in Ranchi, Jharkhand’s capital, that “money is no issue. What-
ever amount of money people require, want as compensation, I am willing 
to pay.” Mittal also used “hundreds of millions of rupees for awareness- 
building” in mining areas and made landowners shareholders in his com-
pany. These moves were an attempt to widen the capitalist mining base in 
social space and build symbolic capital for mining, which could lead to a set-
ting where large sections of the society would encourage the locals to accept 
money for allowing mining across the state. However, some locals resisted, 
and the reply below, by a leader of the Adivasi movement in Jharkhand 
to the steel industry, captures the alternative, noncapitalist symbolic- physical- 
social space on the other side of the frontier:
What will money do for us? You tell us. Where will our boys spend 
all the money within a few years? We lose our forest. We lose our land 
that we cultivate. We are happy with that. We don’t need money. We 
want to live peacefully in our own environment. What will happen to 
our ancestors? Their spirits are there in our village. Their last remains 
are buried in the village. How can we leave them alone?
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As the creation of social or symbolic capital by miners in the West Sing-
hbhum forest areas had not been successful, the prominers started to use 
physical acts such as violence and armed occupation of the area. In the view 
of the activist and movement leader from Jharkhand, they did this to instill 
fear in locals so that they would not dare to take part any further in the mass 
rallies, whose participants were framed as terrorists. The current thrust of 
turning the last remaining areas outside the bounds of Western modernity 
and its extractivist appetite into resource areas is very violent.
What Are the Lessons for Global Environmental Governance?
The Indian and Brazilian cases offer an opportunity to make significant con-
tributions to both the political opportunity discussion in movement litera-
ture and the debate on the role of states in development and environmental 
politics literatures. There are five major findings that both challenge and 
corroborate existing studies on global (environmental) governance.
First, despite the prevalence and focus on globalization, I found that 
national politics, that is, the pressure exerted by the resistance on the state, is 
a crucial axis around which natural resource disputes still revolve. Accord-
ing to Khagram (2004, 3), who studied large dam resistance outcomes in 
the Global South, “outcomes are most likely to be altered when domestic 
communities and social movements capable of sustaining mass mobiliza-
tion and linked to transnational advocacy efforts contest these projects.” 
My findings, when taken in comparison to Khagram (2004), show that the 
dynamics within the domestic state and society have been more important 
for blocking the mines than transnational action. This is perhaps owing to 
the differences in conflicts over large dam projects and iron ore mines. One 
illustration of this difference are the essential and significant cases of local 
resistance success in India and Brazil, which are not very well known on the 
international level and have not received the attention that their empirical 
existence merits, in terms of informing our understanding of the global set-
ting of environmental governance.
Second, sectoral specificities have had a prominent role in explaining both 
global investment and environmental politics. There are many important 
sector specificities related to iron mining including the geographical par-
ticularities of iron ore deposit locations, the bulkiness of this resource, the 
comparatively slow pace at which its extraction shows signs of environ-
mental degradation and side effects (in comparison to, for example, gold 
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or bauxite), and the fact that it is not a closely consumer- society- related 
commodity. Resistance is not formed in a void, but in real places that are 
being threatened in particular ways. A comparison with resistance to global 
industrial forestry expansion (Kröger 2013a) illustrates that different sectors 
can have notable differences in terms of what kinds of resistance may influ-
ence investments, and when.
Third, these resistance cases were not driven by transnational advocacy 
networks, but by locally born resistance groups of varied kinds, a few of which 
engaged in transnational advocacy (and became the cornerstones of those 
coalitions). Like Rodrigues (2003), who compared transnational environ-
mental activism in Brazil, India, and Ecuador, I found that local resistance 
groups are the key actors in forming transnational resistance coalitions to 
extractivism. The reason for this is that in extractivism, the actors who hold 
the most direct control over the flow of resources, that is, those in direct 
touch with “upstream struggles” (see Bridge 2010), hold a key position. 
They can, for example, use territorial, geographic strategies in the physical 
space, such as sit- ins and occupations, to block the flow of resources or new 
investment projects. Local groups can also avoid the danger that partici-
pation in transnational networking can harm the movement (as identified 
by Rodrigues 2003); if the resistance group was formed through the five 
key strategies, it avoided this danger. By showing how local action can be 
supplemented by transnational coalition building, and how action can affect 
the global operation of iron production, I illustrate how local behavior is 
embedded in, and therefore affects, global governance.
Fourth, I found support for the findings of Fuentes- George (2016), who 
compared the conditions under which transnational civil society actors and 
local communities in Jamaica, Mexico, and Egypt managed to promote 
biodiversity and resist harmful investments. In some of my cases (such as 
Kudremukh), there were clashing local resistance groups dynamics, which 
were successfully united by an outsider arbitrator. Similar to the findings 
of Fuentes- George (2016), I found that the new resistance coalitions were 
successful under the following circumstances: (1) when scientific consensus 
was framed in social justice terms (for example, the mining wastewaters were 
severely harming agriculture); (2) When social relationships were created 
with local actors (which aided in uniting quarrelling factions) and (3) when 
biodiversity and biocentric worldviews were advocated for in a way that 
promoted local environmental justice (for example, including the indigenous 
forest dwellers and not just environmental NGOs).
Fifth, I found support for the claims that there is a strong ethnic, social, 
and class injustice incorporated in global relations that unequally distributes 
the most damaging environmental activities (Martinez- Alier et al. 2016). 
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The most severe extractivist pressures were taking place in the key global and 
national resource frontiers, particularly where those on the other side of the 
frontier were poorer or from despised ethnic minorities, or both. I further 
explored the roles that ethnicity and class play in resistance, which are key 
parameters that were identified by Pellow (2007) in global toxic dumping 
and its resistance. Like Sawyer (2004), who illustrates how the resistance 
to oil extraction in Ecuador was as much a struggle against environmental 
destruction as for the recognition of ethnic injustices and for building new 
national belonging for excluded groups, I explained how minority groups 
reached important political outcomes through their struggles. For example, 
in Odisha indigenous populations and impoverished rural communities 
remolded the rules of political games, while retaining their autonomy; in 
Keonjhar new informal yet forceful rules for electoral politics where indig-
enous and mining- critical politicians got elected were produced, thus creat-
ing real and stronger political power for the minorities in their resistance to 
extractivism. I also identified cases where this did not happen and explained 
the different reasons in cases where this occurred, such as in Joda and West 
Singhbhum where ethnic injustices deepened. Providing more detail to Pel-
low’s (2007) call for paying attention to ethnicity and class as key parameters 
of inquiry, I discussed both the potentials and pitfalls of single- ethnicity/
class and cross- class/ethnicity resistance groups, and the compounded effects 
of multiple distinct ethnic resistance groups working against the same extrac-
tivist process. There is indeed a global environmental justice movement— if 
the compound effects of different local struggles against extractivism are 
considered as forming a “global movement” (this is one level of movement 
conceptualization) (Martinez- Alier et al. 2016). However, a closer look at 
this global movement illustrates that it is not unified or nonstratified. I pro-
vide several specific ways to disaggregate such “global resistance.” This over-
arching theme requires further study, as it will help in avoiding far too broad 
analyses that are still common and forecast, for example, that capitalism 
is coming to its end, or that there will or will not be a global counterhe-
gemonic movement. The situation is much more complex than this, there 
being tendencies and forces at play that both support and undermine such 
prognoses, and these need to be analyzed in much more detail.
Toward a Hyperextractivist or Postextractivist World?
This final section will reflect on the lessons in this book directly through the 
lens of extractivism; the prior parts of the conclusion have reflected more on 
how the book has contributed to other, more established fields of scholar-
224  Iron Will
Revised Pages
ship. I will also present the broader picture where the world seems to be 
heading and point to directions for future research. I will discuss the uncon-
ventional, not so commonly voiced ways forward for starting to solve the 
pressing global crises.
This book examines the political economy of resource extractive indus-
tries under current rising global powers. While most theorizing on the global 
political economy is still largely at the macro level, this book presents a 
detailed multisited political ethnography of how macro- and micropolitics 
operate in economies that are growing rapidly and whose extractive nature is 
currently presenting serious challenges of environmental sustainability with 
significant implications for humanity and all life on this planet. This study of 
two giants, Brazil and India, shows how extractivism is at the heart of their 
political strategies, and how local people have revolted against such policies, 
with differing outcomes. By doing so, this book deviates from the all- too- 
common “resource conflicts” strand in the literature on political economy 
and deepens these discussions by adding the social movements’ perspective.
Many scholars have criticized extractivism, and from many viewpoints. 
The writers in Petras and Veltmeyer (2014), for example, discuss how pro-
gressive governments can be seen as having imperialist dimensions under 
the new extractivism— or neoextractivism, the developmental paradigm 
adopted by many Latin American governments during the 2000s, where 
they siphoned off a larger part of extractive proceeds to the populace than 
the old extractivism. Latin American thinker Raúl Zibechi has argued that 
extractivism was a big mistake for Latin American progressive governments, 
and led to the collapse of progressivism, which makes it hard and even 
impossible to make systemic changes. Zibechi also argues that extractivism, 
as an activity that displaces people from the rural areas by its highly mecha-
nized extractive technologies and models, has made it much harder for social 
movements to mobilize (as extractivism “creates a society without subjects” 
that could mobilize).6 Gudynas (2016) argues that extractivism has made it 
much harder for alternative political economic and human ecological models 
to be created, sustained, and developed, while other studies (see Kröger and 
Lalander 2016) show how extractivism has led governments to violate the 
progressive constitutions that they themselves created in the 2000s. There is 
also a large literature criticizing the “old extractivism,” which refers to the 
typical situation where the population of the country of origin gets almost 
nothing in return for extraction, showing how it causes underdevelopment, 
with Bunker and Ciccantell (2005) providing a good list of examples and 
references. Iron Will demonstrates that “old” and “new” extractivism still 
coexist in the world, and that both can be successfully resisted.
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Extractivism is based on a specific world- ecology and the idea that 
boundless extraction of nature’s bounty would be possible. Jason Moore 
(2015) argues that capitalism was not created by the steam engine and 
the industrial revolution of the late eighteenth century, but as a result of 
a changed understanding of nature and increased human appropriation of 
nature beginning in the late fifteenth century (when the discovery/conquest 
of the Americas and the rest of the non- West allowed for a major extractiv-
ist opportunity). Similarly, Naomi Klein (2014), in her book on climate 
change and the importance of tackling capitalism if climate disruption is 
to be quelled, argues that an ideology that is unfit for its material setting is 
at the core of our problem. Through the case of Nauru island, she describes 
how its remote geographical location largely impacted its overextraction, 
with most of its topsoil cast off to mine the phosphate needed for making 
fertilizer to support the agro- industrial sector, which is located at the core of 
the world economy. The people of Nauru allowed themselves to be deceived, 
spending frivolously while mining their own future away. As possibilities 
for self- sustaining were irreversibly lost, the nation resorted to desperate 
measures, for example trying to become a global money- laundering haven 
and a refugee camp for Australia (wherein gruesome conditions prevailed, 
according to witnesses). That peripheral nations will seemingly destroy their 
own possibilities for self- sustaining life speaks more generally of the options 
remote regions have in the current world- ecology. This world- ecology is 
based on a double idea/practice: powerholders locate extraction, with its 
attendant pollution, in remote areas out of sight and mind, and then pro-
fess to be surprised by the negative impacts of these extractive operations, 
although they knew from experience this would occur.
Active resistance stemming from upstream struggles against extractiv-
ism can bring to light the firsthand, lived experiences of people facing the 
destruction of their sustainable livelihood. The sum of the local struggles in 
all these different small remote areas changes the overall picture of global 
environmental governance. The world is growing smaller through the ease 
of transportation and communication across space. At the same time, new 
extraction peripheries are being created even in the old core areas, as the 
recent mining booms in the Nordic welfare countries demonstrate (Kröger 
2015a). This means that new sets of people will be forced to experience the 
push of extractivist projects firsthand. Capitalism seeks territories to appro-
priate, but as this process meets with ever- more diverse and larger numbers 
of people, their responses will vary. At one extreme, we have the Nauruans 
described by Klein (2014) who embrace the model without a thought of 
tomorrow; at the other extreme we have the people who are taking up arms 
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as their last attempt to protect their livelihoods and environment. There is 
also a vast middle, where we have all sorts of peaceful civil society actors 
who try to use a varied assortment of strategies to shift their region’s political 
choices away from extractivism.
If extractivism is the core habit of thought behind the surge of capital-
ism, as Moore and Klein, among others, suggest, then the resistance to this 
process could mean the end of the capitalist world- system/world- ecology, or 
at least represent its most serious challenge. Klein (2014) describes extrac-
tivism as a nonreciprocal relation of taking by domination, where the key 
move is to reduce life to objects. For Moore (2015), the overappropriation 
of what is separated from humanity as “nature” and the overexploitation of 
paid labor is a particular historic nature- relation within the larger web of 
life. In this web, stewardship or sustaining of life can be forgotten as life’s 
basic elements (such as water, soil, and forests) are rendered into abstract 
objects with no intrinsic value outside their role in accumulation. What the 
recent cases of resistance to extractivism have increasingly illustrated, how-
ever, is that people can retain and defend their nonextractivist lived envi-
ronments, start to change their habits of thought, and make others change 
theirs as well. They turn their emotions into poetry about their beautiful 
forested hills being ground to dust, as happened in Goa. They raise their 
voices loudly, so the world knows that a mountain is their god, as happened 
in Odisha. They wake up to the fact that their last remaining stretches of for-
est and sources of water are being destroyed, which will make it impossible 
for them to continue living sustainably, as happened in Chhattisgarh and 
Minas Gerais. Granting a greater political agency to all forms of life, much 
more than what was possible during the heyday of extractivist thought, may 
well be the greatest unaccounted challenge to the development projects of 
modern civilization.
Social ecologist Eduardo Gudynas (personal communication, 2016) sug-
gests that, as the modern world was built by the extractivist mind- set, it 
is hard for us inside modernity to challenge extractivism. Many resistance 
struggles in the so- called developed world might actually be what could be 
called “Not in My Backyard” or “NIMBY” struggles. In other words, this 
type of struggle does not really question extractivism as a practice of the 
capitalist world- ecology. In fact, in a NIMBY situation, extraction is okay 
if it does not take place in “my” backyard. Thus, if people can continue to 
enjoy of the freedom of movement and freedom from work that overextrac-
tion affords without suffering the negative impacts, then extractivism is fine 
by them. In one sense, Western liberal democracies might actually be just 
carbon- based democracies (see Mitchell 2011), basing their ways of life and 
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political economic stability to a large degree on massive imports of resources 
extracted elsewhere, by under- or maldeveloping those polities. However, 
the struggles I have discussed herein are not NIMBY struggles; the people 
affected have little access to the benefits of modern society, and many of 
them do not share the modern mind- set. The people in Brazil and India who 
resist extractivism are not those who benefit from the extractivism of their 
governments.
The global political economy, particularly since the 2008 financial cri-
sis, is predominantly based on the extractivist mind- set and the presump-
tion that resource extraction could and should be the basis for development. 
However, as the current political economic turmoil in Brazil and other 
resource- dependent economies illustrates, the growth- through- resource- 
extraction model is a myth in most cases. The possibilities to “develop”— in 
the modern sense of the word— depend on a large assortment of factors that 
ensure that the capital accumulated by extractive sectors could be made to 
serve larger social, economic, and state- power- building ends (Walker 2001). 
The cases in which resource extraction has led to so- called development 
have been anomalies (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005), including Norway and 
nineteenth- century California, both of which had very particular resource 
and wealth governance settings, and were progenitor cases with favored 
world- system embedding (factors that both Brazil and India lack).7 What is 
worse, studies on resource- based development rarely ever discuss the nega-
tive impacts that this process will have once the new corporations, built to 
master the extraction of resources in one setting, are eventually globalized. 
Globalization typically leads to unequal power relations where the resource 
extraction model of the new target investment areas is deliberately built on 
a different model, not the one that led to the development of global power 
players in the host country (Kröger 2013c). For this reason, the hype about 
building, for example, a leading Arctic resource extraction industry in one 
Arctic country where there are welfare- state- like functions (such as Finland 
or Norway) is blind to the future consequences of deepening extractivist 
expertise and investing capital and technological know- how in this pro-
cess (Kröger 2015a). The extraction process is bound to create particularly 
extrahuman suffering and devastation when the machineries and investment 
models are expanded to more peripheral regions, to ever- more hard- to- get 
mineral sources, as old areas are depleted, or when projects in core areas are 
subject to greater resistance by locals.
Most of the resistance to mining in Brazil and India does not believe 
that those rare conditions in which resource extraction could lead to “devel-
opment” could be achieved in their countries and regions. They have seen 
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such arguments before and rebuffed them through their own experiences. 
In many senses, these populations are much closer to the solution to our 
modern crises than those who believe in resource- based growth models. 
This is particularly the case with those populations who have environmen-
tal ontologies that challenge ontologies of modernity. To counter these ten-
dencies, extractivist governments have rolled out social welfare increases to 
ease the tensions. In the areas with fierce resistance, extractivists need to 
increasingly resort either to distributing a larger chunk of the accumulated 
wealth to the larger citizenry (as in parts of Latin American neoextractivism 
by so- called progressive governments; see Gudynas 2016) or to militarizing 
and paramilitarizing areas that are to be turned into the sacrificial zones of 
extraction (Valdivia 2015) (such as in many parts of India and Brazil). Both 
the governments of Brazil and India have, during the years of the global 
commodity boom, used a mixture of both countermeasures against the 
resistance to extractivism. However, as I have shown, the learning curve of 
impacted populations is getting shorter, as activists are networking across 
larger spaces and in faster time. Transnational coalitions might make the 
whole setting for global extractivisms much harder, in an ever- larger number 
of cases, and in different contexts. In addition to this expansion in the scale 
of resistance, the scope of resistance seems also to be shifting radically, and a 
qualitative change may be even more important in the deep- level challenge 
to extractivism.
The rise of authoritarian regimes across the globe since 2015 may be 
detrimental to the advance of the new global resistance against extractivism 
examined in this book; at least in the short term the setting has gotten more 
violent. Global resistance coalitions, formed by locally rooted struggles, 
greatly rely on peaceful and democratic settings for success. As this book 
has illustrated, the extractivist boom created windfall gains and power for 
authoritarian politicians to rise to power. Busting this boom has started to 
cut into the basis of this authoritarian power. The rise of this authoritarian-
ism seems to be a reaction to an already- deepened resistance agency, a des-
perate attempt by a vanishing way of life and thinking to cling to power to 
use nature for their dark ends. Thus, it is understandable that these regimes, 
such as that of Bolsonaro’s Brazil backed by the landowning elite, seem to 
have as their key agenda to attack and quell the will to resist, condemning 
the building of contentious agency and particularly environmental activ-
ism. In the future, these two processes promise a more difficult context and 
a stronger corporate- state push for extractivism and against resistance. It 
should be acknowledged that the resistance movements detailed here have 
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also changed the broader setting, by making it difficult, if not impossible, to 
restart once- discontinued mining operations in many areas. The locals are 
politicized and organized, and in many cases capital has moved elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, the rise of authoritarianism seems to have already intensified 
the spread of armed resource conflicts, especially one- sided conflicts, where 
the assassinations of environmental activists have spiked both in Brazil 
and India since 2015, at least in comparison to the 2000– 2015 era. This 
suggests that the armed resistance struggles will not be disappearing from 
India, where the existence of this political game as a rooted possibility will 
be strengthened by the rise in authoritarian response by the government. 
However, in the contexts that are less markedly armed conflicts, with at least 
some openings to use electoral, institutional, or judicial politics, the possi-
bility of using all the five key strategies simultaneously will remain as a way 
for people to live through the difficult period and ensure their land is not 
churned up by extractivist operations.
In some conflicts, those resisting have challenged modern ontological 
notions of what constitutes “nature.” For example, Mario Blaser (2013) 
argues that conflicts based on ontological cleavages are on the rise. Members 
of local indigenous groups in Andean mining conflicts, for example, have 
claimed that a targeted mountain is angry about the project. Anthropologist 
Marisol de la Cadena (2014) explains how in Cusco, a mountain (perhaps 
replete with gold) was also an earth- being and participated in a political con-
test where “the mountain won, the mining company lost.” For de la Cadena 
(2014), this type of environmental conflict with “ontological openings” may 
challenge the hegemony of modern politics by exposing it “to what it can-
not deal with, to what may constitute its excess.” I noted how such onto-
logical openings have already yielded significant outcomes. In India’s Odisha 
state, the local Kond and other indigenous people worship the Niamgiri 
Hills as their god. These hills are also targeted for bauxite production, which 
conflicts directly with their contention that they are holy (Padel and Das 
2010a); for this reason, and because researchers had documented this state 
of affairs, the Supreme Court of India ruled that the mine cannot be estab-
lished. Such an imbuing of sacredness and also agency to what the modern 
worldview considers merely a natural resource or environment (or in some 
cases deserving of special rights to exist, e.g., in connection with endangered 
species) should be studied in more detail.
In future research on extractivism and its resistance, more theoretical 
attention should be paid to these metapolitics, a field that goes beyond con-
ventional and also a large part of contentious politics. As Gudynas (2016) 
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has pointed out, when a monetary value is given to a “natural resource,” then 
such a framing of nature is still an act within politics as usual. There is no 
attempt to transform the underlying ontological assumptions of what are, 
what can be, and what should be the scales and scope of valuation and poli-
tics. In politics as usual, radically different conceptualizations, worldviews, 
understandings, and cosmologies are not pursued; rather, the rules of the 
games and the set of games go unchallenged.
The difference between engaging in politics or metapolitics may have pro-
found impacts. For example, Joan Martinez- Alier (2016) argues that when 
the resistance places monetary values on nature— exemplified in the recent 
rise of environmental economics and “environmental services” calculations 
by some proponents of a “green economy” (see Kröger 2016)— it has already 
lost the battle, as it has joined the project of positing alternative ontologies as 
mere curiosities or oddities. This claim merits further investigation.
New ontological conflicts have received attention from scholars inter-
ested in “political ontology,” particularly in Latin America. Mario Blaser 
(2013) argues that the whole project of modernity is globally in crisis and 
alternative notions gaining public awareness are cracks that are getting larger 
as the modern project fails to deliver the solutions it has promised. Indeed, 
the modernity project is seen by many as a cause of the problems, and alter-
natives are sought that could provide more sustainable, more sound “lived 
environments.” This book has applied this useful post- Cartesian concept by 
Marcus Taylor (2015), which offers a fruitful avenue for future research. So 
far, study of these new metapolitics has been sporadic rather than system-
atic, and more research is needed to examine how metapolitics works (as a 
political mechanism), and what impacts it might have. The political analysis 
in this book provides a step in this direction, as through application of the 
factors presented herein to the study of metapolitics, the impacts of these 
processes can be analyzed. In particular, the strategy of campaigning by non-
modernist framing against extractive operations could be divided into more 
detailed subcategories and tactics, and the impacts of this framing process 
on extractivist processes should be studied for possible causalities.
In many cities of the old promining state of Minas Gerais, people are 
no longer willing to let mining expand, and are indeed trying to return 
the mining industry’s “overburden” back into living entities such as rivers, 
forests, fields, and the humans who inhabit them. In Odisha, several groups 
have endorsed peasant, communal, and indigenous lived environments, and 
brought natural wonders, such as large waterfalls located in forested moun-
tains, with their spirits, into public consciousness. In Goa and Tamil Nadu, 
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resistance capacities and willingness have been built through the metapoli-
tics of poetry, and the framing of rampant mining as a threat to life, beauty, 
and feeling has left a lasting imprint on the popular mind- set that will ensure 
a continued resistance to extractivism and support for regeneration. These 






In September 2019, as I finished this book, the leaves were turning from 
green into red, yellow, and bright orange— all colors of the fall in the 
North. During this time, I often looked at the Finnish forests, and thought 
about all the existences being jeopardized by the extractivist thrust. The 
children of today, like my son, can no longer see the forests in which I was 
able to play as a child, as these forests are being decimated all around 
by expanding extractivist mind- sets. What kind of nature will the chil-
dren of tomorrow face? The weakening of life in its current expressions in 
the forthcoming environments is evident in the burning of the Amazon 
rainforest and the attempts to reopen mines in India. Yet there is hope: 
people are marching around the world in climate strikes, the birth of a 
new global social movement. Even though many political leaders call the 
strikers delirious, and continue to make speeches that result in very few 
concrete actions, global consciousness is rising. Though sometimes it can 
be hard to see amid all the chaos and noise and distraction of modernity, 
there are multiplying and myriad voices of people who are involved in on- 
the- ground tangible action around the world. Those who struggle daily 
to maintain their lived environments continue to gain strength, even if 
the world has not put a spotlight on them. The concrete actions of these 
peoples, who are working to resolve the global crises day by day by safe-
guarding the sustenance of their homes— now and for the future— using 
their courage, endurance, ingenuity, and connectedness, merit much more 
credit. I have tried to use these pages to bring attention to their actions 





Participant Observation and Qualitative Comparative Analysis
I began the field research for this project in 2010, after finishing my PhD in 
world politics. My dissertation addressed the impact of resistance on indus-
trial forestry expansion in Latin America (Kröger 2010). My broad initial 
hypothesis at the beginning of this project was directly informed by my field 
experiences during my dissertation project. During the dissertation I identi-
fied a set of resistance strategies in the forestry context, and I wanted to test 
whether these strategies could be applied more generally to other types of 
resistance, across sectors— despite changes in contingencies and contexts. To 
test whether this was the case, I made a detailed study of twenty- three min-
ing areas, with functioning or proposed mines, or both.
I did not know the cases, outcomes, or causal conditions when starting 
this study, but gathered this knowledge over the course of the field research. 
The methodology in the field research was primarily to provide an open 
space in which informants could describe their views on mining politics 
in the cases they personally knew. The new categories that cropped up in 
these discussions were codified and then I looked at whether these potential 
causalities or dynamics were also present in other cases. I also conducted 
semistructured interviews to ask more specifically whether the strategies that 
have been considered central in movement scholarship were used in the lived 
experience of the interviewees.
The research first mapped all major iron mining projects in Brazil and 
India, using the snowball method for conducting field research. This was 
complemented by an extensive literature and secondary- document review. 
I systematically compared the cases where the impacted locals or other 
concerned peoples had either affected mining trajectories, mobilized new 
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mining- focused movements, resisted in some other capacity, or did noth-
ing at all. I also studied cases where the resistance did not manage to make 
an impact on expansion or made only a small difference; such comparison 
across variation in the dependent variable allowed me to establish sufficient 
causal conditions.
The material for this book was collected using multisited ethnography 
(Marcus 1995) with a focus on political ethnography, through which rich 
empirical materials can be compared and used in analyses of process and 
power (Schatz 2009). This method, which incorporates participant obser-
vation and semistructured interviews, creates knowledge through engaged, 
microscopic, and long- term exposure to the lives and experiences of the 
research subjects (Auyero and Swistun 2009), and it has been used to study 
routine politics (established political practices such as clientelism), the socio- 
environmental dilemmas of investment projects, civil war, and other vio-
lent settings (Auyero 2007; Auyero and Swistun 2009; Schatz 2009). This 
work combines multisited ethnography (which is not limited to one place 
or culture but uses ethnographic approaches to study global processes— in 
this case, the resistance to extractivism) and political ethnography (which 
aims to make ethnography useful for political scientists in broadening their 
tools of inquiry and explanation, via a focus on power relations). My eth-
nographic approach is a world- political ethnography, close to the approach 
discussed by MacKay and Levin (2015).
I created a very large and detailed database from the observations and 
data collected, including hundreds of recorded interviews and extensive field 
notes. This material was then analyzed systematically. For each case, I studied 
the presence of several explanatory factors and outcomes. To assess this data-
set, I used crisp- set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA), a set theo-
retic, configurational comparative method developed initially by Charles 
Ragin and later by others (Rihoux 2008). I compared the use of the strate-
gies and outcomes described in the hypothesis section of the introduction.
I identified the factors in this study after reading existing theories, gath-
ering the field research material, and analyzing the dynamics between the 
cases via QCA, looking for anomalies, generalities, and the need for more 
precise explanatory tools. The methodological reasons for including these 
specific factors, some of which might seem quite similar, comes from a scale 
of analysis that is primarily detailed and local, looking at each investment 
project area via multisited political ethnography. There were important dif-
ferences in the presence of each of the causal conditions between the cases. 
If the unit of analysis were larger, I would be analyzing Brazilian and Indian 
resistance as two large movements. Or perhaps these could even be thought 
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of as local expressions of a single global movement against extractivism, 
albeit with different expressions. However, it would not be pertinent or even 
possible to distinguish the existence of specific factors to the same extent 
when they are considered at such a macro scale. One resistance or corporate 
actor might be involved in several cases, each of which can have their own 
dynamics. Resistance is therefore formed by a set of different strategies in 
different cases (if all cases were compounded as a totality, the movement 
would be using all strategies), and I assess the causal relation of these strate-
gies with different outcomes.
I used QCA throughout the research to ascertain the presence or absence 
of causal conditions (strategies, processes, and dynamics) and outcomes 
(creation of new resistance agencies and actors, effects on investment pace 
and style). The QCA technique facilitates analysis of multiple causation 
and interaction effects, where a given outcome may follow from different 
causal “paths” (Rihoux 2008, 726); furthermore, it assists in summarizing 
data, detecting logical contradictions, and producing new hypotheses— all 
pressing demands in the new land rush or land grabbing literature (Edel-
man, Oya, and Borras 2013). I placed the rich ethnographic accounts into 
a relative perspective in relation to the overall database, demonstrating to 
what extent each case is either an anomaly or supportive of the overall gen-
eral findings. This type of analysis is rare in studies based on rich empirical 
material collection and large qualitative databases, since, first of all, ethnog-
raphers seldom go beyond particular areas, and if they do, they do not use 
QCA or similar systematic methods of comparison. On the other hand, 
political scientists or comparative politics or international relations schol-
ars seldom include field research visits and participant observation in their 
research to the extent done here.
If I found that the dynamics differed within one case, such as in the dis-
trict of Keonjhar in Odisha, where the administrative block of Joda showed 
less widespread resistance to mining in comparison to several other blocks 
with fiercer resistance, I divided the initial “case” into several cases, to facili-
tate analysis of the differing dynamics. If I saw that there was a need to add 
a new central strategy or other causal condition to explain the particularity 
of case dynamics, I added that condition, and then also looked for the values 
related to that causality in the other cases as well. If a large area had similar 
dynamics, I did not disaggregate it into smaller parcels, but discussed the 
largest possible, contextually united area as a single case. Thus, I did not sep-
arate Goa into the south (where most mining was taking place) and north, 
as the resistance was statewide with very small interstate variation in com-
parison to the differences relativized by the larger comparative apparatus.
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Ethics of Data Presentation and Information Integrity
The personal, social, and political situation of many of my informants con-
tinues to be increasingly difficult, both in India and Brazil. Revealing their 
names could lead to serious problems for them, and hence I have not men-
tioned by name many of the organizations and most of the individuals who 
were interviewed. Some of them also spoke on the condition of anonymity 
and confidentiality.
The key ethical issue I must consider in producing a book delving deep 
into resistance strategies is the avoidance of divulging insider information or 
data that could be used by the movements’ opponents against the activists. 
The informants were aware that the results of my data collection would be 
published, for which reason information that was not meant for public eyes 
has almost certainly not been disclosed to me. I also asked many of my key 
informants to read through parts of this book and make comments to ensure 
that no confidential or harmful information is contained in these pages.
Data Limitations and Triangulation
Multisited ethnography requires making numerous compromises on what is 
observed and who is interviewed. These choices were guided by my politi-
cal ethnographic focus on the process of resistance to extractivism. Thus, 
my informants were mostly well- known activists, such as coordinators, 
movement leaders, NGO directors, scholars, politicians, bureaucrats, law-
yers, experts, and journalists. In other words, they tended to be key policy- 
makers. I did not conduct many interviews, or do much participant obser-
vation, with “lower- ranking” movement members, as my focus was not on 
movement ontology, organizing specifics, internal problems, or hierarchies. 
Rather, my focus remained on confrontations with companies and the key 
strategies used therein, which could be best opened up by the key policy- 
makers. This focus allowed me to make a contribution to political ecology, 
which has historically lacked studies on social movements, or looked mostly 
at movement hierarchies (Wolford and Keene 2015).
I visited most of the areas detailed in map 1 and 2, but I did not go to 
Bellary (3) or Tiruvannamalai (5), as I managed to interview a large number 
of the leading resistance organizers and other actors elsewhere. Entrance to 
West Singhbhum (8), Dantewada (11), Rowghat (12), Dalli Rajah (13) and 
Manpur (14) was forbidden or not recommended by the authorities as they 
were civil war areas, so I approached as closely as I could and invited locals to 
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join me for discussions that lasted from several hours to days, and included 
over 200 people in total.
I have been studying rural Brazil since 2003, including the mining areas 
that have been the principal focus of my research since 2010 (via participant 
observation in Carajás). I focused especially on mining dynamics in 2011, 
during a period of participant observation in the Palmares settlements of the 
MST in Parauebebas, and inside and around the Carajás mine next to Pal-
mares. I also followed the commodity chain and studied the broader context 
of mining politics, including charcoal and pig iron production and trans-
portation politics connected with the export railroad, particularly in Marabá 
and western Maranhão. I did not study the cases of Minas Gerais, Bahia, 
or Mato Grosso do Sul in such detail (via my own field research). Minas 
Gerais has a huge number of iron ore mines and conflicts related to these 
mines, and they should be systematically explained in a separate study— 
research to this end is already under way by other scholars. One effort has 
been made by Grupo de Estudos em Temáticas Ambientais (Study Group 
on Environmental Themes) from the Federal University of Minas Gerais to 
update a Map of Environmental Conflicts in Minas Gerais, including iron 
ore mines.1 The Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), an academic special-
ist research institute that is publicly funded by the Brazilian state, had a 
similar mapping project with quite a bit of data on some iron ore mine 
conflicts. Both of these efforts could be used to triangulate my findings. 
Similarly, some of the notes on mining projects written in the EJOLT Atlas 
(ejatlas.org) were used to triangulate and supplement my findings. Brazil 
had the world’s four largest iron ore mines during the studied period. These 
were Carajás (7.27 billion tons of reserves and a production of 106.7 mt 
[million tons] in 2012, Vale); Samarco Alegria (2.97 bt [billion tons] of 
reserves, 21.8 mt of production, owned 50/50 by Vale and BHB);2 Minas 
Itabiritos (2.78 bt, 31.8 mt, Vale); and Vargem Grande (2.53 bt, 22.6 mt, 
Vale).3 The last three mines are located in Minas Gerais. They are old opera-
tions, with expansion happening mostly inside the existing mines during the 
studied period. I have not studied the conflicts around them in detail,4 as I 
focused on greenfield expansions in Minas Gerais. These greenfield projects 
had more problems and much more resistance as they encroached on land 
that has not previously been mined. It is worth mentioning that Vale was 
founded in Itabira (where Minas Itabiritos has been in operation since the 
1940s), and that there were no mass social movements against mining there 
by 2015 (although a new reopening plan of an old mine by Vale may stir 
problems), despite claims by the anti- Vale network that Vale has committed 
people to slave- labor- like conditions in Itabira.5 I have studied these three 
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massive Minas Gerais mines, and others in Minas that were not explicitly 
discussed in this book, from a broader contextual perspective, not in detail. 
These mines indirectly formed which I characterized as an old, promining 
context, and I used this context to see how this “pro” could influence resis-
tance outcomes. This analysis is offered in part II.
Different languages were used to conduct this research. I am comfortable 
communicating in Portuguese, Spanish, and English, but not in Hindi or 
other local Indian languages. In Brazil I could interview anyone without the 
need for an interpreter. In India there were some problems with translation, 
particularly when meeting some of the Adivasis. While I used the help of 
translators to converse with non- English speakers in India, the quality of the 
data was problematic, as my methodological apparatus sometimes required 
a quite lengthy explanation of what I wanted the informants to reflect on 
in their cases (after having had open discussions about the mining situation 
and their views on its politics in the localities that each person knew). Trans-
lators were hard to find for localized Adivasi languages, and the translators 
typically had their own ideas, intermeshed into the translations, often to a 
degree that I could not decipher. Consequently, I mostly avoid quoting the 
translated interview data from India.
Some of the recorded interviews were transcribed, resulting in a 50,000- 
word document, which could be used for verifying quotations and for ana-
lyzing anything that was missed when handwriting the key points in field 
memos (which covered most points).
Lastly, in some cases, I could not find more than a few people who knew 
the local mining politics well enough to be considered potential informants, 
which could be a risk for data integrity. For example, in the discussions I had 
while staying in Keonjhar in Odisha, visiting mining regions and stalled- 
project areas, I had to rely on a small number of informants. These infor-
mants shared with me the dynamics and very specific issues in remote rural 
areas that people in the state capital did not know about, for which there 
was no media or other public coverage, or prior research, but which were 
very important.
I used multiple forms of verification of the material, including data tri-
angulation (e.g., reading existing academic publications, media accounts, 
and other secondary documents, and talking to other scholars and experts at 
conferences and elsewhere); method triangulation (e.g., looking at satellite 
images to spot whether a mine had expanded or existed in a place that was 
mentioned by an informant, to verify whether their accounts were precise or 
trustworthy, and physically visiting the areas besides talking to people about 
local politics); researcher- analysis triangulation (e.g., asking what other 
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scholars who had been in the area had found, using field research assistants 
in some cases, using assistants to read through the transcriptions and draw 
their own analytical findings, and then juxtaposing these findings with my 
own analysis); and theoretical triangulation (e.g., having three complemen-
tary parts in this book that approach the data from different theoretical 
viewpoints— political context, contingency, and movement strategies— to 
explain the dynamics).
List of Cases Studied
Table 1 lists the cases studied, location, case type, main companies, and 
main resistance groups. Column 1 lists the case name with district, block, 
or other region- specifying attributes in parentheses; column 2, the state; 
column 3, case type. I used numbers as a shorthand for the type: 1 refers to 
the existence of mine(s) in the case area, and 0 indicates that there are min-
ing projects, but no ready mine as of July 2015. Column 4 lists the main 
companies with mines, including those in the process of attempting to open 
up a mine in parentheses. Finally, column 5 lists examples of the resistance 
groups involved in the case.
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Table 1. Indian Cases
Case type: 1 = existing mine(s); 0 = only mining expansion project(s)
Case Name State Type
Main Companies  
(no mines by 2015)
Named Resistance 
Groups Involved








Bellary Karnataka 1 Obulapuram, Jindal, 
NMDC, etc.
SPS
Salem Tamil Nadu 0 (Jindal) Kanjamalai Protection 
Committee, Speak 




Tiruvannamalai Tamil Nadu 0 (Jindal) Kavunthimalai, Vedi-
yappanmalai Pro-
tection cCommit-
tee, TNEC, DWM, 
DFCS, TNDAYF, 
WF, WC, DALM, 
DMK, KUMPUM, 
GLOW, JASuL
Joda block (Keonjhar 
district)










Odisha 1 Several small com-
panies
Keonjhar Integrated 




Odisha 0 (POSCO, KIOCL) Khandadhar Surakhya 
Sangram Samiti
Pre- 2005 Sundargarh 
(the rest of the cases 
besides Khandadhar, 
e.g., Koida)
Odisha 1 Jindal, Essel, etc. n/a
Post- 2005 Sundargarh 
(the rest of the cases 
besides Khandadhar, 
e.g., Koida)
Odisha 1 Jindal, Essel, (POS-
CO, KIOCL), etc.
n/a





Case type: 1 = existing mine(s); 0 = only mining expansion project(s)
Case Name State Type
Main Companies  
(no mines by 2015)
Named Resistance 
Groups Involved
Rowghat Chhattisgarh 0 (Bhilai Steel Plant— 
BSP)
CPI(Maoist)
Manpur Chhattisgarh 1 Sarda/SEML, Goda-
vari
CPI(Maoist)
Dalli Rajhara Chhattisgarh 1 BSP Chattisgarh Mukti 
Morcha
Kawardha Chhattisgarh 0 (BSP) n/a
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Table 2. Brazilian Cases
Case type: 1 = existing mine(s); 0 = only mining expansion project(s)
Case Name State Type




Carajás (old mine) 
(Parauebebas)
Pará 1 Vale, etc. MST, La Via Campe-
sina, MAM, indig-
enous movements, 
Comissao Pastoral da 
Terra (CPT), trade 
unions, Justice on 
the Rails
Carajás (new S11D  
mining project)
Pará 1 Vale, etc. MST, La Via Campe-
sina, MAM, indig-
enous movements, 
CPT, trade unions, 
Justice on the Rails
Minas- Rio (Conceição 
de Mato Dentro)
Minas Gerais 0 Anglo American CPT, Movimento 
pelas Serras e Águas 
de Minas, Fórum 
do Desenvolvim-
ento Sustentável de 
Conceição do Mato 
Dentro
Apolo (Serra do  
Gandarela)
Minas Gerais 0 Vale Movimento pela Preser-
vação da Serra do 
Gandarela, etc
Casa de Pedra Minas Gerais 1 CSN Grupo Rede Con-
gonhas, trade union 
of the mine,  
politicians
Mina Del Rey Minas Gerais 1 Vale Mariana Viva, churches, 
trade unions, mayor, 
politicians, etc.
Corumbá Mato Grosso 
do Sul
1 Vale, MMX, etc. Kadiwéu indigenous 
people, Associacao 
Civil Ecologia e 
Acao (ECOA), Rede 






 1. See a collection of photos from the field sites visited in this book here: https://
blogs.helsinki.fi/mkroger/photo-gallery-field-sites/
 2. There is an expansive literature in political ecology, political ontology, world- 
ecology, and related approaches that explains how “natural resources” do not just 
inherently exist. They are created in the sense that such things need to be first framed 
as existing in a certain place, and second, they need to be considered as having a higher 
value than the other things existing there. For example, are the underground minerals, 
the aboveground forests, the agricultural soils, or water reserves considered to be the 
key “natural resource” in a given area? Is a part of the nature or the web of life even 
being cast as such things, to serve primarily for human extraction or exploitation? 
Through this kind of questioning, the carving out of “natural resources” from nature 
can also be seen as a form of violence, which turns a part of the web of life with living 
beings turned into objects that can be calculated, managed, and extracted. The cre-
ation of natural resources is at the core of expanding resource frontiers, an ideological 
work that precedes extractive operations and extractivism, including mining projects.
 3. See the figures in this link for an analysis of Grantham’s “Great Paradigm Shift,” 
whose claim that we have entered a new paradigm seems to be holding even in 2020: 
http://claritycoalition.net/en_GB/knowledge-base/resources-commodities-2014/ 
(accessed 9 January 2020). The prices of most commodities are currently higher, or 
much higher, than in the pre- 2005 period, even after the partial decline in prices at 
around 2014– 16 (see: https://www.indexmundi.com/).
 4. These include, for example, Khagram’s (2004) classic comparison of resistance 
to big dams and Rodrigues’s (2003) analysis on the role played by Brazilian, Indian, 
and Ecuadorian local movements in transnational environmentalist coalitions.
 5. Examples of the prior books that compare the role of resistance in global envi-
ronmental governance/politics, which I will be supplementing with my contribution, 
include Duit (2014), Fuentes- George (2016), Hochstetler and Keck (2007), Klein 
(2014), Kröger (2013a), Pellow (2007), Sawyer (2004), and Sowers (2013).
 6. The processes leading to conflict outcomes receive little examination in the 
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literature on mining and grassroots resistance. More attention is paid to explaining 
where, when, why, or how resistance occurs (e.g., Arsel, Hogenboom, and Pellegrini 
2016; Bebbington and Bury 2013; Dougherty and Olsen 2014; Haslam and Tani-
moune 2016), or on resistance networking and state and corporate responses (e.g., 
Conde 2017), but investment outcomes are dealt with only cursorily.
 7. Iron ore was by far the most valuable metallic mineral produced in India in 
financial year 2013, comprising 81.04 percent of total value; second was chromite 
with 6.03 percent. In Brazil iron ore is even more central, accounting for about 90 
percent of mineral exports, and alone it is the most important factor behind the posi-
tive trade balance of the Brazilian economy (EMIS 2014b).
 8. By “consolidating democracies,” I refer to such polities that are formally demo-
cratic, but where there are serious power imbalances that are usually related to colonial 
legacies and deeply entrenched social cleavages based on ethnic, caste, racial, gender, 
or class lines, but which are nevertheless being challenged by subaltern groups. These 
struggles seek to promote democracy in the sense of expanding the power of those who 
have not previously had a real voice in making important political and economic deci-
sions, that is, expanding the scope and scale of democracy in that polity, and seeing 
that the formal rules of democracy are applied, followed, and expanded. Democracy 
has not yet been consolidated in these polities, and it is under constant threat by 
authoritarian and nondemocratic politics. As I will discuss, the resistance to extractiv-
ism has been a key force in ensuring that the wider populations are asked how they 
would or would not like to see their home regions being changed through extractive 
operations. As these political processes have been recently, not only locally but also 
nationally, crucial in both Brazil and India, these politics of resisting rampant extrac-
tivism have also been politics of ensuring that democratic rules are respected and even 
advanced. The forging of active citizenship through participation in the resistance has 
also been a boon to consolidating democracy, as the state has been unlikely to uphold 
the constitutions and laws of these democracies without civil society inputs.
 9. The categories of similar rankings include Rule of Law (Brazil: 95; India: 97); 
Government Effectiveness (Brazil: 91; India: 95); and Voice and Accountability (Bra-
zil: 78; India: 87). In the following categories India and Brazil displayed slight differ-
ences: Control of Corruption (Brazil: 93; India: 113); Regulatory Quality (Brazil: 93; 
India: 128); and Political Stability (Brazil: 111; India: 190).
 10. Brazil was the third and India the fourth largest iron ore producer in the world 
in 2010, behind China and Australia (USGS 2011); in the dollar value of iron exports, 
Brazil was the world leader and India third (UNCTAD/WTO 2012). These statistics 
highlight the centrality of these countries in the global political economy of iron. 
In 2014, these four countries represented around 80 percent of global iron ore pro-
duction. China consumes almost three- quarters of the global seaborne iron ore trade 
(EMIS 2014a; 2014b; Parallaxis Economic Research, Commodity Trend: Iron Ore). 
Since 2010, Brazil and India have embarked on dramatically different pathways. Brazil 
has been caught up in a cycle of gigantic expansion in mineral extraction: iron ore 
production was 351 mt (million tons) in 2008 and was targeted by the state’s Plano 
Nacional de Mineração 2030 (MME 2010) to be 585 mt in 2015, and a whopping 
1,098 mt in 2030. The share of mineral extraction of Brazil’s GDP was 4.1 percent in 
2013, and the main export markets for Brazil’s iron ore were China (51 percent) and 
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Japan (10 percent) (EMIS 2014b). In 2011, Minas Gerais produced most of the iron 
ore (71 percent), followed by Pará (26 percent).
 11. See Bedi 2013a; Meher 2009, 2011; Mishra 2010; Moody 2007; Padel and 
Das 2010b; Sridhar 2010; and Kalshian 2007. Some books deal with mining in gen-
eral in India (Karlsson 2011; Lahiri- Dutt 2011, 2014; Padel and Das 2010a). There 
are also a few policy studies on mining sector impacts in India, such as Centre for Sci-
ence and the Environment (2008, 2011) and Human Rights Watch (2012) as well as 
more advocacy- focused studies such as Rodrigues (2014).
 12. For example, Vale mining company had its operating revenues from iron grow 
more than 300 percent between 2009 and 2011, while iron extraction grew by only 
35.5 percent, but realized average prices jumped from USD $56 per metric ton to 
USD $136 (Vale 2012). Vale, with headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, and deep roots as 
an important state- owned mining company, which was largely privatized in the 1990s, 
is one of the world’s largest mining companies, and hugely important in global iron 
ore production. Brazilian iron ore exports comprised the single most important export 
commodity of Brazil. In 2011, iron still accounted for 71.5 percent of Vale’s operating 
revenues, thereby retaining iron extraction as the bone of contention in revenue and 
power distribution and resulting in ongoing targeting by activists. For example, Vale 
was awarded the Public Eye award in 2012 as the corporation causing the most harm 
globally to the environment and human rights. Since the 2014 fall in prices, many 
iron ore operations are being shut down.
 13. In this book, by Eastern India I refer to the states of Jharkhand, Odisha, 
Chhattisgarh, and Telangana; by Western India to Goa and Karnataka; by Southern 
India to Tamil Nadu and Kerala; and by the Eastern Amazon to Pará, Maranhão, 
Amapá, and Tocantins.
 14. “Iron Ore Mining to Partly Resume in Karnataka,” Reuters, September 3, 
2012 (accessed August 10, 2015).
 15. “Goa Government Mum on Recovery of Losses from Illegal Mine Owners,” 
Economic Times, September 13, 2012 (accessed August 10, 2015).
 16. Besides the BJP, the Congress Party and other parties have had mining bar-
ons engaged in illegal mining as electoral candidates, which has caused consternation 
among the critics of mining scams (defrauding the government and others of revenue 
while producing ore, for example by mining without permits, over the limits, outside 
lease boundaries, and without paying royalties) around India, especially in states such 
as Karnataka and Chhattisgarh. See https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/
national/reddy-troika-no-longer-kings-but-mining-lords-still-rule/article23115625.
ece (accessed June 26, 2019). Several experts and scholars on these matters in India 
confirmed to me the veracity of the link between illegal iron ore proceeds and their 
crucial role in election funding.
 17. Political power was used to allow illegal and damaging mining to continue and 
deepen during the boom, according to an NGO coordinator who said that “systemic 
corruption was rampant.” Another activist lamented that the Centre (India’s federal 
government) “has been useless, an advocate for mining companies. The elite increased 
this loot.” Leading politicians were directly connected to the Reddy Brothers mining 
mafia in Bellary. It was claimed that “if not for the resistance, India would have looked 
like Indonesia.”
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 18. http://www.mining.com/india-picks-worst-time-to-resume-iron-ore-mining-
analysts/ (accessed August 17, 2015).
 19. https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-india-mining/indias-top-court-cancels-iron-
ore-mining-permits-in-goa-petitioners-idUKKBN1FR0FZ (accessed November 28, 
2018).
 20. As Reuters noted, “Restrictions aimed at curbing illegal mining in Goa and 
Karnataka states have choked the iron ore industry, with India’s production falling 
to 136 million tons in 2013/14 from a peak of 218 million in 2009/10, according to 
industry lobby group ASSOCHAM. India was once the world’s third largest exporter 
of iron ore, sending out more than 117 million tons in the fiscal year through March 
2010. It slipped to No. 10 last fiscal year, with exports estimated at less than 20 million 
tons.” Reuters, June 2, 2014, http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/06/02/india-ironore-
odisha-idINKBN0ED0BI20140602 (accessed August 10, 2015).
 21. Source: Cargo Traffic: ytd: Iron Ore, CEIC, Indian Ports Association.
 22. Private politics are a dangerous path for mobilization that is not based on a 
strong and large mass movement, but on isolated local resistance. The example of 
Corumbá, on the border of Mato Grosso do Sul with Bolivia, exemplifies the dangers 
of private politics. Based on my analysis of Diogo Rocho’s notes on the Corumbá case, 
taken in April 2014 for the EJOLT Environmental Justice Atlas (http://ejatlas.org/
conflict/corumba-indigenous-communities-and-mining-brazil (accessed August 13, 
2015), the reason the local indigenous peoples’ and NGOs’ joint resistance against 
Corumbá iron ore mine expansion failed (though they did use the five key strate-
gies) was that they mostly relied on private negotiations with companies. Significantly, 
the movement did not manage to even slow down the expansion or create a lasting 
mobilization, as it was satisfied by a promise of a new study on impacts, funded by the 
companies.
Chapter 1
 1. Adivasis are a large and heterogenous group of indigenous peoples in India. It 
has been argued that there are about 100 million people given this designation, includ-
ing those who have been able to take advantage of the protection and benefits guaran-
teed to them under the Constitution, and those who have been oppressed (Sisodia and 
Dalapati 2015); both these groups are represented in the cases I study.
 2. While a concise literature review on this topic is beyond the aims of this book, 
it is worth mentioning some of the prior key works on social movements in India 
in general, and their theoretical contributions. Basu (1992), Omvedt (1993), and 
Ray (1999) have looked at how the new social movements were born in the 1970s 
and have mobilized around concerns about the environment, class, caste, and gen-
der. Shah (2004) has tried to position social movements more centrally in political 
analysis, offering an analytically more precise and dynamic way to look at resistance 
than that of subaltern studies, which is a mostly historical study of colonial India with 
people as central political actors (Ludden 2001; Spivak 2004). The writers in Ray and 
Katzenstein (2005) provide an overview of movement organizations and resistance 
struggles since the 1947 independence in many fields, including trade unions and par-
Revised Pages
Notes to Pages 32–35  249
ties, emphasizing right- wing Hindu movements as the most central civil society actors. 
Basu (2015) confirms this finding in a detailed study of the Hindutva social move-
ment organization’s relation to party politics, while my own analysis integrates the role 
of political parties and electoral politics in defining mining resistance outcomes.
 3. World- ecology has mostly focused on explaining the expansion and work-
ings of capitalism, and not on the resistance to capitalist expansion. I follow the call 
of world- ecology “to put our post- Cartesian worldview to work on the crucible of 
world- historical transformation— understood not as history from above but as the 
fundamental co- production of earth- moving, idea- making, and power- creating across 
the geographical layers of human experience” (Moore 2015, 3). This yields analysis of 
the historic natures (or “lived environments,” as they are termed by Taylor 2015) of 
extractivism and its resistance, and particularly of the ways in which such futures are 
currently being created (and, in some cases, expanded to global scales). World- ecology 
is usually based on a methodology akin to world- systems analysis, where field research, 
let alone multisited ethnography, is used less than longer- term historical analysis. 
This book, however, is primarily based on participant observation, and can therefore 
ground the theory- building of world- ecology.
 4. Adivasi is a Hindi term meaning the descendants of a given place and refers 
to India’s original inhabitants. The term was first used as a political category by which 
indigenous people referred to themselves in the 1930s and 1940s, but the older cat-
egories of “indigenous,” “tribal,” and “aboriginal” are also still in use in India (Rycroft 
and Dasgupta 2011). The official Indian state ideology, on a par with the far- right 
Hindutva movement that pursues a unitary Hindu nation, does not recognize that 
there are indigenous people in India. It finds the notion of Adivasis a threat to its 
project of gaining political power through a national myth of Hindus as the original 
dwellers of India (Karlsson 2011). Lately this strategy has worked, as evidenced by 
the rise of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) currently in government and led by Naren-
dra Modi (Basu 2015). This political party is one of the two major parties in India 
and directly translates to the People’s Party. Hindutva supporters see that notions of 
indigeneity are harmful for the “forest- dwellers” (a term by which they refer to the 
Adivasis). “Development”— meaning more mines, steel plants, dams, resource extrac-
tion, factories, and capitalist expansion of markets— is what this government wants to 
provide, as benefactors, to these populations. Some Adivasis agree and are in political 
alliance with the BJP (and some other parties), which has led to significant disillusion-
ment between elected Adivasi MPs and constituents in the would- be mining regions 
who are highly critical of the projects they experience daily as “undevelopmental” and 
unjust. The (de- )framing of indigeneity is a major way to legitimize nature uses and is 
a key ingredient of symbolic politics.
 5. For example, Coelho (2012) detailed the potential damages of Vale’s projected 
Apolo mining project in Minas Gerais, just a short distance from Belo Horizonte to 
the east, arguing that the absence of a popular class or local movements is the result 
of mineral dependency and a discourse of progress and development that demobilizes 
critical movements; Maher (2014) has made a similar argument, emphasizing com-
munity dependency on mining jobs as the key condition of “un- opposition” (that is, 
the absence of visible resistance). It is interesting to note, however, that since 2012 
the Apolo project has been discontinued; Coelho’s (2012) prognosis did not foresee 
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the impacts of an NGO- based resistance against a large company, which Coelho- De- 
Souza (2015) studies in detail. Coelho- De- Souza (2015) is a deep case study on the 
importance of the quality of resistance in the Apolo project discontinuation. Maher 
(2014) and Coelho (2012) provide warning examples of how overreliance on contex-
tual analysis can result in unexplained cases and unforeseen events, particularly given 
that resistance, in one form or another, still manages to check mining, a result that 
runs against the theoretical foundations of structural arguments.
 6. Personal communication, June 2015. By “modernics” Gudynas refers to the 
dominant language of today, which is so deeply ingrained in most of the world’s cur-
rent politics that it is difficult to even consider issues outside “modernics” as existing 
or having agency.
 7. Vivir Bien refers to many Latin American indigenous communities’ concep-
tions of good life as being created through different ways of “living well together.” 
Vivir Bien refers to this practice, the analyses of overall policies, and contexts of prac-
tices that discuss Buen Vivir, translated as “good living.” This Buen Vivir challenges 
Western and modernistic notions of development through its emphasis on nonan-
thropocentric value- giving, which gives equal rights to nonhuman beings and entities 
to exist and live. Reciprocity and giving back to Mother Earth are key ideas and prac-
tices. There are many expressions of this Buen Vivir among different indigenous and 
other groups. These depict a whole set of values, practices, cosmologies, ontologies, 
epistemologies, and ways of life that create communities that are seen as being more 
sustainable and nonmodernist in comparison to Western ideas and practices. Further 
exploration of Buen Vivir is provided, for example, by Alberto Acosta: https://www.
degrowth.info/en/dim/degrowth-in-movements/buen-vivir/ (accessed September 10, 
2019).
 8. Keynote in the panel on “Social/Climate/Agrarian/Environmental Justice, 
Social Movements & Alternatives,” February 5, 2016, The Hague http://www.iss.nl/
fileadmin/ASSETS/iss/Research_and_projects/Research_networks/ICAS/2016_col 
loquium_draft_Programme_10_Dec_2015.pdf
 9. This phenomenon of a single individual working on both on the regulatory 
and business side of mining, in what could be thought of as a revolving door, is also 
present in the Global North, including Finland, where mining regulators have worked 
as company directors and received stock options. Thus, the expansion of global extrac-
tivism seems to influence nations very strongly and quite independently, despite dif-
ferent political systems (see Kröger 2015a). The autonomy and technical expertise of 
the regulators seems to be a key factor in determining where new reckless resource 
booms are given leeway to expand, which would support Max Weber’s (1968) classic 
argument about the crucial importance of the bureaucracy’s autonomy and techni-
cal expertise in development. Mauno Vilminko (personal communication, November 
2016), a senior mining manager experienced in opening and running several mines 
and knowledgeable about both the recent Finnish and Swedish mining booms (2005– 
15), argued that similar kinds of reckless mining projects, with no solid basis in profit- 
making or environmental impact terms, were proposed during the boom in both Swe-
den and Finland. In Sweden, these were mostly blocked by regulators, as there were 
still mining experts available to judge the projects independently. In Finland, however, 
cuts in the training of mining experts to work as regulators in the 1990s left a regula-
Revised Pages
Notes to Pages 42–44  251
tory setting where no one was technically capable of judging whether there was ore or 
not in a proposed project. Talvivaara mine is one of the most notorious examples of 
this oversight. In recent years, revolving doors and policies dismantling the autonomy 
and insulation of state bureaucracies seriously diminished regulatory capacities in Fin-
land, in contrast to Sweden (Kröger 2015a). Regulatory capacities thus matter, and 
in the absence of the state, civil society has started to provide this oversight, as I will 
explain later in this book.
 10. Evans (1995, 12) likens the “internal organization of developmental states” 
(whose effectiveness in industrial transformation was the goal of his study) to being 
“embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides 
institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and re- negotiation of goals 
and policies.” This institutionalization of continual channels for negotiating policies 
can be equated with the creation of “consistency,” which also is interestingly a required 
element in the conceptualization of a “political opportunity” by Tarrow (2005). When 
such consistency has been created or some state actors have changed their views by a 
series of events where the civil society has been the primary motor, then state embed-
ding by civil society has occurred. Following Tarrow’s (2005) theory, this would then 
suggest better political opportunities for resistance, and following Evans’s (1995) the-
ory, also a more developmental transformation.
 11. As my focus is more on the resistance side and particularly on explaining its 
impact on outcomes, I build on Evans’s (1995, 236) brief notes on “encompassive 
embeddedness,” wherein the state and social groups, and possibly also progressive parts 
of the industry, all have embedded relations. This is in contrast to a situation where 
only state- industry embeddedness would exist. Evans (1995, 236) argues that devel-
opment in the state of Kerala in Southern India, with globally notable advancements 
in social welfare (for which reason Kerala has been studied as a key explanatory case 
in comparative developmental analyses), has been a result of the mobilized resistance 
groups (to capital) embedding the state, which has nevertheless retained autonomy. 
Evans’s interpretation thus contrasts with the view that Kerala’s changed social struc-
tures and the new welfare institutions were simply an outcome of leftist mobilization. 
He argues that “regardless of the level of protest,” the mobilization would not have 
reached these outcomes without adequate state capacity— an administrative apparatus 
that already existed for usage, to be embedded, for example, by making “full use of the 
competence built into the Indian civil service.”
 12. Brazil’s Land Reform Institute, embedded by MST (in a way that retained both 
the Land Reform Institute and MST autonomy), has acted as a powerful state institu-
tion (in a way that would not have been possible for a nonstate actor) in upholding 
the rule of law. In Rio Grande do Sul, the Land Reform Institute blocked corporate 
intrusions that were expanding industrial tree plantations onto land under agrarian 
reform settlements of the MST (Kröger 2010, 2011).
 13. States would have reason to increase their role in steering extractive policies. 
Building on Evans (1995, 2010), this would result in more value- adding growth and 
could be done by increasing embeddedness in civil society and among corporations 
by (1) regulating excessive extractivism and (2) increasing state autonomy by shedding 
the ties that have allowed states or parts of them to be captured by extractivist inter-
ests. Some state actors in India have pursued this goal, but it is important to note that 
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governments (federal and some state- level regional governments) did this only after 
resistance pinpointed the problems of extractivism and the massive losses it causes, for 
example, to state exchequers.
 14. A discussion of the post- 2015 slide toward different forms of authoritarianism 
is beyond the scope of this book, although the discussion here is essential to under-
stand how many authoritarian leaders gained power and clout. The windfall gains 
from the iron mining boom financed many important fanatical, nonconventional, and 
totalitarian politicians’ political campaigns in Brazil and India. Their rise to power was 
premised on extractivist gains, which explains why they want to clamp down on the 
mobilization that is starting to cut the flow of ore and thus barring the road to power 
via extractivism.
 15. I follow the Gramscian separation of dominance as open violence and hege-
mony as a subtler use of force based on at least partial agreement by the subjects to be 
governed; see Arrighi (1994).
 16. Scott (1998, 2009) emphasizes the duality of state and nonstate space in his 
conceptualization of the state as a modernizing project, but for the purposes of a more 
fine- grained analysis of both antistate and state- embedding strategies, I have disaggre-
gated the “state” and “nonstate” into different political processes and games. Similarly, 
Max Weber’s (1968) monopoly of violence is only one part of the explanation of state- 
related processes, to which I have added more detailed heuristic tools.
Chapter 2
 1. The extension of the boxes of varied political games across the state and into 
different types of agencies shows how they can be embedded or coproduced; nonstate 
actors can form a part of the actual state- making practices and politics. Nature is 
everywhere in the figure, and the global setting is also embedded in the agencies and 
games mentioned.
 2. For example, in India, the “protection of the land rights of the poor is one of 
the most important provisions made by the Constitution. Since the land is subject to 
state control, many Indian states have state- specific Acts that protect the land rights of 
the tribals and Dalits [Dalits are the noncaste people in India, often in even worse con-
ditions than Adivasis]. In many cases these Acts are a result of the tribal and agrarian 
resistance and movements by tribal and other deprived people to protect their rights 
over land and natural resources” (Ahmad 2014, 260).
 3. For informant safety I have decided to leave out detailed referencing of most 
informant- obtained data used in the text. I have also omitted dates and places of dis-
cussions in many cases, to minimize the connection of the data presented to specific 
informants.
 4. A large number of India’s many different leftist revolutionary groups came 
together in 2004 and formed the Communist Party of India (Maoists), a loose alli-
ance, which the state termed a terrorist organization in 2009. This designation gener-
ated an operation in 2012 called the “Green Hunt,” which involved approximately 
100,000 federal paramilitary officers, to exterminate these “Naxalites,” which the gov-
ernment sees as its greatest internal security threat (Kohli 2012, 75).
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 5. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/allindia-adivasi-mahasabha-calls-
for-unity-among-tribals/article1579773.ece (accessed July 2, 2015).
 6. For example, in Jharkhand, “Activists are prosecuted in law to discourage them 
from organizing resistance against forced evictions or forced sale of land” for mining, 
and “the police prevent activists from campaigning near land acquisition sites” (Lahiri- 
Dutt, Krishnan, and Ahmad 2014, 172).
 7. In India, the federal state is called the Centre, as India is not a collection of 
federal states with their own political will in the same way as, for example, the United 
States of America. Control is much more centralized. A coordinator from Mines, Min-
erals and People (MMP, a national alliance of those concerned by mining) told me in 
December 2012 that if differences arise at the state- federal level of political dynamics 
in India, then the Centre government will act, meaning that the Centre ministers will 
also override their counterparts in the states. According to the MMP coordinator, the 
“Indian Centre government is more despotic than the old monarchs.” However, this 
does not mean that the federal state apparatus does not offer opportunities for activ-
ists. The court system in particular shows the robustness of Indian democracy: “we can 
go to court against the government without fear,” he explained to me.
 8. The Justice MB Shah Commission was appointed in November 2010 to probe 
the illegal mining of iron and manganese ore in contravention of provisions of the 
Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, the Forest (Conserva-
tion) Act, 1980, and the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. By the time the govern-
ment ended the commission’s tenure in October 2013, its investigations had “led to 
the closure of hundreds of illegal mines” (http://www.tehelka.com/who-is-the-mines-
ministry-trying-to-save/, accessed June 30, 2015). These outcomes were not a result of 
the commission per se, as civil society activism played a crucial role.
 9. For example, much recent mining resistance in India has based its protesting 
and campaigning strategies on the premise of a mid- 2000s progressive law that gave 
the right to information, a law that would not exist without the actions of a particular 
social movement and its agency. This has swiftly become “structure” that has been 
relied upon when activists occupied government offices demanding that government 
officials disclose mining project documents. In this relational approach, opportunities 
are disaggregated to their constituent causal paths.
 10. The MST was central in promoting the inclusion of clauses in the Constitu-
tion that made it legal to appropriate and redistribute land that was socially unproduc-
tive or even idle. The MST continues to be a pivotal movement resisting extractivism 
and uses those very clauses, which it was in a central position to push through in the 
1988 Constitution (Carter 2015). The movement is not just attributing or using a 
political opportunity structure in this case (which would imply a top- down process 
of a larger “openness” by decision- makers), but has in fact created earlier that very 
structure while coproducing several key institutional positions to ensure that the law 
is implemented.
 11. Targeted voting has also been used as a political tool in mining conflicts else-
where. In Peru’s Arequipa region, the local farmers used a concerted voting for proag-
riculture politicians in the 2015 municipal elections, which brought a major change 
in the power distribution (Romero 2017). According to José Romero (interview, May 
5, 2017), this was a key reason why the Tia Maria mining project, which threatened 
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the agricultural lands, was not advanced, alongside other factors, such as a sixty- day 
clash between the locals and the police and military apparatuses that left several activ-
ists dead. However, as Romero argued, in 2017 many of the politicians elected via 
targeted antimining voting were turning promining, and bribery tapes appeared, in a 
sign of the strength of Latin American clientelism as an overriding and deep- rooted 
political mechanism through which corporate interests can wipe out the gains made 
in reshaping electoral politics by movements. Still, the 2015 episode might have been 
enough to close the project, and at least it discontinued the project, so targeted voting 
can have major impacts even in polities where state coproduction by the resistance to 
extractivism is not easy or does not easily have a lasting effort.
 12. While the new Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) director had a role 
creating possibilities to tap into the knowledge of civil societies and build deeper 
democracy, this cannot be conceived solely as a case of a top- down creation of politi-
cal opportunities. The embedding work and actual constitution of the Committee for 
Food Sovereignty by La Via Campesina members had been intense in the previous 
years, and the outcome would not have been reached without their actions and chang-
ing of the institutional game around food governance at the international level. FAO 
director José Graziano da Silva mentioned at the signing of the official pact with the 
Committee on Food Sovereignty that “we do not want to take the responsibility away 
from states, but we also want to give the opportunity to other actors to participate in 
the processes.” This statement can be seen as an indication of a successful civil society 
embedding of the state/interstate spaces. See http://www.fao.org/about/who-we-are/
director-gen/faodg-news-archive/detail/en/c/232697/ (accessed May 30, 2019).
 13. The identification of the heuristic devices of cultural, economic, social, and 
symbolic capital as analytical and empirical categories derives from Bourdieu (1986, 
1991, 1998). Social space includes social positions, particularly class relations and 
other positions of power that economic, cultural, and social capital offer, but also 
social acts that change these. Physical space change signifies, for example, landscape or 
bodily changes; in other words, material changes in landscapes and territories. Redis-
tribution of power in symbolic space occurs through a different logic. When differ-
ences in capital are misperceived as differences in honor, they function as what Bour-
dieu calls “symbolic capital,” which also functions as symbolic violence (1991, 238). 
Symbolic power is “the power to constitute the given by enunciating it, to make people 
see and believe, to confirm or transform the vision of the world, and thereby action 
upon the world, and thus the world itself ” (Bourdieu 1991, 170). In other words, it 
consists of ideas. An example of symbolic power at work is the framing of a region 
in the Amazon as a “natural resource frontier” by a government policy, which then 
leads companies, state officials, and even the locals to relate to that lived environment 
more as an area to be extracted of “riches” than as a valued home of many beings. A 
resistance strategy of nonmodernist framing would try to counterbalance such fram-
ings, challenging symbolic power. If the symbolic power of those in favor of mining is 
weakened— that is, their honor and their position as agents of rightful, merit- based, 
or natural development becomes perceived as a product of the control of dispropor-
tionate amounts of social, economic, or cultural capital— then their power to expand 
extraction also diminishes.
 14. The aim of this book is not to explore ontological questions of whether a 
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thing actually exists or can exist, but rather the political nature and impact of acts and 
processes. I do not judge, for example, framings as either right or wrong, primordial, 
essentialist, or by some other category. Rather, following the line of political ontology 
(see Blaser 2009; Escobar 2011), I seek to understand the world as it is made and 
constructed through framings and other acts.
Chapter 3
 1. http://www.esgindia.org/about-us/index.html, accessed April 21, 2015.
 2. http://www.spscommunitycontrol.org/fight-against-illegal-mining.html, 
accessed April 21, 2015.
 3. See, e.g., http://www.downtoearth.org.in/coverage/chaos-in-the-iron-age- 
41038 and http://bellary0.hpage.co.in/india-illegal-mining_83098762.html, accessed 
February 15, 2016. The amounts vary depending on who and how the lost value of 
the loot is calculated.
 4. http://www.spscommunitycontrol.org/fight-against-illegal-mining.html 
(accessed April 21, 2015).
 5. According to several different informants from around India, Karnataka is the 
only state where the Lokayukta system has worked even to some extent; in Bellary, an 
effective Lokayukta even facilitated an investigation by “organic society.” Lokayuktas 
were established approximately thirty years ago following activist coproduction of the 
state and could be turned into working and effective bodies of governance, based on 
the Karnataka example.





pdf, accessed February 15, 2016.
 7. The mapping of minerals by the new “organic society” also had unforeseen 
consequences. The mining barons “used the report to find out the highest 69 percent 
ore deposits!” Such an outcome would not have been surprising to the scholars of 
historical capitalism such as Moore (2014), who proclaim that mapping is essential 
for creating capitalism. This troubling dynamic between “organic society” promoting 
both democracy and capitalism is an issue to be revisited, and it speaks of the need to 
build movement agendas and frames on nonmonetary terms (not based, for example, 
on mineral quantities or wealth), but on nonmodernist values, as suggested by the 
examples of Buen Vivir (good living) (see Gudynas 2015), Gandhi’s Swaraj (self- rule 
or independence), and the Nguni Bantu term Ubuntu (humanity, or I am because we 
are).
 8. “In the ‘Republic of Bellary,’ a Minister’s ‘Muscle Power’,” Indian Express, 
August 1, 2011.
 9. Only 1.56 percent of the mining conflicts observed by Özkaynak et al. 2015, 
or thirty- six in total, had links between activists and legal organizations, which is strik-
ing, as in 43 percent of those cases the communities tried to use legal tools. This 
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suggests that an increase in access to law, via the inclusion of legal organizations in 
resistance networks, might be one of the fastest ways for movements to increase the 
likelihood of securing their objectives. My data support this suggestion, particularly 
given that the resistance uses this potential to embed and coproduce the judicial poli-
tics.
 10. B. R. Ambedkar, as noted above, is the creator of India’s Constitution and the 
key figure in the historical Dalit movement against casteism in India (see Omvedt 
1993).
 11. Satyagraha translates as truth force. Chaining oneself in front of mining 
machines or in key locations, to call for attention or to block the access to the areas 
that locals want to protect, has been a key and successful tactic in Indian mass protests. 
I will talk more about the use of these tactics in part III.
 12. The promining stance of Minas Gerais withered away after the November 5, 
2015, Samarco tailings dam collapse in Bento Rodrigues, which caused the biggest 
socio- environmental catastrophe mining has produced in Brazil; see Zonta and Tro-
cate (2016). I study the events preceding that catastrophe, in the heyday of the extrac-
tivist “commodity paradigm,” particularly between 2007 and 2014. The breaking of 
the dam created a “tsulama,” a tsunami of mud, silt, mining waste, and hazardous 
toxins, which wiped out entire towns from the riversides, killing nineteen people and 
leaving large numbers homeless and jobless. A fierce debate continues in Brazil about 
the consequences and who to blame, and it will be interesting to study in the future 
whether this occurrence has played a role in possibly checking the problems of ram-
pant and unregulated mining. Samarco is an iron ore joint venture of Vale and BHB 
Billiton.
 13. Also, according to Rodrigo Santos (interview, June 25, 2014), an experienced 
steel- politics researcher, and Maria Júlia Gomes Andrade, the coordinator of Movi-
mento Nacional pela Soberania Popular frente à Mineração (interview, June 27, 2014). 
MAM is a new mining- focused social movement and a member of La Via Campesina, 
created principally by the MST.
 14. Located in the Rio Acima and Caeté districts, the Apolo project would have 
had access to 1.1 billion metric tons of iron ore reserves; Vale bought the deposit 
exploitation rights from another company (http://www.vale.com/EN/investors/home-
press-releases/Press-Releases/Pages/vale-adquire-direitos-minerarios-da-mineracao-
apolo.aspx accessed July 30, 2015).
 15. Vale started to sell some noncore assets around 2014 and decided to concen-
trate its iron ore production in Carajás, according to Santos (personal communication, 
August 16, 2015). The blocking of Apolo’s project might have been facilitated by these 
corporate decisions.
 16. The Apolo Project was Vale’s second most important investment project after 
the Carajás expansion (via the S11D project in Pará). While the anti- Apolo group was 
short on mass participation, and indeed was more like an NGO in structure, accord-
ing to Andrade from MAM, it included members of the middle classes, forest protec-
tors, poor workers, and semirural peoples. Later, it turned into a small movement. On 
July 30, 2015, the resistance group, called Movimento pela Preservação da Serra do 
Gandarela, had over 1,000 publicly named members with individual profiles on their 
website. However, the major economic outcomes were mostly a result of the early 
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actions of the more NGO- like group. See a long list of actors who became involved 
later and a detailed discussion of the case at http://conflitosambientaismg.lcc.ufmg.br/
conflito/?id=498 (accessed August 13, 2015).
 17. http://www.aguasdogandarela.org/page/english-language-1 (accessed July 30, 
2015).
 18. Gaining urban middle- class support was a move that concurrently prevented 
the dismantling of local resistance by the typical means of rural conflict- resolution 
in Brazil— a mix of dialogue, clientelism, brute force, and neglect (see Maher 2014; 
Zhouri and Valencio 2014).
 19. The Apolo resistance embedded state institutions, such as the Chico Mendes 
Institute for Biodiversity Conservation, an official environmental institute of the fed-
eral state. The Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation was a key player 
in the struggle: as a progressive but not radical institution, it had its own discussions 
with Vale, offering a minor parcel of the area the company wanted in order to resolve 
the conflict, while the institute itself wanted the largest part of the area to be turned 
into a natural park that it would govern. http://www.mining.com/vales-4-billion-
apolo-iron-ore-project-in-brazil-jeopardized/ (accessed July 30, 2015).
 20. Progressive state institution powerholders, together with civil society resistance 
(these two embedding each other) created several specific- purpose working groups 
that invited all stakeholders (including Vale) to join in discussions on whether mining 
would be allowed inside the park. The result of these interactions was that only the 
small existing mines were given permits to continue mining. http://rioacima.com/
noticias/15/Uni%C3%A3o-decidir%C3%A1-futuro-de-projeto-Apolo-da-Vale.html 
(accessed July 30, 2015).
 21. http://diariodocomercio.com.br/noticia.php?tit=projeto_apolo_mais_perto_
de_sair_do_papel&id=142993 (accessed July 30, 2015).
 22. http://www.aguasdogandarela.org/notes/PARQUE_NACIONAL_
CRIADO_N%C3%83O_PROTEGE_A_SERRA_E_AS_%C3%81GUAS_DO_
GANDARELA (accessed July 30, 2015).
 23. This makes it partially more understandable why the Capão Xavier mine, 
established by Vale in the early 2000s just next to the city of Belo Horizonte before 
Gandarela and also located on hills providing water, was resisted only after the mine 
was constructed. This resistance was low level, with no visible protests, and mostly 
consisted of neighborhood people, so there were many weaknesses in mobilization that 
are causally related to the nonstoppage outcome. For a basic overview of the case, see 
http://ejatlas.org/conflict/capao-xavier-mine-brazil (accessed August 13, 2015). With 
the Apolo project, people could rely on incorporated experience from Capão Xavier.
 24. Yet in many ways this is a very special case, as it involved an urban middle class 
with many technical skills and connections who realized that the targeted area would 
be the last remaining water source for the millions of people living in the state capi-
tal. It is therefore difficult in this case to claim that specific resistance strategies alone 
explain the outcomes.
 25. For a fuller list of the entities involved in this movement, see http://conflitos-
ambientaismg.lcc.ufmg.br/conflito/?id=237 (accessed August 12, 2015).
 26. Santos, who is a key expert on Brazilian iron ore mining, and deeply involved 
in trying to pressure the government to make better mining policies, considers the 
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relocation outcome an interactive property of the company- resistance relation, which 
has different impacts on resistance depending on the sector; relocation can either 
empower the resistance group or make it subject to criticism.
 27. Dinius (2010) notes that the CSN workers had the power to challenge and 
even undermine the post– World War II developmentalism of large Latin American 
countries already between the 1940s and 1960s and build labor regimes that benefited 
workers. These historical roots can be seen as partly explaining the new contentious-
ness (trade union environmentalism) visible in the CSN mining resistance groups of 
today. There’s a particular kind of resistance agency linked to CSNs corporate agency, 
and their interaction, including conflicts, which breeds a particular dynamics of con-
tention, where the resistance has a stronger compounded agency to start with than 
in some other cases. A somewhat similar case, to be discussed later, existed in India 
between the Dalli Rajhara iron ore mine and its labor union. It is important to identify 
such contextual factors that help to build up resistance, so that the differing roots of 
mobilization can be linked to possibly differing outcomes.
 28. Investors do not seem to be aware of the politics that explain investment out-
comes, as this news article intended for investors portrays, “A survey from consul-
tancy Wood Mackenzie points to twenty iron ore projects in Brazil with a combined 
capacity for 250 million metric tons per year, all pending the solving of infrastructure 
bottlenecks. CSN is to postpone the expansion of Casa de Pedra mine; the Itabiritos 
reserves of Brazilian mining company MMX are not feasible under the current prices 
scenario” (“Brazil: Iron Mining Investments on Hold,” SABI– News, April 9, 2015). 
This investor view lacks a more complete understanding of the politics at the point of 
production, whereby many of the projects mentioned above were already curbed and 
stalled well before the price decline, and whose opening would not be politically easy 
or feasible even in high- price scenarios. It is more investor friendly to say that your 
company is postponing a project due to a bad market situation rather than due to 
resistance making the expansion hard or impossible. In many cases there is no knowl-
edge of the politics of resistance behind investments, for which reason they need to be 
opened up.
 29. http://marianaviva.blogspot.fi/p/informe-se.html (accessed May 23, 2015)
 30. Available online: http://revistadoispontos.com/trilha-do-minerio/uma-cidade-
feita-de-minerio/ (accessed July 30, 2015).
 31. http://www.folhamarianense.com.br/web2/?id=artigo&artigo=5 (accessed 
July 30, 2015).
 32. http://al-mg.jusbrasil.com.br/noticias/2746972/mariana-resiste-ao-projeto-
de-reativacao-da-mina-del-rey (accessed July 30, 2015; author’s translation).
 33. http://ejatlas.org/conflict/impacts-of-iron-ore-mining-in-conceicao-do-mato- 
dentro-mg-brazil (accessed July 30, 2015).
 34. See also http://conflitosambientaismg.lcc.ufmg.br/conflito/?id=253 (accessed 
July 30, 2015).
 35. http://www.conflitoambiental.icict.fiocruz.br/index.php?pag=ficha&cod=229 
(accessed July 30, 2015).
 36. https://acervo.racismoambiental.net.br/2010/06/02/morre-assassinado-um- 
dos-moradores-mais-querido-da-comunidade-da-mumbuca-conceicao-do-mato-den 
tro/ (accessed July 30, 2019).
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 37. The difference between Bellary and the Minas Gerais cases, however, is while 
in the latter the resistance was waged before major physical space changes took place, 
the resistance largely managed to avoid rampant land destruction through creation of 
new open- pit mines. In Bellary the resistance had to operate on top of an already rav-
aged landscape— that is, on a physical arena whose key game rules had already been 
set to favor the continuation of mining, accruing all kinds of capital to miners (as the 
physical change was largely irreversible).
 38. During this pre- 1996 era, there was a much greater degree of violence and 
police repression than after the nationally acknowledged massacre of nineteen MST 
protestors in 1996, who were killed by police during a peaceful march in Eldorado dos 
Carajás, close to the Vale mine, and linked to the land conflicts caused by the project, 
bringing international shame upon the government.
 39. March 8 is not just any day; it is the day chosen by La Via Campesina and MST 
for the most radical of acts, those that seek to directly confront capital by sabotage and 
other means, and, not coincidentally, it is also International Women’s Day (Kröger 2010, 
2011, 2013a). Women’s protests are central, and acts on this day are chosen, organized, 
and implemented exclusively by women, in order to link the powerful potential that 
instigating protests has for turning typically less politically active people into critical 
activists. By this, they mean activating women in many rural areas of Brazil, as they 
have less capital (in its gendered social divisions) and potentially would not normally be 
involved in political protest. When I first arrived at the Palmares settlement on March 8, 
2011, it was carnival time and “everybody else except the MST were on holiday” as the 
activists explained to me. I witnessed a large women’s protest march the same day.
 40. The Pastoral land Commission is linked to the Catholic Church and the the-
ology of liberation, which inspires important civil society networks and supports a 
variety of land justice initiatives, by issuing, for example, a yearly report about violence 
in the countryside.
 41. The general goal of the protests by the MST and its allies has been a transfor-
mation in Brazil’s mining policy, which includes the elimination of tax incentives, the 
fortification of regulatory state agencies supervising mining, new mining taxes, higher 
royalties, and greater environmental control over Vale (Alvares da Silva, Costa, and 
Veiga 2011). Vale has exploited a lack of information, by dealing with individuals 
rather than with communities (Gerbode 2011), and battles over knowledge are central 
to the conflict.
 42. Unfortunately for the resistance in Carajás, the economically stronger opposi-
tion in Minas Gerais may have driven Vale’s decision to focus all its attention on their 
new expansion project in the Carajás complex, called S11D.
 43. These moves have brought important economic outcomes: Vale was ordered by 
a court on August 14, 2015 to close down its Puma nickel mine and pay an equivalent 
in Brazilian reais to $US287,000 to each indigenous village in the area and conduct 
environmental impact assessments before resuming any operations. Such outcomes 
show that, like in India, the resistance has gained by adopting the protesting tactics of 
direct land control and blocking the physical entrance. This tactic seems to be particu-
larly useful against greenfield mines. The public interest in litigation in the Puma case 
was based on successful judicial embedding by the indigenous and their anti- Vale allies 
such as the MST.
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 44. The same applies to the Goan, Karnatakan, Odishan, and Tamil Nadu cases of 
peaceful resistance in India, although in these the political outcome fostering the cre-
ation of larger resistance coalitions or deeper local willingness and capacity for mobi-
lizations in the future was less explicit; the main aim being economic— to close the 
mines or projects.
Chapter 4
 1. The mining sector in India is less focused on serving China than the sector in 
Brazil, and more on creating its own industry. India already produces more than three 
times as much steel as Brazil and has a much larger metal industry. India also has also 
had export- oriented projects, such as POSCO (which will be talked about at length 
in a forthcoming chapter) that would feed the massive steel capacity of South Korea. 
I mention this here to highlight that there are important differences between these 
contexts.
 2. The resistance agencies here had particular qualities. One important particu-
larity of the armed Indian resistance is that a large number of the Maoists are women, 
and most of them are Adivasi (Chandroke 2015). There’s more leeway for political 
economic agency among Adivasi women than among some other comparable groups. 
In India, Adivasi women typically have more control over their earnings than Hindu 
women. Basu (1992) found that this increased access and control over economic gains 
has made Adivasi women more apt protagonists in protesting than their Hindu peers.
 3. The Salwa Judum in the Gondi tribal language means a “purification hunt”; in 
English these paramilitaries are called “Peace March.” According to Kalshian (2007, 
6), “a Chhattisgarh state government- sponsored campaign to mobilise Adivasi youth 
against the Naxal ‘menace’ as well as, as some allege, popular resistance to mining in 
the state . . . threatens to fracture and destroy the indigenous communities caught in 
the crossfire between the state and the Naxalites. . . . [In May 2007,] 55 ill- equipped 
Salwa Judum troopers were mowed down by their Naxalite brethren in Dantewada.” A 
survey by Zemp and Mohapatra (“Child Soldiers in Chhattisgarh: Issues, Challenges 
and FFDA’s Response,” no date) revealed that in the Dantewada district alone, 12,000 
minors were recruited by the Salwa Judum as soldiers. The state also recruited thou-
sands of Adivasi boys and girls as police officers, and such recruitments were also very 
common among the Maoist cadres.
 4. http://www.epw.in/editorials/salwa-judum-version-20.html (accessed June 5, 
2015).
 5. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/06/04/ironore-india-chhattisgarh-idINL-
3N0EG1U320130604 (accessed August 4, 2015).
 6. Several national mining activists saw this as a tragedy. One wondered “why 
militants have to call themselves after Mao,” as “nobody has imposed mining as ruth-
lessly as Mao himself.”
 7. The FRA has provided strong de jure ethnic- territorial rights in India but 
failed to offer de facto rights. According to Nayak (2015, 262), the act will save Adiva-
sis and forest dwellers “from being treated as encroachers and evicted from their land 
for development purposes without compensation” and “is designed to prevent the use 
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of forestland for development projects . . . without the consent of the Gram Sabhas 
(village assemblies). However, the implementation of this law has failed on various 
grounds.”
 8. Panchayats are village- level statutory institutions of local self- government. 
These village governments are headed by a sarpanch, who links the village commu-
nity to the central and state governments, and also has judicial powers in some states. 
According to police officers, sarpanchs who have been elected without Maoist accep-
tance of them as candidates are sometimes killed in civil war areas in India (http://www.
thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/maoists-kill-sarpanch-deputy-sarpanch-
in-bastar/article7534609.ece?ref=sliderNews accessed August 13, 2015). Besides the 
sarpanch, the Gram Panchayat is constituted by elected panchas (members). Activists 
against land acquisitions have used panchayats to get movement members elected as 
sarpanchs, which has been helpful (National Center for Advocacy Studies 2011).
 9. Some politicians, such as Centre minister Jairam Ramesh, according to an 
National Adivasi Alliance activist, had been strengthening the FRA in the early 2010s, 
which meant that Adivasis could declare their areas Adivasi areas. However, the cur-
rent drive of Narendra Modi’s government is exactly the opposite, to cut Gram Sabha 
power. Until now, most Gram Sabha, FRA, and other pro– local land control “political 
opportunity” power has been curtailed by the contradictory Land Acquisition Act of 
1894 under which “the government has the right to acquire any private land as long as 
it’s in the public interest to do so” (Hinmon 2007, 130).
 10. I am referring in this book to the pre- 2012 district separation, before the splin-
tering of the three southern Chhattisgarh districts of Bastar, Kanker, and Dantewada 
into several smaller districts. In 1999, Bastar was divided into these three districts. 
The Bastar Division refers to all of the three districts together. This overlapping of 
names explains why many texts refer to Bailadila iron ore deposits being in Bastar, for 
example, although they are in the Dantewada district. Dalli Rajhara deposits are now 
in the Balod district, while before 2012 they were in Durg. The proposed Rowghat 
mines close to the city of Narayanpur were before 2012 located in the Kanker district. 
The Bastar district proper has no known large iron ore deposits or projects, but it has 
several steel plant projects.
 11. Please see Map 1, in the introduction, for the locations and the rough size of 
the case areas being discussed in this chapter.
 12. Godawari acknowledges that it has not been able to open up the Boria Tippu 
mine due to Naxal presence (http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-
02/news/42617578_1_iron-ore-ari-dongri-2-4-mtpa, accessed August 7, 2015).
 13. Recently Sarda has resumed operations on a small- scale mine, which it argues 
has reserves of 20 mt (http://www.seml.co.in/mining.php, accessed July 2, 2015).
 14. http://Naxalrevolution.blogspot.fi/2010/11/interview-with-com-ganapathy-
general.html (accessed August 7, 2015).
 15. https://southasiarev.wordpress.com/2010/01/15/peoples-liberation-gue-
rilla-army-stages-daring-ambushes-in-chhattisgarh/ (accessed August 7, 2015).
 16. http://Naxalrevolution.blogspot.fi/2012/06/oppose-army-deployment-in-
bastar.html (accessed August 7, 2015).
 17. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2117812.ece (accessed July 2, 
2015).
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 18. This also partly explains why there has been a strong Communist trade union 
in the plant, and why the historically Soviet Union- leaning Communist Parties of 
India (CPI and CPI- M) are at odds with the China- leaning Communist Parties (Mao-
ist and Marxist- Leninist). There has been for decades a rupture in the internal politics 
of the Left in India flowing from the international schism between the Soviet Union 
and China. Officially India has been on good terms with the first and at times at war 
with the latter (Banerjee 2013).
 19. http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/rowghat-iron-ore-
project-gets-home-ministry-s-push-115021001610_1.html (accessed July 1, 2015).
 20. CMM has “successfully resisted mechanization” since the late 1970s according 
to a national mining activist. The movement’s founder was assassinated by industrialists 
in 1991, but the movement has left a strong statist and nonmechanizing legacy to the 
Chhattisgarh steel and iron industry to push for an alternative industrialization (but not 
resistance to it) (Krishnan 2014). CMM has also been centrally involved in resisting 
genetically modified crops and defending the rights of peasants against land grabbers. 
It has mobilized small and marginal farmers, some of whom are part- time laborers in 
the mines, to resist the destruction of cultivable land and fresh water sources by mining 
(Baviskar 2005). Krishnan (2014) argues that the CMM’s success in affecting technol-
ogy development and usage in mining is a globally important example. The combination 
of outside movements in concert with an in- mine labor union is indeed a promising 
example, and the movement’s ability to secure MLA positions suggests that it is one of 
the most notable and most nuanced place- based mining- critical contentious agents in 
the world— not an easy feat when one embeds a movement in an industry.
 21. http://www.epw.in/authors/chhattisgarh-mukti-morcha (accessed July 12, 
2015).
 22. http://www.tehelka.com/who-is-the-mines-ministry-trying-to-save/ (accessed 
July 12, 2015).
 23. I received and found diverging claims on whether the current mines, mainly 
Dalli Rajhara, are actually depleting as fast as claimed, and whether there is a real 
“necessity” to open the Rowghat mines to avoid closing down the Bhilai plant. In 
2011 the government of Chhattisgarh’s Mineral Resources Department (http://chhat-
tisgarhmines.gov.in/iron-ore.htm, accessed July 2, 2015) estimated there were approx-
imately 165 mt of iron ore reserves in Dalli Rajhara. On average, 1.6 tons of iron 
ore are needed to produce a ton of steel (https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/50494260.pdf, 
accessed July 2, 2015), but the Bhilai Steel Plant consumes about 2 tons, claimed the 
president of the iron miners’ union in Chhattisgarh. With its current 4.7 million tons 
per annum hot metal capacity, the captive Dalli Rajhara deposits would last the BSP 
plant about eighteen years. If the plant capacity increases to the proposed 7.5 million 
tons per annum, they will last for eleven years. In the official public statistics, refer-
enced above, Rowghat had a deposit of 732 mt, but my expert informants claimed 
that this is an underestimation and that the best information is not public; the big 
private players have much more information than the state on the deposits. Rowghat 
hills were argued by some to have at least as much reserves as the hills in Dantewada, 
which had 1,343 mt in 2011.
 24. http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/new-iron-ore-mine-to-
be-developed/article4063401.ece (accessed July 2, 2015)
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 25. http://chhattisgarhmines.gov.in/iron-ore.htm (accessed June 10, 2015).
 26. Although Eklama seems to have far fewer reserves than Rowghat, the authori-
ties argue that there is enough iron ore to start a new independent steel mill for the 
deposit, suggesting that there might be more than the announced 200 mt.
 27. See http://scroll.in/article/802590/in-chhattisgarh-mining-interests-and-
tribal-rights-on-a-collision-course (accessed March 31, 2016).
 28. It has 66 percent pure ore and the minerals extracted were valued at about 40 
billion rupees or 815 million US dollars in 2010– 11.
 29. In the official statistics 80 percent of the people in this region were considered 
to be tribal even by the Indian government. However, the actual number is higher, as 
the Adivasi group also includes people who are not considered by the Indian state to 
be members of “Scheduled Tribes.” For example, there are officially no such Scheduled 
Tribes in Goa, but the locals see themselves as Adivasis and indigenous.
 30. A large part of the ore is still exported to Japan, and such international dimen-
sions typically deepen corporate agency. Estimates of the percentage exported to Japan 
varied wildly among my informants. One journalist and a bureaucrat argued that it 
was about half. This was disputed by NMDCs Bailadila trade union leader and the 
CPI secretary for Chhattisgarh who claimed in an interview that only 10 percent of 
the Bailadila mine production was exported, with 70 percent going to Andra Pradesh 
to a government steel plant, and 20 percent to Chhattisgarh sponge iron plants and 
other local uses.
 31. http://www.newindianexpress.com/business/news/Naxal-Problem-Hits-
NMDC-Bailadila-Mine-Expansion/2014/09/05/article2414586.ece (accessed July 7, 
2015).
 32. These two Communist parties split into two, mostly because the Maoists 
wanted to opt for an armed revolution, backed up by China, while the traditional 
CPI was aligned with the Soviet Union, and wants to seek change via parliamentary 
politics.
 33. Unskilled laborers earn 15,000 rupees per month there, while in private com-
panies the rate is 4,000– 5,000 rupees. Private operations are also unconcerned about 
the environment, according to this informant.
 34. NMDC’s Bailadila trade union leader and the CPI secretary for Chhattisgarh 
shared the argument that the relations with Adivasis were “good,” with many of them 
employed. At the same time, he acknowledged that there is pollution in loading places 
and water pollution going to the villages; losses for which the Adivasis are “compen-
sated,” according to him. Sundar (2006), by contrast, claims that Bailadila does not 
provide employment to the locals. A CPI- affiliated Bhilai Steel Plant and iron ore 
mine trade unionist asserted to me that Adivasis get only “sweeping jobs” as they are 
the “most illiterate, backward, poor, distressed people.” He also emphasized that the 
Rowghat mine must be opened at any cost.
 35. I do not compare these steel plant cases systematically, but discuss many of 
them (such as CNS in Congonhas, the Mangalore plant that used Kudremukh ore, 
and several steel plants and projects in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand Odisha), as they 
help to explain iron ore extraction politics. As stated by two Adivasi leaders, as well as 
journalists I interviewed, the Naxals have been central in blocking the private com-
panies Essar and Tata in Dantewada, in the Bastar and Kanker districts, whose steel 
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projects were in the middle of Naxal areas. A journalist claimed that “Essar would have 
opened a big steel plant in Dantewada, if not for the Maoists.” The Tata steel plant case 
in Bastar demonstrates similar stoppage dynamics, but in Bastar further pressure has 
come from peaceful resistance building.
A non- Adivasi mining activist explained to me that there is a petition in court 
against the Tata steel project in Lohandiguda, and as of 2013 Tata had not gotten the 
required permits. The petition was submitted by Manish Kunjam, a former MLA and 
the president of the Adivasi Mahasabha, a political party and Adivasi movement; Kun-
jam also led the peaceful mobilization. So in this case there was simultaneously both 
armed revolutionary agency and peaceful litigation by organized social movements at 
play in the resistance to the privatization of the Bastar mines/forests. A lawyer familiar 
with the petition said that, despite it being in a High Court, and despite strong peace-
ful local mobilization, Tata went ahead with the project in 2007. At this point, the 
Maoists stepped in and stopped the project by force. According to the lawyer, there 
were over 150,000 Naxalite and peaceful resistance movement members all agitating 
against the Tata project in that area. In practice, the Naxalites killed two strong local 
politicians, which led to a stoppage of the Tata steel project, which as of 2015 still had 
not advanced. A bit later, the Maoists also burned a trial Tata mining operation in 
Dantewada, thus stopping it. This was shared with me in 2013 by a Tehelka journalist 
knowledgeable about the area. In these Tata steel plant and mine project stoppages, a 
mix of armed and nonarmed resistance is clearly visible as well.
 36. Essar came to own the waste iron dust created by the public NMDC com-
pany’s mining, converting the dust to pellets and transporting it via slurry pipelines for 
that purpose. Naxals have bombed the pipeline. BJP was in power when the MOUs 
were signed, and not even the opposition Congress Party could see these agreements 
in order to check them, and they were later found to be “signed with scant regard to 
all rules and regulations” (Putul 2007, 50).
 37. This suggests that the media is not a good source of information when examin-
ing resistance in Eastern India (or elsewhere for that matter), and that field research 
is needed. A journalist exclaimed that “rallies do not matter” as the government in 
Chhattisgarh “can easily ignore” them. A lawyer observed that a general feature of 
Indian democracy is that it is not very responsive to its people. This sentiment specifi-
cally referred to the 1980s dam movement, which was, according to the lawyer, well 
supported and organized but “gained nothing.” My comparative analysis does not, 
however, support this dam- movement claim— the 1980s dam movement had several 
weaknesses in comparison to the successful peaceful social movements in mining con-
flicts in India, which are studied herein.
 38. One possible cause for this, mentioned by the advocate, is that this resistence 
has no informed intellectual class, even in the capital. This situation is unlike the 
capitals of Odisha and Jharkhand, and is a state of affairs dating back to the very late 
arrival of British education to this part of India.
 39. Dayamani Barla, a Munda tribal, Adivasi leader, journalist, and an Aam Aadmi 
Party Lok Sabha MP candidate in the 2014 elections (inspired by her sixty- nine day 
imprisonment in 2012) spearheaded a land occupation movement. This movement 
peacefully stopped ArcelorMittal from investing 8.8 billion USD to build a giant steel 
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plant, only thirty kilometers away from Ranchi, the state capital. The steel plant would 
had been fed by West Singhbhum iron ore.
 40. After the events described above transpired, the Shah Commission report 
had an impact on Jharkhand. On September 4, 2014, the Jharkhand government 
was ordered by the central government to close the operation of twelve of its seven-
teen working iron ore mines, all in the West Singhbhum district. This closure was 
done in response to the May 15, 2014, direction of the Supreme Court demand-
ing that companies without leases should be acted against. West Singhbhum has 
had strong resistance against greenfield mining, but not much activism around the 
existing mines, where populations are mostly promining. However, the Shah Com-
mission also forced existing mines to close, bringing almost all iron mining in the 
state to a halt. The closed mines were operating illegally as their leases had expired, 
so this was an imposition of the rule of law. According to an interview with the 
state mines and geology department secretary, Arun Kumar, reported in the Tele-
graph, his institution “had served notices to mines and in some cases started hear-
ings in the wake of the Shah Commission report tabled in Parliament this August 
[2014]. ‘The report mentioned illegal mining in tune of over Rs 20,000 crore alone 
in Jharkhand by companies’.” http://www.telegraphindia.com/1140904/jsp/front-
page/story_18798968.jsp#.ValFQ2PtN4k (accessed July 17, 2015). According to 
the website Down to Earth, this closure of mines “triggered panic among major steel 
makers in the area.” The chief minister blamed the capitalists: “the closure is a result 
of inability of mining giants to follow the rules.” This minister also blamed the 
mining companies for their inability to set a corporate social responsibility policy 
and maintain the environment and forests. http://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/
panic-hunger-and-loss-of-livelihood-follow-closure-of-12-mines-in-jharkhands-
west-singhbhum-46280 (accessed July 17, 2015).
 41. Dalli Rajhara resistance was spearheaded by an alternative trade union move-
ment, not armed resistance, but the threat of armed resistance lingered in the air, as 
the Maoists made it clear they could intervene there as well.
 42. Max Bearak, “Indian Villagers Cut Down Hills in Quest for Mining Wealth,” 
New York Times, March 24, 2014, B2.
 43. Armed conflicts often hide the actions taken while they are happening. Coltan 
from Congo is an example of how a civil war context allows the dubious background 
of minerals used transnationally to be hidden (Nest 2011). In Nigeria, the creation 
and maintenance of “economies of violence” by petro- capitalism (the key agency of 
change in that context, according to Michael Watts [2004]) has been essential not only 
for oil extractivism to continue but also for several national, ethnic, and community 
minorities and underdogs to be able to get at least something out of the extractive 
revenues (through the use of arms) for themselves.
 44. Banerjee (2013, 390) argues that, since independence, armed revolutionary 
agency has always returned to India, and more strongly after being repressed, while the 
places where Naxalism has not resurfaced have been those where land reform has been 
carried out, rural minimum wages increased, and Gram Sabhas have been given power. 
It is this power that “the demand for which initially drove the rural poor to join the 
Naxalites.” Therefore, Hinmon (2007) argues that instead of the extractivist projects’ 
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resulting in less armed resistance, as the Hindutva movement and the BJP assume, a 
deeper armed conflict is likely to ensue.
Chapter 5
 1. In Kudremukh, the ore was not of very high quality, but this weakness was 
partly compensated by the uphill location of the mine, which meant the ore could be 
sent downhill by pipelines, thereby cutting logistical costs. However, the mine did not 
turn a profit during the thirty years of its life. This was partly because it was a public 
operation whose key goal initially had been to help increase India’s exports to ease the 
balance of payment crisis during Indira Gandhi’s rule, and to establish diplomatic ties 
with Iran, which bought the ore (see Sridhar 2010). In the wave of liberalization in 
the 2000s, the threat of privatizing the mine and selling to the Japanese would have 
meant greater environmental and social costs for the people and workers as the private 
owners would obviously have wanted to make the mine profitable, argued Saldanha.
 2. http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/jindals-quest-for-iron-ore-in-tn-
enters-the-final-phase/article5735945.ece (accessed July 29, 2015).
Chapter 6
 1. Another claim that I heard constantly from informants who had studied the 
project in detail was that the POSCO project design involves many very curious and 
worrisome features from the viewpoint of potential corruption. For example, 30 per-
cent of the iron ore of the captive mine could be swapped with ore coming from 
abroad— one informant asked, “why is there such a scheme?” Another informant 
argued that foreign direct investment such as POSCO is not in fact even foreign direct 
investment, but principally Indian billionaires’ black money from abroad, which they 
want to bring back to India, laundered, under the guise of foreign direct investment.
 2. Replicative networking is typically a temporal process, whereby the methods 
of successful movement organizations spread, often through conscious efforts by activ-
ists. Such networking can be very effective in spreading the ability and willingness to 
resist. This type of expansion, however, is quite strongly defined by the span of a spe-
cific moral economy, as forms of protesting or organizing may be resisted by the inertia 
of other local moral economies. The example of MST’s (few) failed expansions of the 
“MST model” from southern to Northeast Brazil illustrate the centrality of moral 
economy (Wolford 2010) in placing barriers to replicating networks. Odisha seems to 
have a shared moral economy among the resistance— the horizontal organizing typical 
to the movements mentioned above is an illustration.
 3. The different local struggles in Odisha present very interesting and differing 
dynamics between the strategies used and the outcomes, which is why their analysis 
is fruitful for testing the hypothesis. The rich local variation across cases demonstrates 
that not all mining politics are about resistance. In my database there are also cases 
where the locals have not used many of the five key strategies, such as in Sundargarh. A 
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comparison between neighboring Sundargarh and Keonjhar, where all of the five were 
used (successfully), is therefore highly useful to highlight how particular strategies cre-
ate activism, which then leads to particular investment outcomes.
 4. Sundargarh has been an important feeder of iron ore, not only to the Rourkela 
state- owned SAIL plant but also, among many others, to the private Jindal Company’s 
three million tons per annum steel plant in Raigarh, in the neighboring state of Chhat-
tisgarh. Activists in Raigarh explained to me that there had been fierce and long- term 
resistance by the locals to the installation of the steel plant, which still continues, as the 
violently displaced people have not received compensation. The difficult situation for 
the resistance against the Raigarh steel project, which failed, coincided with an absence 
of networking with the Adivasis affected by mining in Tensa in eastern Sundargarh 
where Jindal gets its iron ore. Conversely, the absence of resistance in Tensa meant that 
these people could not hold back Jindal’s steel plant installation in Raigarh.
 5. This activist also said the state- level Adivasi leaders are building some electoral 
alliances with politicians, but that this task is “complex.” Thirty- five percent of the 
electorate is Adivasi, and political parties are keen to get their votes. They have also 
had Adivasi politicians in power (three members of the Legislative Assembly), but 
they have been co- opted, so this is not a path they would like to continue to pursue. 
In comparison to the MST in Brazil, which also has its own politicians (who were not 
co- opted to favor corporate investments at the cost of locals), a key difference lies in 
organizational identity, which is weak for the Adivasis in Odisha’s old iron mine areas. 
In contrast, Adivasis who are still forest dwellers in areas adjacent to old mines seem 
to be better organized in this sense. In Keonjhar (apart from Joda), locals deployed 
targeted voting, and managed to use this tactic to help block mine expansion.
 6. Indian districts are divided into several smaller administrative units, called 
blocks. My prior analysis has focused on the district or state levels, but here I will do 
a more fine- tuned analysis across blocks, as this is essential to understand the dras-
tic differences in the use and nonuse of resistance strategies in the different parts of 
the Keonjhar district. In the discussion below, focusing on resistance to mining in 
the Keonjhar district, I talk mostly about the Banspal, Harichandanpur, and Telkoi 
blocks, where the resistance was strongest. I also discuss the Joda block, where resis-
tance was not so common at all, as this is an old and established mining area. This is 
important to bear in mind in instances where Joda is discussed.
 7. By nonmodernist lines, I mean that one does not put a monetary value on 
nature and nature is understood in ways that are not solely anthropocentric. These 
are cases in which the mountain is a god, or holy, or the place of spiritual worship, 
or some kind of being, or otherwise beyond the scales of valuation in monetary or 
other modern terms, which do not give such supernatural, agentive, or place- specific 
uniqueness to mountains, for example. These holy and even agentive mountains can-
not be compensated by saving a piece of nature elsewhere, or by giving money. They 
are beyond and outside modernity’s project of rendering everything ontologically flat, 
so that it can be managed and governed, and calculated. Moore (2014) also talks about 
this “modern” thinking that flattens everything as something that was born in Enlight-
enment thinking and is behind the capitalist way of organizing things.
 8. Particularly if people with different experiences are mixed in rallies, including 
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villagers who have suffered from repression and others whose lands and lives have been 
ravaged by mining, “everybody learns from each other.”
 9. In India, district collectors, also called district magistrates, are the most senior 
officials responsible for administrating a district. They are appointed by the state gov-
ernment, and their duties generally include maintaining law and order, coordinat-
ing the police, supervising jails, being arbitrators of land acquisition, collecting land 
revenue, registering property documents, as well as other related duties as they arise. 
Thereafter, the collector of the district was the key powerholder to be blamed for the 
irregularities in these matters concerning the mining projects in question.
 10. Khandadhar is not just any place, a coordinator from the Bhubaneswar- based 
National Center for Advocacy Studies explained to me in February 2013. It is a “reli-
gious area” where “even the British did not dare to enter” in fear of an “emotional 
backlash.” It hosts one of India’s largest waterfalls, an important elephant corridor, and 
is an ecological hotspot with high biodiversity and extremely rare species such as the 
golden gecko.
 11. The Khandadhar region has many corporate takers. Among the corporations 
in court still disputing over rights to the lease are POSCO and KIOCL, the state- 
owned Kudremukh mining company whose mine was closed in Karnataka. KIOCL 
argues that the Odisha government gave overlapping extraction MOUs for the site, 
first to KIOCL and later to POSCO (CSE 2008).
 12. This NGO seemed to prefer more of a conciliatory stance than contention, 
noting, for example, that mine sites could be revegetated by returning the “overbur-
den” (layers of soil and rock covering a deposit) to the open pits after closures, giving 
examples of where this had been done. Their organization, among other entities, had 
found by analyzing transport registries that mines were “typically double legal size,” 
but they did not describe their work to me as having played a role in the closures. They 
explained that the illegal looting has been “going on for long, but not monitored well,” 
because forest officials shared the proceeds and thus have stayed quiet.
 13. http://odishanewsonline.blogspot.fi/2014/08/odisha-unrest-in-koira-region-




 15. See, for example, http://www.deccanherald.com/content/195087/from-
tourists-paradise-mining-mafias.html and http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-
news/goa-anti-mining-activist-battles-defamation-suit/article1-372997.aspx for their 
actions. See also http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=9069.
 16. To read the whole poem, please visit http://mandgoa.blogspot.in/2008/04/i-
love-pissurlem.html (accessed May 16, 2015).
 17. See, e.g., http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report-mining-ruined-goa-s-
water-says-activist-1596232 (accessed March 31, 2016).
 18. One reason for this has been that all parties have had to take into consideration 
minorities such as Muslims as key swing voters, as the rising number of caste- based 
parties has increased the competition for non- upper- caste support.
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Chapter 7
 1. Liberation theology was born in Latin America and has been a particularly 
impactful ideology and practice in inspiring and organizing the rural poor who are 
facing situations of oppression. Its preachers guide the members of rural communities 
to reflect on their economic and political oppression and understand their situation as 
being similar to how God liberated his people in the Exodus and elsewhere and could 
do the same for them (Kröger 2010, 103).
 2. http://www.justicanostrilhos.org/nota/849 (accessed May 16, 2016)
 3. The privatization of Vale in 1997 changed the playing field significantly. As 
a public company, Vale had to invest 8 percent of its profits in municipalities; this 
money was passed onward via Caixa, a Brazilian state bank, to municipalities that then 
decided what to do with the money. After privatization, the development fund became 
the Vale Foundation, which independently decides what it will finance. This moved a 
significant political game from state remediation to private politics. Such a change in 
the structure of available political alternatives has worked to push movements outside 
of state- based rights and into company- based private negotiations of interests, not 
backed by laws. According to Father Antonio, “there was also corruption in the previ-
ous scheme,” but now that the company decides, the problem is that it “listens very 
little to civil society.”
 4. It is worth noting, however, that these notes on CSE’s work apply only to their 
mining advocacy. I interviewed a few people working at their pulp and paper industry 
section and looked through their publications. The paper industry work of the CSE 
seemed to differ dramatically from their mining advocacy; it was characterized by close 
engagement in private politics with corporations, which were small mill companies 
with relatively small tree plantations in the global context.
 5. In India, La Via Campesina is not actively involved in mining politics, its sec-
retary told me in interviews. Other activists suggested that La Via Campesina India is 
not as radical or as tightly small- peasant based as the movement is in Brazil (gleaned 
from several interviews with Brazilian, Indian, and global La Via Campesina insiders 
since 2003).
 6. I talked to Jurutí mobilizers while conducting participant observation among 
the rainforest movements for six months around Santarém between 2005 and 2011. 
The Jurutí case is exemplary and should be studied in detail— it belongs to the cat-
egory of bauxite mine expansion, which appears to have been easier to resist than iron 
ore mining. However, based on my field research in the area in 2018, Alcoa is trying 
to expand to multiple- use conservation areas there, such as Lago Grande.
 7. These causalities became more obvious and clearer when I exposed the political 
ethnographic accounts to a crisp- set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, whereby the 
resistance strategies identified across all the cases were rendered as causal conditions, 
and the causal condition complexes formed by these were analyzed in relation to their 
causal outcomes. While the political ethnographic accounts presented here exposed 
the richness of different cases, the QCA analysis I performed systemized that data, 
enabling me to grasp the key lessons needed to draw conclusions and unite and sys-
tematically compare the lessons from the different political ethnographies.
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Conclusion
 1. Later, quite a few progressive state actors also became involved, due to massive 
mobilizations and state embedding by civil society, which made them see the dangers 
of wanton extractivist expansion or forced them to act to retain power. A wide range of 
civil society actors can resist extractivism: it was not necessary to have a popular social 
movement, created via grassroots mass mobilization, to counter project expansion. A 
professional NGO could do the same, provided it used all the other key strategies and 
abstained from private politics with companies. However, based on the data, such an 
outcome may also depend on the targets’ underestimation of the resistance potential.
 2. As these are large countries with major internal differences, there are also 
exceptions, such as the armed revolutionary/secessionary conflicts in India.
 3. http://ejatlas.org/ (accessed August 5, 2019)
 4. A more detailed and systematic study of conflicts and resistance in these areas 
that is based on the outline proposed herein should verify the extent of my findings.
 5. In fact, Nayak (2015) argues that the best known Indian mining conflict— 
Niamgiri’s bauxite project by Vedanta— was successfully resisted due to its affiliation 
with opposition parties. Some movements critical of iron ore extraction were also 
political parties, for example, CMM in Dalli Rajhara and the CPI- Maoist Naxalite 
resistance in Chhattisgarh and West Singhbhum. The key movement activists or the 
movements in Goa, Salem, Tiruvannamalai, Keonjhar, and Khandadhar were also 
strongly party affiliated.
 6. See, e.g., http://upsidedownworld.org/main/international-archives-
60/5409-extractivism-creates-a-society-without-subjects-raul-zibechi-on-latin-
american-social-movements, and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rdb3xdIzcCg 
(accessed March 30, 2016).
 7. These were the places where the welfare- state- based oil extraction model, and 
the modern mining industry, respectively, were created— where it was even possible to 
create such models, due to their first world position.
Appendix
 1. See http://conflitosambientaismg.lcc.ufmg.br/observatorio-de-conflitos-ambi-
entais/mapa-dos-conflitos-ambientais/ (accessed August 15, 2015).
 2. Carlos Bittencourt from IBASE argued during his interview with me in 2011 
(that is, before the massive tailings dam catastrophe) that the Alegria mine had the 
world’s largest tailings pond, whose water use is very badly supervised.
 3. http://www.mining-technology.com/features/featurethe-worlds-11-biggest-
iron-ore-mines-4180663/ (accessed August 15, 2015).
 4. For the grievances, see http://www.ifch.unicamp.br/profseva/SEVA_texto%20
analiticoR_MapeamentoGESTA_junho2011.pdf (accessed August 15, 2015).





BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
BSP Bhilai Steel Plant
CMM Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha (Chhattisgarh Liberation Front)
CPI Communist Party of India
CPI(M- L) Communist Party of India (Marxist- Leninist)
CPI- M Communist Party of India
CSD Campaign for Survival and Dignity
CSE Centre for Science and Environment
CSN Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (National Steel Company)
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FRA Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers Forest 
Rights Act 2006
IBASE Brazilian Institute for Social and Economic Analysis
ICMBio Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation
INCRA Brazil’s Land Reform Institute
JoR Justice on the Rails
KIOCL KIOCL Limited (Kudremukh Iron Ore Company Limited)
MAM Movimento dos Atingidos pelo Mineração (as of 2014 Movi-
mento Nacional pela Soberania Popular frente à Mineração) 
(Movement for Popular Sovereignty in Mining)
MLA Member of the Legislative Assembly
MMP Mines, Minerals and People
MMX MMX Mineração e Metálicos S.A. (Minerals and Metals 
Company)
MOU memorandum of understanding
MP Member of Parliament
MST Landless Workers’ Movement
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NGO nongovernmental organization
NMDC National Mineral Development Corporation
PESA Indian Extension to Scheduled Areas Act of 1996
POSCO POSCO Group (formerly Pohang Iron and Steel Company)
PPSS POSCO Pratirodh Sangram Samiti (Anti- POSCO People’s 
Movement)
PT Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party)
QCA Qualitative Comparative Analysis
SAIL Steel Authority of India Limited Company
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